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Hungary is one of those countries which, as a result of the 20th century border changes, have lost a significant proportion of their territory and population, and consequently, substantial Hungarian communities have lived in the neighbouring countries (in Romania: more than 1.2 million, in Slovakia: 450 000, in Serbia: 250 000, in the Ukraine: 150 000) for more than 90 years now. Hungary, as the mother country of this ethnic Hungarian population of approximately 2.1 million people, was offered a new opportunity of minority protection by joining the European Union in 2004. However, the ten years gone by since the EU accession of the Central European countries have made it clear that the EU membership itself does not guarantee the protection of minorities. Nonetheless, the publicity provided by the European Parliament (EP) enhances the efficient representation of the interests and concerns of ethnic Hungarian communities. Thus regarding the Hungarian government's kin-state policy, the most important concern of the EP elections, held in each member country of the European Union between 22-25 May 2014, was the number of ethnic Hungarian representatives gaining EP mandates for the next five-year period, and consequently, to what extent ethnic Hungarian interests would be represented in the parliamentary body of the EU.

In 2004, out of the four major ethnic Hungarian communities living outside the borders of Hungary, only Hungarians in Slovakia had the opportunity to send representatives into the European Parliament, but later, with the accession of Romania in 2007, Transylvanian Hungarians were also given the chance to be represented at the mid-term EP elections. In Slovakia, the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP) won 92 927 votes with a participation rate of 16.96%, which meant 13.24% of the votes, earning two out of the fourteen mandates of Slovakia. In Romania, around 18 million voters were entitled to cast their votes in 2007, and their participation turned out to be a few decimals lower than 30% (29.46%). The threshold required for obtaining a mandate was 5% for parties, while László Tőkés[1], running as an independent candidate, needed to reach

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[1] László Tőkés has been an iconic leader for Transylvanian Hungarians. He played a significant role in the 1989 revolution in Timisoara, and as a protestant pastor his activities have contributed to the strengthening of the Hungarian community in Romania.

2.85% in order assure his seat in the EP. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR-RMDSZ), the most popular ethnic Hungarian party in Romania, received 282 929 votes (5.52%), while László Tőkés got 176 533 votes (3.44%). By breaking down the results by counties, the analysis revealed that Tőkés and the DAHR fought a fierce battle in the Seklerland (Székelyföld – consisting of Harghita and Covasna, and parts of Mures counties) inhabited mostly by Hungarians. In Covasna county, it was the independent candidate that prevailed by far, with about 12 000 more votes than the DAHR. In Harghita county, the competition was much more balanced, for there the DAHR received 43.8% of the votes while Tőkés won 43.1%. In Mureş county, the DAHR won with a self-confident 33.4% of the votes, while only 12.1% of the voters opted for Tőkés.

In the 2004-2009 period, Slovakian Hungarians were represented by two SMK-MKP politicians, Edit Bauer and Árpád Duka-Zólyomi, whereas the Transylvanian community was represented by László Tőkés as well as DAHR politicians Gyula Winker and Csaba Sógor. Besides that, there was one more Transylvanian Hungarian member of the political body: Magor Csibi from Miercurea Ciuc (Csíkszereda) obtained a mandate on the list of the National Liberal Party. Since then, he has retired from political activism, and currently he is the president of WWF Romania.

In the 2009-2014 period, ethnic Hungarians had once again five representatives in the EP. In 2009, the SMK-MKP in Slovakia was able to repeat its 2004 result, and obtained two out of the thirteen mandates. With a national participation rate of 19.64% the Hungarian party got 93 750 votes. With an 11.33% support, Edit Bauer and Alajos Mészáros got into the Parliament on behalf of the SMK-MKP. In Transylvania, the Hungarian Co-operation List was put together as a result of a compromise between the DAHR and the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (EMNT),[2] which obtained 8.92% of the votes at the elections. However, legally speaking, this list was that of the DAHR; launching a joint list was out of the question because the EMNT is not a political party but an association. EMNT-head László Tőkés got into the EP as the leader of the Hungarian Co-operation List, and Gyula Winkler and Csaba Sógor, candidates of DAHR, could keep their mandates as well.

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[2] The Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (Erdélyi Magyar Nemzeti Tanács), led by László Tőkés, emerged as a civil organization promoting the issue of autonomy for Transylvanian Hungarians. The Council is very critical of the DAHR, the ethnic Hungarian party. In 2010, the Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania was established as a political party on the basis of the Council, however, the Council did not suspend its activity as a civil organization.

In the course of the past ten years, ethnic Hungarian representatives worked in close co-operation with the MEPs of the Fidesz-KDNP, the centre-right conservative party coalition of Hungary, since they were sitting shoulder to shoulder in the rows of the same European party family, the European People's Party (EPP) in the EP. This co-operation is likely to be further reinforced in the next five-year period, because for the 2014-2019 period it became possible for the Hungarian communities of the currently non-EU members Subcarpathia[3] (Ukraine) and Vojvodina (Serbia), the two other principal "transborder" Hungarian regions besides Southern Slovakia and Transylvania, to be represented in the European Parliament. The Fidesz-KDNP party coalition announced in April 2014 that it would set up a "national" list for the European parliamentary elections on which Hungarian communities living outside Hungary could take "winning" positions. Based on the results of the Hungarian national parliamentary elections of April 2014, the governing parties had a good chance of getting 10-12 places out of the 21 EP mandates assigned to Hungary. Transylvania was represented by László Tőkés, placed third on the list. The seventh place of the list was occupied by György Schöpflin, who had lived in the United Kingdom from 1950 till 2004 and who has been an active MEP of Fidesz since 2004, representing Hungarians living in the Western parts of the world. György Schöpflin's activities in the EP are connected to the domain of minority protection, since he has outstanding academic achievements in political theory, nationalism, national identity and the social network of ethnic minorities. The ninth place on the Fidesz' EP list was occupied by Andrea Bocskor, professor of Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute and the director of the Tivadar Lehoczky Institute (a local research institute for social sciences in Subcarpathia), while the tenth place was given to Andor Deli, the vice-president of the government of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and Secretary for education, public administration and national communities of the province. The symbolic twenty-first place of the Fidesz-KDNP list was assigned to László Gubík, president of the Via Nova Youth Group, the youth organization of the SMK-MKP in Slovakia. As László Gubík, who was the first to openly announce his acquisition of Hungarian citizenship in Slovakia, and

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[3] Subcarpathia is the Hungarian name of the westernmost region of Ukraine, where the Hungarian population of Ukraine lives. The region is more often referred to as Transcarpathia, as it expresses the „majority point of view", that is, that of Kiev. However, since the paper applies a Hungarian perspective for its analysis, the authors prefer to use the term Subcarpathia, because it is more widespread in the Hungarian language.

who was, as a consequence, deprived of his Slovakian citizenship, said himself, "a symbolic Hungarian from Slovakia was nominated for a symbolic position".[4] The Fidesz-KDNP list received about 1.2 million votes with a participation rate of 28.97%, thus the 51.48% support brought 12 mandates for the party.

The EP elections of May 2014 implied several questions for the future of the European parliamentary representation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. In 2009, with the secession of some representatives of the SMK-MKP and the foundation of the Slovak-Hungarian mixed party named Most-Híd by them, the earlier unity, existing since 1998, cracked. The Most-Híd, leaving behind ethnicity-based party politics, achieved better results at the elections both in 2010 and 2012 than the SMK-MKP, which continued to define itself as an ethnic party. (The party changed its name to Party of the Hungarian Community in September 2012, as its earlier name, Party of the Hungarian Coalition, became pointless after the appearance of another (partly) Hungarian party.). Therefore, it was extremely important for the SMK-MKP, not having reached the five-percent parliamentary threshold at the two last national elections, to keep its representation in Brussels at the EP elections. However, while at the 2004 and 2009 European elections the SMK-MKP was the only one competing for the votes of Hungarians, in 2014 it had to face several rivals. Its list was headed by Pál Csáky, the former president of the SMK-MKP, who was deputy prime minister of Slovakia responsible for human rights and minorities from 1998 till 2006. He was followed on the list by Iván Farkas, the vice-president of the party in charge of economic and regional development, while the third place was taken by Ákos Horony, lawyer of the Legal Aid Service managed by the party. The Hungarian Christian Democratic Alliance (MKDSZ), a new organization with marginal support nominated candidates of Hungarian ethnicity exclusively. In the Hungarian-populated areas of Slovakia, the Most-Híd was clearly the greatest rival of the SMK-MKP: the first three candidates on the list of the Slovak-Hungarian mixed party were Zsolt Simon, József Nagy and František Šebej. There was a Hungarian candidate on the list of Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) as well: the fifth place on the list of the liberal party, winning one mandate in the end, was taken by Kálmán Petőcz, president of the Slovakian Helsinki Commission. Petőcz previously said that he would be running as a Hungarian politician, but neither on

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[4] Gubík László a Fidesz EP-listáján ("László Gubik on the Fidesz EP list"). *Itthon, ma.* 16 April 2014. http://itthon.ma/karpatmedence.php?cikk_id=3980; Downloaded 10 June 2014.

the list of the Most-Híd nor on that of the SMK-MKP because those are members of the conservative party group while he is a liberal both with respect to his political past and his convictions.

The European elections took place with an extremely low, mere 13.05% participation rate in Slovakia, by which the country – breaking its former negative record of 2004 – produced the poorest EP elections participation result of all times. The elections saw the competition of altogether 29 parties for the 13 mandates assigned to the country, and in the end, 8 of them managed to send representatives to Brussels. Although the highest number of votes was gained by the social democrat Smer led by Prime Minister Robert Fico, it came as a surprise that the ruling party acquired only 24.09% of the votes, so it could delegate four representatives to the EP, one less than in 2009. With that result, the Smer had to face a second election defeat within a short period of time after the presidential election in March 2014, which resulted in the failure of Robert Fico. As a result of this poor performance, right-wing and liberal parties of the opposition could consider themselves as the true winners of the elections by obtaining altogether nine mandates. It should be added, however, that these nine places are shared by seven parties, which makes it obvious that the scope of the Slovakian opposition parties is still very fragmented. Two mandates were gained by the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and the Slovakian Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS) each, who managed to collect 13.21 and 7.75% of the votes, respectively. One mandate was obtained by the Ordinary People Association, the Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) and the New Majority (Nova) each, the latter running jointly with the Conservative Democrats (KDS) and the Civil Democrats (OKS). The Party of the Hungarian Community (SMK-MKP) and the Most-Híd obtained one-one mandate as well. The SMK-MKP got 36 629 votes (6.53%), while the Híd got 32 708 (5.83%) (see Table 1). The two extremist parties performed poorly: the Slovak National Party (SNS) lost its representation in Brussels, and the People's Party – Our Slovakia, headed by Marián Kotleba and having triumphed at the regional elections in November 2013, could not get any mandates, either.

For Hungarians, the essential question of the elections was whether they would be able to maintain their earlier level of representation in Brussels. Following the schism of the party in the summer of 2009, the SMK-MKP failed to surpass the 5% parliamentary threshold at both of the two subsequent parliamentary elections (2010, 2012). At the same time, the SMK-MKP performed better at the 2010 local elections and the 2013 regional elections than its principal rival, Most-Híd. A little after the regional elections of November 2013 the SMK-MKP announced

Gyula Bárdos as its candidate for the presidential election (to take place in March 2014). It was a landmark decision, as it was the first time that there was a Hungarian candidate at the Slovakian presidential election. The more than five-percent result achieved by the SMK-MKP indicated that the party was able to become stronger, which was in line with the opinion polls. Thus, within a time little more than half a year, five elections were held in Slovakia, including the double-ballot regional elections and the likewise double-ballot presidential election, which might partly account for the low turnout at the EP elections. On the other hand, the intense electoral period provided an excellent opportunity for the SMK-MKP to keep its voters mobilized in the framework of a basically continuous campaign from autumn 2013.

Table 1. *Results of the parties having acquired a European parliamentary mandate in Slovakia*

Name of party	Number of votes	Proportion of votes (%)	Number of mandates	Group of MEPs
Smer-SD	135 089	24,09	4	S&D*
Christian Democratic Movement	74 108	13,21	2	EPP**
Slovakian Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party	43 467	7,75	2	EPP
Ordinary People	41 829	7,46	1	ECR***
Nova, Civil Conservative Party, Conservative Democrats of Slovakia	38 316	6,83	1	ECR
Freedom and Solidarity	37 376	6,66	1	ALDE****
Party of the Hungarian Community	36 629	6,53	1	EPP
Most-Híd	32 708	5,83	1	EPP

    * Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
   ** European People's Party
 *** European Conservatives and Reformers
**** Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

With the extremely low national participation rate, two Hungarian representatives could be delegated to Brussels, which, principally, was also due to the fact that – contrary to the previous elections, – this time voter participation in Southern Slovakia did not fall behind the national rate. In fact, the district participation rate surpassed the national average in Bratislava (Pozsony), Košice (Kassa), and in half of the 16 districts partly inhabited by Hungarians. The Most-Híd could overtake the SMK-MKP in only the two biggest cities and in the

district of Dunajská Streda (Dunaszerdahely) and Rožňava (Rozsnyó), by 700 and 19 votes, respectively. The two parties finished neck and neck in Nitra (Nyitra) district (with a sporadic Hungarian population), where the SMK-MKP collected only four votes more than the rivalling party. In sum, the SMK-MKP headed by József Berényi was able to mobilize more people in 14 districts: it received twice as many votes as the Most-Híd in the districts surrounding Košice, that of Trebišov (Tőketerebes), Revúca (Nagyrőce) and Levice (Léva). In the district of Veľký Krtíš (Nagykürtös), the advantage of SMK-MKP was threefold. SMK-MKP got 400 votes more in the district of Rimavská Sobota (Rimaszombat), 600 more in the district of Galanta (Galánta), 2000 more in the district of Komárno (Komárom), and 2300 more in the district of Nové Zámky (Érsekújvár) (see Table 2) than Most-Híd. As a Slovak-Hungarian mixed party, the Most-Híd could count on Slovakian ballots – most likely, it would not have gained the EP mandate without them. The fact that the party obtained a mandate was the matter of less than 5000 votes. In the 54 districts located north of the southern districts inhabited by Hungarians, the Most-Híd got 3835 votes, while the ethnic Hungarian SMK-MKP got only 343 votes. The results in Bratislava proved to be crucial for the mixed party regarding the final outcome: the Most-Híd collected nearly five times as many votes in the capital as the SMK-MKP.

At the recent elections in Slovakia, voters increasingly took advantage of the opportunity to cast so-called preference votes for candidates on the party lists, thus changing the order of candidates on the list. The weight of preference votes became even greater at the last elections: neither of the persons heading the list of the Ordinary People, Nova, SaS and Most-Híd could keep their winning position. Zsolt Simon, heading the list of Most-Híd got about 12 511 preferential votes, while József Nagy, ranked second, won nearly 15 000. The difference in support between the two candidates was the greatest in the district of Dunajská Streda: József Nagy, inhabitant of this town, got 2 600 more votes than Zsolt Simon, so we can declare that their rivalry was decided in the district of Žitný ostrov (Csallóköz). József Nagy performed better in the Western Slovakian districts than Zsolt Simon; the latter proved to be more popular in Central and Eastern Slovakia. József Nagy's convincing result in the Western districts can be explained with the fact that he became well-known in the region during the regional elections of November 2013 as the prefect candidate of Trnava (Nagyszombat) county. There was no change in the SMK-MKP list: Pál Csáky's 19 400 preferential votes indicate that every second voter of the SMK-MKP confirmed his first position. The second person on the list, Iván Farkas got 7 000 less preference votes.

Table 2. *Election results of the SMK-MKP and the Most-Híd in the southern districts*

District	Participation rate (%)	SMK-MKP Number of votes	SMK-MKP Proportion of votes (%)	Most-Híd Number of Votes	Most-Híd Proportion of votes (%)
Bratislava districts (Pozsony)	19.62	751	1.03	3 373	4.89
Senec district (Szenc)	15.87	948	10.43	757	8.33
Dunajská Streda districts (Dunaszerdahely)	15.03	5 597	38.74	6 297	43.59
Galanta district (Galánta)	12.14	2 539	27.19	1 919	20.55
Komárno district (Komárom)	13.22	5 216	46.62	3 155	28.20
Levice district (Léva)	12.99	2 851	23.59	1 468	12.15
Nitra district (Nyitra)	12.14	629	3.88	625	3.85
Nové Zámky district (Érsekújvár)	13.56	5 177	32.58	2 885	18.16
Šaľa district (Vágsellye)	11.23	1 229	25.54	819	17.02
(Losonc)	11.71	1 194	18.02	810	12.22
Revúca district (Nagyrőce)	12.13	706	19.28	347	9.47
Rimavská Sobota district (Rimaszombat)	14.21	2 065	23.37	1 660	18.79
Veľký Krtíš district (Nagykürtös)	13.50	1 330	27.87	486	10.18
Košice districts (Kassa)	13.09	772	2.89	994	3.68
Košice neighbourhood district	11.35	1 445	14.36	705	7.01
Michalovce district (Nagymihály)	10.61	990	11.06	630	7.04
Rožňava district (Rozsnyó)	11.53	1 025	18.96	1 044	19.31
Trebišov district (Tőketerebes)	11.01	1 822	20.69	899	10.20

The relations of the SMK-MKP and the Most-Híd have not been undisturbed since the party schism of 2009, which means that despite the approval of the document entitled "The fundamental conditions of the survival and development of Slovakian Hungarians" (the so-called "Minority Minimum[5]), created jointly in co-operation with the Roundtable of Hungarians in Slovakia (an association of Slovakian Hungarian civil organisations), there is virtually no co-operation between the two parties. It remains an open-ended issue how the two Hungarian representatives from Slovakia will co-operate in the European Parliament – in fact, both of them will be sitting in the faction of the European People's Party (EPP). Pál Csáky was deputy prime minister responsible for human rights and minorities for eight years, and his work has had various connections with the activities of the Hungarian MEPs from the Carpathian Basin, who have fought for the recognition of national (autochthonous) minorities over the past decade. Csáky has made it clear: it is not Slovakia's national interests, but those of the Hungarian community that he wishes to stand for in Brussels, thus he would like to call attention to the unfair practices of Slovakia regarding the issues of citizenship and language use, among others. József Nagy has a reputation as a politician specialized in environmental protection. Thus he highlighted environmental protection in his EP campaign, but besides he also intends to work on the protection of ethnic minorities; his goal is to promote the creation of a European regulation for the protection of autochthonous minorities.

In contrast to Hungarians in Slovakia, there was no competition at the European Parliamentary elections in Transylvania: ethnic Hungarians appeared only on the list of the DAHR. With László Tőkés's decision to run on the Fidesz list it was clear that the Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania would not register its own election list. As for the third Hungarian political organization, the Hungarian Civic Party (MPP), it supported the list of the DAHR in accordance with its agreement with the party, and the first two places of the list were taken by the former MEPs of the party, Gyula Winkler and Csaba Sógor.

In Romania, voters elected representatives for 32 parliamentary seats at the European parliamentary elections. The elections brought the overwhelming victory of the ruling left-wing alliance; the party

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[5] A szlovákiai magyarok megmaradásának és fejlődésének alapfeltételei (The fundamental conditions of the survival and development of Slovakian Hungarians). *Sribd.com*, 25 September 2012. http://www.scribd.com/doc/106793067/A-szlovakiai-magyarok-megmaradasanak-es-fejl%C5%91desenek-alapfeltetelei-Alairt-valtozat; Downloaded 10 June 2014.

leadership of the National Liberals resigned as a result of the disappointing outcome, while right-wing parties deteriorated each other's camps.

More than 18 million voters were eligible to vote, and nearly 6 million of them cast the ballot; the participation rate was 32.44%. This was a five-percent increase compared to the 27.67% participation rate of 2009, which coincided with prior expectations. The reason for the increase of participation was that Romanian parties interpreted the EP elections as a precursor for the autumn presidential elections, so they mobilized their voters. The parties on the right wanted to clarify the balance of power, while the left-wing party alliance wished to make its advantage undisputed against its would-be rivals.

The elections were won convincingly by the electoral alliance composed of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the National Union for the Progress of Romania (UNPR) and the Conservative Party (PC). The alliance received 2 093 234 votes (37.60%), which brought the party 16 European parliamentary mandates, i.e. half of the seats allocated to Romania. These MEPs will be sitting in the faction of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D). Although the left-wing block hallmarked by the name of Prime Minister Victor Ponta triumphed at the elections, it failed to achieve the prior objective of performing above 40%.

The second place was obtained by the National Liberal Party (PNL), having recently quit the government, with 835 531 votes, which was 15% of the eligible votes, and was worth six European parliamentary mandates. The result is a major defeat for the party, which expected a performance above 20%, thus party president Crin Antonescu, deputy president Klaus Johannis and all the vice-presidents resigned from their posts the day after the elections. Before his resignation, the party president made the leadership approve that, in contrast to the previous practice, the MEPs of the PNL would be sitting in the faction of the European People's Party (EPP), and not in that of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). This decision had been circulated in the Romanian press for some time, but Antonescu consistently denied it, what is more, he assured Belgian politician Guy Verhofstadt of his firm support for his election as president of the European Commission. From the perspective of PNL, working within a bigger and more influential faction can have some obvious advantages, especially since, with the weakening of the PDL, they can become the strongest Romanian member party of the EPP. In the long term, the PNL would like to be the most significant actor of the Romanian political right, and being a member of the European People's Party can also help the party to achieve its goal.

The third place went to the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), which collected 680 853 votes (12.23%), and thus obtained five mandates. The performance of the PDL – even though it was the weakest result of the past decade – can be interpreted as a success because it constitutes a similar size political base as that of the PNL, and a much greater one than that of the People's Movement Party backed by president Traian Basescu, so the PDL will be a substantial force among right-wing parties in the future. PDL's representatives will also be fortifying the faction of the People's Party.

Actor Mircea Diaconu, independent candidate came in fourth with 379 582 votes, which is 6.81% of the votes. Originally, Diaconu was candidate of the PNL list, but due to a conflict of interests – he was both an MP in Romania and the director of a theatre in Bucharest – the party took him off its list. The well-known and popular Diaconu, whom many considered to be the victim of the system, basically earned votes enough for two mandates, and as a result of that, he left a lot of fractional votes behind, which affected the number of mandates obtained by the other parties as well.

Having won 350 689 votes, 6.29% of the votes, the DAHR finished fifth, and the Alliance obtained two mandates in the European Parliament. These Hungarian representatives will join the rows of the European People's Party. Although there was hope for getting a third DAHR mandate for some time due to the high number of fractional votes because of Mircea Draconu's outstanding performance, in the end, only the two MEPs of the Alliance currently in office, Gyula Winkler and Csaba Sógor can continue their work in Brussels. The magnitude of the 350 000 votes falls far behind the 431 000 votes collected in 2009 by the DAHR. The Hungarian voters were not as efficiently mobilized as in 2009, though their proportion still somewhat exceeded the proportion of those voting for the Romanian parties.

While Romanian voters were mobilized by the competition between the major Romanian parties, focused on the presidential elections, Hungarian voters were not motivated to participate. The low Hungarian participation rate could be mainly explained by the general disillusionment with the European Union and to its indifference regarding minority policy, as well as the failed realization of hopes for a fast increase in the standards of living after the accession. In accordance with the agreement between the DAHR and the Hungarian Civic Party (MPP), the latter supported the Alliance at the elections despite the fact that in the end, they did not nominate anyone on the list, as they could have run only for an obviously hopeless position. The Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania (EMNP)

did not draw up a list at the elections. Instead, they recommended to László Tőkés that he accept the Fidesz-KDNP's offer, and run for an EP seat in Hungary. The lack of a broader co-operation can be explained with the election results of 2012: at those elections, the EMNP was unable to provide such a voter support that would have given them a strong bargaining position. The DAHR had no interests in legitimizing the People's Party; rather it strived to make an agreement with the MPP so that it could not be accused of unwillingness to cooperate. Moreover, winning the support of the voters of the MPP was equally important in certain electoral districts for DAHR. The agreement was facilitated by the fact that for the moment, the MPP can increase the number of its voters to the detriment of the EMNP, so it is currently its interest to co-operate with the DAHR. The DAHR can also win from this bargain, because it cannot win over the voters of the MPP and the EMNP in the short run, so it is more advantageous if these votes are collected by an MPP willing to join the DAHR in certain situations than losing these votes altogether. Although the EMNP did not take part in the campaign formally, it organized an autonomy campaign in Transylvania in this period, and several of its politicians declared that there was no reason to participate in the elections, as the European representation of Hungarians in Transylvania was already guaranteed by László Tőkés' taken-for-granted mandate. The strategy of the EMNP was reasonable: due to the election results and the DAHR-MPP agreement, the party had no scope for action. With the potential elimination of the DAHR, the European Parliament would have become a forum where only the representative of the EMNP is present; moreover, a potential DAHR result below five percent would have weakened the party's position in Transylvania as well.

The decrease of the number of the votes cast for the DAHR (see Table 3) is noticeable in each Transylvanian county, but it is exceedingly high in Maramureş (Máramaros), and it is bigger than the average in Mureş (Maros), Covasna (Kovászna), Bihor (Bihar) counties. The smallest drop can be observed in Satu Mare, but in this county interim parliamentary elections were also held, where Szabolcs Nagy, the candidate of the DAHR also ran, which can explain the higher participation rate. The drop was much lower than the average in Cluj (Kolozs), Braşov (Brassó) and Caraş-Severin (Krassó-Szörény) counties.

Similarly to the DAHR's result, two mandates were obtained by the People's Movement Party (PMP), backed by president Traian Basescu and hallmarked by Elena Udrea, which party collected 345 973 votes (6.21%) at the EP elections. This performance is

rather disappointing since the party expected a support above 10%. The PMP was unable to position itself as an equal partner against the PDL, so the preparation for the presidential election might be founded mostly on a PNL-PDL co-operation. The five-percent parliamentary threshold proved too high for Dan Diaconescu People's Party (PP-DD), which got into the Parliament in 2012, but collected only 3.67% of the votes in 2014; for the extremist Greater Romania Party (PRM), which got into the EP in 2009, but received 2.7% in 2014; as well as for the Civic Force (FC) headed by ex-Prime Minister Mihai Razvan Ungureanu, performing 2.6%.

Table 3. *Votes cast for the DAHR in 2009 and 2014 by counties*

Transylvanian counties	2009	2014	decrease (%)
Harghita (Hargita)	97164	80708	16.94
Mureş (Maros)	74516	57082	23.40
Covasna (Kovászna)	53315	39700	25.54
Satu Mare (Szatmár)	37516	35754	4.70
Bihor (Bihar)	44948	35209	21.67
Cluj (Kolozs)	33525	29193	12.93
Sălaj (Szilágy)	22116	18173	17.83
Braşov (Brassó)	12062	10527	12.73
Arad (Arad)	10003	8296	17.07
Maramureş (Máramaros)	9650	6371	33.98
Timiş (Temes)	7520	6137	18.35
Hunedoara (Hunyad)	5830	4961	14.91
Bistriţa-Năsăud (Beszterce-Naszód)	5186	4277	17.53
Alba (Fehér)	4680	3664	21.71
Sibiu (Szeben)	2524	2150	14.82
Caraş-Severin (Krassó-Szörény)	853	755	11.49

As a result of the work of the Hungarian representatives from the Carpathian Basin, minority issues and the most important problems of ethnic Hungarian communities have been constantly on the agenda of the European Parliament and its committees for the past ten years. Significant work has been done by the Intergroup for Traditional Minorities, National Communities and Languages of the European Parliament, whose fundamental objective is to represent the interests of autochthonous ethnic minorities and constitutional regions in European politics, by shading light on the grievances of these communities and by promoting support for them.

Thanks to the Subcarpathian and Vojvodinian representatives having received a mandate on the list of the Fidesz-KDNP, and also to the results of the SMK-MKP and the DAHR, we can affirm that the representation of Hungarian communities of the Carpathian Basin will be fortified in the EP in the five-year term beginning after the elections of 2014. The role of the European Parliament is increasingly important not only in the European decision-making system, but also with respect to the European public. The next period may be favourable from the perspective of the settlement of the problems of national minorities, as more and more legal documents are adopted by the European institutions that can be used as points of reference for minority protection in the future. Moreover, the EP representation of Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary is also significant because this is what can reinforce the legitimation of paying more attention to the issue of national minorities on the European level.

Zoltán Kántor

Hungary's Kin-State Politics, 2010–2014

There are several countries in which the borders of the state and those of the nation do not coincide. The treatment of this situation constitutes a political task for countries and governments which offer very different solutions to this problem. The model of taking responsibility for people belonging to the same nation but living abroad was established in Western Europe in the period after the Second World War. In the Central European region the supporting of compatriots living abroad – either in neighboring countries (traditional national minorities/communities) or in any other parts of the world (diaspora) – became a norm after the change of regime. Today it is considered natural that the kin-state provides some kind of assistance to its compatriots living beyond its borders.

The principle of supporting people belonging to the same nation but living in different (neighboring or not neighboring) countries is often included in constitutions. With some rare exceptions, the constitutions of the majority of states located in the region contain the so-called responsibility-clause. In the period after the regime change, Central and Eastern European Countries supported their compatriots living abroad politically, by means of declarations and programs. States have gradually established those mechanisms and institutions which operate aid policy. Nevertheless, there is no coherent model concerning this field; countries are using different solutions, have different objectives and established different institutions. The relations with nation parts (communities) living abroad depend on the financial possibilities and political priorities of the kin-state as well as the situation of people living abroad. As a basic rule, we differentiate between the supporting of people living in neighboring countries and of those living in the diaspora.

The Venice Commission, the High Commissioner on Minorities of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe – partly as a result of the impact of Hungarian initiatives – consider kin-states' bearing responsibility for compatriots abroad and its practical consequences accepted. Within Europe Hungary has the most complex and most active policy for its communities abroad. This is reflected in its legislation, the institutionalized forums of Hungarian-Hungarian relations, the high-level (ministerial and state secretariat) governmental presence of the policy for Hungarian communities abroad and the aid

policy as well (in particular in targeted programs). This is – first of all – due to the fact that there are large Hungarian communities living in neighboring countries (they are politically active communities, defining themselves in national terminology and having endeavors for autonomy), secondly, it is a result of the fact that the government formed after 2010 treats the policy for Hungarian communities abroad as a priority.

The level of principle

The policy for Hungarian communities abroad is Hungary's policy towards Hungarians living in neighboring countries and other countries of the world, which is aimed at strengthening the relations of the kin-state with Hungarian individuals and communities living abroad in order to achieve the prosperity of the unified Hungarian nation. Its objective is to preserve the identity of Hungarian communities living abroad, and to pass it on to future generations. The policy for Hungarian communities abroad means nation-building, society-building and institutionalization.

It is an evident aim for Hungary that, as the kin-state, it has to support the enhancement of ties between the parts of the nation, the unity of Hungarians living in the kin-state and those living abroad and their responsibility for each other. The Act on the Testimony for National Cohesion (2010) states that "*Every member and community of the Hungarian nation thrown under the jurisdiction of different states is part of the unified Hungarian nation, the beyond borders unity of which is reality, and is also an important element of Hungarians' personal and community identity.*"[1]

Actions connected with the policy for Hungarian communities abroad are included in the document entitled *Policy for Hungarian Communities Abroad – Strategic framework for Hungarian communities abroad* (2011).[2] The document systematizes Hungary's policy for its nation parts abroad, summarizing the strategic aims, leading directives and fields of action both for Hungary's politics and public administration and for Hungarian communities abroad. The *Strategic framework for Hungarian communities abroad* affects every field of Hungarian politics and public administration, therefore, due

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[1] http://www.vajma.info/docs/Nemzeti-osszetartozas-torveny.pdf

[2] Hungarian Communities Abroad - Strategic framework for Hungarian communities abroad. State Secretariat for Hungarian Communities Abroad. http://www.nemzetiregiszter.hu/download/9/a2/00000/Magyar%20nemzetpolitika%20A4.pdf (see excerpts in English: https://www.nemzetiregiszter.hu/download/b/12/10000/policy_2013.pdf)

to its horizontal nature, every actor at the levels of decision making- and execution has to take it into account.

From the point of view of the reproduction of Hungarians living abroad, the strategy for Hungarian communities abroad considers autonomy the most important objective. This objective is based on the conviction that the long-lasting permanence and prosperity of Hungarians can only be achieved by means of autonomy. Consequently, the short-term aim of the policy for Hungarian communities abroad is society-building. Therefore, *institutionalization* is a key concept of the strategy for Hungarians abroad. National reproduction can be realized if the policy for Hungarian communities abroad focuses on areas in which the dense and high-quality network of institutions provides an opportunity for Hungarians to be in contact with the Hungarian language, culture and community throughout their whole life. The aim of the strategic framework is to achieve the numerical growth of Hungarian communities (the number of community members grows, the community is not assimilated, it is characterized by a positive population growth and a good quality of life), their intellectual growth (the identity of community members is strong, they regard community norms as their owns, they have a competitive knowledge, preserve and develop the cultural treasures of the community), economic and legal growth (in the latter case the members of the community are confident in exercising, protecting and – if necessary – expanding their rights.)

The level of legislation

Most European states grant citizenship for their compatriots living abroad by means of a simplified naturalization procedure, and – as a basic rule – provide them an opportunity to participate in the kin-state's elections. Almost every state supports its compatriots living abroad by means of laws similar to status law and different aids connected with it.[3]

Even after the adoption of the amendment to the Hungarian Constitution in 1989, the Basic Law of Hungary stated that "*The Republic of Hungary feels responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living beyond its borders, and shall promote the fostering of their links*

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[3] See: European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), 'Report on the Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by their Kin-State,' adopted by the Venice Commission at its 48th Plenary Meeting, (Venice, 19–20 October 2001).

with Hungary".[4] This statement opened a new chapter in the relations between the kin-state and Hungarians living beyond its borders. This responsibility is defined in the Basic Law of Hungary in the following way: *"Bearing in mind that there is one single Hungarian nation that belongs together, Hungary shall bear responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living beyond its borders, shall facilitate the survival and development of their communities, shall support their efforts to preserve their Hungarian identity, the effective use of their individual and collective rights, the establishment of their community self-governments, and their prosperity in their native lands, and shall promote their cooperation with each other and with Hungary"*[5]

The Act on Hungarian Citizenship and its amendment adopted in 2010, the status law (2001) and its amendment (2010), the extension of the right to vote to Hungarian citizens living abroad (2012) strengthened the ties between Hungary and Hungarians living beyond its borders – either in neighboring countries or in the diaspora – and transformed the cultural ties which had existed before into a relation under public law.

On 26 May 2010 the National Assembly of Hungary adopted the Amendment to the Act on Hungarian Citizenship and on 1 January 2011 the application of the act – the simplified naturalization procedure – began. The amendment states that one can acquire Hungarian citizenship without permanent residence status in Hungary and taking a citizenship test; it is enough to have a command of the Hungarian language and to have one ancestor who was a Hungarian citizen. The amendment of the Act on Citizenship is based on the conception that although Hungarians living abroad are the citizens of other countries, they belong to the same – Hungarian – nation, regardless of which state they live in. This concept is in line with that of Hungarians living in neighboring countries or in the diaspora.

The level of decision-making bodies

Decisions in the field of policy for Hungarian communities abroad are made by Hungarian National Assembly and Hungarian–Hungarian forums. Earlier, the issues concerning Hungarians abroad were discussed by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian

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[4] http://www-archiv.parlament.hu/fotitkar/archiv/a_magyar_koztarsasag_alkotmanya.pdf

[5] http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20-Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf

National Assembly (between 2006 and 2010 its name was Committee on Foreign Affairs and Hungarian communities abroad). On 1 January 2010 the *Committee on National Cohesion*[6] was established which focuses specifically on the issues of Hungarians abroad. The establishment of the Committee on National Cohesion is an integral part of Hungary's strategy for Hungarian communities abroad. The establishment of the committee has a symbolic significance, as since the period of the regime change the Hungarian Parliament has not had any independent committee specified exclusively on the questions of Hungarians abroad. Within the framework of the Committee on National Cohesion a subcommittee named Autonomy Subcommittee was formed which deals with transborder Hungarians' aspirations for autonomy. Besides, the Foreign Affairs Committee continues to operate and the current issues of foreign policy are regularly on its agenda, including issues concerning Hungarian communities abroad. Other questions regarding Hungarians living beyond borders – like constitutional, budgetary, educational and ecclesiastical issues – are also discussed by other parliamentary committees.

Close relations with Hungarians living abroad, the establishment of dialogue with them and the presentation of their standpoints in the Hungarian Government's decision-making procedure are important elements of the government's policy for Hungarian communities abroad. The Hungarian Standing Conference (Magyar Állandó Értekezlet – MÁÉRT) is the most important Hungarian-Hungarian political forum which – after a six-year break – started its operation again on 5 November 2010. The MÁÉRT as an institutionalized forum of dialogue between legitimate Hungarian organizations representing national interests plays an important role in joint thinking and decision-making on issues concerning the Hungarian nation. The MÁÉRT has at least one session every year, and its midyear work is assisted by different specialized committees. The MÁÉRT consists of representatives of the Hungarian Government, Hungarian parliamentary parties, Hungarian organizations operating outside Hungary with parliamentary or provincial representation and the representatives of the Western Hungarian diaspora. Currently, the Hungarian Standing Conference has 4 working committees: Committee on Foreign and Legal Affairs, Committee on Education and Culture, Committee on Economy and Local Government and Diaspora Committee.

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[6] The Committee on National Cohesion maintains relations with Hungarian political and social organizations abroad, monitors the events of Hungarians living abroad and the work of institutions connected with the policy for Hungarian communities abroad. Since its establishment, it has had several extramural sessions at different venues within the Carpathian Basin.

The Hungarian Diaspora Council is a forum of Hungarian organizations from all over the world focusing on the special needs and interests of Hungarians living in diaspora, and creating an independent representative body for the global Hungarian diaspora. The Hungarian Diaspora Council works in close cooperation with the Hungarian Standing Conference.

The Forum of the Hungarian Representatives of the Carpathian Basin (Kárpát-medencei Magyar Képviselők Fóruma – KMKF) is a forum supplementing the Hungarian Standing Conference with the dimension of parliamentary cooperation. The aim of the body, which was first convened in 2004, is to make the cooperation between Hungary's parliamentary parties and the representatives of Hungarian organizations abroad regular, and, consequently, more successful. From 2010, the activity of the KMKF was completed with a new content: while MÁÉRT deals with political and governmental communication and sectoral policies, the KMKF focuses on the establishment of long-term strategies, besides dealing with parliamentary communication. The KMKF is the forum of Hungarian representatives of neighboring countries elected at national, provincial or county level and Hungarian members of the European Parliament.

The level of governmental structure

The concept of bearing responsibility for persons belonging to the same nation but living in other countries is present in the governmental structure of several countries. Solutions are different: there are countries in which the department or office dealing with compatriots living abroad belongs to the ministry of foreign affairs, in others – to the Parliament, but there also are countries in which it is part of the President's Office.

In Hungary the Secretariat for Hungarians Living Abroad was established in 1990, after the regime change. Two years later it became a body with national competence under the name Office for Hungarians Living Abroad (Határon Túli Magyarok Hivatala – HTMH) and came under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the socialist-liberal government of Gyula Horn, the HTMH was placed under the supervision of the Prime Minsiter's Office, while from 1998 – under the first, right-wing conservative government of Viktor Orbán – it became part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2002 – under the socialist-liberal Medgyessy-government – the HTMH was returned to the Prime Minister's Office again, and in 2006 – during the administrational reform which took place under the socialist-liberal government of Ferenc Gyurcsány, the office was

ceased. Between 2007 and 2010 the issues of Hungarian communities abroad belonged to the Department of Affairs of Hungarians Abroad which was a department of the State Secretariat for Foreign Relations and Affairs of Hungarians Abroad at the Prime Minister's Office.

The governmental structure established after the 2010 election brought significant changes. It was the year when the State Secretariat for Hungarian Communities Abroad was established within the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice. By this change the issue of Hungarians living outside the kin-state was raised to a higher level and became equivalent with any other sectoral policy. Operative policy work is performed by the State Secretariat for Hungarian Communities Abroad.

The State Secretariat for Hungarian Communities Abroad coordinates the Interministerial Committee for Hungarian Communities Abroad (Nemzetpolitikai Tárcaközi Bizottság – NPTB), which was established by the Government in order to harmonize the activity of different governmental units touching upon issues of Hungarian communities abroad, based on the principle of mutual responsibility and attention. The president of the Committee is the Deputy Prime Minister, while its vice-president is the parliamentary state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The NPTB has at least two sessions per year, but it is convened whenever it is required. The tasks of the committee – among others – is to realize mutual information exchange supporting the Government's activity for Hungarians abroad, the coordination and evaluation of tasks concerning this policy, and the harmonization of other ministries' strategic activity affecting Hungarians abroad. At the same time, the Committee is also responsible for ensuring the most effective possible way of using budgetary resources allocated to the realization of targets concerning the policy for Hungarians abroad.

Since 2010 the State Secretariat for Hungarian Communities Abroad continues its work under the Prime Minster's Office.

The level of aid policy

The Bethlen Gábor Fund[7] was established in 2011 as a successor of the Szülőföld Alap, managing the financial assistance provided by Hungary for Hungarians living abroad. Its tasks cover three main areas: the payment of aids, the operation of the House of Hungar-

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[7] www.bgazrt.hu

ians (Magyarság Háza) and the Research Institute for Hungarian Communities Abroad[8]. The purpose of the restructuring of aid policy was to transfer financial flows which had been multicentric and non-transparent into a centralized, simple and transparent system. The management of funds is performed by the Bethlen Gábor Fund Management Ltd. In 2011 the Hungarian Standing Conference decided to lay emphasis on long-term, predictable and normative aids instead of tender-like, occasional ones for institutions of national importance (institutions that play an outstanding role in the preservation of the given Hungarian community, e.g. educational institutions, cultural associations, etc.).

The most important tender of the Bethlen Gábor Fund is the assistance named *Szülőföldön magyarul* – also called educational aid – designated for Hungarian children living abroad and studying in Hungarian-language educational institutions. In 2011 the educational aid was extended to nursery school children as well. Besides, the Bethlen Gábor Fund provides assistance to natural and legal persons, local governments, civil organizations, cultural institutions etc. under an open tender system and also decides about the awarding of individual aids.

Beside the coordination of aids for Hungarians abroad, since 2011 the Bethlen Gábor Fund Management Ltd. has also been responsible for the realization of the visitor and educational-methodological center *House of Hungarians (Magyarság Háza)*. The House of Hungarians operates as a public educational institution presenting Hungarian communities living abroad. The *Research Institute for Hungarian Communities Abroad* operates within the organizational framework of the Bethlen Gábor Fund Management Ltd. Its primary objective is to conduct research in the field of minorities, to harmonize and encourage research on minorities and Hungarian communities abroad and to process the research findings for further policy implementation.

The level of programs

In order to transform the policy for Hungarian communities abroad into a field policy, several programs have been established. The Hungarian government enhances the prosperity of Hungarians abroad by means of well-formulated, realizable programs.

Institutions – educational institutions in particular – play a very important role from the point of view of the permanence and pros-

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[8] www.npki.hu

perity of Hungarian communities abroad. In light of this, the State Secretariat for Hungarian Communities Abroad launched thematic programs in 2012 and 2013: in 2012 it launched the programs entitled *2012 – the year of Hungarian nursery school children abroad,* while one year later – the program *2013 – the year of Hungarian junior elementary school children abroad* began. The *Dr. Szász Pál Scholarship* was founded in 2012 to support highly qualified young jurists who have outstanding results in the field of economic law and might contribute to the legal and economic prosperity of Hungarians abroad.

The program *Határtalanul*! (Without borders!) is aimed to provide an opportunity for every Hungarian student studying in public education to make at least one state-funded visit during their studies to Hungarian communities living in neighboring countries, and to give an opportunity for Hungarian students living abroad to visit Hungary by means of student exchange programs. The Without borders! program helps young people to experience and understand national unity through education.

There are different governmental projects targeting specifically the Hungarian diaspora in the West. In October 2011 the Hungarian Government launched another initiative, the *Hungarian Register* website which was created in order to realize a direct contact with Hungarian living in different parts of the world. The aim of the *Kőrösi Csoma Sándor Program*[9] is to develop the Hungarian language skills of diaspora Hungarians, encourage their community activity and strengthen their relations with Hungary. Within the framework of the program, Hungary sends interns to the diaspora to aid Hungarian communities with the preservation of various levels of Hungarian culture, and fostering Hungarian organizations' ties to the motherland.

The objective of the *Julianus program*[10] is to create a comprehensive register of the Hungarian material heritage located in the diaspora and create broad access to its data. The aim of the program is to present Hungarian material heritage which are to be found in the diaspora territories, and giving an overview of how Hungarian communities living in diaspora have contributed to the universal Hungarian culture. The *Mikes Kelemen program*[11] focuses on preserving the diaspora's material heritage, collecting its elements

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[9] https://www.nemzetiregiszter.hu/korosi-csoma-program
[10] https://www.nemzetiregiszter.hu/julianus-program-en
[11] https://www.nemzetiregiszter.hu/mikes-kelemen-program-en

in a systematic manner, transferring them to Hungary and making provision for their appropriate utilization.

Summary

Hungary's policy for Hungarian communities abroad integrates into the system of European trends, but it has its own peculiarities. The aim is the supporting of the prosperity of compatriots living abroad and the enhancement of their relations with the kin-state. Nevertheless, concerning the level of state policies supporting communities living abroad, Hungary does not only belong to the most active countries, but it is the country which has one of the most complex state administration designed for the support of co-nationals abroad. This is reflected both at the level of legislation and decision-making (joint state forums and Hungarian-Hungarian forums established specifically for this purpose). Considering the process of this policy's transformation into an independent sectoral policy area, Hungary is also on the top – compared with other Central and Eastern European states.

The objective of the harmonized policy for Hungarian communities abroad is to integrate individuals – by means of institutions – into communities, into the nation, and to integrate communities into the political system of the concerned state. Institutionalization provides a basis for the multilevel national integration of the Hungarian nation: 1. at the level of individuals: strengthening the ties of Hungarians living abroad both with Hungary (citizenship, right to vote) and their own community (institutionalization); 2. at community level: strengthening the links of Hungarian organizations abroad with the kin-state (for instance: MÁÉRT, KMKF, etc.) and – as a community – with their own country (collective recognition and rights, autonomy); 3. the integration of the unified Hungarian nation – integrated both individually and collectively – into the European Union.

Attila Dabis

The South Tyrolean Party System

Introduction

South Tyrol has inspired numerous in-depth analyses, mostly describing the functioning of the legal and institutional framework of the autonomous province, its adoptability in similar minority conflicts, or the history of its coming into being, with special regards to violence applied, and the role Austria as a kin-state played in the process.[1] The distribution of financial competencies is a highly discussed topic as well, witnessing increased scientific and political attention since the economic crisis started to unfold in 2008. The party system of the province, however, is a subject that has received a more modest attention compared to the aforementioned issues. The following study professes to be a humble contribution to this topic.

The rise Europe has been witnessing in the popularity of parties exhibiting a secessionist agenda makes it particularly topical to cast a glance on the party system of South Tyrol. The current economic crisis has provided new arguments for, and fueled a substantial growth in the popularity of secessionist parties in numerous regions, including Catalonia, the Basque Country, Flanders, or Scotland. South Tyrol, as well as the rest of Italy, has been struck by the financial crisis, still one can see only moderate changes in the popularity of secessionist political groups, compared to pro-autonomy parties. It appears that the Autonomous Province of Bozen/Bolzano resiliently keeps on revolving around an anti-secessionist political core, centripetally drawing the vast majority of the votes towards a central force that is committed to the further development of the autonomous competencies of the province. This dominant force is the main governing party of the history of the province, the South Tyrolean People's Party (*Südtiroler Volkspartei,* hereinafter *SVP*). Despite its decreasing popularity, SVP is far from losing the dominant position of the provincial party system. Despite witnessing similar economic tribulations as other regions of Europe, it seems that South Tyrolean party politics keeps on revolving much more around the development

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[1] The Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, concluded on 10 September 1919, awarded the southern half (with South Tyrol, and Trentino) of the former Tyrolean crownland to Italy, while the northern and eastern parts remained with the newly formed First Republic of Austria.

of the autonomous arrangement rather than around questions of secession.

In order to solve this scientific puzzle the study aims to explore the dynamics of the party-political discourse, the political cleavages that define the interaction between the parties, as well as the background of the shifts in popularity of the main political parties. First, I draw up the electoral system along with the political mechanisms it creates, and refer to the legal provisions of the autonomy statute that are relevant to the party political circumstances. Then, I provide a brief history of the provincial party system, mentioning amongst others the influence that party political developments on the national level had on the province, and the pluralisation of the ethno-political party palette. This section is followed by drawing up the cleavages that divide the parties, and all the relevant issues bound to be addressed by the parties due to these cleavages. The analysis pays special attention to the dominant political actor of the province, SVP, and it also mentions the plausible trends in future party political developments.

Electoral system

Before the amendment of the Italian Constitution in 2001, the Regional Council (*Consiglio Regionale della Regione Autonoma Trentino-Alto Adige / Regionalrat der Autonomen Region Trentino-Südtirol*) was elected first, whose representatives then automatically became members of their respective provincial parliaments.[2] Since 2001 the process has been going the other way around. Citizens first elect the 35 members of the provincial legislative bodies (the Provincial Council of Trento / *Consiglio della Provincia Autonoma di Trento*, and the Provincial Council of Bolzano / *Südtiroler Landtag*), who then by dint of this office also become members of the Regional Council.

The Provincial Council of Bolzano/Bozen is elected in an open list proportional representation system, in one round of voting where the whole province forms one constituency.[3] Favorable for smaller parties, the system has no electoral threshold and has a *compen-*

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[2] *Regionalgesetz vom 8. August 1983, Nr. 7 - Ordinierter Text der Regionalgesetze über die Wahl des Regionalrates*, available: http://elezioni.provincia.bz.it/downloads/testo_coordinato_regionale.pdf, accessed 2014.01.27.

[3] For more information on the election, functioning, and dissolution of the Legislative Council see: Bonell, Lukas - Winkler Ivo: *Südtirols Autonomie*. Bozen/Bolzano: Südtiroler Landesregierung - Karo Druck KG. 2010. pp.27-43.

satory mechanism.[4] As an important tool for protecting the ethnic minorities of the province, active suffrage was granted only to those Italian citizens over 18 years of age who resided in the Region for an uninterrupted period of four years, counted from the date of the official announcement of the Election Day.[5] The same rules applied to passive suffrage as well till the Regional Council adopted Regional Law No. 9 of 1989. According to this amendment, in order to be entitled to passive suffrage one only needs to have a residence in one of the communes of the region on the day the elections are officially announced.

Every constituent can choose one of the competing party-lists, and within this selected list one can cast up to four preferential votes for the candidates. These preferential votes will then determine the exact order in which candidates of a given list can receive mandates from the elections. The distribution of seats among the party-lists is decided upon the largest remainder method: the total number of valid votes gained by all the lists is divided with the total number of available seats (in this case 35) plus two. The so-established corrected electoral quota, also known as the Imperiali quota (hereinafter "q"), is then used to divide the number of votes won by each party, to decide the distribution of the mandates. If this process has the result that the total sum of mandates won by all the parties exceeds the 35 available seats, than a new "q" will be established by reducing the electoral divisor (total number of available seats plus two) by one unit (from 37 to 36). If this process is successful and there are still seats available, then the fractional remainders produced by the aforementioned quota, are set in descending order and the parties with the largest remainders are each given an additional mandate until all the seats are allocated. This is the point where the compensational mechanism is applied: those parties that received fewer votes than the "q" number are entitled to take part in this division as well. If the remainders are equal by two parties the mandate will go to the one that gained more votes. In case the total number of votes gained by the two parties is equal as well the mandate will be decided via drawing.

The new electoral law adopted on 8th May, 2013 did not change the bases of the electoral system described above, it did however introduce some minor changes. Art. 5 of this law stipulates that one

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[4] Decision No. 356/1998 of the Italian Constitutional Court, declared that an electoral threshold in the Regional Council elections would be discriminative with regards to minority political representation.

[5] Art 25 (2), Autonomy Statute (hereinafter ASt)

sex may not represent more than two-thirds of the candidates on any party lists. It also provides the opportunity for Italian citizens who have their residence in South Tyrol but are – either permanently or temporarily – living outside the province to cast their votes by post. Canvassing expenses were also specified; they cannot surpass 40.000 Euro per candidate.

The constitutional reform of 2001 made it possible to directly elect the heads of the governments of the Regions having special statute (which in the case of Trentino/South Tyrol applies for both provincial governments). South Tyrol is the only province in Italy that has not made use of this opportunity. Consequently, the Governor is still elected by the Provincial Council with the absolute majority of its members, by secret ballot. The mentioned new electoral law of 2013 also made some changes with regard to the executive power. It maximizes the number of government members in eight, not counting the Governor. A representative cannot become member of the government if he or she filled such a position in the preceding three legislative cycles or for 15 years consecutively. The government can only be replaced trough a constructive vote of no confidence against the Governor or the whole government, voted for by the majority of the members of the legislature.

The rules of active suffrage are not the only ones building in provisions regarding the protection of the ethnic balance of the political system. Article 50 of the Autonomy Statute stipulates that the composition of the Provincial Government of Bolzano/Bozen must reflect the numerical strength of the linguistic groups as represented in the Provincial Parliament.[6] Due to the small number of the Ladin community, paragraph three of the same Article also states that the Ladin linguistic group may be given representation in the Provincial Government, even with derogation from proportional representation.[7] Given the fact that the local parties mostly represent clearly distinguishable linguistic blocks, this article had the effect that the provincial executive branch has always been composed of coalition governments. The leader of these administrations since 1948 is the dominant party of the political system, the SVP.[8]

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[6] Similar safeguarding mechanisms exist with regard to the local-municipal bodies, as set out by Art. 61-65, ASt.

[7] In addition to this, the 2013 electoral law sets out that the composition of the government has also to reflect the gender proportion of the Legislature.

[8] As opposed to this achievement it is worthwhile to note that, due to the differences in political culture, there has not been one Italian government since the end of World War II that managed to serve out a full legislative period. Silvio Berlusconi came closest to achieving a full term with his 1410 days in office between 2001 and 2005.

In German speaking polities it is customary to have a sole dominant political organization (like ÖVP in Tirol, or CSU in Bavaria).[9] Due to the dominance of the German speaking community, the same rule applies to South Tyrol. Between 1948 and 1993, SVP governed for 45 years together with the Christian conservative Christian Democracy (*Democrazia Cristiana* – DC) party. During this nearly 5 decade long interval, there were only 9 seats in the executive branch which went to a third party (mostly from the socialist (PSI) or social-democratic (PSDI) parties). SVP, on the other hand, received 134 seats from a total of 187 which meant a 71,65% large governmental representation. This dominant position was reinforced after 1993 when DC vanished from the party system due to the *Mani pulite* scandal (see later). Between 1993 and 2013 out of 50 government positions only 13 were filled by other party than SVP, which meant a governmental representation up to 74% for the People's Party. In the current legislative cycle this dominance is more tangible than ever. 7 of the 8 governmental seats are being filled by members of SVP (87,5%) although they won only 45,7% of the votes, and 48,5% of the seats in the Legislation. Due to the fact that the composition of the provincial government has to reflect the numerical strength of the linguistic groups as represented in the Provincial Parliament, the more German speaking members the Parliament has, the more seats will be provided for the dominant actor of the party-system, the SVP (see Table 1). The new electoral law further contributes to the strengthening of this position by maximizing government members in 8, plus the Governor.[10] Besides cumulating the election result of the dominant party, the system also ensures the participation of the Italian and Ladin minorities in the decision-making process of the local executive branch. Without the linguistic quota, there would not have been an incentive for SVP to build coalition governments, which could have resulted in the formation of single-party majority governments between 1948 and 2008, excluding Italians from the executive branch.[11]

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[9] See: Nick, Rainer - Pelinka, Anton: *Österreichs politische Landschaft*. Innsbruck: Haymon Verlag. 1993, and Zehetmair, Hans: *Das deutsche Parteiensystem: Perspektiven für das 21. Jahrhundert*. München: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 2005

[10] Formerly the number of government members never decreased below 10, with the average number for the 1948 - 2013 period being 12,5.

[11] 2008 was the first year in the past 5 decades where SVP was not able to win the absolute majority of the votes.

Table 1. *Linguistic groups in the South Tyrolean Legislative Council as established by the 2013 provincial elections*

German linguistic group		Italian linguistic group		Ladin linguistic group	
SVP	17	Partito Democratico – Demokratische Partei	2	SVP	1
Die Freiheitlichen	6	Grüne Fraktion – Gruppo Verde – Grupa Vërda	1		
Südtiroler Freiheit	3	Lega Nord, Forza Alto Adige, Team Autonomie	1		
Grüne Fraktion – Gruppo Verde – Grupa Vërda	2	L'Alto Adige nel cuore	1		
Bürger Union, Ladins Dolomites, Wir Südtiroler	1				
Movimento 5 Stelle – 5 Sterne Bewegung – Moviment 5 Steiles	1				
	29		5		1

Source: http://www.landtag-bz.org/de/abgeordnete/fraktionen-a.asp, accessed: 2014.02.05.

History and dynamics of the party system

At the time of its creation SVP was an anti-fascist umbrella organization for the German speaking community of South-Tyrol. It was established in 1945 by ten „*Dableiber*" and four „*Optants*".[12] The first term was used to describe those citizens who chose to stay in Italy during the Mussolini-era, and the latter one to describe those who opted for the proposition of the Third Reich and thus moved to Germany. In the fifties the party experienced a series of internal strifes between rural-agrarian-Christian conservative and the more moderate and urbanized members, which led the then chairman of the party, Silvius Magnago, an iconic figure of the South Tyrolean autonomy movement, to develop a more concentrated party structure and at the same time to transform SVP into a catch-all party. These reforms included the creation of various platforms within the party (platforms for youngsters, women, or for workers), and the integration of the Ladin community of the province. This latter one was conducted by providing the opportunity to nominate Ladin SVP-candidates in the constituencies inhabited by Ladins (in *Pustertal*

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[12] Holzer, Anton: *Die Südtiroler Volkspartei*. Thaur-Tirol: Kulturverlag. 1991.

and *Bozen*), as well as to name a Ladin speaking vice chairman for the party. Since then SVP can be described as an ethno-regional catch-all party, representing the German and Ladin speaking groups regardless of their social statuses.[13] It is harder to classify the party with regard to its ideology.[14] It can accurately be characterized as a right wing, Christian conservative party taken into account that they pledge themselves to Christian-humanistic social ideals in their Fundamental Programme;[15] or that their MEP works within the Group of the European People's Party. However, it is also true that the same Fundamental Programme enshrines that the party is open to social democrats "not representing class struggle dogmatism", and that SVP proved to be coalitionable with left-wing Italian parties – such as *Partito Democratico* currently – several times before.[16]

The way through which the province has managed to ensure its autonomous competencies has been a bumpy one and had its bearings on the party-system.[17] Although the 1948 Constitution of Italy already foresaw the special status of South Tyrol according to the Gruber-de Gasperi Agreement concluded in 1946, it was not until 1972 that the entry into force of the second Autonomy Statute ensured these competencies on the provincial and not on the regional level.[18] It then took an additional 20 years – and the proactive contribution of Austria as a protecting power (*Schutzmacht Österreich*), as well as that of the United Nations – to implement the provisions of the Autonomy Statute. Until the reaching of this point (referred to as "Dispute settlement" / *Streitbeilegung*) there was a strong incentive

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[13] Later on in 1993 Ladins established a party on their own under the name: Ladins (renamed: Ladins Dolomites in 2008), which merged with smaller German speaking parties before the 2013 provincial elections.

[14] For a useful summary concerning the difficulties of categorizing ethno-regional parties see: Chandra, Kanchan.: What is an ethnic party? *Party Politics. Volume 17, Nr.2*. March 2011. Sussex: Sage publications. 2011. pp.151-169.

[15] An ideal also enshrined in the Statute of the Party, available at: http://www.svpvahrn.org/Parteistatut%20-%202012.pdf, accessed: 2014.02.14

[16] Südtiroler Volkspartei: *Das neue Programm der Südtiroler Volkspartei, Beschlossen von der Landesversammlung am 8. Mai 1993*. Meran/Marano: SVP, available: http://www.svp.eu/smartedit/documents/download/grundsatzprogramm.pdf., accessed: 2014.09.22.

[17] See: Dabis, Attila: A Dél-Tiroli Felszabadítási Bizottság (BAS). *Pro Minoritate* 2012. Nyár pp.81-93.

[18] The Treaty of Paris or the Gruber-De Gasperi agreement (named after the foreign minister of Austria of that time (Karl Gruber) and the prime minister of Italy (Alcide De Gasperi)), is the origo of the South Tyrolean autonomy. It ensures the most basic rights such as proportional representation in the public offices, or linguistic rights. It also provides the international legal entrenchment of the South Tyrolean autonomy.

for the local German and Ladin speaking communities to maintain a unified representation, in order to make it clear who the Italian governments should be negotiating an autonomy arrangement with. By the end of this implementation period, however, the more relaxed political atmosphere gave rise to political ferment within the SVP.[19]

The first German rival party was the Union for South Tyrol (*Union für Südtirol* – UfS), established in 1989, by Alfons Benedikter and Eva Klotz (who at that time was already a representative for the South Tyrolean Homeland Association – *Südtiroler Heimatbund*).[20] UfS successfully managed to siphon votes from the right-wing supporters of SVP. Parallel with this, Ladins created their own party as well, reducing the Ladin-speaking voter base of SVP. These developments were clearly reflected in the election results (see Table 2). While SVP obtained 60,38 % of the votes in the 1988 elections, its support melted to 52,04 by 1993. UfS won 4,8 %, and another German party, the Freedom Party (Freiheitlichen) gained 6,06 %, while the newly established Ladin formation won 1,97%. SVP lost 8,34 % of its voters in these four years, while newly emerging smaller parties (including also the Greens and Lega Nord) gained almost 23% of the votes.

The decline of the SVP base has been continuing ever since. In 2008, for the first time in its history, the party failed to win the absolute majority of the votes, although the mathematical transformation method of the electoral system still provided a narrow majority for them with regard to the mandates in the legislature. In the 2013 elections even this position was lost when SVP won only 17 seats from the total 35. In absolute numbers the 2013 election result was the fourth worse in the history of the party (with only 131.236 votes). Only the three first elections that followed World War II brought lower results, at a time when the German speaking community counted 100.000 persons fewer than in 2013. These results are being further exacerbated from election to election by the decline of voter participation. The turnout of the elections has been declining since the nineties, which can be understood as a consequence of the more relaxed atmosphere that commenced after the South Tyrol dispute was settled between Austria and Italy before the UN in 1992. The

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[19] It should be noted that the sixties was largely shaped by the violent struggle for the secession of the province, led by the South Tyrolean Liberation Committee (*Befreiungsausschuß Südtirol*). For a detailed description of this period see: Golowitsch, Helmut: *Für die Heimat kein Opfer zu schwer. Folter – Tod – Erniedrigung; Südtirol 1961–1969*. Bozen/Bolzano: Kienesberger E. 2009.

[20] *Heimatbund* was an advocacy group for the perpetrators of the bomb attacks carried out by the German minority in the sixties.

92,1% turnout witnessed in 1988 decreased to 89,5% in 1993, kept on decreasing in 1998 to 85,7%, then to 82,3% in 2003, 80,1% in 2008, reaching the bottom at 77,7% in 2013.

If we take a look at the Italian parties of the provincial party system, we find the local formations of the national parties and smaller regional parties. Strongly influenced by the bipolar logic of the Cold War era, there was a centripetal competition among Italian parties during the First Italian Republic.[21] This phenomenon was motivated by the fact that the second most popular party nationwide was the Italian Communist Party (*Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* – PCI) that obtained 19-35% of the votes from election to election between 1946 and 1987. As a result, Italian national governments were either coalition governments of the party Christian Democracy (DC) and one or more of the smaller centrist or left-wing parties, mostly including the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), or single-party DC minority governments. This constellation was perfectly mirrored in the South Tyrolean party politics as well. SVP governed the province in coalition with DC, the latter receiving three to five seats in the executive branch. Additionally, one or two governmental seats were given to the smaller social-democratic parties (except in the second, third and fourth legislative period). It was the early nineties which brought a change in this structure on the national, and by extension, on the provincial level as well. The *Mani pulite* (Italian for "clean hands") inquiry – a judicial investigation into pervasive political corruption (referred to as *Tangentopoli* a.k.a. "Bribesville") – resulted in the disappearance of the main parties and most of the political elite of the country.[22] Considering its effects on the Italian political forces, the *Mani pulite* scandal can be understood as an analogy of the *Streitbeilegung* (the settlement of the dispute of the South Tyrolean question before the UN) for the German speaking polity of the province.

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[21] Fusaro, Carlo: Party System Developments and Electoral legislation in Italy (1948-2009). *Bulletin of Italian Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1.* Glasgow: University of Glasgow. 2009. pp.49-68.

[22] These being: Christian Democracy (*Democrazia Cristiana* - DC), Italian Socialist Party (*Partito Socialista Italiano* – PSI), Italian Democratic Socialist Party (*Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano* – PSDI), Italian Liberal Party (*Partito Liberale Italiano* - PLI)

Table 2. *Results of the South Tyrolean provincial elections (1948-2013)*

Results of the South Tyrolean provincial elections (1948-2013)												
	1948		1952		1956		1960		1964		1968	
Party	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats
Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP)	107.249 (67,6%)	13	112.602 (64,76%)	15	124.165 (64,40%)	15	132.351 (63,86%)	15	134.188 (61,27%)	16	137.982 (60,69%)	16
Die Freiheitlichen	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Verdi Grüne Vërc, in 2008 common list with Liste Civiche	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Südtiroler Freiheit (STF)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Union für Südtirol (UfS), from 2011: BürgerUnion	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ladins, from 2008: Ladins Dolomites	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lega Nord Südtirol (LN), in 2013 common list with Team Auton. & Forza Alto Adige	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unitalia Movimento per l'Alto Adige	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Democrazia Cristiana (DC), from 2002: Casini UDC	17.096 (10,78%)	2	23.864 (13,72%)	3	27.676 (14,35%)	3	30.277 (14,61%)	3	29.596 (13,52%)	3	32.734 (14,40%)	4
Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), from 1995: Alleanza Nazionale (AN)	4.662 (2,94%)	1	8.371 (4,78%)	1	11.607 (6,02%)	1	14.687 (7,09%)	1	13.615 (6,22%)	1	11.059 (4,86%)	1
Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI)	7.925 (4,99%)	1	9.996 (5,75%)	1	10.826 (5,62%)	1	12.217 (5,90%)	1	11.780 (5,38%)	1	16.328 (7,18%)	2
Italiano Sociale Democratico Partito (PSDI)	-	-	6.013 (3,46%)	1	7.774 (4,03%)	1	7.544 (3,64%)	1	8.369 (3,82%)	1		
Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI)	-	-	3.455 (1,99%)	-	1.669 (0,78%)	-	2.839 (1,37%)	-	5.413 (2,47%)	1	5.872 (2,58%)	1
Partito Repubblicano Italiano (PRI)	-	-			-	-			733 (0,35%)	-	2.733 (1,20%)	-
Kommunistische Partei Italiens (KPI)/ Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (PCI)	6.281 (3,96%)	1	5.335 (3,07%)	1	4.203 (2,18%)	1	6.514 (3,14%)	1	8.051 (3,68%)	1	13.569 (5,97%)	1
Partito Democratico (PD)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	15.434 (9,73%)	2	4.238 (2,47%)	-	4.875 (2,62%)	-	3.656 (0.39%)	-	7.253 (3,29%)	1	7.072 (3,12%)	-
Sum	158.647 (100%)	20	173.874 (100%)	22	192.795 (100%)	22	210.085 (100%)	22	218.998 (100%)	25	227.349 (100%)	25

Source: Source: http://www.landtag-bz.org/de/wahlen/ergebnisse-landtagswahlen-archiv.asp, accessed: 2014.09.22.

	1973		1978		1983		1988		1993		1998		2003		2008		2013	
	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats
	132.186 (56,42%)	20	163.468 (61,27%)	21	170.125 (59,44%)	22	184.717 (60,38%)	22	160.186 (52,04%)	19	171.820 (56,6%)	21	167.353 (55,6%)	21	146.555 (48,1%)	18	131.236 (45,7%)	17
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18.669 (6,06%)	2	7.543 (2,5%)	1	15.121 (5 %)	2	43.615 (14,3%)	5	51.510 (17,9%)	6
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.293 (6,92%)	2	19.696 (6,5%)	2	23.708 (7,9%)	3	17.745 (5,8%)	2	25.070 (8,7%)	3
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.888 (4,9%)	2	20.743 (7,2%)	3
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.777 (4,80%)	2	19.607 (5,5%)	2	20.554 (6,8%)	2	7.048 (2,3%)	1	6.065 (2,1%)	1
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.058 (1,97%)	1	11.028 (3,6%)	1	4.112 (1,4%)	-	3.334 (1,1%)	-		
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.115 (2,96%)	1	2.606 (0,9%)	-	1.626 (0,5%)	-	6.413 (2,1%)	1	7.120 (2,5%)	1
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.419 (1,8%)	1	4.499 (1,5%)	1	5.689 (1,9%)	1	4.831 (1,7%)	-
	32.990 (14,08%)	5	28.800 (10,79%)	4	27.341 (9,55%)	3	27.748 (9,07%)	3	Part Pop. common list: 13.622 (4,43%)	2	-	-	-	-	3.792 (1,2%)	-	-	-
	9.431 (4,02%)	1	7.782 (2,92%)	1	16.829 (5,88%)	2	31.491 (10,29%)	4	35.833 (11,64%)	4	29.287 (9,7%)	3	25.382 (8,4%)	3	merged into PdL 25.297 (8,3%)	3	-	-
	13.214 (5,64%)	2	8.944 (3,35%)	1	11.207 (3,91%)	1	12.332 (4,03%)	1	3.847 (1,25%)	-								
	8.059 (3,44%)	1	6.120 (2,29%)	1	3.643 (1,27%)	-	-	-	-	-								
	2.806 (1,20%)	-	2.924 (1,10%)	-	2.178 (0,76%)	-	-	-	-	-								
	3.234 (1,38%)	-	2.868 (1,07%)	-	5.890 (2,06%)	1	3.289 (1,08%)	-	-	-								
	13.343 (5,69%)	2	18.776 (7,04%)	3	16.079 (5,61%)	2	9.214 (3,01%)	1					2.614 (0,9%)	-	1.262 (0,4%)	-	730 (0,3%)	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18.139 (6%)	2	19.210 (6,7%)	2
	19.039 (8,13%)	3	26.166 (10,17%)	3	32.929 (11,52%)	4	37.115 (12,14%)	4	24.438 (7,93%)	3	36.583 (12,9%)	4	35.781 (12%)	4	10.838 (3,6%)	-	20.495 7,2%	2
	234.302 (100%)	34	266.848 (100%)	34	286.221 (100%)	35	305.906 (100%)	35	307.838 (100%)	35	303.589 (100%)	35	300.750 (100%)	35	304.615 (100%)	35	287.010 (100%)	35

After the investigations, numerous new Italian organizations started to rise, merge and split, making Italian party politics more complex and pluralistic. The five elections of the "post-*Mani pulite*" era were coined by the high volatility of the votes and an Italian party palette much more diverse than the German one.[23] The provincial elections of these twenty years saw an average of 8,6 Italian parties per election, as opposed to the 3,4 German parties.[24] Even if one counts all other parties potentially capable of siphoning votes from SVP (for example mixed parties like Verdi Grüne, or the separate Ladin party), this number still grows only to 5,6. Regarding the volatility of Italian parties, it is a telling data that there were only 4 parties capable of taking part on at least more than half of the elections in this 20 year period: the far-right National Alliance (*Alleanza Nazionale* – AN, called *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI) before 1995); a local splinter party of AN: Unitalia – Movement for South Tyrol (*Unitalia – Movimento per l'Alto Adige*); the far-left Italian Communist Party (*Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* – PCI); and the North League (*Lega Nord*). Demographic decline of the local Italian community on the one hand, and diminishing electoral participation and the pluralisation of the Italian parties on the other where the major factors resulting in the drop of the number of Italian representatives from 8 in 2008 to 5 in 2013.

Last but not least, an important party political development of the province was the establishment of a green party as an alternative for the two major voting blocks in 1978. The party first ran under the name New Left (*Neu Linke*), which was altered to Verdi-Grüne-Vërc in 1993. This eco-social party is the only one which dedicates itself to connecting the linguistic groups of the province, and thus establishes its candidate-list in respect of ethnic balance. Since the nineties they have managed to win two or three mandates per election, making them a relevant actor of the political landscape.

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[23] Electoral volatility seeks to capture the stability of the electorate's preferences across elections. See: Pedersen, Mogens N.: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems 1948–1977: Explorations in Explanation, in: H. Daalder - P. Mair (eds): *Western European Party Systems. Continuity and Change*. London: Sage. 1983. pp.29-66.

[24] Own calculations according the data of the provincial elections between 1948 and 2008

Cleavages

In the light of the original cleavage-theory, established by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, the dominant cleavage of the South Tyrolean party system is the center-periphery dichotomy, dividing the electorate into Italian and German speaking voting blocs.[25] Given the fact that both blocks are equally religious (mostly Catholic), the state-church cleavage, which otherwise has a major relevance in Italian politics, is a marginal factor in the provincial party system. Although there are some minor exclusions, German speaking electors tend to give their votes – both at the municipal and the provincial elections – to German parties, while Italian electors tend to give their votes to Italian parties. Inspecting the territorial distribution of the votes this tendency can be verified. The smaller and the closer a settlement is to the Austrian border, the larger is the number of German speaking inhabitants of that settlement, thus the more likely its electorate cast their votes to German parties.

A salient example is that of Martells' (a village in the *Vinschgau* area), which is the most homogenous settlement of the province, with 100% of its less than 1000 inhabitants being German speaking.[26] The 2013 provincial elections brought the following results in this village: 61,2% – SVP; 26,4% – *Freiheitlichen*; 7,9% – *Südtiroler Freiheit*, 2,7% – *Verdi – Grüne – Verc – Sel*; 6,5 % – *Bündnis Bürger Union – Ladins Dolomites – Wir Südtiroler*. The four contesting Italian parties, on the other hand (*PD, Forza Alto Adige – Lega Nord – Team Autonomie, Unitalia, and La Destra Minniti),* received only 5 votes from the total 556, which make up little more than 1%.[27] Results of the local elections were even more unambiguous, as both in 2005 and in 2010 SVP received 100% of the valid votes.[28] The same trend becomes visible when we take a look at the Italian side of the political spec-

[25] Lipset, Seymour Martin - Rokkan, Stein: *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. New York: Free Press. 1967; Lipset, Seymour Martin - Rokkan, Stein: Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments. In: Peter Mair (ed.): *The West European Party System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990. pp.91-111.; Karvonen, Lauri - Kuhnle, Stein (eds.): *Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited*. London: Routledge. 2000.

[26] ASTAT: *Volkszählung 2011, Berechnung des Bestandes der drei Sprachgruppen in der Autonomen Provinz Bozen- Südtirol / Censimento della popolazione 2011 Determinazione della consistenza dei tre gruppi linguistici della Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige*. Bozen/Bolzano: Landesinstitut für Statistik/ Istituto provinciale di statistica. 2012.

[27] For the regional differences in the 2013 provincial election results, see: http://www.provinz.bz.it/vote/landtag2013/results/muni_ld_vg.htm, accessed: 2014.03.05.

[28] For the results of the municipial elections see: http://www.gemeindewahlen.bz.it/, accessed: 2014.03.05.

trum. Italians mostly inhabit the urban areas and the plain southern parts of the province. "The most Italian" settlement is the provincial capital, Bolzano. According to the 2011 census, only 25,52% is German speaking, as opposed to 73,8% being Italian, with the Ladin population representing only 0,68%.[29] In this district German parties obtained only 29% of the votes (22,2% went to SVP, 4,4% to *Freiheitlichen*, 2% to *Südtiroler Freiheit* and 0,4% to *Bündnis Bürger Union – Ladins Dolomites – Wir Südtiroler*), while Italian ones received 59,6%.[30] During the municipal elections 21.5% of the citizens' voted for Silvio Berlusconi's PdL (*IL Popolo della Libertá* – People of Freedom), 17.2% to PD, and only 19.6% to SVP. German secessionist parties were, unsurprisingly, almost invisible in these results (*Freiheitlichen* obtained 1,4%, while *Südtiroler Freiheit* 0,5% of the votes). The mayor of Bolzano has always come from the Italian community. Even within specific parts of the city, the picture of ethnic party preferences is tangible. In the voting sections of the *Don Bosco* quarter (an Italian quarter, located in the westernmost part of the city) SVP struggles to reach at least 15% of the votes in average (Presseamt der Autonomen Provinz Bozen 2013). While the same proportion in *Gries,* an overwhelmingly German speaking part of the city that used to be a separate suburban settlement, is above 40%.

The above described ethnic cleavage between German speaking and Italian parties is the one mostly defining the party system, however, with the pluralization of the ethno-regional party palette another cleavage has arisen: the attitude towards self-governance. The peculiarity of this cleavage is that it polarizes the German speaking block far more intensively than the Italian one. The only Italian party engaging in this topic is Lega Nord whose agenda indeed has had a salient role in resurging the regional dimension of Italian party politics (south v. north, central state v. federalism) after the importance of cold war bipolarity faded. The program of Lega envisages transforming Italy into a federalist state. As a matter of fact, in 1996 the former leader of Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi unilaterally

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[29] ASTAT: *Die Ergebnisse der Volkszählung in Italien - Bevölkerungsstruktur und Erhebungsverfahren in der Autonomen Provinz Bozen – Südtirol / L'Italia del Censimento - Struttura demografica e processo di rilevazione nella Provincia autonoma di Bolzano - Alto Adige.* Rom/Roma: Nationalinstitut für Statistik – ISTAT / Istituto nazionale di statistica – ISTAT. 2013a.

[30] Verdi - Grüne - Verc – Sel received 11,4% of the votes in Bozen/Bolzano (5.166 votes), which made them the third most popular party in the capital of the province.

declared that Padania is an independent and sovereign federal republic.[31] The declaration has of course never been implemented.[32]

Different attitudes towards self-governance were always present in the political discourse of South Tyrol, although until the early nineties they divided the internal party structure of SVP, or they took shape in organizations less susceptible for activities that remain within the sphere of the organized political arena (such organizations were the already mentioned South Tyrolean Liberation Committee / *Befreiungsausschuss Südtirol – BAS,* responsible for the bomb attacks conducted in the sixties, or the South Tyrolean Safeguard Association / *Südtirol Schützenbund*).[33] With the formation of the new German parties this cleavage has become external. On one side of this cleavage one can find SVP and the Greens, while on the other side the secessionist parties in favor of establishing a new state (*Freistaat*) and/or reuniting with the kin-state Austria. This side of the cleavage contains the Freedom Party / *Freiheitlichen,* South Tyrolean Freedom / *Südtiroler Freiheit* – STF, and the Civic Union / *Bürgerunion* (formerly Union for South Tyrol / *Union für Südtirol* – UfS).

SVP tends to characterize itself as "The" Autonomy party referring to the fact that they were the sole representative organization for the German speaking community of South Tyrol during the period coined by the struggle for territorial autonomy. Throughout the decades this also meant that membership in the SVP was strongly linked with positions in the executive branch. This position has not changed, and SVP keeps on identifying itself with ideas regarding the further development of the autonomy. For this reason they have elaborated the so- called "Full autonomy" *(Vollautonomie)* concept.[34] This concept envisages that the province takes over the primary jurisdiction over every field that is currently secondary. The South Tyrolean Autonomy statute sets a complex system of jurisdic-

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[31] Padania practically refers to the richer northern parts of Italy, mostly identical with the Po valley. The full name of the party itself refers to this territory: *Lega Nord per l'Indipendenza Della Padania* (Northern League for the Independence of Padania). For the Padanian Declaration of Independence See: http://www.giovani-padani.leganord.org/dichiarazione.asp, accessed: 2014.03.06.

[32] These kind of initiatives are not unprecedented in Italy. The party Indipendenza Veneta, for example organized a legally non- binding online referendum between the 16th and 21st of March, 2014 on the secession of Veneto from Italy, the EU, and for withdrawal from NATO.

[33] An organization originally founded by Andreas Hofer to protect Tyrol against the troops of Napoleon, nowadays having a secessionist agenda.

[34] For more information on the *Vollautonomie* concept visit: http://www.svp.eu/de/themen/vollautonomie/, accessed: 2014.03.18.

tion divided between the central state, the region and the province, including also shared competencies of these levels. Primary jurisdiction refers to those fields where the province has exclusive decision-making competencies.[35] Secondary jurisdiction refers to fields where the state sets the general framework in which the province is allowed to establish detailed regulations.[36] This latter group of competencies includes subjects like the management of the regional police forces, education in elementary and secondary schools, public utilities, and sanitation. In addition to taking full jurisdiction over these fields, SVP wishes to terminate the still existing Regional Council – because the party considers it to be an obsolete institution – and most importantly, implement full fiscal autonomy in the province (*Finanzhoheit* as they call it). Similarly to the Basque model, South Tyrol would be granted the right to levy and collect all local taxes, and negotiate a specific sum needed to be paid for the central government so that it would be able to carry out the competencies it still exercises in the province.

The Greens also support the further development of autonomy and oppose the concept of secession as a non-desirable alternative. They consider the present autonomy arrangement, however, as an "SVP-autonomy", and support the establishment of a third statute through a wide autonomy convent, which would ensure a better co-existence between the ethnic groups of the province.

The economic crisis increases the number of those voters opting for more radical changes than the ones mentioned above. According to the last elections, secessionist parties represented the opinion of almost 1/3 of the total electorate. The most popular among these parties is the Freedom Party. The Freedom Party went as far as to elaborate the future constitution of a South Tyrolean Free State.[37] This draft is a mix of currently existing provisions of the autonomy statute and newly inserted preferences of the party. Thus, the Free State envisaged by the Freedom Party would also have ethnic quotas in the government, rotating presidency in the legislature,[38] linguistic equality between Germans and Italians, special status for the Ladin

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[35] These competencies are listed in Article 117 paragraph 4 of the Italian constitution, and in Article 8 ASt.

[36] Listed in Article 9 ASt.

[37] For this draft visit the homepage of the party: http://www.die-freiheitlichen.com/images/stories/_downloads/layout_d_140x170_druck.pdf, accessed: 2014.03.19.

[38] The South Tyrolean legislature is headed in the first 30 months of the parliamentary term by a German speaker, with either an Italian or Ladin vice-president, and in the second 30 months by an Italian speaker with either a German or Ladin vice-president.

culture, as well as the same electoral system. Instead of a Governor, however, here we find a directly elected Prime Minister who can only be removed through a constructive vote of no confidence. All these provisions are set in a Christian conservative framework, where marriage would receive special protection from the state, children need to be thought at schools to neighborly love, patriotism, and moral responsibility, and ethics and religious education would be a part of the national curricula. Another characteristic of this party is its anti-immigration sentiment. As one of the richest parts of the country South Tyrol inevitably attracts foreign immigrants. According to the census data of 2011 there are 45.932 foreign immigrants in the province (approximately one-third of these people live in Bolzano/Bozen), which is more than twice the rate of the indigenous Ladin community, and it is constantly growing (see Table 3).[39] The number of foreign residents tripled in the past two decades, which shows the lively nature of this new challenge to the province.

The second most popular secessionist organization is the South Tyrolean Freedom, a splinter party emanating from UfS in 2007. The leader of the party is Eva Klotz, daughter of Jörg Klotz, former leader of the South Tyrolean Liberation Committee. The party is popular particularly among youngsters. The average age of the party's members is 36 years, more than 50% of its members are under 30, and members younger than 18 represent almost 20%.[40] The main goal of the party is the reunification of South Tyrol with Austria via referendum. For this purpose they organized a legally non-binding self-determination referendum in 2013, where 92,17% of the partici-pating 61.189 citizens voted in favor of South Tyrol exercising her right to self-determination. (SVP had called for the boycott of the referendum).[41] The party exhibits a similar approach with regard to European affairs, which is why they have participated in organizing a European citizens' initiative aimed at recognizing the right to self-determination as a fundamental human right.[42] The initiative was not registered by the European Commission.

Last, but not least, the decreasingly popular Civic Union, whose predecessor UfS was the first contender party to SVP, is also on the side of reuniting South Tyrol with North-and East Tyrol. Further-

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[39] ASTAT: *Südtirol in Zahlen / Alto Adige in cifre*. Bozen/Bolzano: Landesinstitut für Statistik/ Istituto provinciale di statistica. 2013b.

[40] Source: http://www.stol.it/Artikel/Politik-im-Ueberblick/Lokal/Suedtiroler-Frei-heit-will-auch-in-Oesterreich-politische-Bewegung-werden, accessed: 2014.03.21.

[41] Source: http://www.nationalia.info/en/news/1733, accessed: 2014.03.21.

[42] For the homepage of the initiative visit: https://www.europeancitizensdecide.eu/petition.php, accessed: 2014.03.21.

more, they protest against the Italian toponyms invented by the fascist oppressor, *Ettore Tolomei,* and claim that every settlement should bear its original German and Ladin name. They also wish to remove the victory monument in Bolzano/Bozen that was erected during the *Mussolini*-era, celebrating the occupation of Tyrol.[43]

Table 3. *Population of South Tyrol according to linguistic groups (1880-2011)*

Year	German	Italian	Ladin	Other	Total
In absolute numbers					
1880	186 087	6884	8822	3513	205 306
1890	187 100	9369	8954	4862	210 285
1900	197 822	8916	8907	7149	222 794
1910	223 913	7339	9429	10 770	251 451
1921	193 271	27 048	9910	24 506	254 735
1961	232 717	128 271	12 594	281	373 863
1971	260 351	137 759	15 456	475	414 041
1981	279 544	123 695	17 736	9593	430 568
1991	287 503	116 914	18 434	17 657	440 507
2001	296 461	113 494	18 736	34 308	462 999
2011	314 604	118 120	20 548	51 795	505 067
In percentage					
1880	90,6	3,4	4,3	1,7	100,0
1890	89,0	4,5	4,3	2,3	100,0
1900	88,8	4,0	4,0	3,2	100,0
1910	89,0	2,9	3,8	4,3	100,0
1921	75,9	10,6	3,9	9,6	100,0
1961	62,2	34,3	3,4	0,1	100,0
1971	62,9	33,3	3,7	0,1	100,0
1981	64,9	28,7	4,1	2,2	100,0
1991	65,3	26,5	4,2	4,0	100,0
2001	64,0	24,5	4,0	7,4	100,0
2011	62,3	23,4	4,1	10,3	100,0

Source: ASTAT (2013b): *Südtirol in Zahlen,* op. cit. p. 20.

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[43] In 2002 the City Council of Bolzano/Bozen tried to rename this square from the current Victory square to Freedom square, but the local Italian right wing forces initiated a local referendum, successfully hindering this plan.

Conclusions

Trying to summarize the characteristics of the South Tyrolean party system one can state the following. South Tyrol has a party system with ethnicity-related voter preferences, and an additional cleavage regarding the self-governance of the province. The dominant actor of the party system is the ethno-regional catch-all party, SVP, leading the local government since the end of World War II. The party political developments of the past decades have been posing substantial threats to the popularity of SVP, which can be expected to further decrease in a modest rate. The biggest threats to the electoral achievement of SVP are the decline in voter participation, the pluralization of the ethno-regional party palette, and the deepening of the economic crisis. This latter factor is prone to step to the fore if the party continues to fail to negotiate a new autonomy arrangement for the province in the long run. The open list proportional representation electoral system, having no threshold, endorses party fragmentation, which affects Italian parties much more than German ones. In addition, the demographic decline of the local Italian community and the plummeting electoral participation are all factors which predict that the number of Italian members of the Provincial Council will stagnate or decrease in the future. A slight increase is only plausible with the concentration of the Italian parties.

While there are fundamental differences between the aforementioned blocks, most visibly in political culture, a common challenge for all the parties of the province is how to integrate the preferences of the immigrant population. Given the rapidly increasing number of foreign residents, the parties more capable of channeling these votes towards themselves can expect to gain serious electoral leverage in the future. In this process, secessionist parties are not likely to take a leading role due to their anti-immigration agendas. The main goal for these smaller parties in the future will rather be to absorb more German votes from SVP, and the main strategic challenge will be how to move closer to governmental positions. Despite the fact that almost one-third of the votes came in support of secessionist parties during the last provincial elections, none of these organizations are likely to move into the government in the near future. SVP is in fact loosing electoral confidence, but its support is not declining rapidly. The economy of the province has been burdened by worsening indicators, which are often regional spill-over effects of the economic woes of the national budget, still the economic crisis has not stricken South Tyrol as hard as other parts of the country.[44] Economic

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[44] A vivid example is when Moody's downgraded the creditworthiness of South Tyrol from A1 to A3 on the 17th of June 2012, only because they did likewise in the case of

deterioration has been unfolding with smaller amplitude due to the fiscal levers provided by the autonomy arrangement.[45] This ensures an effective argument for SVP in supporting the further development of this arrangement in the framework of the *Vollautonomie* concept.

Beside this main reason, it is important to add that the already mentioned Article 50 of the autonomy statute, in a way, safeguards the dominant position of SVP. This article creates a coalition-compulsion with Italian parties, who are not coalitionable with organizations having a secessionist agenda. The sole exception under this rule could be Lega Nord, however, it never managed to send more than one representative into the provincial legislation even at the peak of its popularity. As a matter of fact, between 1998 and 2008 they did not manage to send representatives to the legislation at all. The same situation applies to the Greens. Although they are a party with a cross-cutting membership with regard to linguistic groups (currently they provide one of the 5 Italian members of the legislation), they strictly oppose secession and are on the side of further developing the autonomy of the province. An additional obstacle is that secessionist parties are not united in their pursuits. Some prefer to establish a Free State, while others wish a reunion with the kin-state Austria.

In historical terms, the two most important developments affecting the party system have been the *Mani pulite* scandal and the pluralisation of the ethno-regional party palette since the nineties. This latter one keeps on increasing its relevance ever since, which is why we are likely to witness the intensification of the secession debate in the future. In this respect, Italy and South Tyrol fit in the European trend shaped by the increasing activity of secessionist movements – a trend being fueled mostly by the economic problems of the EU and its member states, respectively. Even if the strengthening of the secessionist parties brings forth the increasing relevance of the self-governance cleavage in the province of South Tyrol, this cleavage is not likely to become the pivotal subject of the political discourse in the medium- and long term, as it is in Scotland or Catalonia.

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the host country shortly before as well. Source: *„Diese Herabstufung verdienen wir uns nicht"*. Dolomiten 130 Jahrgang, Nr. 162 von 2012-07-18, p. 18.

[45] For more information on the connections between the Statute of autonomy and the economic performance of the Province see: Dabis, Attila: Dél-Tirol autonómiastatútuma, in: *Magyar Kisebbség* 3-4. szám. Kolozsvár/Cluj Napoca: Jakabffy Elemér Alapítvány. 2012. pp. 43-95.

Diaspora

Eszter Herner-Kovács

Nation Building Extended: Hungarian Diaspora Politics

The article aims to present and analyze Hungarian diaspora policy, the most recent aspect of Hungarian nation building politics. The first part of the paper builds on literature on various types of diaspora politics and tries to situate the Hungarian model in that framework. The second part introduces and analyzes the diaspora projects launched after 2010 in Hungary in order to realize the objectives of Hungarian diaspora politics. The paper claims that diaspora projects launched by the Hungarian government after 2010 form a coherent strategy aiming to reach the diaspora, to raise their awareness of their Hungarian heritage and culture, as well as to enhance their connection with the homeland.

Diasporas and diaspora politics

Academic interest on diaspora studies has been growing since the second half of the 20th century, which resulted in, as Rogers Brubaker argues, the confused use of the term "diaspora".[1] The numerous definitions of diaspora usually operate with notions such as dispersion, community, collective memory and/or myth of a homeland, idea of return to the homeland, lack of complete integration into the host country, and responsibility towards the homeland.[2] However, these descriptions of diaspora were adapted to the "various intellectual, cultural and political agendas" that became defined as diaspora, and thus the term has not acquired a consensual definition in the scholarly literature.[3] Brubaker therefore suggests that instead of thinking of diasporas as substantive entities and counting them as bounded groups we should rather use the term as referring to a "stance or a claim". The avoidance of considering a diaspora as a bounded group is applicable in the case of the Hungarian "diaspora" as well since, as it is argued later in the paper, it is very heterogeneous and cannot

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[1] Rogers Brubaker, "The 'Diaspora' Diaspora," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1 (2005): 1–19.

[2] William Safran, "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return," *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1, no. 1 (1991): 83–99, doi:10.1353/dsp.1991.0004; James Clifford, "Diasporas," *Cultural Anthropology* 9, no. 3 (August 1, 1994): 302–38.

[3] Brubaker, "The 'Diaspora' Diaspora."

be treated as a coherent group, despite, members of the diaspora are the subjects of the diaspora politics of the Hungarian government. As a result, the Brubakerian concept of diaspora is to be applied for the Hungarian diaspora as well.

According to Tölölyan, four factors were central in the "popularization" of the term diaspora and thus contributed to the rapid growth of interest in diaspora studies: the success and aftermath of the civil rights movement in the USA which raised public awareness to the "Black diaspora"; the rise of Jewish diaspora lobby during the 1967 war and the "re-diasporization of ethnicity" following it; the liberalization of the American Immigration Act which resulted in a great influx of migrants to the US; and finally the growing academic interest of notions of identity and diversity after the 1960s.[4] The proliferation of the use of diaspora resulted in the creation of numerous typologies. Based on the reasons of dispersal, Robin Cohen set up five categories of diasporas: victim, labor, imperial, trade, and cultural.[5] By victim diasporas he means classical groups which dispersed due to persecution (Jews) or to other traumatic factors such as famine (Irish). He handles trade, labor and imperial diasporas as subgroups of an umbrella category where the reason for emigration was social mobility and he mentions several examples, e.g. European migrants in the US at the end of the 19th century, Chinese traders, or the British imperial diaspora in the Southern hemisphere. As for cultural diasporas, his argument is that Caribbean people share the same experiences of colonization which manifest in shared cultural expressions. Although Cohen argues that the notion 'diaspora' has a strong biblical overtone and is not understandable without the Jewish archetype, he develops further categories which fit modern diaspora formations as well. Cohen's typology is useful if one wants to investigate diasporas from a historical perspective, however, it proves to be insufficient when analyzing contemporary diaspora entities which are the result of various emigration waves that were provoked by different (political, economic) reasons – as is the case for many East-Central European diasporas in North America.

A contrasting typology is provided by Milton J. Esman, who argues that instead of defining the reason of dispersal of the given diaspora, one should categorize them according to their present function in the

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[4] Khachig Tölölyan, "Diaspora Studies. Past, Present and Promise. Working Paper" (International Migration Institute, 2012), http://www.migration.ox.ac.uk/odp/pdfs/WP55%20Diaspora%20studies.pdf.

[5] Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997).

host country.[6] Thus he suggests three categories: settler, labor and entrepreneurial. Esman's definition may seem more applicable since the initial reasons of emigration have already lost their significance for many diasporas. However, Esman's typology is just as limited as Cohen's inasmuch as they both treat diasporas as bounded and cohesive groups without internal diversity. Another typology is defined by Janine Dahinden, who approaches diasporas (or, in her own words, transnational formations) from the perspective of mobility and locality.[7] Mobility means the degree of physical mobility of the person with transnational ties, whereas locality means the degree of embeddedness of the person in the host country. The categories Dahinden defines are: localized diasporic transnational (where mobility is low but locality is high), localized mobile transnational (where both mobility and locality are high), transnational mobile (where mobility is high but locality is high), and transnational outsider (where both mobility and locality are low). Dahinden does not differentiate between diaspora and transnational formations, however, her article illuminates one of the definitive characters of diasporas, which is the presence of effective local ties in the host country. Dahinden's typology manages to overcome the bounded nature of both Cohen's and Esman's "diasporas" inasmuch as her unit of reference is the individual and not the diaspora per se, and thus, her typology can be used to describe diasporas of heterogeneous social, cultural and political background,

Diaspora politics is a broad concept which might embody the politicization and political behavior of diasporas, their relationship with the home and the host country, as well as the efforts of the home country to engage its diaspora in its affairs (be it political, economic, social, etc.). The role of diasporas in international relations and ethnic conflict resolution has acquired academic attention in the past two decades as well.[8]

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[6] Milton J. Esman, "Definition and Classes of Diasporas," in *Diasporas in the Contemporary World* (Cambridge, UK, Malden, USA: Polity, 2009).

[7] Janine Dahinden, "Dynamics of Migrants' Transnational Formations: Between Mobility and Locality," in *Diaspora and Transnationalism. Concepts, Theories and Methods*, ed. Rainer Baubock and Thomas Faist (Amsterdam University Press, 2010).

[8] Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 57, no. 3 (July 1, 2003): 449–79; Bahar Baser and Ashok Swain, "Diasporas as Peacemakers: Third Party Mediation in Homeland Conflicts," *International Journal on World Peace* 25, no. 3 (September 1, 2008): 7–28.

One comprehensive set of diaspora politics (referred to as transnational political practices by the author) is given by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen. Østergaard-Nielsen argues that transnational practices can be initiated by both members of the diaspora and the home country as well. In the former case, political developments or environmental disasters in the country of origin can trigger the engagement of both recent migrants and "established diasporas" as well.[9] In the latter case, when diaspora politics is initiated by the homeland, the motivation can be often of economic nature, namely persuading the diaspora to send remittances back home or to support the homeland's economy through investments. Besides economic benefits, prospects for the diaspora's professional resources or political support (lobby in the host country) may also be appealing for home country governments. However, depending on the contemporary interest of the sending country, encouraging return migration has sometimes priority over the solidification of and keeping contact with the diaspora, as is usually the intent of newly emerged nation states like Israel and Armenia (though intensive homeland–diaspora relations are equally important for these countries).

Further motivations can be behind diaspora politics as well. For example, demonstrating the homeland's responsibility towards expatriates carries an important message for the "mainland" constituency and therefore can be considered as a way of reinforcing the electorate of political party "at home" by demonstrating the government's engagement towards co-nationals abroad. Moreover, the political incorporation of the diaspora after regime changes can serve as a symbolic restitution and compensation for those who left the country because of political persecution,[10] as is the case for many post-communist countries in East-Central Europe. In certain cases the betterment of the situation of the diaspora in the host country may require efforts from the homeland government, which might be another relevant reason to initiate transnational engagement projects.[11]

However, it is important to emphasize that sending countries should not be taken for granted as the sole initiators of transnational practices; these projects are more often reactive than pro-active, and

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[9] Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, "The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices. Working Paper" (Transnational Communities Programme, 2001), http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/WPTC-01-22%20Ostergaard.doc.pdf.

[10] Szabolcs Pogonyi, "Four Patterns of Non-Resident Voting Rights," *Ethnopolitics*, November 2013, 1–19, doi:10.1080/17449057.2013.846041.

[11] Østergaard-Nielsen, "The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices. Working Paper."

furthermore, whether any of the attempts to engage the diaspora turns out to be successful is very much dependent on the "societal and political-institutional context in the receiving countries".[12] It is often argued that the longer a diaspora stays in the receiving countries, the less interest it has in the homeland's affairs,[13] however, factors like the reason of emigration as well as the cultural similarity of the emigrant group to the receptor population may also have a crucial impact on the degree of willingness to resonate to the homeland's calling.[14]

Alan Gamlen, who gives a concise summary of recent diaspora politics in his paper entitled "The emigration state and the modern geopolitical imagination", suggests that home countries can have two strategies to start the engagement of their diaspora: cultivating "diasporic identities and community structures" or "formally recognize existing diaspora communities".[15] To illustrate diasporic identity cultivation Gamlen mentions symbolic acts like the celebration of the "role of expatriates in the nation", delegation of diplomats to the diaspora at national holidays, or hinting references to co-ethnics abroad in official statutes, and practical ones like financing national language media or broadcasting. Formal recognition of the diaspora usually starts with statistical procedures or the establishment of official bodies in charge of the diaspora (consulate, government offices, etc.). Gamlan separates diaspora engagement from diaspora integration, the later meaning the establishment of "reciprocal ties" between the homeland and the diaspora. It is usually manifested in the extension of political and/or social rights (citizenship, voting rights, availability of social benefits) to the diaspora from the side of the state, in turn of which the state might expect political and/or economic benefits (investments, "expatriate tax", lobby, political participation in the homeland elections) from the diaspora. The cases of two of the classic diasporas,[16] the Jewish and the Armenian in the United States

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Kenneth D. Wald, "Homeland Interests, Hostland Politics: Politicized Ethnic Identity among Middle Eastern Heritage Groups in the United States," *International Migration Review* 42, no. 2 (July 1, 2008): 273–301.

[15] Alan Gamlen, "The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination," *Political Geography* 27, no. 8 (November 2008): 840–56, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.10.004.

[16] Anthony D. Smith, "Diasporas and the Homelands in History: The Case of the Classic Diasporas," in *The Call of the Homeland: Diaspora Nationalisms, Past and Present*, ed. Allon Gal, Athena S. Leoussi, and Anthony D. Smith (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010).

demonstrate clearly that the diaspora's effective lobby can be a real asset for the homeland's political affairs,[17] which further explains the willingness of the homeland governments to improve their ties with the diaspora.

Although birthright journeys do not appear among the popular "tools" of diaspora politics on Gamlen's list, these programs have been practiced by several countries with significant diaspora as a remarkable step on the way of diaspora engagement. The essence of birthright journeys lies in a positive personal experience attached to the home country; these programs call upon young individuals in the diaspora who are of the given country's origin to join for a journey (usually free of charge, or requiring only symbolic financial contribution from the participant) in the frame of which the "home country" is (re)discovered by them. As Kelner argues, "[d]rawing on nationalist assertions of inherent connections between people, culture, and place these [birthright tourism] strategies seek to unite globally dispersed populations by fostering a sense of shared belonging in a common political community that is simultaneously territorialized and deterritorialized, rooted and uprooted."[18] The working mechanism of birthright journeys is clear: it operates with highly emotional experiences by presenting the idealistic "homeland" and by bringing together same-aged youngsters who have in common their ethnic (or religious) ancestry, the latter being crucial in creating and maintaining group boundaries.[19]

In order to situate the Hungarian case among the various diaspora politics model, one has to first examine the characteristic features of the Hungarian diaspora. As claimed earlier, the Hungarian diaspora as such is the result of various emigration waves – various in terms of time, reason, social background of the emigrants, location of emigration, level of integration in the new state, level of connection to Hungary, and linguistic skills (both in Hungarian and in the

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[17] Tony Smith, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass. ; London, England: Harvard University Press, 2000); Yossi Shain, *Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush, "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation," *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 2 (June 1, 1999): 341–61.

[18] Shaul Kelner, *Tours That Bind: Diaspora, Pilgrimage, and Israeli Birthright Tourism* (New York: New York University Press, 2010).

[19] Jillian L. Powers, "Reimaging the Imagined Community Homeland Tourism and the Role of Place," *American Behavioral Scientist* 55, no. 10 (October 1, 2011): 1362–78, doi:10.1177/0002764211409380.

language of the host state).[20] Despite the obvious heterogeneity of the Hungarian diaspora, one might differentiate between two major subgroups, which can be labeled as the "old" and the "new" diaspora. The old diaspora embodies emigrants and their descendants who left Hungary because of the persecutions of the 20th century (World War I and II, communism, 1956 revolution),[21] and whose presence in their new countries has been interpreted as "emigration" for a long time. The new diaspora, in contrast, consists of migrants who moved away from Hungary since the democratic transition (and to an enhanced extent since 2004, the EU-accession of the country), thus who left the country for economic, professional, perhaps educational reasons. Members of the new diaspora have a totally different attitude towards the home country, and they very often exhibit intensive transnational ties in the sense that they are more mobile and tend to have connections in both the home and the host country.

Measuring the number of members of the Hungarian diaspora is highly problematic, and we can rely on tentative estimates only. In 2013, the Hungarian government counted with 2,5-3 million Hungarians living in diaspora,[22] which number is partly based on national statistics of the host countries and partly on the national statistics on emigration from Hungary. However, due to the intense migration scale and especially the free movement within the territory of the EU, the follow-up of migrating individuals became even more difficult, and as a result, it is doubted whether we can have any more exact data on the Hungarian diaspora.

Hungarian governments thus have to take into consideration the diverse nature of the Hungarian diaspora when defining the aims of its diaspora politics. The Policy Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad defines the integration of the "diaspora individual" into the diaspora community (and diaspora organizations) as the priority for Hungarian diaspora politics. Besides, enhanced connection to Hungary from the side of the diaspora, strengthening the national identity of the diaspora, exploitation of the economic, professional potential of the diaspora as well as their ability to improve the image of Hungary abroad, and finding and reaching the newest diaspora

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[20] For a detailed summary of Hungarian emigration waves to the USA see Andrew Ludanyi's paper in the present volume of Minority Studies.

[21] The „old" diaspora has to be supplemented with the economic migrants and their descendants of the turn of the 19th-20th century who settled in North America.

[22] "Magyar Nemzetpolitika – A Nemzetpolitikai Stratégia Kerete," (Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad) 2013, https://www.nemzetiregiszter.hu/download/a/12/10000/nemzetpol_strat_2_2013.pdf.

appear as strategic goals in the document.[23] Although it is not listed among the priorities of Hungarian diaspora politics in the Policy Framework, political mobilization of the diaspora might be a valid objective as well, since from 2014 non-resident citizens of Hungary are allowed to vote at the national elections. Thus, the electoral potential of the Hungarian diaspora might be a significant factor, however, diaspora population has not exhibited remarkable interest in the political affairs of the home country so far.

Hungarian diaspora politics since 2010

The landslide victory of Fidesz (center-right, conservative party) in 2010 meant a huge turning point in many respects of Hungarian kin-state politics. The most significant step was obviously the amendment of the Law on Citizenship which enabled non-resident ethnic Hungarians to apply for Hungarian citizenship. The possibility of preferential naturalization was soon followed by the extension of political rights to dual citizens, which meant that non-resident citizens became eligible to vote at the Hungarian national elections. Besides these, the Orbán-government introduced many symbolic measures, furthermore, it laid down the foundations of Hungarian diaspora politics as well, which – in certain regards – became separated from kin-state policy.

Although kin-state policy has been a central concern of Hungarian governments since 1990, interestingly, Hungarian diasporas enjoyed very little attention from the homeland before 2010. The second Orbán-government has been the first to introduce a structured policy to call for and engage diaspora Hungarians, and these measures were inserted – at least rhetorically – in the logic of the revised kin-state politics. One of the central mottos of post-2010 kin-state politics has been the propagation of the "unified and single Hungarian nation", which in the government's interpretation refers to a spiritual and symbolic unification of the nation, without any revisionist (territorial) claims, and in which there is room for all Hungarians, regardless of their residence, and, in the case of the diaspora, regardless of their command of the Hungarian language. The "discovery" of the diaspora led to the launching of a series of programs addressing the target group, as well as to institutional reforms.

In 2010, when the consultative forum for members of the Hungarians Parliament and members of Hungarian communities abroad, the Hungarian Standing Conference (Magyar Állandó Értekezlet

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[23] Ibid. pp.31-32.

– MÁÉRT) was convened anew for the first time after 2004,[24] the government decided to set up a separate consultative forum exclusively for diaspora organizations. With that measure, the government basically separated the coordination bodies of transborder Hungarians and diaspora Hungarians (although the diaspora is still represented in the Hungarian Standing Conference by one person per region). This implies that the different characters, needs and approaches of the two kinds of "Hungarians abroad" have been officially admitted. Thus we can claim that Hungarian kin-state and diaspora politics became separated from each other in institutional terms after 2010.

Diaspora politics differ from kin-state politics not only in institutional terms, but in their objectives as well. One of the initial steps of diaspora engagement policy was the launch of Hungarian Register (Nemzeti Regiszter), a virtual database for Hungarians worldwide, which provides weekly newsletter on Hungarian politics both in Hungarian and English. Its primary aim was to re-channel those who have lost contact with the homeland and to give them an up-to-date view about the home country. In fact, Hungarian Register has extended its function: it does not only serve to give information about Hungary to the diaspora but vice versa as well; diaspora organizations are allowed to share their news and events on the webpage. Thus, Hungarian Register fulfills one of the most important goals of Hungarian diaspora politics as defined in the Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad: to raise awareness of the diaspora in the homeland's current affairs and to reinforce their connection to Hungary.

Secondly, a cultural revitalization program (called Kőrösi Csoma Sándor Internship) was launched in 2012 in the frame of which young Hungarians travel to diaspora organizations and help them in organizing cultural events, heritage cultivation or language education. The internship takes six months and diaspora organizations work as hosting institutions for the interns. The program was welcomed with great enthusiasm and satisfaction by diaspora organizations, and already after the pilot year the budget of the program and thus the number of interns was doubled in 2014.[25] The tasks of the interns are

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[24] The socialist-liberal governments did not convene the Hungarian Standing Conference between 2004 and 2010 due to the deteriorated relationship of the Hungarian government and minority Hungarian communites abroad, which was the result of the failed referendum on dual citizenship in 4 December 2004.

[25] Bálint Fabók, "Felrázták Az Elfeledett Magyarokat (The Shake-Up of Forgotten Hungarians)," *Http://www.origo.hu/*, accessed April 9, 2014, http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20131111-korosi-csoma-sandor-program-a-diaszporaban-elo-magyaroknak.html.

defined by the conditions and needs of the hosting institutions, there-fore they can vary from location to location. Most often the interns are involved in organizing cultural events, festivals, commemorations of national holidays, but providing Hungarian language education or children's programs can also apply. Besides, taking stock of diaspora organization's heritage and carrying out basic research tasks are also done by the interns at certain locations. The Kőrösi Csoma Intern-ship thus aims to help the diaspora in preserving their identity and culture, and by sending Hungarian interns to the communities, intensified relations to Hungary is also expected as an outcome of the program.

Another key program targets the (physical) heritage preserva-tion of the diaspora. Mikes Kelemen Program was designed to collect Hungarian bequests – books, journals, photos, audiovisual records, personal collections – and to ship them back to Hungary. The program was launched in 2014, therefore the evaluation of the project is to be seen in the future. The idea is, however, to secure the "befitting utilization" of those heritages by disseminating them either to the National Széchenyi Library or to libraries of Hungarian kin-minori-ties in the neighboring countries.[26] A similar program called Julianus (since 2012) aims to list all Hungarian "memories" (streets named after Hungarians, statutes, plaques, etc.) and Hungarian-related places (cafés, bookshops) worldwide. The cadastre is available online[27] and can be extended by sending the name and address of the items with a photo or video to the State Secretariat for Hungarian Commu-nities Abroad. Both the Mikes Kelemen and Julianus Programs have the agenda to initiate a more conscious cultivation of diaspora pres-ence all around the world and to direct the attention of the diaspora (the old and the new as well) to their own heritage, and by doing so, to strengthen their Hungarian identity.

As a matter of fact, the availability of Hungarian culture has been offered by Hungarian cultural institutes (Balassi Institute) already before 2010 in many cities of the world. However, the scope of such institutions is very limited, as they usually operate in capital cities exclusively, which means that the geographically dispersed Hungarian communities cannot be expected to get involved in the events and programs of the institutes. Nonetheless, as those insti-tutions have a twofold agenda: to spread and popularize Hungarian culture abroad for foreigners and second, to provide a "Hungarian location" for members of the diaspora, the operation of the Balassi

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[26] https://www.nemzetiregiszter.hu/mikes-kelemen-program
[27] https://mapsengine.google.com/map/viewer?mid=z3mbci7PDIdA.kV11NcME-jvk

Institute should be mentioned among the projects aiming to reach the Hungarian diaspora. Moreover, the activities of the Balassi Institute in the field of Hungarian language education abroad and its scholarships offered for the younger generation of the diaspora in order to improve their Hungarian linguistic skills further reinforces its place among the tools of Hungarian diaspora politics.

Considering the engagement of the younger generation of the diaspora, who in most cases have already lost their personal ties with the homeland of the ancestors, birthright journeys offer a great opportunity to re-awake the interest of the target population in the homeland. ReConnect Hungary, the Hungarian birthright program targets Hungarian Americans and Hungarian Canadians (the program is offered for the Hungarian diaspora in North America exclusively), and the Hungarian American diaspora itself played a highly proactive role in the initiation of the project. It was George Pataki, former governor of New York (who is very proud of his Hungarian ancestry), and his daughter, Allison Pataki who suggested the idea of a Hungarian birthright program, and some prominent personalities of the Hungarian American diaspora like László Hámos, president of the Kossuth Foundation (based in Washington, DC) and of the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation (based in New York City) embraced the idea. The first year when ReConnect Hungary was offered was 2012 and it was co-financed by the Hungarian government and by the Kossuth Foundation in approximately 50-50%.

ReConnect Hungary targets young Americans of Hungarian heritage aged 18-26 who have not lived in Hungary past the age of 13. Those who do not speak Hungarian are equally eligible for the program, and it does not matter how far one can trace his or her Hungarian ancestry. The organizers try to find those candidates who have no or only very limited knowledge about Hungary and few contacts to Hungarian culture. This also implies that the channels of advertisement have to be chosen carefully in order to reach optimal candidates. Beside the most effective networking sites such as Facebook, the organizers advertise ReConnect Hungary in the newsletters of the "old" Hungarian American organizations that were founded by (mostly economic) immigrants of the early 20th century.[28] The main "narrative" of ReConnect Hungary is that "Hungarians are innovative", so that besides the natural beauties and historical sights of the country the participants can find another perspectives why they can be proud of their Hungarian heritage. The program offers tourist

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[28] Máté Vincze, ReConnect Hungary - from the perspective of an organizer, interview by Eszter Herner-Kovács, February 24, 2014.

attractions in Budapest and the countryside, meetings with top politicians, introduction to business and commercial opportunities in Hungary (including the legal conditions of launching a venture in the country), meeting talented young Hungarian start-up entrepreneurs, innovative designers and directors of successful firms in Budapest.

The expected outcome of the Hungarian birthright journey is twofold. First, to "win" the participants for the ancient home country in various possible ways, for example to have "goodwill ambassadors" of Hungary who can contribute to spread the good reputation of the country, or to encourage them to foster American investments or any kind of business activity in Hungary in the future. The other expected outcome of the birthright journey is to involve the participants in the cultivation of Hungarian heritage in the United States. The majority of the Hungarian American institutions' management is facing the problem of generational change and is struggling to find successor leaders. ReConnect Hungary therefore aims to contribute to this process by encouraging the participants to get involved and to take a more active role in the life of the Hungarian American community and organizations in their home when they return to the US.

As the last one among "diaspora projects" since 2010 one has to mention the political integration of the diaspora into the Hungarian nation. As claimed earlier in the paper, the second Orbán-government made Hungarian citizenship available for non-resident Hungarians. The criteria of acquiring Hungarian citizenship are the command of the Hungarian language and an official document proving that the applicant has a predecessor who was a Hungarian citizen. Although preferential naturalization is primarily designed for Hungarian kin-minorities living in the states surrounding Hungary, diaspora Hungarians are equally eligible for citizenship. However, the latter's interest in obtaining Hungarian citizenship has been remarkably lower than that of Hungarians in the neighboring countries. Similarly, diaspora members exhibited little activism at the 2014 national elections; only a couple of thousand persons in the diaspora registered on the electoral list.[29] This fact implies that the Hungarian diaspora is politically inactive, therefore their political mobilization should be encouraged in order to complete their integration in the homeland's political community.

Many of the diaspora projects launched after 2010 apply to both the old and the new diaspora. Although the work on cultural revitalization of

[29] Number of registrations for the 2014 national elections: http://valasztas.hu/hu/ogyv2014/766/766_5_1.html (downloaded 30 November 2014)

Kőrösi Csoma interns happens within the old diaspora institutions, members of the new diaspora are equally welcome to join the events and programs. Similarly, the registration of Hungarian-related places and memories for the Julianus program is open to anybody living in the diaspora, as is the possibility to subscribe in the Hungarian Register. On the other hand, Mikes Kelemen Program and ReConnect Hungary essentially targets members of the old diaspora; the former offers the transfer of personal collections back to Hungary, the latter wants to evoke connection to the homeland of the ancestors in the younger generation of Hungarian Americans. Concerning the option of preferential naturalization, it is again mostly applicable for the old diaspora, since members of the new diaspora did not lose their Hungarian citizenship when they left the country, while those who emigrated under communism were deprived of it.

Although half of the diaspora projects are designed to be able to affect members of the new diaspora as well, an important deficiency of the newly elaborated diaspora politics of Hungary is that there is no strategy which would ensure the finding of this (constantly growing) segment of the target population. It would be important to work out a strategic plan to find, reach and address – and probably channel into the old diaspora institutions – the members of the new diaspora, so that the goals of Hungarian diaspora strategy could be realized to the fullest extent.

Conclusions

The international toolkit of diaspora politics offers a range of possibilities for homeland governments to reach and engage their diaspora. Based on the characteristic features of the diaspora, Hungarian diaspora politics managed to define its primary goals: the integration of the "diaspora individual" into the diaspora community and its organization; enhanced connection to Hungary from the side of the diaspora; strengthening the national identity of the diaspora; exploitation of the economic, professional potential of the diaspora as well as their ability to improve the image of Hungary abroad; and finding, "identifying" and reaching the members of the newest diaspora. For most of these priorities the Hungarian government has found the tools and programs that can best foster the realization of these objectives, and thus the governmental projects launched after 2010 make up a coherent system which can be inserted in the international practice of diaspora politics.

András Ludányi

The Origins of Diaspora Consciousness in the Hungarian American Experience

The 20th Century was a time of great trials and tribulations for Hungarians throughout the world. Four historical events had particularly drastic and dramatic consequences for their existence. The First World War witnessed their military defeat with extensive human losses (1914-18). This was followed by the humiliation of the imposed Peace Treaty of Trianon (1920) which led to the loss of three-fourths of their territory and two-thirds of their population, including one-fourth of the ethnic Hungarian population of the Carpathian Basin.[1] The latter paved the way to World War II and the revisionist policies which tied Hungary's fate again to the side of the defeated states. The human losses of this war were staggering (both in terms of the holocaust and battlefield losses) and the occupation of Hungary first by the army of the Third Reich and then the Soviet Red Army, thereby weakened the nation still further.[2] It took the Hungarians another ten years before they were able to challenge the occupiers and their Teheran-Yalta-Potsdam facilitators.

The Revolution of 1956 was glorious but also devastating as it continued to bleed the nation in losses on both the battlefield and in the stream of refugees heading West. Finally the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1989-91 witnessed the peaceful erosion of national strength as the West's economic exploitation replaced Soviet military occupation and as unemployed young Hungarians became absorbed

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[1] Two very good "outside" perspectives are provided by Macartney, C.A.: *Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences 1919-1937*. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1937. Introduction, pp.1-40; and Cartledge, Bryan: *The Will to Survive: A History of Hungary* New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. Ch. 13; and for a decidedly Hungarian perspective see Fűr, Lajos: *Magyar sors a Kárpát-Medencében: Népesedésünk évszázadai 896-2000* (The Fate of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin: Population Growth from 896 to 2000). Budapest: Kairosz Publishers 2001., pp.279-298. Also see Bárdi, Nándor – Fedinec, Csilla – Szarka, László (eds): *Minority Hungarian Communities in the Twentieth Century* New York: Atlantic Studies on Society in Change, distributed by Columbia University Press 2011. all of Section One.

[2] Cartledge, Brian: *The Will to Survive*. op. cit. Ch. 16; Fűr: *Magyar sors a Kárpát-Medencében*, op. cit. pp.314-326; Also see Fűr, Lajos: *Mennyi a sok sírkereszt? Magyarország embervesztesége a II. világháborúban* (How many Headstones are a Lot? Hungary's Casualties During World War II.) New York: Püski Publishers. 1987., entire study.

by the job markets of the developed European Union and the United States.[3]

Each one of these events contributed to the global dispersal of the Hungarian population. Wave upon wave of Hungarians found their way to Western Europe, Australia, South and North America. The Hungarian migration to the United States was drawn from each of these 20th century national tragedies. As a consequence of the traumatic origins of each wave of migration, the fate of Hungarian settlers, particularly members of their emigré upper elite, were to be advocates for their people in American foreign policy. From the beginning they perceived their role to be unofficial diplomats and lobbyists in support of Hungarian national interests. Of course their differing perceptions of „national interests" did not enable them to present a united front during either the inter-war period or the post-World War II era to the 1956 Revolution. In the inter-war period this role was not seen as a direct factor in the immigrant or emigré self-definition. Only after the Second World War, particularly after 1956, did the diaspora self-perception become a conscious choice among members of the younger generation

The Hungarian American population of the USA in the interwar period was composed mainly of immigrants who left Hungary for a better life in the USA prior to World War I.[4] Only a small sector of this population could be described as emigré, that is people who left Hungary because of a political agenda either before or after World War I. This meant that the vast majority was involved in judging American-Hungarian diplomatic relations only on a general, even superficial level. The emigré population, on the other hand, attempted to influence or form the perspectives of American policy-makers. Aside from the differences in their socio-economic status, other factors also had a strong influence on how recent immigrants and emigrés must be broken into additional subdivisions while the working-class immigrants represented a more coherent but less active audience.

This less active audience can be dismissed for the moment, in the discussion of influencing foreign policy decision-makers. In an organizational context this mass immigrant population had its will reflected in the two great fraternal organizations (today called William Penn and HRFA-Hungarian Reformed Federation of America, although the latter just ended its career in a merger with a German-American

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[3] Cartledge, Brian: *The Will to Survive*. op.cit. Ch. 18; Főr, Lajos: *Magyar sors a Kárpát-Medencében*, op. cit. pp.350-351.

[4] For the immigrants of this period the most detailed general study is that of Puskás, Julianna: *From Hungary to the United States, 1880-1914*. Budapest: Akadémiai Publishers. 1982.

fraternal two years ago.) But HRFA and the predecessors of William Penn (Rákóczi and Verhovay fraternals) were the main base for the American Hungarian Federation established in 1906. These organizations were active, but not very influential in the American foreign policy area. More influential were the church leaders, the newspaper editors and the professionals who composed the upper elite of the Hungarian American communities – and provided the leaders for the fraternals – in places like Cleveland, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Toledo, Dayton, or New York City and New Brunswick, New Jersey.

The American setting in the interwar years was, however, the circumscribing, constraining factor. Who could and who could not exert influence in this setting? What was the relationship that can come into being between Hungary and the USA? What sectors of the emigré population tried to alter or obstruct these relations?

Three major conditions of American foreign policy circumscribed what Hungarian emigrés could or could not influence. First, the neo-isolationism of the post-World War I era. This had at least two spin-off effects. One was the USA rejection of the treaties concluding World War I and the refusal to join the League of Nations. The other was the emergence of a strong nativist movement that led to a dramatic curtailment of immigration to the USA and a strong assimilationist drive in society and education.[5] In one sense, the first result was viewed positively both in Hungary and by most Hungarian emigré leaders, namely that the USA was not a signatory to the Treaty of Trianon, and it did not even mention Hungarian borders in the final normalization of relations documents with Hungary. This at least in theory meant that the USA was open to the question of border revisions in East Central Europe, a major concern of the Hungarian government as well as of many emigré activists. The other result was less positive for Hungarians. American refusal to be part of the League of Nations meant that Hungary would not be able to piggy-back its concerns and interests on the back of a friendly great power. After all the French and the British were unflinchingly committed to the territorial *status quo*, while Germany and Italy became suspect allies after the Mussolini and Hitler power consolidations, and the Soviet option was a domestic impossibility after the Béla Kun fiasco (the proletarian dictatorship in Hungary between March and August 1919).

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[5] Ludányi, Andrew: *„Birmingham: The History of an American Neighborhood and an Ethnic Community,"* unpublished study 2005., pp.7-8; Also see Barden, Thomas E. – Ahern, John (Eds.): *Hungarian American Toledo: Life and Times in Toledo's Birmingham Neighborhood.* The University of Toledo, Urban Affairs Center. 2002., pp.18-20.

Finally, the domestic consequences of the neo-isolationism had negative consequences for Hungarian Americans in two very direct ways. First, it led to stringent immigration standards. As *The United States and Hungary: Paths of Diplomacy 1848-2006* State Department publication points out: "In May 1921, the U.S. Government began to limit immigration from southern and eastern Europe. The Emergency Quota Act restricted… Hungary's quota… [to] 5,747 immigrants … [and to] 869 people [annually after 1927]."[6] This meant that plans for family reunification were next to impossible and the strengthening of the Hungarian sector of the American population also highly unlikely. Furthermore, the Hungarians in cities like Cleveland, Chicago, Pittsburgh and Toledo now came under excessive nativist pressure to assimilate to an American WASP culture that many of them were not yet prepared to become part of.

Already before World War I groups like the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) campaigned to extirpate the "foreign" flavor of the immigrant communities. In my study on *Birmingham*, I point out that "[t]hroughout the United States at this time the 'Americanization Movement' was an important force for redefining the cultural commitments of recent immigrants. Just at the moment when the model of Ango-conformity was being challenged by the new model of the 'melting pot,' the neighborhood was already under pressure to abandon its distinctive Hungarian traits. The major pressure came through the Birmingham (public) School and the citizenship drive that took on a particularly aggressive momentum during World War I […]. The U.S. entrance into this conflict in 1917 put to test the loyalties of the neighborhood. As for German-Americans, this was also a very difficult time for Hungarian Americans. […] their 'old countries' were now at war with the USA […] they had to prove their American patriotism and loyalty. Acquiring citizenship and purchasing Liberty Bonds were two of the easiest ways of doing well on this test. János S. Strick, a business leader from the neighborhood even was given the distinction of being 'the first citizen of Toledo' for buying $20,000 worth of Liberty Bonds during this conflict."[7] On top of these environmental conditions, two others must be considered. The Prohibitionist movement of the greater society contrasted strongly with the Hungarian cultural perspective of enjoying life to the fullest. At the same time the economic depression hit in 1929 and

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[6] Office of the Historian (2012), The U.S. Embassy at Budapest Hungary, U.S. Department of State (Ed.:) *The United States and Hungary: Paths of Diplomacy* (Department of State Publications # 11363), pp.27-28.

[7] Barden, Thomas E. – Ahern, John Eds. :*Hungarian American Toledo*. op. cit. p. 20; Ludányi, Andrew: „*Birmingham…,*" op. cit. p.13.

it cut into the livelihood of all the people. The former factor limited the escape valve in the social sphere, the other constricted the promises of the American dream.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the most pressing Hungarian concern was to break out of the ring of isolation that the Little Entente and France imposed on Hungary after Trianon. Hungarian state policy and also non-state actors attempted to overcome this isolation by publicizing the injustice of the territorial *status quo* and by bypassing the physical and geographic barriers imposed by the above coalition of powers. Important in this endeavor were the agreements reached with the USA and Italy and later also Austria and Germany. The Hungarian emigrés in the USA split into two major camps in supporting or opposing these efforts. The larger camp tended to accept the "NO, NO, NEVER" strategy of the Hungarian government, while the more limited camp was represented by the disgruntled exiles of the former Károlyi government and the Oszkár Jászi intellectuals.[8]

For the sake of the present analysis as a simplified short-hand I will focus on three individuals who represented the main streams of emigré thinking. First, I will focus on Monsignor *Elemér Eördögh*, the pastor of St Stephens Church in Toledo, Ohio, second, on Oszkár Jászi of Oberlin College in Oberlin, Ohio; and finally on Dr. *Géza* Farkas, the editor of the Hungarian language newspaper Toledo, in the Ohio city of the same name. (The reason all three of my examples are from Ohio is due to the fact that I spent a great deal of time researching the Hungarian American Birmingham neighborhood in Toledo and I also spent a great deal of time on the writings of Jászi due to our common interests in ethnic, minority and inter-nationality relations.)

Hungarian relations with the USA had a solid foundation going back to the era of 1848-49 uprising, but even earlier to the time of the American Revolutionary War. It is not accidental that the first ever Louis Kossuth statue was put onto a pedestal in Cleveland, Ohio in 1902 and that George Washington received such recognition in Budapest in 1906. (Both of these efforts of symbolic solidarity were the results of American-Hungarian bridge building of emigrés and immigrants who wanted to strengthen the ties between the "old country" and the "new homeland.")[9] This strong bond was shaken

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[8] Ludanyi, Andrew: *American-Hungarian Diplomatic Relations and Interwar Hungarian Emigrés and Immigrants* 2012. p.4. Unpublished study presented at Central European University Symposium on the 90th anniversary of the establishment of the U.S. Legation in Budapest.

[9] Ibid. p.5

by the two world wars which swept Hungary into the enemy camp twice. However, even in this context, even when state to state relations were at a low point, the people to people relations were maintained on a level of friendship.

The Hungarian immigrant and emigré populations deserve a lot of the credit for this. Their efforts in the USA helped Hungary break out of this Little Entente imposed isolation. Diplomatic contacts were the first break-through, but other efforts also deserve attention. Hungarian participation in international events like the world fairs and conferences were opportunities to sell Hungarian products and to familiarize others with Hungarian culture. While they shunned the 1920 Olympics in Antwerp because the pain of Trianon was still too raw, they attended all the other interwar Olympic Games and outshone their Little Entente neighbors in the gold, silver, and bronze medals they accumulated in Paris (1924), Amsterdam (1928), Los Angeles (1932), and Berlin (1936). Also because of Trianon the Hungarian scouts did not send participants to the First Scouting Jamboree in London (1920). However, in all subsequent interwar Scouting Jamborees they were high visibility participants, including in Copenhagen, Denmark (1924), Birkenhead, Great Britian (1929), Gödöllő, Hungary (1933) as the host, and Vogelenzang, Netherlands (1937), and Pax Ting, the first Girl Scout Jamboree, also held in Gödöllő, again as host, in Hungary (1939).[10] This high visibility participation in sports and scouting is also paralleled in other "global" activities. These were viewed as opportunities to open windows to the world through which Hungary could be rehabilitated as a nation. Two other such global organizing efforts were the organization of the Roman Catholic Eucharistic World Congress in Budapest (1938) and the first calling together of the Hungarian World Congress also in Budapest in 1928. The latter conclave also resulted in the sending of a delegation to New York City in 1928 to unveil a second Kossuth statue, now on the West Side in uptown Manhattan. On the diplomatic front Hungary also became one of the first signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1929, outlawing first resort to war.[11]

How did emigré Hungarians relate to this activism on the international scene? Here let me return to Monsignor Elemér Eördögh, who was an active organizer for Toledo Hungarian participation both in the New York City Kossuth statue unveiling (1928) and in going to Budapest to be part of the World Eucharistic Congress in 1938. Msgr. Eördögh became an emigré as a direct result of the Trianon treaty.

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[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

He could no longer "go home" to his place of birth, because it had now been incorporated into Czechoslovakia. He used his incredible influence over his flock as St. Stephen's pastor to collect funds for efforts to reverse the negative consequences of the Trianon decision. He was very active both within the context of emigré politics and within the Church as a liaison with political leaders in Hungary. He was one of the major organizers and sponsors of the trans-Atlantic flight of the "Justice for Hungary" airplane piloted by György Endresz and Sándor Magyar in 1931. He was also involved – and recognized for this role in Hungary – as an important host for prominent Hungarian visitors to the USA and as a major Hungarian American leader in the Catholic Church.[12]

Oszkár Jászi was an emigré of a different sort, although he too was no longer able to "go home" because his birthplace was now incorporated into Romania. He also belonged to the outcasts of interwar Hungary. He was, unjustly in my opinion, held responsible for the collapse of historical Hungary because of his role as Minister for Nationalities of the Károlyi government. His early writings in the USA consequently reflected his disillusionment with his homeland. He was probably the most prolific writer and scholar from Hungary and his life at Oberlin College (1925-1957) straddled a large part of the interwar period. However, unlike Msgr. Eördögh, he did not have a community of supporters. Jászi was influential in another way, as a scholar whose writings had long-term influence in the academic world, but almost no influence at all on the foreign policy makers of the period, either American or Hungarian. However, his early writings in publications like *The Nation* were definitely not just critical but extremely negative regarding "Horthy's Hungary."[13] These opinion pieces did not influence USA foreign policy in the interwar period. In the long-run, on the other hand, they may have helped to set the stage for anti-Hungarian writings and scholarship in centers of East European and Slavic studies in the USA.

The third emigré is Dr. Géza Farkas, the editor of the newspaper *Toledo*, which he founded in 1929. *Toledo* became a mirror for the Birmingham neighborhood for the next forty years and provided a vehicle for promoting community solidarity. This newspaper did

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[12] Szántho, Miklós: *Magyarok Amerikában* (Hungarians in America) Budapest. 1984. p.76.

[13] Jaszi, Oscar: *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary*. London: P.S. King and Son. 1924., p.86; Bakisian, Nina: „Oscar Jaszi in Exile: Danubian Europe Reconsidered," *Hungarian Studies* (1994) 9 (1-2), 153, 155; Also see Oscar Jaszi's comments in journals of political opinion like *The Nation,* during the 1920's and 1930's.

not provide a critique of either American or Hungarian foreign or domestic policy. It was mainly a reporter of events in the neighborhood and American society. It did not promote or mobilize, it simply recorded developments. In this task it used mainly the Hungarian language, but after World War II more articles and reports began to appear in English. The role of Géza Farkas was to provide a transition from first generation loyalties to second generation integration. Through the pages of his newspaper it is possible to assess the challenges faced by the community from the Great Depression, through World War II and the 1956 anti-Soviet Revolution. However, *Toledo* contains no ideological commitment to ethnic survival or loyalties to the "old country." In the face of the aggressive campaign for fitting in there is not even a faint whimper against too much conformity. This probably was a reflection of the intimidating factor of the Hungarian homeland's enemy status in both world wars. Thus Farkas became an advocate of painless assimilation, he could think of maintaining Hungarian values only for one generation.[14]

These three perspectives were probably present in most Hungarian American communities and neighborhoods during the interwar period. Overall, the immigrant rather than the emigré dominated the scene. This would change dramatically during World War II and also after the 1956 Revolution. During the war the emigré status of Tibor Eckhardt and Rusztem Vámbéry began the splintering. This continued with the arrival of the DPs (Displaced Persons) following World War II and the Freedom Fighters of 1956. But the perspectives and activities of the latter two waves demands a new analysis, a look at the post-1956 scene.

The re-thinking began almost simultaneously in the Brazilian city of Sao Paulo and the American city of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. In both these cities younger generation activists began to question the formulations of their emigré forefathers regarding the role and purpose of "emigráns magyarok" (emigré Hungarians). The émigrés of 1945 and 1947 were escapees or refugees from the Soviet occupied Hungary of the Stalinist Rákosi regime. The 1945-ers were strong anti-communists and mostly conservatives who had been either the civil servants, military officers of the Horthy era, or middle class and upper class elements of that society. The 1947-ers were also anti-communists, but they had hopes for the establishment of democracy after the eviction of the Nazi German occupiers. These emigrés were mostly also middle class in social background, but also included many well-to-do peasants and a rising agrarian middle-class. They were

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[14] Ludanyi, Andrew: „*American-Hungarian Diplomatic Relations…,*" op. cit. p.7.

escaping to the West from the newly established Rákosi totalitarianism.[15] Both the 1945-ers and the 1947-ers were emigré Hungarians par excellence, they left Hungary for political reasons. As political expellees, they rejected post-1945, post-1947 Hungary, the Communist dictatorship and its institutions, and hoped that its existence was only temporary and an aberration that had been imposed on Hungary by foreign occupation and the ignorance of the Western democracies. Their hope was that this system would come to an end with global political developments and that eventually they would be able to return „home" to Hungary with the expulsion of the Communists.[16]

From the beginning of their exile these emigrés differentiated themselves from the large number of immigrants who were already present in their new homelands. These "kivándorlók" (immigrants) were the first and second generation labor and agricultural elements of Hungarian society that had settled in Brazil, USA, Canada and Australia from the 1890's to 1914 and during the years of the global depression. For the most part they were economic immigrants who left Hungary or Hungary's immediate neighbors to better their economic and social existence by working overseas for a time and then returning to the region to buy land or build a family house. The First World War and Trianon transformed their planned temporary stay into a permanent one. For both social and political reasons these two waves of emigrés and immigrants did not become a unified Hungarian Brazilian or Hungarian American community. Their distance from one another was also assisted by the tiny, but influential "Béla Kun" and "őszirózsás" left-wing emigrés who left Hungary as exiles of the Horthy era in 1919-20, like Oszkár Jászi. The latter gained control of a number of influential newspapers which perpetuated not just the divisions between left and right, but between social classes as well as between „old" and „new" settlers in the Brazilian, Australian and American settings.

The Revolution of 1956 led to the start of re-thinking the role of Hungarians beyond the borders of Hungary. Although most of the 1956-ers were also emigré Hungarians, the event that forced them into exile also signaled that the Soviet occupation and the Communist order in Hungary was not coming to an end soon. The brutal repression of the Soviet Union and the tepid response of the "West" convinced Hungarians both at home and abroad that they had to

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[15] Várdy, Béla: Magyarok az újvilágban: A dipi emigráció. (Hungarians in the New World: The D.P. Emigrés) In: Kovalszki, Péter (ed.): *ITT-OTT Kalendárium* Ann Arbor, MI, 2013. p.146.

[16] Ibid.

prepare for the long-term duration of János Kádár's (1956-1988) political status quo. The emigré organizations broke into two major camps at this time,[17] the larger, more conservative cluster, favored a steadfast opposition, a hard-line rejection of the Kádár regime, while the smaller cluster felt that an incremental erosion of the communist totalitarian system was possible. They favored the *Détente* politics which began to emerge during the last years of the Eisenhower Administration under Secretary of State Herter.

As opposed to these two emigré clusters a small number of activists began to stress that these two options were not the only ones available to displaced Hungarians. This group was composed mainly of the children, or the second generation of the 1945-ers and 1956-ers. They were born in the new homeland or were very young when they became exiles. Consequently, they did not have the firm attachments of their predecessors to the Hungarian homeland. They did not think that "returning" to the "old country" was required once Hungary shook off the Communist shackles and again became a free political system. This group emerged mainly in the early 1960's in a debate that began in the ÉMEFESZ (Északamerikai Magyar Egyetemisták és Főiskolások Egyesületeinek Szövetsége), the emigré university student organization created after the 1956 Revolution. The organization included mainly 1956-ers, but it also recruited Hungarian college students who were the offspring of the immigrants and of the 1945-47 emigré waves. Within this organization the debate centered on the role that this student generation was to serve in the long-run. Since the organizational leadership of ÉMEFESZ was in part dependent on US State Department, i.e. Radio Free Europe (some link it to the CIA) funding,[18] the stance of the organization reflected the foreign policy concerns of the USA. After 1962 this meant mainly a low-key support for *Detente*.

The dissidents within ÉMEFESZ were some of the founders of the new diaspora consciousness of Hungarians in the United States, Canada, Brazil and elsewhere. The split became obvious with the emergence of the newsletter and later periodical called ITT-OTT (Here-There) edited in Baton Rouge, Louisiana by two graduate

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[17] Borsody, István: Az Amerikai külpolitika és az emigráció politikája (American Foreign Policy and the Politics of the Emigrés) in *Látóhatár* (Horizon) 1956, no. 5, pp.251-252.

[18] Várallyay, Gyula: *Tévuton—ügynökök az ötvenhatos diák mozgalomban nyugaton és utóélete* (Missed Intersection: Subversive Agents in the 1956 Student Movement in the West and its Aftermath) Budapest: L'Harmatan - ÁBTL 56-os Intézet. 2011. pp.39-42.

students at Louisiana State University.[19] Already in the fifth issue of ITT-OTT (May 1968) one of the editors called on the upcoming ÉMEFESZ conference in Chicago (Summer 1968) to distance itself from emigré politics.[20] This article focused on the emigré weaknesses of ÉMEFESZ which must be replaced by „szétszórtsági" (diaspora) consciousness if ÉMEFESZ does not want to become extinct. In this article the author defined emigré consciousness as capable of maintaining only one generation of Hungarians. It is not capable of sustaining the survival of Hungarians abroad because it tends to define its condition as „temporary." As opposed to this the diaspora Hungarians (szétszórtsági magyarok) set out to perpetuate Hungarian existence in future generations. They do not view their existence outside of Hungary either as „unnatural" or as „temporary."[21] The emigrés view their existence as defined by organizations and goals that froze in time at the moment they left Hungary. Thus, the emigré isolated himself from developments in Hungary and became an unrelenting critic of everything that characterized his former homeland. This mentality led the emigré as it had for the intra-war emigrés, to one of two options: either repatriation after the hated regime collapsed, or total absorption into the life and society of the new homeland. Between these alternatives every emigré group disappears after one generation.[22]

As opposed to this result, the diaspora mentality makes it possible to survive for multiple generations. While the emigré can imagine existence only by associating it with the territory of the Hungarian state, the diaspora Hungarian sees the meaning of their existence defined by their association with the language, culture and national values of the Hungarian people. The diaspora Hungarian preserves, or attempts to preserve these throughout the global dispersion. They feel that you can be a „jó magyar" (quality Hungarian) even if you have never been to Hungary, and have never seen the Tisza river, Lake Balaton, or visited a small Székely village in the shadow of the Hargita mountains.[23] This mentality of the diaspora Hungarians demands constant renewal and commitment to community inter-

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[19] See *ITT-OTT* (Here-There), vol. 1, no. 1 (Oct. 23, 1967).

[20] Ludányi, András: Szétszórtság vagy emigráció? (Diaspora or emigrés?) In: *ITT-OTT*, vol.1, no. 5 (May 31, 1968). pp.13-14.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Cseh, Tibor: Gondolatok egy templomban (Reflections in a Church). In: *Csernátontól a Reménység taváig: Válogatott írások* (From Csernáton to Lake Hope: Selected Writings) .Budapest: Fekete Sas Publishers, 2014. p. 372, quotes the Australian-Hungarian Ruttkay Tamás' poem (1970) to drive home his point.

ests. It leads to an existence characterized by constant networking. It requires contact with developments in Hungary as well as the world at large. Because it involves keeping contact with Hungarian communities without regard to borders, the diaspora Hungarians do not isolate themselves, nor do they hold onto a frozen moment in time, whether 1945, 1947, 1956 or 1989.

However, the refusal to be time-bound by a particular moment in history is in itself not enough to sustain a diaspora. Its survival depends at least on two other very important factors, the tolerance of the new homeland for diversity and the inner will and cultural cohesion of the people concerned. The tolerance factor is in large part a consequence of how the "new" homeland came into being. Did it become a state as a consequence of the nation-state ambitions of one nationality? For example the French, the Slovak, the Romanian or Austrian states define themselves as nation-states each having a dominant *Staatsvolk* (state forming nation). As opposed to this states like Australia, Canada, the United States or Brazil came into being as states composed of multi-ethnic populations, due to the immigrant origin of their peoples. In both contexts assimilationist processes are a constant part of existence, however, the states based on mass immigration policies have generally been willing to tolerate diversity. (Although the degree of tolerance varies from state to state even among these immigration based states. Thus, on a cultural diversity continuum Brazil and Australia exhibit less, while the USA and Canada exhibit more tolerance for diversity.)

In the United States context, integration and ultimate assimilation has moved from the initial rigid perspective of Anglo-Conformity to the Melting Pot, and then the Cultural Pluralism formulation. Since September 11, 2001, however, the cultural pluralism formula has lost some of its appeal and more recently the assimilationist values of the melting pot seem to have been revived and re-asserted. Still, the diaspora Hungarians have been able to retain their identity even within this context. The reason for this is their commitment to the preservation of cultural values. They have not affiliated with specific political groups or ideologies in the present-day or the recent past. Instead they are motivated by the survival of the Hungarian language and culture wherever it has taken root. Thus, they have been in the forefront in defending the rights of Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia, Carpatho-Ukraine, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia or the Burgenland region of Austria. In addition they have exerted efforts to sustain their own communities in such widely dispersed centers as Sydney, Australia, Sao Paulo, Brazil, Toronto, Canada and Chicago or Cleveland, USA. While their emigré or immigrant

predecessors had defined themselves by the political symbols of their former homeland in the title of their publications (e.g., *Népszava/ People's Voice, Szabadság/Freedom, Nyugati Magyarság/Hungarians in the West, Szittyakürt/Skythian Horn, Munkás/Worker,* or their geographic location as *Pittsburghi Magyarság/Hungarians in Pittsburgh, Clevelandi Népszava/Cleveland's Voice of the People, Chikágó és Környéke/Chicago and Environs),* the diaspora Hungarians have titled their publications to reflect their dispersion and diversity (e.g., *ITT-OTT/ Here-There, Nyolcadik Törzs/Eighth Tribe, Ötágú Síp/Five Vented Flute, Sziget Magyarság/Hungarians of the Archipelago, Szivárvány/Rainbow,* and *Haza a Magasban/Homeland Transcending Borders.)*[24]

For their survival they have learned to depend on themselves. Hungarian governments, excepting the Orbán governments, have paid primarily lip-service to the fate of diaspora Hungarians. However, the diaspora has been able to overcome many of the issues which have divided their immigrant and emigré predecessors. In their organizations and institutions they have de-emphasized social class and religious differences and have also avoided the rigid left-right ideological divisions of the past. This has been in part a consequence of learning from the pragmatic experiences of American society. Thus, most of their involvement has been with some ethnically active churches, the Hungarian exile scouting movement, and cultural and literary societies. They have turned their political involvement mainly toward defending minority rights and human rights. They have avoided the posturing and memorandum politics of their predecessors and have instead become adept at lobbying and charitable work for the Hungarian minority communities in East Central Europe as well as support for the diaspora communal organizations that have enabled them to survive to the present.[25]

The diaspora activists were loosely linked to one another through the exile scouting network and through the human rights struggles of the late 1970`s and after. Those disenchanted with ÉMEFESZ also bolstered the work of the Alumni Association (Bessenyei György Kör) in New Brunswick, New Jersey. But the theoretical foundation of diaspora consciousness was derived mainly from the ITT-OTT periodical of the late 1960's. Besides the founders of the ITT-OTT

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[24] Bakó,Elemér: *Magyarok az Amerikai Egyesült Államokban* (Hungarians in the United States of America). Budapest: A Magyarok Világszövetsége Nyugati Régiója, 1998. , pp149-152.

[25] Ludányi, Andrew: Hungarian Lobbying Efforts for the Human Rights of Minorities in Rumania: The CHRR/HHRF as a Case Study. In: *Hungarian Studies* (1990) vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 79-80.

movement (Louis Éltető, George Csomay, Andrew Ludányi), in the early years, particularly the early 1970's, Tibor Cseh (from Midland Park, New Jersey), Laszló Bőjtös (From Cleveland, Ohio), Endre Károly Nagy (from Columbus, Ohio), Márta and Thomas Frecska and Márton and Magdi Sass from Chicago and László and Mária Soltay from Toronto were early supporters of the movement. Most of them had already become part of the inner circle of the movement by the Hereford, Pennsylvania conference of 1972.[26] The Lake Chautauqua, New York meetings in 1974-75, witnessed the addition of József Értavy from Buffalo and Balázs and Csilla Somogyi from Connecticut as well as many younger generation activists like József Megyeri and Erika Bokor from Chicago, who would become the backbone of the movement by the 1990's. In the formulation and active debate surrounding the movement's religious commitments Sándor Szent-Iványi and András Hamza played a significant role besides Louis Éltető.[27] On the critical side Balázs Somogyi and prominent leaders of the former ÉMEFESZ (including Károly Nagy, László Papp, Gyula Várallyay and Béla Lipták) contributed a great deal to the refinement of the movements' goals.

Although diaspora perspectives were gaining ground in the thinking of Hungarian Americans, it is surprising that the most influential emigré thinkers viewed them as a threat to the unity of a strong anti-communist front against the Kádár regime. Tibor Tollas, András Pogány, László Pásztor and the Hungarian Association of Cleveland under János Nádas represented this group. Fearing the reaction of the former to close ties with ITT-OTT, in private, people like Gábor Bodnár (leader of the Scouts Association in Exile), expressed their sympathy toward the objectives of the movement. Also in this category we could include László Hámos, Bulcsu Veress and Jenő Brogyányi (Hungarian Human Rights Foundation) of the younger generation.[28]

Surprising is that the doyen of emigré intellectuals, Gyula Borbándi, failed to deal with the diaspora perspective in a serious way. In his writings in *Uj Látóhatár*, as well as the writings of many of his colleagues the focal point always remained emigré politics and concerns.[29] This is also the case for István Sisa who toys

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[26] Névmutató (Index of Names) in *ITT-OTT Szeminárium* {Here-There Conference} (Hereford, Pennsylvania: 1972. szeptember 2-3) p. 94.

[27] Ibid.*;* and perusal of *ITT-OTT* index issue for years 1967-1977.

[28] Ludányi, Andrew: *Hungarian Lobbying Efforts…,* op. cit. pp. 81-82.

[29] See for example Borbándi,Gyula: *A magyar emigráció életrajza 1945-1985* (The Hungarian Emigrés from 1945-1985) .Münich: Az Európai Protestáns Magyar Szabad Egyetem, 1985, and Borbándi, Gyula: *Nyugati magyar irodalmi lexikon és*

with the main ideas of diaspora consciousness and then makes the claim that the ITT-OTT periodical took these ideas from his writings in 1990.[30] Others, like Sándor Kiss, János Horváth, and Gyula Gombos accepted many of the group's assumptions, but did not join the debate. However, one of the most prominent members of the emigré elite, Zoltán Szabó, titled one of his books published in 1999 as *Diaszpóranemzet* (Diaspora Nation).

The most interesting reaction or nonreaction, is that of the Hungarian government. In official circles, Hungarians in the West were always viewed as reactionary emigrés. In the publications of the World Federation of Hungarians Miklós Szánthó set the tone, or at least reflected the tone of official Hungary. Thus, for the Communist Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkás Párt) the World Federation of Hungarians remained a mechanism not for the support of Hungarian survival of the diaspora beyond the borders, but as a means of infiltrating and dividing the emigré world.

Only after the collapse of communism in 1989-91 is a real change possible. But initially, only lip-service is paid to support the Hungarians in diaspora. Only three exceptions to this are the activities of the Bethlen Gábor Foundation from 1982 to the present, the World Federation of Hungarians in the period from 1992-1998, and the efforts of the Orbán governments (1998-2002 and 2010 to the present). The Bethlen Gábor Foundation as well as some other civic organizations already began to build bridges to the diaspora in the last decade of the Kádár regime, during the 1980's. Their task was mainly the creation of communication networks with the most active diaspora groups. As a continuation the World Federation of Hungarians already went one step further when the opportunity offered itself after the collapse of the communist power structure. This led to a re-vitalized World Federation that was no longer the control instrument of communist power, but became a forum for the Hungarian communities across the borders via its quality publications and the work of the Mother Tongue Conferences (Anyanyelvi Konferenciák) (under the leadership of Béla Pomogáts) through textbook publishing, language camp organizing, and the organizing of language instructional conferences. This outreach to the diaspora Hungarians was particularly effective

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    bibliográfia (Hungarian Literary Lexicon and Bibliography in the West). Budapest: Hitel, 1992. This is also the case in the two volume compilation by Gazda, József: *A harmadik ág: Magyarok a szétszórattatásban* (The Third Branch: Hungarians in Dispersion) Budapest: Hétkrajcár Publishers, 2011.

[30] Sisa, István: Szétszórtságban: Az emigráció alkonya (In Dispersion: Sunset for the Emigrés). In: Sisa, István: *Örtállás Nyugaton* (Standing Guard in the West) Morristown: Vista Books, 2004. pp.76-80.

during the 1994-1996 years when Sándor Csoóri and István Bakos were at the helm of the organization. Unfortunatelly, it was short-lived, because the new leadership under Patrubány discredited itself and the work of the organization.[31]

Fortunately the Orbán governments realized that this vacuum had to be filled with new programs that would strengthen the diaspora and its activities. It replaced symbolic posturing and developed plans to ensure diaspora survival. The first real such commitment comes with the establishment of the Balassi Institute to provide scholarships to 10-20 young overseas Hungarians to study for a year in Hungary. This was established by the first Orbán government and involves KMCSSZ (Külföldi Magyar Cserkész Szövetség) – Scouts in Exile and members of the Hungarian Communion of Friends (MBK) in the screening and selection of student participants.[32] Although this program was not abandoned by the Medgyessy-Gyurcsány-Bajnai interlude, nothing was done to expand like programs.

Only when FIDESZ and KDNP regained power with a two-thirds majority in Parliament, did the Orbán government have the opportunity to return to its support for diaspora survival programs. These are most succinctly summarized for us by Péter Kovalszki (President of MBK) on the occasion of the second conference of the Hungarian Diaspora Council (Magyar Diaszpóra Tanács) in October, 2012. Kovalszki became a member of the Hungarian diaspora, and joined the work of MBK/ITT-OTT together with László and Ágnes Fülöp in the early 1990's. (He was part of the exodus that left Romania to escape the minority repression of the Ceauşescu regime.) From this conference onward a whole series of programs were put into place, which at the present time are still ongoing in sustaining the existence of diaspora Hungarians. Probably the most successful such programs have been the Körösi Csoma Sándor Internships which have provided cultural guidance for about one hundred diaspora communities during the past two years. The Julianus Program supplements this by developing an inventory of Hungarian artifacts globally and the Mikes Kelemen Program which attempts to save the library and book collections of diaspora communities. It also includes the „ReConnect

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[31] For the background see particularly Bakos, István: *Közszolgálatban (*Servicing the Commonweal) Budapest: Püski, 1994.

[32] See magyarság ismereti képzés a diaszpórában élő magyar származású fiatalok számára and Teleki Pál Alapítvány at www.balassiintezet.hu
Kovalszki, Péter: Diaszpóra nemzet: Bevezetés egy válogatáshoz (Diaspora Nation: An Introduction to a Compilation), pp.171-172; Bakos, István Honismeret (National Awareness), pp.172-182; Csapó, Endre: Mit ér a magyar a nagyvilágban? (What is the Global Worth of Hungarians?), pp.183-189; In: *ITT-OTT Kalendárium* (2013).

Hungary – The Hungarian Birthright Program" and the easing of restrictions for Hungarians to acquire dual citizenship. An explosion of activities has taken place in the past five years that have reached out to diaspora communities in all parts of the world! It would be impossible to do them justice in the context of such a brief overview. Each one of these programs deserves a special study on its own to present its goals, activities and results. However, these programs would not have been possible, without the triumph of the diaspora perspective among the policymakers of the Orbán government.[33]

The statements of Zsolt Semjén at the 2013 Diaspora Council echo the earliest formulations of the diaspora conception.[34] This was reviewed in the presentations of László Bőjtös at both one of the EPMSZ (European Free University of Hungarian Protestants) conferences as well as his latest presentation at Lake Hope State Park (Ohio) in August of 2014. In essence his study collected all the significant statements on the diaspora conception and demonstrated that these led step by step to the formulations and policies of the current Orbán government and its outreach to the Hungarian diaspora. The abandonment of emigré politics and its replacement with the diaspora perspective has transformed the relations between the Hungarian government and Hungarians living beyond the country's borders.

The major challenge now is to integrate the „kiszivárgók" („seepage Hungarians") who have left Hungary since 1989. Kovalszki aptly designated them in this category, because of their gradual drain, or oozing dispersal throughout the world (i.e., seeping/oozing out of the 20th century wounds of the Hungarian nation). However, these „seepage Hungarians" now constitute an important part of the diaspora population. As László Hámos points out in his essay „Gyarapodó nemzetrész" (A Growing Community): According to the U.S. Census Bureau they have increased by 138,481 from 1,398,724 Hungarian ancestry inhabitants of the USA in 2000 to 1,537,205 in 2012.[35] The diaspora activism of the Orbán government addresses this seepage crisis as well, and not one moment too soon!

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[33] Semjén, Zsolt: *Nemzetpolitika*. Talk presented at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, 24 September 2012. Budapest: Szent István Társulat, 2012., pp. 7-30.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Hámos, László: Gyarapodó nemzetrész, In: *ITT-OTT Kalendárium* (2013), p.203.

Education

Attila Papp Z.

Selecting a Majority-Language School by Hungarian Minority Students, or From PISA Results to Discourses in the Carpathian Basin[1]

The schooling of children, their transition from kindergarten to school and from one educational level to another, sets the direction of their entire future career path, and it is usually embedded into parental decisions – be it conscious or determined by the environment. Besides the individual benefits (success), real or assumed, the outcome of these decisions and series of decisions has social and economic relevance affecting public good. From a minority perspective, these decisions may be coloured by further special aspects, since by choosing the language of schooling, parents opt not only for a school, but for a language as well.

International comparison: faith in school choice and counterexamples

Based on the international PISA tests, we can affirm that in the OECD countries, the possibility of school choice itself can have a beneficial effect on average school performance. In those educational institutions where parents could choose between several similar schools, the pupils admitted perform better on the whole than those who had no choice or had only a limited one.[2] However, it should be noted regarding the methodology that for the OECD, two mean values are used: our statement above has been formed on the basis of valid responses, but if we consider the OECD countries as a unit, within which each country is represented proportionately to the

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number of its pupils,[3] then the results of those who did not have a choice regarding their school are not inferior to that of those pupils who could have chosen a different school (but they are lower than the performance of those who could choose between two or more schools apart the one they attended). Thus, strictly speaking, we can only observe that although a more competitive situation produces a significant increase in school performance, the lack of competition does not necessarily lead to a poor performance.

Table 1. *The averages and standard error of competency (SE)[4] according to the number of schools that could be chosen at the time of schooling (PISA 2012)*

	How many schools could parents choose from at the time of schooling?					
	Two or more		**One more**		**No other school**	
	Mathematics					
	Avrg	*Standard error*	Avrg	*Standard error*	Avrg	*Standard error*
OECD-average	501	*(.76)*	488	*(1.69)*	481	*(1.71)*
OECD total	493	*(1.48)*	475	*(4.55)*	475	*(2.55)*
	Reading					
OECD-average	504	*(.77)*	491	*(1.70)*	482	(1.79)
OECD total	502	*(1.48)*	483	*(3.65)*	482	(2.66)
	Sciences					
OECD-average	508	*(.74)*	497	*(1.71)*	489	*(1.67)*
OECD total	502	*(1.59)*	485	*(4.36)*	487	*(2.73)*

However, PISA tests allow not only for the comparison of different school types, but they also report about system-level performances. Competition between schools does not necessarily go hand in hand with a rise in system-level performances, as we could see in the case of Switzerland, Finland and Lichtenstein, all of which did well on the 2012 tests. More than half of the parents of the pupils of these three countries did not have a choice regarding the school of their children, and yet, these countries are considered to be in the lead in Europe. At

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[3] In the PISA-OECD reports, the former is indicated in the lines of *OECD Average*, and the latter as *OECD Total,* completed by the following explanation: "*OECD Average* – the average of the valid percentages and mean performance of OECD countries", and "*OECD Total* – (OECD as single entity) – each country contributes in proportion to the number of 15-year-olds enrolled in its schools."

[4] At a 95-percent probability level, the mean confidence interval is: [average – 1,96*SE; average + 1,96*SE].

the same time, most of the students in Estonia and the Netherlands attend a school that the parents could select from at least two institutions, and these educational systems also fared well on the tests.

The situation gets even more complex if we examine the school performance of "school choice 1",[5] "school choice 2"[6] and "no school choice"[7] pupils. In some countries, pupils without a school choice do better or at least, not significantly worse than those pupils whose parents could select between schooling options. And interestingly, countries that exhibited excellent performances in mathematics in 2012 can be found among the abovementioned educational systems: China Shanghai, Macao, Hongkong, the provinces of Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and the Netherlands and Lichtenstein among the Europeans. In the case of these countries, we can note that having a school choice contributed more to the decrease of the national performance. In the United Kingdom, pupils who did not choose their school do not lag behind those who did, although the country's performance is considered to be the average among OECD countries.

Table 2. *The averages and the standard error (SE) of performance points according to the number of schools available at the time of schooling in some Central and Eastern European countries (PISA 2012)*

| | How many schools could parents choose from at the time of schooling? | | | | | | Difference* | |
| | Two or more | | One more | | No other school | | | |
	Avrg	Standard error	Avrg	Standard error	Avrg	Standard error	No choice – school choice 1.	No choice – school choice 2.
Hungary	486	(6.72)	466	(9.89)	468	(9.84)	2	-18
Czech Republic	510	(4.45)	481	(10.15)	459	(11.31)	-22	**-51**
Slovakia	493	(4.25)	446	(15.32)	448	(11.21)	2	**-44**
Slovenia	519	(1.80)	477	(3.27)	478	(2.23)	1	**-41**
Poland	524	(4.95)	518	(10.50)	504	(4.86)	-14	**-19**
Romania	449	(5.61)	434	(10.51)	443	(6.94)	9	-6
Serbia	450	(5.15)	440	(12.89)	447	(10.37)	7	-3
Croatia	477	(5.18)	485	(12.25)	445	(6.27)	**-40**	**-32**

* *The differences between the averages in bold can be considered significant at 0.05 level.*

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[5] Those pupils whose parents could have enrolled them in another school.

[6] Those pupils whose parents could have enrolled them in at least two other schools.

[7] Those pupils who had no choice at the time of their enrolment.

Now let us have a look at these trends in our region, Central Europe. Is it true that the schools attended by "school choice 1" or "school choice 2" pupils as defined above perform better than those which cannot select their pupils due to structural reasons? In our region, and also among ethnic Hungarian parents in the countries surrounding Hungary, there is a kind of faith in school choice: the bulk of parents believe that they have to select the school for their children, because in this way, they can contribute to the future success of their children, i.e. their success on the job market.

If this job market success is "operationalized" with the competence values, then we can state that in our region, it is only Croatia where the educational system is selective to such an extent that the competition contributes substantially to the increase of skill points. In other countries, including those located in the Carpathian Basin, the possibility to choose between two schools does not affect the performance of pupils in terms of competences. However, if competition becomes fiercer, the issue of school choice may become decisive: besides Hungary, this also holds true for Slovakia. Interestingly enough, both Romania and Serbia have such a homogeneous school system that in reality, there is nothing at stake. Even though ethnicity does not appear as a factor in these figures, they seem to suggest that from an ethnic Hungarian point of view, choosing between schools has a serious impact in Slovakia whereas it makes no big difference in Transylvania and Vojvodina.

The majority school choice of ethnic Hungarian minorities

Somewhat tautologically, we can only talk about school choice if a choice is actually made at some point. If there is only one school that is available, for instance due to school districts or the specificities of the settlement, then we have a case of "forced ride" for lack of another choice. If we put this choice into a minority language context, we can observe that theoretically, school choice matters where there are institutions competing with each other linguistically as well. Consequently, one can talk about a real choice in those regions which have relatively balanced ethnic proportions and mother-tongue institutions as well. Where the ethnic minority's ratio is very low and there is no mother-tongue institution, or in the opposite case, where ethnic Hungarians are the regional majority, the ethnic aspect of school choice is pushed into the background. Based on our interpretation of the PISA figures, however, that does not mean that in ethnically homogeneous situations (as a regional majority), choosing

a particular school would not change anything. On the contrary, it is in these regions and where parents have to choose from at least three potential schools that the danger is the greatest: there is a risk that those who cannot choose fall back, while those who can will become separated, i.e. they can go to a high-performance school.

Thus, in regions where minorities live dispersedly one often encounters a forced choice and advanced assimilation, whereas in the block regions (where minorities make up the majority) the ethnicity- and language-based school choice does not make a difference, because almost everyone can study in their mother-tongue. Nonetheless, specific school choice can be overridden by macro processes as a result of which dispersed communities may attach a renewed importance to the maintenance of minority forms of education, and on the other hand, ethnic Hungarian block regions may also face the challenges of majority-language school choice.

Based on our earlier research, it has been revealed that choosing a particular school can be motivated by various reasons. That is why it is difficult to treat this cluster of problems as a solid unit.[8] Nevertheless, the analyses carried out in various locations and ethnically diverse (block and dispersed) environments have shown several similarities. The motives of school choice can be grouped in several ways. From a pragmatic point of view one can distinguish symbolic (the transfer of the language and the culture) and rational (characteristics of the school) motivations. If one takes interethnicity as a starting point, one can distinguish the particular motivations of those living in dispersed communities and in blocks, while if one considers the person actually making the decision one may differentiate between the decisions of parents, pupils, teachers or other professionals, and so on.

Systematizing the motivations of ethnic Hungarians regarding school choice, one need to look at them on macro, mezzo and micro levels, and one has to distinguish between factors directly and indirectly related to ethnicity, i.e. minority education. The macro level refers to the motivations pertaining to the whole of the educational system, the mezzo level is constituted by the factors closely related to school, while the micro level represents the motivations underlying individual decisions.[9]

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[8] See the compilation entitled Iskolaválasztás határon túli magyar közösségekben (School selection by transborder Hungarian communities) *Kisebbségkutatás* 2012/3. pp.399-566.

[9] For further details, see Papp Z., Attila: Az iskolaválasztás motivációi és kisebbségi perspektívái. (Minority perspective as a motive for school selection) In *Kisebbségkutatás* 2012/3. pp.399-417.

According to the data of a survey published recently, the majority of those participating in state-language education were born to interethnic marriages.[10] Mixed marriages, the educational level of the parents and the socio-economic status related to the above all affect majority-language school choice. Based on the international PISA figures, it can also be shown that lower socio-economic status increases the probability of majority-language school choice in Transylvania and Vojvodina, while it is not necessarily the case in Slovakia.

As for the mezzo level, school choice is also influenced by the prestige of the institution, the services provided by it, and the local opinion of the quality of those services. Whether the majority-language school is "better" than the minority-language school is not only a question of minority politics, but also a factor with a significant impact on school choice on the local level. The fact that one can perfectly acquire academic knowledge only in one's mother-tongue has often been demonstrated scientifically,[11] but (minority) parents do not necessarily base their decisions on scientific grounds. The local prestige of an institution is determined by the judgement formed about its students and teachers, school results made public, the conscious recruitment strategy of the institution, etc. Minority parents may be targeted by the services of the majority-language school as well, or minority parents may look for the majority-language school if they think or hope that education is more effective there – at least, that of the majority (state) language.

At the same time, the language-oriented organization and tradition of the educational system (Is it a separate system of institutions?; Are there mixed or bilingual schools or classes?; Is the environmental language part of the curricula?; etc.) also affects the school performance of those pupils who do not study in their mother-tongue. Based on the recent 2012 PISA figures, I can affirm that in our region, those who do not study in their mother-tongue in the educational system of Serbia and Croatia, both having traditions of bilingual school organization, do not fall behind those who study solely in their mother tongue.[12]

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[10] Dobos, Ferenc: *Asszimilációs folyamatok az erdélyi, felvidéki, kárpátaljai és vajdasági magyarság körében 1996-2011.* (Assimilation tendencies among Hungarians in Transylvania, Hungarian part of Slovakia, Carpatho-Ukraine and Vojvodina 1996-2011) B Fókusz Intézet, 2011. http://www.kmkf.hu/tartalom/assszimilacio.pdf

[11] See also the accumulated OECD data of Table 3.

[12] In Hungary, there is no significant divergence in this respect, but that is probably related to migration factors and the state of assimilation of ethnic minorities living in Hungary. It is most likely that this has also contributed to the fact that a minority educational sub-system based on independent institutions is not typical in Hungary, either.

Table 3. *Competence values according to the language spoken at home and the language of the test in some countries of this region (PISA 2012)*[13]

	Language spoken at home	READING		MATHEMATICS		SCIENCES	
		Average	SE	Average	SE	Average	SE
Albania	same as test language	395	(2.97)	394	(2.02)	397	(2.34)
	other language	382	(18.43)	382	(13.95)	394	(14.01)
Austria	same as test language	**502**	(2.69)	**519**	(2.60)	**521**	(2.42)
	other language	**453**	(6.26)	**460**	(6.03)	**452**	(5.80)
Croatia	same as test language	486	(3.29)	472	(3.55)	493	(3.10)
	other language	462	(15.89)	460	(16.75)	473	(16.89)
Hungary	same as test language	490	(3.18)	478	(3.21)	496	(2.97)
	other language	473	(16.59)	483	(20.13)	498	(18.81)
Romania	same as test language	**439**	(3.96)	**445**	(3.76)	**440**	(3.24)
	other language	**384**	(14.00)	**418**	(13.02)	**403**	(12.21)
Serbia	same as test language	448	(3.47)	450	(3.43)	445	(3.41)
	other language	441	(9.83)	447	(9.00)	450	(10.21)
Slovakia	same as test language	**474**	(4.05)	**491**	(3.34)	**482**	(3.57)
	other language	**351**	(13.89)	**394**	(12.51)	**367**	(13.27)
Slovenia	same as test language	**487**	(1.21)	**507**	(1.09)	**520**	(1.29)
	other language	**431**	(4.87)	**447**	(5.95)	**457**	(5.02)
OECD TOTAL	same as test language	**500**	(1.13)	**492**	(1.11)	**502**	(1.13)
	other language	**469**	(2.55)	**459**	(2.83)	**463**	(2.71)

Note: the averages in bold vary significantly within the given country. It is important to point out that the group of people who filled in the test in a different language includes not only Hungarians, but other ethnicities as well in Slovakia, Romania and Serbia. We will come back to the discussion of the data regarding the Hungarian minority later on.

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[13] http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/interactive_results.php table: 190800. Retrieved: 20 September 2014

**Figure 1.** *The competences of ethnic Hungarian pupils in mathematics (PISA 2003-2012)*

Figure 2. *The competences of ethnic Hungarian pupils in reading comprehension (PISA 2003-2012)*


Figure 3. *The competences of ethnic Hungarian pupils in natural sciences (PISA 2003-2012)*

Based on what can be gathered from the PISA tests (see *Figures 1-3*), ethnic Hungarians usually fall below the average in the Slovakian system considered to be mediocre in European comparison, while they have above the average competencies in the Romanian and Serbian educational systems, which seem to lag behind compared to the rest of Europe. In Vojvodina and Transylvania, one can see the success of the mother-tongue education of ethnic Hungarians (those partici-pating in Hungarian-language education do better than their majority

fellow students), while among Slovakian Hungarians, the performance of those attending majority-language education has been catching up since 2009, whereas the performance of mother-tongue education has been decreasing over the years. At the same time, one can also observe that from an ethnic perspective, the most homogeneous results have been produced by Serbia, while the processes going on in the other two, rather fragmented systems point in the opposite direction. In Slovakia, the majority is "winning", and this is also indicated by the fact that ethnic Hungarians studying in Slovak-language education did better than "average" Hungarians in 2009 – at least in the domain of mathematical competences. In Romania, trends seem to be the opposite: the performance of Hungarians was better between 2006 and 2009 than that of Romanians, but the results became more even by 2012. At the same time, ethnic Hungarians studying in the majority Romanian language seem to lose the most, as they have been steadily producing the poorest results among the groups examined in the three countries.

The discursive space of majority-language school choice in Carpathian Basin

As one can see, choosing a majority-language school shows various patterns according to the PISA figures: in certain places, it can produce virtually equivalent results with mother-tongue schooling, while in other places it projects the possibility of school failure. Therefore, in the framework of our qualitative research, we wanted to find out why a smaller group (about 20 percent on average) of ethnic Hungarian parents chooses majority-language schools. Based on the schema presented above, this problem can be classified as an ethnicity-related micro-level analysis. To put the question differently: through which micro-mechanisms did parents make their decision to opt for education in the majority language? Our research was mainly qualitative (based on interviews), but we are aware of the fact (as demonstrated by PISA figures) that opting for majority-language education varies from country to country and from region to region, and it is also related to the ethnic composition of the settlements. Although we made interviews in the first place, the analysis of the interviews shed light not only on the importance of micro-levels, but also on some opinions regarding educational institutions and the local functioning of educational systems.

In the framework of the research, we examined the motivations for choosing majority-language schools in two micro-regions within each of the four greater ethnic Hungarian regions. Altogether, we designed eight micro-region case studies, which were created on

the basis of the interviews made with the parents concerned, school directors, teachers, and representatives of other pedagogical service providers.

However, the fieldwork made us reformulate many of our original ideas. In some regions, we encountered genuine resistance when it came to finding subjects to be interviewed and in conducting the interviews. Most of all it was the case studies of Dunajská Streda (Dunaszerdahely) in Slovakia and Gheorgheni (Gyergyószentmiklós) in Transylvania that made it clear that a more thorough investigation of this topic may run into major methodological difficulties. According to our Slovakian colleague's interpretation of this phenomenon, the topic is likely to be a taboo, and that is why it encountered opposition. The parents who choose a majority-language school for their children can sense their non-conformity to certain expectations of the local society, thus they would like to cover up/hide their decision in discourse in order to mitigate this structural tension. At the same time, the heads of some of the schools concerned did not wish to share the specificities of the problem with outsiders (e.g. researchers), so they applied a strategy of non-disclosure through a certain administrative discourse.

Nonetheless, if we found a few willing interviewees thanks to the local resourcefulness of our colleagues, a whole new world opened up. These conversations revealed the worries of parents concerning the future of their children. In many cases, these worries are not of ethnic nature, but rather they reflect both the effort to meet the particular characteristics of the local structural and educational policies and the future prospects thus undertaken. It should be highlighted again that these parents often go against the conventions of the local society and the ideological considerations of preserving ethnic Hungarian identity. These decisions are simultaneously affected by the individual level and the mezzo- and micro-levels going beyond that, and it is often difficult to tell to what extent these factors are related to ethnicity. If we assume that opting for the majority schooling language means that the mother-tongue of one or both of the parents will not be regarded as the language of schooling, then this act will have a linguistic, i.e. ethnicity-related aspect (besides the potential negotiations and conflicts within the family). Thus, the fundamental question is rather what kind of rationalizing discourses are born in this situation that carry a structural and interethnic perspective and how these discourses are related to the local microcosmos. Although it is impossible to give a unified picture based on our research and methodology, one can still point out the principal forms of discourse.

In the Slovakian case, the most striking observation was the *administrative refraining* and the discourse of non-disclosure that

teachers resorted to, and this was partly characteristic of one of the Transylvanian case studies, too. In Subcarpathia (Ukraine), the teachers who were asked used a *self-legitimating discourse*. A teacher working in a majority-language institution, but whose mother-tongue was Hungarian, spoke positively about participating in majority-language education. According to this logic, Hungarian children adapt easily to new linguistic challenges, tackle their linguistic difficulties in a short time, and they do well in school.

This legitimating discourse appears among parents as well, since they also have to explain their decision. In one of the Subcarpathian case studies, it can be seen clearly that this rationalization is closely related to the local educational market. Parents feel that Hungarian-language education does not provide as many opportunities as Ukrainian-language education, which also allows for optional Hungarian lessons. In this view, children "learn to read and write in Hungarian, too", but their competences will develop in the official (majority) language as well, which is important if they want to "exist", prosper and build a career at home. Moreover, this legitimazing discourse goes together with a kind of *compensatory discourse*, which has at least two sources. On the one hand, parents would like their children to avoid the limitations the parents have in the majority language, and it follows from this logic that parents are supposed to provide their children with all that was not granted to them. The other source of compensation can be found at the level of individual careers: during a conversation, it turned out about one of the couples committed to making "an existence" at home that they had tried to live and work in Hungary for years, but it never worked out for a variety of reasons. In this case, it is obvious that their own (mobility) failure affects their future plans regarding their child.

There is also a kind of *affront discourse* that can be observed in the parents' testimonials, which indicates that due to their individual decision, they are discriminated by the representatives and procedures of the local minority Hungarian political body. In this affront discourse, the rejection of the local political entities and the educational policy tools (educational support) of the mother country, Hungary, targeted at ethnic Hungarians living abroad, is apparent. One of our conversations showed clearly how the local society is divided into an official sphere and an informal civil sphere. Regardless of rejecting the official local society (i.e. the partial rejection of the expectation to give children a Hungarian-language education), the local society is still thought of as a resource and a civil sphere, through which parents can uphold their own decision. As it was revealed in one of the conversations, parents assure the transpor-

tation of their children to the majority-language town school from the (Hungarian-majority) village by renting a bus together that takes the children back and forth. "Busing" is not a novel tool in educational policy, but this practice is a clear sign of the quiet resistance of parents, associated with their future plans for their children.

The discourses that could be collected among pupils are quite diverse. The positive (i.e. self-legitimating) discourse of teachers does not always surface in them. As it turned out, Hungarian-speaking teachers are not always helpful, and the use of the mother-tongue is often not readily accepted outside the classroom. Consequently, it is not surprising that internal ethnic lines are created within the classes, and that children who have not mastered the majority language prefer each other's company. However, as we move towards the higher grades, these internal lines begin to fade away because with the improvement of majority-language competencies the youth behave more confidently at the school.

Although there are countless differences between the regions we studied, interestingly enough, two shared features can be distinguished. First, the extra value of majority-language schools is provided by foreign languages taught. On our Subcarpathian sites, these schools are considered to be good by parents and teachers because pupils can study not only Ukrainian, but English and German as well. Similarly, our subject from Dunajská Streda (Dunaszerdahely), Slovakia also reported that learning English had been present in his life since the age of kindergarten, and he could continue learning that foreign language in the Slovakian-language school.

Another shared observation is that the Roma question does not appear in the discourse about majority-language schools, which is mostly due to the fact that there are no Romas in the institutions we examined – the Roma usually go to Hungarian-language schools.

Conclusion

Through the interviews, we were mostly able to uncover individual motivations – however, the presence of system-level factors was also perceivable in the background of these discourses. According to estimates, 16 percent of the pupils studying in the Ukrainian elementary schools of Berehove (Beregszász) are of Hungarian ethnicity, but there are some institutions where their proportion is as high as 30-40 percent in the Ukrainian-language classes. In another location, 20 percent of Ukrainian classes are Hungarian. In this context, opting for the majority-language school should not necessarily be regarded as a rare phenomenon – even if local society treats it as taboo. On

the contrary, it seems to be an increasingly dynamic trend, partly induced by the Ukrainian education policy: system-level actions (e.g. the specifics of the Ukrainian school-leaving exam) affect institutional and invididual strategies as well. Our research was intended to provide a starting point, and we can only hope that these phenomena will be further investigated with the help of quantitative and qualitative methods.

Attila Papp Z. – Zsombor Csata

Hungarian PhD Students Abroad: International Contexts and Specificities of the Carpathian Basin[1]

Introduction

The statement that the youth participating in PhD programs assure the academic replacement of a country or a region most likely requires no further justification. At the same time, statistically speaking, with higher education transformed into mass education, an increasing number of students have appeared on the higher levels of education. That raises the question that participation in PhD programs could be not only about the foundation of an academic career, but also about prolonging the stage of youth (pre-adulthood) by an extended school path. This youth moratorium can be regarded as the antechamber of becoming an adult: although PhD students are already grown-ups with a diploma in higher education, the fulfilment of their professional career is still ahead of them. They are equally affected by the challenges of finding a workplace related to the shaping of their professional identity and establishing the conditions of their existence, which presumably have an impact on their private sphere as well (marital status, willingness to have children, etc.)

From the perspective of Hungary and Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary, the situation of PhD students is a complicated issue. First of all, it is not easy to define the notion of Hungarians living "beyond the borders" because the participants of PhD programs enjoy a greater mobility. The bulk of them attend PhD programs in Hungary regardless of their BA level studies, and it is more and more likely that they are Hungarian citizens as well. But then, the question arises: can they still be counted as "Hungarians abroad" or not? However, if we disregard definitional distinctions,

another, perhaps more important question is how their obtained Hungarian citizenship affects their professional career. As indicated above, the status of PhD students presupposes a certain mobility and a (professional, identity, private, etc.) quest, and according to this logic, the new citizenship would inevitably open up new perspectives. While the professional integration in Hungary of ethnic Hungarian researchers coming from neighbouring countries can also be interpreted as a success on the individual level, the Hungarian-Hungarian brain drain may have a backlash on the community "left behind". The more students participate in PhD programs in Hungary, the higher the risk of intellectual migration. While the dimension of the latter does not pose such a great threat for the more numerous Hungarian community in Transylvania, smaller communities are likely to be more affected by this potential migration.

International contexts

Although targeted international comparative studies about PhD students are still lacking from the sociology of higher education, we can get a relatively detailed picture of these student groups in terms of certain indicators. Using EUROSTAT databases,[2] we will present the data of the participants of PhD programs of EU and other countries below regarding some important indicators. The highest number of PhD students has been registered in the U.S., with nearly half a million students. Within Europe, Germany stands out in terms of absolute numbers, followed by the United Kingdom, France and Spain. The French level is somewhat exceeded by the Japanese data with75 thousand PhD students registered.

If we examine the time series of the number of PhD students in the countries of our region (*Figure 2*), a slow increase can be observed in Romania and Slovakia, while Hungary is characterized by stagnation: here the number of PhD students basically did not change in the period between 2002 and 2011. It is also evident that in Slovakia, which country's population is half as large as Hungary's, the number of PhD students is greater than in Hungary each year, and in 2011 it was almost twice as high as the Hungarian figure.

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[2] http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/education/data/database

Figure 1. *The number of persons pursuing doctoral studies – 2011 (source: EUROSTAT)[3]*


Figure 2. *The number of PhD students between 2002-2011 in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania (source: EUROSTAT)*

Besides the absolute number of the participants of PhD programmes, another important indicator is the number of those having obtained a PhD degree per 1 million inhabitants. This figure was 228 persons in the EU, and we can state that Hungary is lagging significantly behind the EU average and the result of the countries of our region. While this figure is 309 in Slovakia and 263 in Romania, Hungary, with its score of 124, is on the same level as the countries of Southern Europe and the Balkans. Although Poland and Japan can also be found in this set, it is still striking that based on the data

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[3] For the sake of clarity, we did not include the data regarding the U.S. in the figure, where there are 492 345 PhD students registered.

available, Hungary is left behind in comparison with basically all of its neighbours, perhaps with the exception of Serbia[4] and Ukraine.

Concerning the gender distribution of PhD students, we can say that on the EU level, men constituted the majority in 2011 (53 percent men compared to 47 percent women). This pattern varies from country to country, and we can also declare that in the countries in the scope of our research, gender proportions shifted more in favour of women compared to the EU average. Thus, gender inequalities are less noticeable here than on the EU level; for instance, in Romania, the ratio of male and female PhD students is equal. Based on further data not detailed here, it can also be concluded from the EUROSTAT databases that the gender proportion of those obtaining a degree does not differ substantially from that of students enrolled. In 2011, the above mentioned 53:47 male-female distribution was preserved among PhD graduates on the EU level. Some dropout by gender can be observed in the case of Hungary: here the figure of male students is 53 percent among PhD graduates compared to 51 percent of those enrolled.

Based on EURASTAT data we can conclude that in the countries examined, 6 percent of PhD students belong to the youngest category, 39 percent are 25-29 years old, about one quarter of them are 30-34 years old, 12 percent have 35-39 years of age, and 17 percent are older than 40. According to these data we can also say that the Anglo-Saxon educational systems are more likely to allow the younger generation to enter doctoral programs than the ones in continental Europe. In Germany, where the number of PhD students is the highest, the typical age brackets are 25-29 and 30-34 years, making up 86 percent of all PhD students, whereas the French system basically incorporates no members of the older generations. Hungary and Slovakia more or less follow the continental model, but their systems are open at both ends; in the international comparison, the participation rates of the youngest and the oldest generations are relatively high in the education of academic replacement. The PhD system of Romania has undoubtedly shifted towards the older generations; there the participation rate of the 30+ generation is almost 60 percent.

If we consider age and gender at the same time , we can say that in all three countries of the Carpathian Basin region, women increasingly drop behind with age, although not to the same extent. While in Slovakia and Hungary this lagging behind becomes noticeable after

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[4] In Serbia this number is estimated at 65-70. (See also: Ágyas – Novák – Rózsa: Pillanatfelvétel a vajdasági magyar doktoranduszokról (Snapshot on the Hungarian PhD students in Vojovdina) *Kisebbségkutatás* 2013/3. pp.80-100.)

the age of 34, in Romania it is more visible among those above 40. This is also related to the fact that the Romanian system is a stronger filter in terms of age, for the group of 20-24-year-olds is quite small compared to the other countries. Romanian PhD students delay (or are delayed in) the beginning of their academic career, thus gender equalities are brought to the fore only in a later period of time.

In the EU countries, the overall ratio of PhD students is relatively balanced in the domains of humanities, social sciences, natural sciences and engineering (between 16-23 percent), and the proportion of those pursuing (human) health studies is also significant (11 percent). In general, Hungary follows these trends, except for perhaps the field of engineering, where the country lags behind by 8 percent. Among the neighbouring countries, Romania is somewhat overrepresented in terms of engineering and medical PhD students compared to the EU, whereas a substantial fall-back can be detected in the area of natural sciences.

Within the sociology of higher education, the targeted research of doctoral students has been a neglected area not only in Hungary, but elsewhere as well. The first major research offering an international comparison was conducted in 2009, the data of which were published in 2011.[5] The research, carried out primarily with the purpose of description (and not of model creation), covered 12 countries,[6] and sought to answer two principal questions: what are the living, social and professional conditions of PhD students like, and what differences can be shown between the doctoral programs of the European countries? According to the main results of the research, in most of the countries men are in majority, their age ranges from 26 to 35, and most of them have a partner, but no children. Two thirds of those surveyed are full-time students, and most of them hope to work as a researcher. Regarding mobility, it should be pointed out that only 10 percent of them started their PhD studies in the country where they received their master diploma. With respect to financing doctoral studies, the authors emphasize that the size of the support received was usually inferior to the needs, and as a direct consequence, it led to the postponing of childbearing. The latter trend is also reinforced by the fact that the time available for completing one's doctoral studies is quite limited, so having children is put off to a later stage in life. According to the PhD students interviewed, the person of the

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[5] http://www.eurodoc.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Eurodoc_survey_I_ report_2011.pdf

[6] Hungary and the countries included in our survey did not participate in that research.

supervisor is of key importance in the doctoral programs, but they also emphasized that the number of courses on research ethics or on the improvement of convertible skills is either negligible or simply non-existent within the programs.[7]

In Hungary, the first comprehensive survey was carried out in 1999.[8] Later on the workplace chances of graduates were scrutinized,[9] and a local research was also conducted (in Debrecen).[10] A survey planned for 2007 but accomplished only in 2009 targeted PhD students in Hungary again, and answers were provided by 226 people through an online questionnaire. As indicated by the authors themselves, their survey could not be considered representative, and the results were published only for the sake of information.[11] Their data revealed that 37 percent of PhD students came from second generation intellectual families, and about half of them were already married. The respondents were quite satisfied with their thesis supervisors, and two thirds of them would have chosen the same person again.

The results of another major Hungarian research were published in 2010. This research analyzed the years following the acquisition of the degree, and it examined the evolution of the young researchers' career and what a PhD was worth on the job market.[12]

Research aims and methodological considerations

Since the establishment of the institutions of Hungarian-language higher education in the Carpathian Basin, more and more Hungarian young people obtain a diploma in their home country, and many of them decide to do PhD studies for an academic degree. The ethnic Hungarian PhD students of the Carpathian Basin partly pursue their studies at the universities of their home country and partly at Hungarian institutions with a Hungarian state scholarship or

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[7] http://www.eurodoc.net/projects/completed-projects/eurodoc-survey-i/

[8] For a short overview see Kucsera, Tamás Gergely – Szabó, Tímea (eds.): *A doktori képzés Magyarországon – szervezetek, szereplők, hallgatók.* (PhD programs in Hungary – Organizations, actors, students) Doktoranduszok Országos Szövetsége, Budapest, 2009.

[9] Fábri, György*: Kutatási jelentés a doktori fokozatot szerzettek munkaerő-piaci esélyeit feltáró kutatási programról*. (Chances on the job market with a PhD – Research report) FTT 2002. Quoted by Kucsera – Szabó i.m.

[10] Fináncz, Judit: Doktoranduszok szakmai és magánéleti tervei. (Professional and personal plans of PhD students) *EDUCATIO* 2007/3. 487-518.

[11] Kucsera, Tamás Gergely – Szabó, Tímea (eds.): *A doktori képzés Magyarországon – szervezetek, szereplők, hallgatók.* op. cit.

[12] See Mosoniné Fried, Judit – Tolnai, Márton (eds.): *Fiatal kutatók. Az életpálya kezdete.* (Young researchers) Typotext Kft, 2010.

by paying a tuition fee, and there are also some who continue their studies in a third country.

We have little or partial information about the exact number of the PhD students concerned, their current place of residence, their position on the job market, the current state of their doctoral studies, and the direction and intensity of their efforts to integrate into the academic world. Although it is precisely in the framework of the present research that we managed to obtain detailed data concerning ethnic Hungarians integrated into the higher educational system in Hungary, we still feel that some data are lacking. The aim of our research was to make up for this gap: most importantly, we wanted to gather information about the doctoral studies and eventual career paths of ethnic Hungarian PhD students from the Carpathian Basin.

The central questions of the research were the following:
   (1) How many ethnic Hungarian youth from the Carpathian Basin attend the various forms of doctoral programs at present, i.e. what kind of academic recrutation basis can ethnic Hungarians expect to see in the Carpathian Basin (and what is its distribution by academic fields)?
   (2) How are the integration efforts of PhD students oriented (do they wish to join the academic network of their homeland, of their country of residence, Hungary, or perhaps a third country)?
   (3) How successful are ethnic Hungarian PhD students from the Carpathian Basin in integrating into the academic world (what are their principal difficulties)?
   (4) How are the PhD scholarships granted by the Hungarian state utilized by the ethnic Hungarian youth in the Carpathian Basin (i.e. compared to the total number of those financially supported, how many actually obtain a degree and where do they find a job)?

In terms of its methodology and conceptual framework, it is the 2009 Hungarian survey that our survey resembles the most. Our research was carried out online, and our questionnaire touched upon 6 major topics: the socio-demographic background of PhD students, their job market situation, information and opinion about doctoral schools, future plans after the programme, and the evaluation of the role of the local PhD associations.

The online questionnaires were spread in Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine (Subcarpathia) as well as on Internet forums, and our objective was to get ethnic Hungarian PhD students

to fill them in regardless of their place of study (Hungary, their home country or elsewhere). The questionnaires were region-specific, but in the present analysis we examine the accumulated database.[13] The questionnaire was filled in by 485 people.

We cannot consider our data representative, because we did not have such background information in comparison to which we could make that claim. We have reliable data only about students studying in Hungary,[14] but even these pieces of information may raise some methodological concerns. In the data of the Educational Authority, PhD students are registered by citizenship and not by ethnicity, however, as a result of the introduction of preferential naturalization in Hungary in 2010, this category may become malleable as well. The official data pertain to those participating in doctoral programmes, so it is possible that those who have finished their courses but have not defended their thesis fall out from the official registry. Nonetheless, we consider these pieces of data as the most substantial and the most reliable database, thus we will take a quick glimpse at them in a separate section.

As indicated above, we do not have straightforward evidence concerning the representativity of the 485 proper respondents for the PhD student society outside the borders of Hungary. However, we can make two tentative claims. First, there are no significant differences regarding the distribution of students by academic domain, i.e. as it transpired from the official Hungarian figures, the highest number of people take part in doctoral programmes in humanities, followed by natural and social sciences in nearly equal proportions. Second, perhaps there is a slight distortion in the data among Transylvanian and Slovakian respondents studying in Hungary in favour of humanities versus technological and medical studies, but since in general we do not have an exact and reliable data as a reference point,[15] we do not weight the database.

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[13] Because of that, certain data lines of the regional studies included in the report may differ from the regional data lines presented here.

[14] We would like to express our gratitude to the employees of the Educational Authority for making these data available for the Minority Research Institute of the Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

[15] In theory, the representativity of the students studying in neighbouring countries could be verified with the help of exact statistics about higher education. However, based on our data, 2.2 percent of ethnic Hungarian doctoral students do not study in the Carpathian Basin. Unfortunately, we do not have any data for the verification of the reliability of this figure.

Ethnic Hungarian PhD students in Hungary in light of the official data

In the academic year of 2012-2013, 446 doctoral students coming from Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine and Serbia were registered in the Hungarian educational system. Even though the official data[16] keep account of citizenship and not of ethnicity, so it is possible that not all the persons coming from these four countries are of Hungarian ethnicity, however, since the language of these programmes is usually Hungarian, it is reasonable to suppose that these students are indeed ethnic Hungarians. Our data are also available by institution (see *Table 1*), and it is possible that among the students of the German-language Andrássy University and the English-language Central European University (CEU) there are some whose ethnicity or mother tongue is not Hungarian. In the former establishment, there are 2 students coming from these countries, while in the latter, there are 34 of them, so we can safely affirm that there are more than 400 ethnic Hungarian doctoral students in the Hungarian educational system.[17]

On the whole, we can observe that Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) is the most attractive institution for ethnic Hungarian students, but strong regional forces of attraction are also at play: Vojvodinians primarily aim for Szeged and to a lesser extent for Pécs, while Subcarpathians opt for Debrecen, and more than half of Slovakian Hungarians wish to continue their studies in Budapest. Since Transylvanians as a group do not have a specifically identifiable educational centre in Hungary, they are usually attracted to the Hungarian capital. Nonetheless, there is a sort of regional crossover between Partium (the westernmost part of Romania, bordering Hungary) and Debrecen. At the same time, other university centres also exert some force of attraction on Transylvanians. In other words, the place of further education within Hungary is determined mostly by the proximity of the institutions – due to economic rationality –, which is indirectly related to the social situation of students (a closer doctoral programme is easier to reach, hence cheaper).

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[16] These data have been provided to us by the Educational Authority in Budapest. We would like to say thank you once again for granting us access to them.

[17] We disregard these uncertainties in our presentation of the data. The cumulative results include all the students of the country of origin. The greatest distorsion is most likely to be caused by students studying at CEU because we can assume that not all of the 26 Romanian citizens are of Hungarian ethnicity.

Table 1. *Rate of PhD students with a Romanian, Serbian, Ukrainian or Slovakian citizenship in Hungary by higher educational institution (academic year of 2012-2013)*

	Ratio of citizens			
Name of institution	Romanian	Serbian	Ukrainian	Slovakian
Eötvös Loránd University	23,3	18,5	28,6	38,8
University of Debrecen	15,7	1,9	33,3	10,2
Central European University	12,4	7,4	4,8	0
University of Pécs	9	16,7	2,4	4,1
University of Szeged	8,1	33,3	6	2
Szent István University	7,6	0	0	4,1
Budapest University of Technology and Economics	5,2	3,7	1,2	4,1
Debrecen University of Reformed Theology	4,8	0	1,2	0
Corvinus University of Budapest	3,8	3,7	2,4	7,1
Semmelweis University	2,9	3,7	3,6	4,1
Pázmány Péter Catholic University	2,4	5,6	14,3	11,2
University of West Hungary	1,4	0	0	2
Károli Gáspár Reformed University	1	0	2,4	0
Hungarian University of Fine Arts	1	1,9	0	1
Andrássy Gyula German Language University of Budapest	0,5	0	0	1
University of Miskolc	0,5	0	0	1
Pannon University	0,5	0	0	0
Moholy-Nagy University of Art and Design	0	0	0	0
Széchenyi István University	0	1,9	0	9,2
University of Theatre and Film Arts	0	1,9	0	0
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total No.	210	54	84	98

The youth of the four countries examined attend doctoral programmes in Hungary mostly in humanities. The second place is taken by programmes in natural sciences and the third by various social sciences (including the domains of social science, economics, law, political science, regional science). 8.5 percent study in the field of medicine, and 5 percent participate in technological and theological programmes. The distribution by academic field depends on a

number of factors, but two of them should be highlighted here: as we have seen earlier, it is influenced by the regional offer of both the emitting and the host higher educational structure.

Among Subcarpathian students, the proportion of humanities is extremely large, and the ratio of those participating in natural science programmes is also above the average. This is, of course, closely related to the fact that these are the dominant tracks in the higher educational structure of the emitting entity. Parallel to that, the ratio of social sciences is way below the average in their case, while it is relatively high among students from Transylvania and Slovakia. The ratio of the participants of medical programmes is also above the average among the latter students, whereas we can barely find any students from Subcarpathia in this form of training. On the whole, we can say that high-prestige areas (technology, arts and medicine) are the narrowest among Subcarpathian students (7.1 %) and they are the broadest among Slovakians (20.4 %), with the other two regions in-between. While Romanians are the "strongest" in the domain of social sciences, Vojvodinian students are present in doctoral schools of natural sciences to the largest rate.

Figure 3. *The ratio of PhD students with Romanian, Serbian, Ukrainian and Slovakian citizenship in Hungary by the special field of the doctoral schools (academic year of 2012-2013)*

Socio-demographic data

About one third of our respondents were raised in Romania/Transylvania, while the others are distributed evenly among the other three regions. In the questionnaire, we also asked them about their citizenship, and about 10 percent of the respondents indicated their Hungarian

citizenship as their primary one. The ratio of those who have "abandoned" their original citizenship (who have indicated a citizenship different from the country they were raised in) is the highest among Vojvodinians (18 percent), followed by Subcarpathians (12 percent) and Transylvanians (8 percent). Among our respondents from Slovakia, no one marked Hungarian citizenship as their primary one. Most likely, this can be explained by the fact that those who admit their Hungarian citizenship openly may suffer reprisals in Slovakia.[18] A little more than one third of the respondents indicated a second citizenship as well, and the bulk of these answers referred to Hungarian citizenship (77 percent). A second citizenship was marked mostly by Transylvanians and Vojvodinians (to the same extent: 39 percent), while it was less apparent in the case of Subcarpathians (20 percent), and only two individuals from Slovakia marked their (Hungarian) citizenship.

The mean age of the respondents is 30.3. Regarding their country of origin (where they were raised), we can observe statistically significant differences: Subcarpathians and Hungarians from Slovakia are the youngest (28, resp. 29 years), while PhD students from the other two countries are older (Romania: 31.5, Serbia: 31.3 years). These differences can be partly put down to the different school structure of the emitting country: while for example in Subcarpathia, the school leaving exam is passed at the age of 17, that usually takes place at the age of 18 in the other countries.

It is worth knowing the data by age brackets as well because in this way, we can position it relative to Hungarian and international data (of 2009 and 2010). Based on the EURODOC survey mentioned above, 70-90 percent of the PhD students of the countries examined belong to the age group of 26-35-year-olds.[19] In Hungary, their proportion was 83 percent in 2009.[20] Ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries also follow this trend, but the number of those between 23-25 years of age among Subcarpathian doctoral students is extremely high even in international comparison (19.8%). As indicated above, this is due to structural reasons, but it may also have significant consequences: on the positive side, it can reinforce the flexibility of PhD students, but on the negative, there is a risk of early professional burnout.

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[18] Hungary approved an amendment of the Citizenship Law in 2010 (Law LV of 1993), which made it possible for ethnic Hungarians (living outside Hungary) to request Hungarian citizenship. Slovakia, as a response to the Hungarian law, introduced a regulation as a result of which those Slovak citizens who obtain another citizenship are automatically deprived of their Slovak citizenship.

[19] EURODOC i.m. 10.

[20] Kucsera – Szabó: *A doktori képzés Magyarországon – szervezetek, szereplők, hallgatók*. op. cit. p.26.

With respect to gender distribution, the ratio of Hungarian PhD students from Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine is well-balanced (50.5 and 51.4% of women) whereas women represent the majority among Transylvanian and Vojvodinian respondents (64.7%, resp. 60%). Even though we cannot draw far-reaching conclusions from these data lines, it should be noted that the EURODOC survey mentioned above also indicated a high female proportion in the southern countries (Croatia and Portugal), so we may suggest that besides distribution by professional field, this trend may also play a role in the high proportion of women among our Romanian and Serbian respondents. Slovakia and the Ukraine are similar to Hungary in that respect (in 2009, the ratio of men was 51.5 percent in Hungary).

If we look at the mean age by gender and by country of origin, it turns out that the mean age of men and women differs significantly only in the case of the Subcarpathian respondents: the mean age of men is about 3 years lower than that of women. This may be a sign of the fact that in Subcarpathia, boys start their doctoral studies earlier than girls after their graduation, while the latter are more likely to consider other careers in greater numbers (they try to get a job within education, they might have children), and they start later the doctoral programme. At the same time, it can also be observed that among women, Hungarian students from Slovakia are the youngest. The average age of Subcarpathian men is the lowest, and in fact, this region is the only one where women are older than men on average.

Figure 4. *Mean age by gender and by country of origin*

As for marital status, Slovakia is the only region that stands out: there the ratio of those living in marriage or in a registered partnership is very low (26.5 percent altogether), while this figure is around 40-53 percent in all the other places. However, it should be pointed out that while the proportion of those married is about the same among Vojvodinians, Transylvanians, and Subcarpathians (36-38 percent), the ratio of those living in an "informal marriage", or a registered relationship, is insignificant among Subcarpathians compared to the other two regions (3.7 percent vs. 14.2 percent and 11.8 percent). This seems to indicate a more traditional social background structure among Subcarpathians, as a result of which the institution of registered partnerships, considered to be the antechamber of family life, is reduced. As there is no possibility of cohabitation as a form of transition, these youth have to choose: they either get married, or they stay "obviously" single.[21]

More than one fourth of PhD students already have a child, and this figure amounts to one third in Transylvania. Related to the date on marital status, it can also be seen that again it is Slovakian respondents who demonstrate a kind of individualism: here only 12 percent of the subjects said that they had children. Regional differences become even more blatant if we examine the fact of having children by gender: in the case of women from Slovakia, it is quite rare to have children already, whereas nearly half of the female PhD students from Carpatho-Ukraine (42.3 percent) have children. Again, that reinforces the claim that PhD studies and aspects of private life create different strategic patterns. In the case of students from Slovakia, these two factors are imposed upon each other, i.e. the pursuit of a career is completed by having a family later on. The other extreme is represented by Subcarpathians, for whom getting married, having children and building their career all merge together.

The educational level of the parents of PhD students is higher than the average schooling of the given countries. The proportion of those with at least a high school diploma is more than 86 percent, and more than one third (35-36 percent) of them are at least second generational intellectuals. If we consider only the schooling of fathers, the influence of the family is relatively high in Transylvania, while it is the lowest in Subcarpathia and Slovakia. Our data greatly coincide with the Hungarian data of 2009,[22] but internationally, the propor-

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[21] Although our survey did not inquire about that, it is likely that some of the singles live in the same household as their parents.

[22] Kucsera – Szabó: *A doktori képzés Magyarországon – szervezetek, szereplők, hallgatók.* op. cit. 52.

tion of fathers with a college or university degree is apparently somewhat smaller than in other countries, which partly shows that in the Carpathian Basin, students coming from a lower social stratum have a greater chance of getting admitted into PhD programmes. However, if we look at the lowest levels of schooling, it appears that it is harder to get into doctoral programmes from these strata than in some southern countries of Europe (Portugal, Spain), but it is easier than in several western countries (e.g. France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway).[23] All of the above can be interpreted as a sign that in the Carpathian Basin, doctoral education is basically related to the processes of educational expansion: although the parental background is decisive, it can be observed only above a certain level, because there is only a faint chance of making an educational/academic breakthrough from the lowest social strata.

Our data allow us to sketch the earlier educational paths of PhD students as well. Since respondents were asked to state where they were brought up until the age of 14, and since we know the place of undergraduate and doctoral studies, we can estimate the ratio of educational migration and educational paths in the home country. If we take the place of education till the age of 14 as 100 percent, where our subjects most likely completed their elementary school studies (*Figure 5*), we can see that the location of undergraduate studies necessary for doctoral studies is partly shifted to another country (usually, to Hungary). The transition between secondary education and undergraduate studies also constitutes a Hungarian-Hungarian migration regarding would-be doctoral students: only little more than half of Vojvodinian PhD students completed their undergraduate studies in their country of birth, while this figure was little less than three fourths among students coming from Subcarpathia and Slovakia, and about 83 percent among Transylvanians.

As we move towards the doctoral programmes, in the second stage of the higher educational path, migration towards the mother country intensifies: compared to the homeland elementary school education, it is Subcarpathians who are the least able to pursue doctoral studies in their own region (only 11 percent). This is, of course, related to the local educational offer: while undergraduate studies can be done in Hungarian in Berehove (Beregszász) and Užhorod (Ungvár) as well, doctoral studies can only be carried out at the National University of Užhorod (Ungvár). The rate of educational migration increases among Transylvanians towards doctoral studies, too, and half of the

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[23] For detailed information, see EURODOC op. cit.. 16.

PhD students do their studies in Hungary. About half of the students from Slovakia also study in a country other than their homeland, but in contrast to the Transylvanian data, the extent of transition from undergraduate studies to PhD studies is less intensive than the transition between elementary school education and undergraduate studies. One of the reasons for that is that it is possible to pursue doctoral studies at Selye János University, a Hungarian language institution in Komarno (Komárom) as well. Our data also show that less than a quarter of Vojvodinian doctoral students study in their homeland.

Figure 5. *The educational paths of PhD students in their country of birth*

If we look at the educational paths by geographical mobility, we can also see which university centres students coming from partic-ular regions are oriented towards with a view to acquiring their PhD. The educational paths indicate that besides some (relative) centres in their homeland such as Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár), Bratislava (Pozsony), Nitra (Nyitra), Komárno (Komárom), Novi Sad (Újvidék) and Užhorod (Ungvár), it is university centres in Hungary as well as some smaller towns in the countryside that emerge as destina-tions for ethnic Hungarians. However, the scrutiny of typical paths also reveals the markedly regional character: Transylvanians choose Cluj-Napoca while Subcarpathians go to Debrecen in the first place. For Hungarians from Slovakia and Vojvodinian Hungarians, no town occupies a central position: their preferences are distributed among several towns. The frequency of paths also sheds light on the fact that

although Budapest can be considered as a nexus, it does not play a central role for either of these regions.

Figure 6. *The most typical sites of PhD studies by country of origin*

The question might arise whether there is a correlation between educational migration and Hungarian citizenship. Based on our data, there is no obvious correlation between the homeland educational path and the acquisition of Hungarian citizenship. If this were the case, our hypothesis could be that those who have completed all their studies in their own country are less likely to apply for Hungarian citizenship. However, according to our data in Slovakia and Subcarpathia, those who complete all the levels of their schooling at home do not apply for Hungarian citizenship at all. While in Transylvania, studies fully completed in the home country make it less likely for ethnic Hungarians to request Hungarian citizenship, in Vojvodina, even those who have always studied at home so far apply for it in great numbers (44% in Transylvania, and 71% in Vojvodina). All of the above goes to show that applying for Hungarian citizenship is somewhat independent from the site of school studies by country, and most likely, it correlates with other factors: Ukrainian and Slovakian respondents might be more determined to make a career at home, and that is why they do not apply for Hungarian citizenship (or they did not reveal that in the questionnaire because it is forbidden by the laws of their country). Similarly, Vojvodinian figures rather show that the application for citizenship can be related to a number of other factors, ranging from a latent migration potential to the legislative framework of the country.

Job market situation

Nearly two thirds of PhD students have a job, and most of them usually work at several workplaces. 72 percent of those who have a job at present work full-time. There are significant differences concerning the type of employment both by country and gender. Among men, the vast majority work full-time, while in the case of women, a significant proportion of them work part-time (although working full-time is still the most typical case for them as well). Looking at the data by country, it is Slovakia that stands out, where barely half of the PhD students work full-time, whereas in the other countries examined, this ratio can represent as much as 70-80 percent.

More than half of the workplaces are related to universities or research institutes, and only 22 percent of students work in the private sector. In about 80 percent of the cases, the workplace is located in the homeland, and in 16-17 percent in Hungary. However, the correlation between the place of the PhD studies and the country the workplace is located in is much higher in the case of those doing their PhD in their home country.

29 percent of those who work and do their PhD in Hungary have a job in Hungary, and the others work in their home country. This is also an indicator of commuting done by many doctoral students: 70 percent of them do their studies while working at home (or in another country). Looking at the specific regions, it is clearly visible that more than half of the students from Slovakia doing their PhD in Hungary also work in Hungary. This also shows that in half of the cases, their professional (and existential) integration is oriented towards Hungary. In the case of Subcarpathians and Vojvodinians, it is much more typical that they do their PhD studies in Hungary while working at home.

The average net income of PhD students is around 400-500 Euros per month. We define this range because if we take out the so-called extreme values (coming from respondents who live in Western Europe or who are private entrepreneurs),[24] the average income is 407 Euros, whereas if we leave them in, the amount is 491 Euros. Whichever value we take into consideration, it is certain that there are significant differences in income by country: Subcarpathians have the lowest monthly income, and Hungarians from Slovakia have the highest. Since we are talking about a well-defined social stratum, neither the schooling level of parents, nor age can influence the level of monthly income. Regarding gender, it is not such a straightfor-

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[24] Statistically, these are figures whose omission ensures the normality of income distribution.

ward case: although there is no significant difference between men
and women in the entire sample, regionally speaking it can be stated
that Subcarpathian women earn[25] less than men coming from the
same country.

Information about the doctoral schools

Although in the Bologna system, the bureaucratic obstacles of getting
a PhD degree in a co-tutorial system have been reduced, this opportu-
nity does not seem to attract ethnic Hungarian PhD students. Out of
the more than 400 respondents of the questionnaire, it concerned only
two people. Analyzing the doctoral programmes by academic field, we
can affirm that the majority of them deal with humanities. There
are significant differences between the countries examined: while, for
example, more than half of the Subcarpathian PhD students go to
some kind of humanities doctoral programme, this ratio is only 38
percent among Hungarians from Slovakia. On the whole, doctoral
programmes in natural sciences are the second most popular, and
they are also second in Subcarpathia. PhD programmes in social
sciences are attractive for Vojvodinians and Transylvanians, while in
the case of Slovakian Hungarians, the second place is taken by engi-
neering/technological programmes. Obviously due to the portfolio of
national doctoral programmes, there is a significant proportion of
theological doctoral students in Slovakia, whereas such students are
a real scarcity to find in Subcarpathia. Agricultural programmes are
the least popular: in Slovakia, none of the respondents have chosen
this specialization.

As for the place of the doctoral school, we get a much more differ-
entiated picture. While in Transylvania and Slovakia, two thirds of the
PhD students go to Romanian or Slovakian establishments, the vast
majority of Vojvodinians (62%) and especially Subcarpathians (87%)
attend doctoral programmes in Hungary. The differences might be
put down to the fact that Hungarian doctoral programmes are more
accessible for the latters, and besides the educational perspectives
of the acquisition of a degree, living in Hungary might offer some
comparative advantages (mobility due to EU membership, more
generous scholarship, etc.). PhD students studying in other countries
outside the Carpathian Basin are represented in very small numbers
in our sample: their overall proportion is less than 3 percent.

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[25] ANOVA test, Sig: 0.08, i.e. the probability that the average income of men and
women differ from each other is 92 percent here.

There are no differences between the regions regarding the way their students pursue their studies: i.e. whether they are doing a full-time or a part-time (evening courses or distance education) programme. The bulk of the respondents (83 percent) take part in full-time education. This figure is the smallest in Vojvodina (78%), but within a sample of this size, that in itself does not reveal a significant difference. Vojvodinians constitute a real exception regarding the fact that nearly half of them do their doctoral studies in a self-financing system, while this proportion remains below 30 percent in the other regions . This, of course, goes together with the fact that the proportion of those entitled to a scholarship is lower (55% vs. 72% typical of the entire population). At the moment of their admission, 53 percent of Transylvanian PhD students, 65 percent of Hungarians in Slovakia, 34 percent of Vojvodinians and 46 percent of Subcarpathians are granted a scholarship.

Naturally, the sum of the scholarship does not depend on one's origin, but on the quotas of the given country. Accordingly, the smallest amount is given to PhD students in Ukraine (on average 108 euros per month), while the highest in Slovakia (514 euros). (*Table 2*). The sum of the scholarship – for those who continue to receive it even today (50 percent) – generally makes up 73 percent of their full monthly income, while more than one third of them have no other source of income. Logically, the amount of the financial support is the most insufficient where it is below the minimum necessary to make a living (Romania: 58%, Serbia: 58%).

Table 2. *The average monthly sum of the doctoral scholarship by country and its proportion compared to the full monthly income*

	Sum (EUR)	Proportion (%)
Hungary	320	79
Romania	276	58
Serbia	216	59
Slovakia	514	81
Ukraine	108	73
other country	939	77
average	350	73

Three fourths of the PhD students started their studies after 2008, so it is understandable that more than two thirds of them are still studying in a doctoral school. However, the ratio of those who have completed their courses, but have not launched the

doctoral process is quite high (20%). Doctoral candidates (who are in the stage of having initiated the degree process) represent only 15 percent of the respondents. The visible delaying (and the possible non-obtaining) of the doctoral degree appears in the future expectations of PhD students as well: nearly 10 percent of the respondents said that certainly or most probably, they would not be able to get a degree, and a further 20 percent are presumably unsure about it. The expected success of obtaining their degree is, of course, related to the progress they have made: the uncertain are clearly overrepresented among those who have finished their studies, but who do not have a doctoral candidate status yet. Every fourth among them said that it is uncertain or unlikely that they would be successful in getting their doctoral degree. The length of time for getting their degree is hoped to be four years and eight months on average, which seems to be an optimistic estimate especially because these students have been in the system for nearly three and a half years on average, and most of them are still studying in the doctoral schools.

Figure 7. *Starting date and expected finish date of PhD*

The length of time in which students are planning to obtain their PhD depends on the country in which they are attempting to do it. In this respect, PhD students in Hungary plan for a longer period of time (5.3 years on average), while students studying at Slovakian universities are planning to do it in the shortest time (3.7 years). Besides the fact that countries may have different practices and

structural motivation factors for encouraging the acquisition of the doctoral degree, in the case of those studying in Hungary, we should take it into consideration that a migration shift and integration into the system of the target country already demand a significant amount of additional time.

The motivating factors for choosing a particular doctoral school and satisfaction with the programme

One of the most important objectives of our survey was to map out – besides the questions pertaining to the situation of doctoral students – the motivation factors associated with obtaining the doctoral degree as well as satisfaction with the doctoral programmes. First of all, we wanted to know to what extent the factors listed in *Figure 8* constituted a motivation factor at the moment of entering the doctoral programme. The results show that the majority of the respondents decided to start the PhD programme due to certain professional considerations (Factor 4). There were virtually no respondents for whom their professional interest did not play an important role (97%), and research and academic career opportunities offered by the PhD programme were also mentioned by the bulk of the subjects (82% and 80%). In contrast, motivation patterns shaped by expected long-term, especially existential benefits are much less significant. Out of these, the highest expectations are attached to the eventual financial pay-off of the PhD degree (60%). An important factor of this cluster of opinions is the potential to obtain a scholarship abroad, and even the possibility of working abroad (Factor 2).

The motivations based on expectations to draw an advantage of the PhD programme in the short run were born out of a more modest pragmatism, not necessarily resting on professional foundations. Looking at it from this perspective, the years of the Phd programme correspond to the period of secure and passive "postpone" since student benefits allow PhD students to make a living for three years. Although these arguments were considered important by much fewer, this group of motivations is still the most delineated one (Factor 1). The intention to get a doctoral degree can also be explained (in about one third of the cases) by the fact that there is an explicit expectation at the workplace or in the family that PhD candidates are trying to meet. 43 percent of the respondents mentioned, for example, that their decision was also motivated by workplace expectations (Factor 3).

Figure 8. *'To what extent did you consider the following factors when you applied for the PhD program?' – cumulative percent for the answers: „rather seriously" and „very seriously"*

**Figure 9.** *'Why did you decide to apply for this PhD program?' (%)*

In order to further differentiate between the motivation patterns of PhD students, we also asked them why they chose their present doctoral school. As it could be expected from the answers given to the previous question, most people took into consideration professional aspects ("the professional offer of the doctoral school

matched my research interests" – 79%), and within that, a distinctive pattern is formed by those for whom the academic performance of the institution was especially important ("because of the high standard of the education" – 67%, "because of the reputation of the institution" – 61% – Factor 2: *professional – success oriented*). More than half of the respondents were also influenced by their professors, and 4 out of 10 PhD students opted for a particular doctoral school because they had completed their previous studies in the same institution (Factor 3: *safe-path dependency*). A less significant, but still well-noticeable factor is *opportunity-orientedness* (Factor 1), which considers financial aspects as well as an easy means of getting a degree for choosing the institution ("this school was the closest to my living place" – 30%, "I thought that it would be easy to get into this school" – 16%, "I thought this programme would be the easiest to complete" – 6.3%).

As for the evaluation of the doctoral programme, the respondents are the most satisfied with the professional competence of the thesis supervisors (84% of them are satisfied or very satisfied). The process of mentoring-tutoring is characterized by personality, so it seems that this is one of the most essential elements of the success of the doctoral schools. On the other hand, the system-level or institutional weaknesses of the programme cause disapproval in a lot more students. They consider the lack of proper information especially annoying (37%), just like the fact that as PhD students, they have to do too many administrative tasks (44%). These are followed by complaints concerning the professionalism and the scarce funds of the programmes (the curriculum is not tailored enough, there is not enough money, the academic infrastructure of the institution is poor), concerns about the organization of teaching and research (the workload of holding classes, the limited opportunities to take part in during the research process), and finally the institutional limitations of personal professional development and the more modest added value of the programme compared to the undergraduate training.

Considering that the standard of thesis supervision is of key importance for the success of doctoral programmes, we examined these circumstances in a separate question. The results confirm the shortcomings of the system indicated above: while the professional competences of professors are rarely questioned by anyone (94% satisfied), much fewer PhD students consider them capable of efficiently helping the integration of their students into the academic system and their advancement (publication opportunities, conference participation: 55%, professional networking: 71%).

Future plans

In relation to the present labour market situation, we have already noted that half of the PhD students already work in higher education or in a research institute. This tendency seems to be even more manifest on the level of plans, and parallel to that, the ratio of those who would like to find a job in the private sector has been decreasing.

We also asked students in which country they would like to live when they start working after getting their PhD degree. According to our data, about 30 percent of the doctoral students are planning to live in a country different from their homeland, but this migration potential is mostly directed to Hungary, and only a fraction of it is oriented towards other countries. The greatest mobility intention is demonstrated by those coming from the two smallest ethnic Hungarian communities (and from non-EU countries): Subcarpathians and Vojvodinians. At the same time, it is also visible that emigration to Western countries is quite significant among Vojvodinians and Hungarians from Slovakia, which can be partly put down to historical reasons and geographical location.[26] We asked a specific question about the intention to emigrate: whether they would emigrate if they could improve their living conditions. We found that those who study in Hungary want to move to a third country only to a lesser extent, but among those who study in their homeland, the migration potential is higher (except for Vojvodinians). That indicates that in Vojvodina there is a more marked difference between the future plans of those studying in Hungary and at home.

Based on our question pertaining to plans of professional integration, we can distinguish two trends: on the one hand, there is a desire for Hungarian or ethnic Hungarian integration in the homeland, but an increasing number of respondents would like to join both the ethnic Hungarian academic circles and the majority-language academic community in their homeland. Although there are great variations between integration strategies from country to country, two important claims can be made. The desire for integration only into homeland Hungarian academic circles is the greatest among Subcarpathians, which is related to the distribution by domains, but it also carries the risk that Hungarian-language professionalism will become inward-looking. The highest degree of openness to the

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[26] Migrant workers' going to Western Europe has been significant in Vojvodina since the 1970s. There are many ties between Slovakia and the Czech Republic even today, and about 800 Hungarian young people are doing their studies there at present.

majority academic circles can be seen among Vojvodinians: 70 percent of the PhD students from this region stated their intention to enter both the Hungarian and Serbian academia. The strongest intention to build professional relationships only with the majority-language body of scholars is also the strongest in this region.

Figure 10. *The country of the workplace planned after the doctoral programme (Option 1)*


Figure 11. *The subjective assessment of integration into the academic circles of Hungarian-language and majority-language community in the homeland*

Table 3. *Factors influencing future plans oriented towards Hungary (logistic regression, Nagelkerke's R-squared: 0,46)*

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Sex (1 – Female, 2 – Male)	-0,594	0,367	2,62	1	**0,106**	0,552
Country of origin			1,623	3	0,654	
FATHER'S education (cat. of ref.: max. 8 grades)			8,832	3	**0,032**	
vocational school	0,987	1,033	0,912	1	0,34	2,683
school-leaving exam	1,901	1,02	3,473	1	0,062	6,696
college or university diploma	0,824	1,028	0,643	1	0,423	2,281
MOTHER'S education (cat. of ref.: max. 8 grades)			6,935	3	**0,074**	
vocational school	-2,637	1,161	5,161	1	0,023	0,072
school-leaving exam	-1,018	0,906	1,261	1	0,261	0,361
college or university diploma	-0,583	0,952	0,376	1	0,54	0,558
Children (1 – Yes. 2 – No.)	1,221	0,43	8,054	1	0,005	3,392
DOMAIN of PhD (cat. of ref.: nat. sciences)			23,288	7	**0,002**	
agriculture	-0,079	1,012	0,006	1	0,937	0,924
humanities	-1,296	0,454	8,139	1	0,004	0,274
theology	-18,57	8409,393	0	1	0,998	0
technology	1,154	0,834	1,915	1	0,166	3,172
art	-0,228	1,621	0,02	1	0,888	0,796
medicine	2,989	1,036	8,323	1	0,004	19,857
social sciences	-0,326	0,506	0,415	1	0,519	0,722
DOCT. PR. – COUNTRY (cat. of ref.: Hungary)			32,595	5	**0,000**	
Romania	-3,521	0,814	18,707	1	0,000	0,03
Serbia	-3,217	1,201	7,176	1	0,007	0,04
Slovakia	-4,247	1,276	11,086	1	0,001	0,014
Ukraine	-2,111	1,144	3,402	1	0,065	0,121
other	-0,252	0,986	0,065	1	0,798	0,777
Constant	-1,517	1,33	1,302	1	0,254	0,219

We also examined future plans oriented towards Hungary as well as professional integration efforts in the homeland with the help of a multi-variable model (logistic regression model). Based on that, we can declare (see *Table 3*) that the "desire" to work in Hungary is not signifi-

cantly influenced by the country of origin of PhD students. However, this migration potential tightly correlates with the education of their parents, the fact of having children or not, and the field and location of the doctoral programme. The higher educational level of fathers increases migration potential while that of mothers decreases it, and the likelihood of those without children migrating to Hungary is 3 to 4 times greater than in the case of those who have children. The most striking finding is that the chance that those with a medical PhD would migrate to Hungary is 20 times greater than in the domain of natural sciences. It is also clear that those who participate in a doctoral programme in their homeland prefer staying at "home" to the greatest extent.

Table 4. *Factors influencing future plans of homeland Hungarian-language professional integration (logistic regression, Nagelkerke R-square: 0,26)*

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Sex	-0,048	0,298	0,026	1	0,872	0,953
Country of origin (cat. of ref. Ukraine)			9,015	3	**0,029**	
Romania	-0,255	0,454	0,315	1	0,575	0,775
Serbia	-1,354	0,494	7,505	1	0,006	0,258
Slovakia	-1,102	0,655	2,829	1	0,093	0,332
FATHER'S education			3,233	3	0,357	
MOTHER'S education (cat. of ref.: max. 8 grades)			7,226	3	**0,065**	
vocational school	1,443	0,899	2,579	1	0,108	4,234
school-leaving exam	0,298	0,818	0,132	1	0,716	1,347
college or university diploma	-0,092	0,864	0,011	1	0,915	0,912
Children (1 – Yes. 2 – No.)	-0,466	0,397	1,378	1	0,24	0,628
DOMAIN of PhD (cat. of ref.: nat. sciences)			27,892	7	**0,000**	
agriculture	0,462	1,008	0,21	1	0,647	1,587
humanities	1,528	0,404	14,289	1	0,000	4,608
theology	2,198	0,661	11,045	1	0,001	9,005
technology	-0,318	0,741	0,184	1	0,668	0,728
art	-19,54	17039,004	0	1	0,999	0
medicine	-0,853	1,121	0,579	1	0,447	0,426
social sciences	0,553	0,505	1,199	1	0,273	1,739
DOCT. PROG. – COUNTRY (cat. of ref.: Hungary)			2,632	5	0,756	
AGE	-0,074	0,036	4,182	1	**0,041**	0,928
Constant	1,9	1,866	1,036	1	0,309	6,687

We investigated homeland professional integration plans by looking at whether our subjects wanted to be admitted into the exclusively or rather Hungarian academic life of their homeland, or they also indicated majority-language academic life as a potential case. In this respect, we found that the country of origin, the mother's education, the field of the doctoral programme and age all have a significant impact (*Table 4*). The likelihood that Hungarian-language professional integration is placed first is substantially smaller among Hungarians from Slovakia and Vojvodinian students than among Subcarpathians and Transylvanians. In contrast to students of natural sciences, those pursuing humanities or theological studies believe mostly in joining the Hungarian-language scholarly world. Interestingly, with age, there is a small, but significant decrease in the likelihood that PhD students opt for mother-tongue academic life. This shows that while for older people, multilingual (mother tongue and majority-language) professional integration comes more naturally, in the case of young PhD students this trend is shifting significantly towards the exclusivity of their mother tongue.

Conclusions

The research was conducted with the help of online questionnaires among PhD students from four ethnic Hungarian regions "beyond the borders" of Hungary. The main argument in favour of the online investigation was that it was easier to reach even those who have been integrated into majority-language educational structure or that of a country outside the Carpathian Basin. At the same time, we also supposed that an online research would not pose a technical problem or difficulties of other nature for this target group.

One of the challenges of the research was effectively reaching the target group and assessing its size. Therefore, before launching the online survey, each doctoral association updated the databases about doctoral students at their disposal. Also within the framework of the research, we obtained detailed data (by institution and field of study) from the Educational Authority regarding ethnic Hungarian students coming from the four countries examined and participating in doctoral programmes in Hungary. Based on all that, we can say that there are about 1000-1100 ethnic Hungarian PhD students, and nearly half of them study in the mother country, Hungary, while the others study in their homeland in Hungarian or in the majority (state) language and in other countries. If we compare our survey to the size of the target group, we can declare that we have been

successful, for we managed to reach every second PhD student on average (the margin of error for the entire sample: +/-1,67)

About one third of our respondents were raised in Romania/Transylvania, while the rest of them were distributed quite evenly between the other three regions. In the questionnaire, we also asked a question about citizenship, and about 10 percent of the respondents indicated Hungarian citizenship in the first place. The ratio of those who have "abandoned" their citizenship (i.e. those who indicated a citizenship different from the country they were raised in) is the highest among Vojvodinians (18 percent), followed by Subcarpathians and Transylvanians (12 and 8 percent, respectively). Based on the above, we can conclude that from smaller Hungarian communities, a higher percentage of people seem to migrate to the mother country.

The mean age of the respondents of the questionnaire is 30.3 years. In relation to the country of origin (upbringing), we can state that there are statistically significant differences: the youngest are the Subcarpathian and Slovakian Hungarian students, while the PhD students of the other two countries are somewhat older. These differences are partly due to the school structure of the emitting country: whereas in Subcarpathia, students usually pass their school-leaving exam at the age of 17, in other countries, this event usually takes place at the age of 18. The low mean age of Subcarpathians stands out even in international comparison, and it can result in both the flexibility of doctoral students as well as the danger of early professional burnout.

With respect to gender distribution, women are overrepresented in Transylvania and Slovakia, while regarding marital status, it is the behaviour of Slovakian Hungarians that stands out among the four regions: the ratio of those living in marriage or partnership is very low here (26.5 percent altogether), while this figure is around 40-53 percent in the other regions. The proportions by gender and marital status may indicate the prestige of the PhD programme and the social background structure of the emitting region. The doctoral programme seems to have a lower prestige in Transylvania and Slovakia, and it is also well-detectable that Slovakian Hungarian female PhD students have a more individualistic mentality (cf. low proportion of those living in marriage or partnership, delaying the time of having children).

From the perspective of the job market, it can be affirmed that nearly two thirds of PhD students work, and the bulk of them hold several jobs at the same time. 72 percent of those who work at present have a full-time job. The type of employment varies significantly by country as well as by gender. The vast majority of male employees

work full-time, while the proportion of female students (many of whom also work full-time) working part-time is also substantial. Looking at it by country, Slovakia is the one that stands out: here barely half of the PhD students work full-time, while this figure can be as high as 70-80 percent in the other countries examined.

If we analyse doctoral programmes by professional field, we can observe that humanities programmes represent the majority. This, again, varies from country to country: while more than half of the Subcarpathian doctoral students attend some kind of humanities programme, this ratio is only 38 percent in the case of Hungarians from Slovakia. All in all, natural sciences programmes come in second, and they are also second in Subcarpathia. Social sciences programmes are popular among Vojvodinians and Transylvanians, while the second place goes to technological/engineering programmes in the case of Slovakian Hungarians. Obviously in connection with the portfolio of the national doctoral education, the ratio of those pursuing theological studies is also high in Slovakia, while such persons are a real scarcity in Subcarpathia. Agricultural programmes are the least popular; in fact, we had no respondents from Slovakia who had chosen this specialization.

As for the location of the doctoral school, we get a much more differentiated picture. While in Transylvania and Slovakia, two thirds of PhD students attend a Romanian or a Slovakian institution, the vast majority of Vojvodinians and especially Subcarpathians (62 and 87 percent, respectively) participate in doctoral programmes in Hungary. The differences are most likely due to the fact that Hungarian programmes are more accessible for the latter, and besides educational and degree-related considerations in the strict sense, residing in Hungary may constitute other comparative advantages as well (mobility due to EU membership, generous scholarship, etc.). Our sample contains a very low figure of doctoral students doing their PhD in countries outside the Carpathian Basin: their ratio is less than 3 percent.

As for obtaining a degree, there is a kind of delaying (and a possible dropback) in the future expectations of PhD students: nearly 10 percent of the respondents said that they will, certainly or most likely, not be able to obtain the degree, and an additional 20 percent were uncertain about it. Naturally, the expected success of getting their degree is also related to where they are in this process at present: the uncertain are clearly overrepresented among those who have finished the programme, but who have not yet become doctoral candidates. One out of four of them thought that it is uncertain or unlikely that they would succeed in getting a degree. The expected

duration of obtaining one's degree is four years and eight months on average, which seems quite optimistic in light of the fact that these students have been in the system for nearly three and a half years on average, and most of them are still studying at the doctoral school.

Having examined the motivations of PhD students with the help of multi-variable analysis, we could distinguish four large clusters of opinion: the bulk of the respondents decided to start the doctoral programme for some professional considerations. There is also a motivation pattern, though much less marked, formed in the hope of long-term, especially existential advantages, and a moderate pragmatism – not necessarily on professional grounds– which draws on taking advantage of the short-term benefits of PhD programmes). Finally, the intention to get a degree can also be motivated by an explicit expectation at the workplace or within the family that the applicants are trying to fulfil.

Based on our question inquiring about professional integration plans, we could distinguish two trends: on the one hand, there is a dominant urge for Hungarian or homeland (minority) Hungarian integration, but the largest group would like to join both homeland Hungarian and majority-language academic circles. Integration strategies vary significantly from country to country, and we can make at least two important observations. Integration exclusively into homeland Hungarian academic life is the most typical among Subcarpathians, which is related to the distribution of academic fields, but it also carries the risk that the Hungarian academia will become inward-looking in this region. Openness towards majority-language academic life is the strongest among Vojvodinians: 70 percent of PhD students coming from this region declared their intention to integrate into both Hungarian and Serb academic circles. The desire to approach only the majority-language professional circles is also the highest in this area.

International law

Péter Varga

"Racial or Ethnic Origin" vs. "Membership of a National Minority" in EU Law

With the 2004 and subsequent enlargements of the European Union numerous national minorities have become EU Citizens which called for a redefinition of the role of the EU towards minorities. Ten years after the largest single enlargement there are still non-exploited opportunities in EU Law in this regard. Article 19 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for a prohibition of discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin.[1] It does not contain a direct prohibition of discrimination and it is not directly effective, but it enables the EU to adopt measures to combat discrimination on the listed grounds within the scope of the policies and powers otherwise granted by the Treaties.[2] The mentioned Article (and its precedent) served as a basis for directives, action programmes and a number of "European years."[3] However, it was not used for adoption of a specific, minority oriented directive, partly due to the fact that it still remains ambiguous whether "race and ethnic origin" in Article 19 TFEU gives competences to the EU-legislator to adopt legal acts governing the rights and situation of national minorities/persons belonging to national minorities.

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[1] Article 19 (ex Article 13 TEC) 1. Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may adopt the basic principles of Union incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States, to support action taken by the Member States in order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in paragraph 1.

[2] Paul Craig – Gráinne de Búrca: *Eu Law Text, Cases and Materials*. Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press, 2011. p.868

[3] Gabriel N. Toggenburg: *A remaining Share of a New Part? The Union's Role vis-à-vis Minorities after the Enlargemet Decade*. EUI Working Papers Law No. 2006/15, pp.6-7.; Since 1983 the EU dedicates a year to a specific subject to encourage debate and dialogue within and between European countries. The aim is to raise awareness of certain topics, encourage debate and change attitudes. For example: European Year of Equal Opportunities for All (2007), European Year of People with Disabilities (2003).

EU Law – as it is

National minority protection has been for a long time reduced to the external sphere of the European Union, only the adoption of Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty (Article 19 under Lisbon Treaty) provided for the "internalisation" of national minorities.[4] The EU's attitude towards national minorities is wittily described with the language of economic integration as "primarily an export product and not one for domestic consumption."[5] Others argue that minority protection is no longer merely a condition for becoming a member state but ever more as an expression of being an EU member state.[6] This argument was formulated before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty which expressly enumerates the rights of persons belonging to minorities among the founding values of the European Union.[7] However, Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) itself does not confer competence on the EU to adopt binding legal acts. Nonetheless, it may be invoked in case of clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values in a political than legal procedure under Article 7 TEU.

New perspectives arose for national minorities with the anti-discrimination clause of Article 19 TFEU, which are still to be exploited. Learning from the unwillingness on the part of the European Union to tackle their specific problems, national minorities have chosen to adopt a bottom-up approach made possible by the European citizens' initiative.[8] The Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN) launched the procedure for a citizens' initiative entitled 'Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe'[9],

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[4] Toggenburg: *A remaining Share of a New Part?* op. cit. pp.2-3.

[5] Bruno de Witte: *Politics versus Law in the EU's Approach to Ethnic Minorities*. EUI working Papers, Euroepan University Institute No. 2000/4, p.3.

[6] Toggenburg: *A remaining Share of a New Part?* op. cit. p.4

[7] Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union: The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.

[8] Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on the citizens' initiative (OJ 2011 L65, p.1).; According to Art. 2 of the Regulation 'citizens' initiative' means an initiative submitted to the Commission in accordance with this Regulation, inviting the Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties, which has received the support of at least one million eligible signatories coming from at least one quarter of all Member States; (OJ L 65, 11.3.2011, p. 1)

[9] **Subject-matter:**
We call upon the EU to improve the protection of persons belonging to national and

Balázs Izsák and Attila Dabis launched a citizens' initiative entitled 'Cohesion policy for the equality of the regions and the preservation of regional cultures'[10], both relying – amongst others – on Article 19 TFEU. The European Commission refused to register either of the initiatives on the basis that they would fall manifestly outside the framework of the Commission's powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.[11] The organizers challenged the decision of the Commission before the General Court of the EU, therefore currently there are at least two pending cases before the General Court in which it could define more closely the concept of ethnic origin and clarify whether Art 19 TFEU enables the EU to adopt measures to combat discrimination on the grounds of belonging to a national minority.[12]

Member States, EU institutions, NGOs and other organisations express diverging views on the question. Due to the fact that in practice it is non-EU nationals who are the main victims of ethnic discrimination, scholarly articles mainly deal with the question whether

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linguistic minorities and strengthen cultural and linguistic diversity in the Union.
Main objectives:
We call upon the EU to adopt a set of legal acts to improve the protection of persons belonging to national and linguistic minorities and strengthen cultural and linguistic diversity in the Union. It shall include policy actions in the areas of regional and minority languages, education and culture, regional policy, participation, equality, audiovisual and other media content, and also regional (state) support. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/non-registered/details/1507. The complete text of the Minority SafePack Iniative is available at: https://www.fuen.org/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/MSPI_ENGL_Official_Document.pdf

[10] **Subject-matter:**
The cohesion policy of the EU should pay special attention to regions with national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics that are different from those of the surrounding regions.
Main objectives:
For such regions, including geographic areas with no administrative competencies, the prevention of economical backlog, the sustainment of development and the preservation of the conditions for economic, social and territorial cohesion should be done in a way that ensures their characteristics remain unchanged. For this, such regions must have equal opportunity to access various EU-funds and the preservation of their characteristics and their proper economical development must be guaranteed, so that the EU's development can be sustained and its cultural diversity maintained. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/non-registered/details/1488; for a detailed presentation and analysis see: Gordos Árpád: Perben, haragban – Luxemburgban; *Pro Minoritate* 2014 Ősz, Budapest; pp.133-147.

[11] See Commission Decision C(2013)5969 final of 13 September 2013 and Commission Decision C(2013) 4975 of 25 July 2013

[12] See cases T-646/13 and T-529/13 respectively

Article 19 TFEU allows for adopting legislation referring to non-EU citizens.[13] The issue concerning the question how the broad range of prohibited grounds could be used in cases of overlapping concepts such as race, ethnicity and national minority remains unanswered.

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) issued a report[14] on national minorities addressing matters closely related to the principle of non-discrimination of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article 21[15]). The report acknowledges that the horizontal obligation under Article 19 TFEU goes further than Article 21 of the Charter, which merely prohibits the Union from discriminating on various grounds.[16] Compared to Article 19 TFEU the Charter contains a broader range of protected grounds, expressly enumerating "membership of national minority", "language" and "colour" in addition to race, ethnic origin and religion (which are contained in both Article 19 TFEU and Article 21 of the Charter). This approach led to a conclusion on the part of the FRA and prominent scholars that the new horizontal obligation of the EU builds on the enabling provision in Art 19 TFEU and does not cover discrimination on grounds of membership of national minority or language.[17] Others argue[18] that the "reference to "ethnic origin" must be seen as complementary to "racial origin": what is meant are persons targeted for discrimination on account of their cultural characteristics, whether or not they belong to a different race"[19] and further explaining that the intended measures would clearly target immigrant communities, but "there do not seem to be good reasons why the Roma, or indeed the traditional territorially-based ethnic minorities, could not also invoke their protection."[20] In line

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[13] Toggenburg: *A remaining Share of a New Part?* op. cit p.21.

[14] Respect for and protection of persons belonging to minorities 2001-2010. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Publications Office of the European Union, 2011

[15] Article 21 Non-discrimination: 1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. 2. Within the scope of application of the Treaty establishing the European Community and of the Treaty on European Union, and without prejudice to the special provisions of those Treaties, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.

[16] Respect for and protection of persons… p.23.

[17] Ibid p.23. and Toggenburg: *A remaining Share of a New Part?* op. cit p.8.

[18] Although those opinions were formulated in the pre-Charter era, I doubt that the text of the Charter changed this position.

[19] de Witte: *Politics versus Law in the EU's Approach to Ethnic Minorities*. op. cit. p.19.

[20] Ibid. p.19.

with this argumentation the EU sets socio-economic integration of marginalised communities such as the Roma as special investment priority in its cohesion policy[21] evaluated as a key development in the FRA report.[22] The latter underlines also the fact that this is the first time that one specific investment priority focusing on the inclusion of Roma and other marginalised communities is included as a requirement in the Structural Funds.[23]

It can be disputed that because of a clear distinction in wording of Article 19 TFEU and Article 21 of the Charter, racial or ethnic origin does not cover national minorities. It would be extremely strange from the human rights point of view if the result of the codification process, which resulted in national minorities being finally expressly mentioned in the primary law of the Union, could also serve as a decisive argument for excluding them from the scope of Article 19 TFEU. It would be also in contradiction to the level of protection article of the Charter which states that "[n]othing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised...".[24] The argument that Article 19 cannot serve as a legal basis for adopting an instrument addressing the situation of special minority communities is more a political than a legal one.[25] As Vizi points out, the lack of a specific directive prohibiting discrimination of ethnic minorities in the EU law is more likely due to the divergent views of the member states concerning the forms of discrimination.[26]

The European Union Network of Experts in Fundamental Rights has recommended the adoption of a "Directive specifically aimed at encouraging the integration of Roma" and was of the opinion that Article 13 ECT (now Article 19 TFEU) forms the appropriate legal

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[21] REGULATION (EU) No 1304/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 December 2013 on the European Social Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1081/2006

[22] Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 2013, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the EU, 2014

[23] Ibid. p.169.

[24] Article 53 of the Charter

[25] See Olivier De Schutter-Annalies Verstichel: *The Role of the Union in Integrating the Roma: Present and Possible Future.* European Diversity and Autonomy Papers EDAP 2/2005, p.33., at www.eurac.edu/edap; Christoph Hillion: Az Európai Unió bővítése – a tagsági kötelezettségek és a csatlakozási követelmények ütközése a kisebbségvédelem terén. *Pro Minoritate*, 2003/Tél, p.7.

[26] Vizi Balázs: *Európai kaleidoszkóp. Az Európai Unió és a kisebbségek*. L'Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest, 2013. p.39

basis for such a directive.[27] The European Parliament also shared this position when urged the Commission to continue to implement a coherent general strategy on the problems facing minorities in the Union, by continuing to enforce existing anti-discrimination legislation and considering possible further action based on Article 13 on anti-discrimination policy. The Parliament was of the opinion that 'using this legal basis, which is the most far reaching as regards the protection of minorities, the Union could, on the basis of its experience, develop the following initiatives that have already been implemented and strengthen various articles of the FCNM [Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities – op. ed.], such as Article 3(1), Article 4(2) and (3) and Articles 6 and 8 thereof'.[28] In addition, the Council of the European Union has specifically based its Recommendation on effective Roma integration measures in the Member States on the contested Article 19 (1) TFEU.[29]

When comparing Article 19 TFEU and Article 21 of the Charter it should be noted that the latter indeed adds new grounds of prohibited discrimination: colour, social origin, genetic features, language, political or any other opinion, membership of national minority, property and birth. Article 21 imports a general prohibition of discrimination with an open-ended wording and therefore it should be necessary to look more closely which grounds are new ones comparing to Article 19 TFEU and which are merely elaborating the ones already included in the enabling article. The international law practice strongly supports the view that discrimination based on colour and belonging to a national minority are already included in the prohibited ground of racial or ethnic origin as elaborated in the next section.

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[27] http://www.errc.org/article/eu-experts-reccomend-directive-on-roma-integration--european-union-network-of-experts-in-fundamental-rights-calls-for-roma-integration-directive/1921; The Synthesis Report: conclusions and recommendations on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union and its Member States in 2003 states: „However, considering the specificity of the situation of the Roma, whose socio-economic condition requires not only protection from discrimination but also affirmative desegregation in employment, housing, and education, the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights invites the European Commission to consider proposing a directive based on Article 13 EC and specifically aimed at improving the situation of the Roma population."

[28] European Parliament resolution on the protection of minorities and anti-discrimination policies in an enlarged Europe (2005/2008(INI)), para 49.

[29] COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION of 9 December 2013 on effective Roma integration measures in the Member States (2013/C 378/01)

The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – a tool for interpretation of EU Law?

When interpreting Article 19 TFEU due regard has to be given to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Article 6 (2) TEU stipulates that the Union shall accede to the ECHR. Subparagraph (3) adds that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law. This reflects the settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) „according to which fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law the observance of which the Court ensures."[30]

The CJEU has found more than forty years ago that international treaties for the protection of human rights (i. e. ECHR), of which the member states are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of community law. „That conception was later recognized by the joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 5 April 1977, which, after recalling the case law of the Court, refers on the one hand to the rights guaranteed by the constitutions of the Member States and on the other hand to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 (Official Journal C 103, 1977, p. 1)."[31]

Another strong argument for finding that the ECHR and the related case law should be used when interpreting Article 19 TFEU is provided by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which is now part of the primary law.[32] Article 52 (3) of the Charter stipulates that in so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to the rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the ECHR. Article 6 (1) TEU provides that the rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter that sets out the sources of those provi-

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[30] Case C-571/10 Servet Kamberaj v Istituto per l'Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano (IPES) and Others, para 61.

[31] Judgment of the Court of 13 December 1979. Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Verwaltungsgericht Neustadt an der Weinstraße - Germany. Prohibition on new planting of vines. Case 44/79. European Court Reports 1979 -03727, para 15.

[32] Article 6 (1) TEU

sions. Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights further clarifies that in so far as the rights in the Charter correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights are the same as those laid down by the ECHR.[33] Furthermore, the meaning and the scope of the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the text of those instruments, but also by the case law of the ECHR and by the CJEU.[34] The Explanations contain two lists, one of which consists of Charter provisions entirely within the scope of Article 52 (3), the other sets out those provisions where the meaning is the same as the corresponding Articles of the ECHR. Neither of them mentions Article 21 of the Charter. A leading Commentary to the Charter points out that there are two cases where, despite the fact that the particular Charter right cannot be found on the mentioned list, the Explanations to a particular Charter right refer to the ECHR. One is Article 21 on equality, which "'applies in compliance' with Article 14 to the extent of the correspondence with that ECHR rule."[35] Article 21 of the Charter lists „racial or ethnic origin" and „membership of national minority", whereas Art. 14 ECHR[36] 'only' "race" and „association with a national minority", however, race and ethnic origin should be regarded as overlapping grounds,[37] the correspondence therefore exists in this regard.

Article 6 (1) TEU, Article 52 (3) Charter and the Explanations thereof read together „incorporate" (although not formally) the text of ECHR and case law of the ECtHR into the primary law of the EU, where the concept of race and ethnic origin should be interpreted in the same way, irrespective of the circumstance which segment (TEU, TFEU or the Charter) is applied. Thus, the Charter is not creating new competences to the EU,[38] but it is relevant in interpreting the treaties,[39] for example in determining the exact scope of competences under Article 19 TFEU. Explanations underline that Article 21 (1) does not alter either the extent of powers granted under Article 19 or

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[33] Official Journal of the European Union (2007/C 303/02)

[34] Explanations on Article 52

[35] Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner, Angela Ward (eds.): *The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights - A Commentary.* Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014. p.1493 ; see also Explanation on Article 21

[36] Article 14 Prohibition of discrimination: The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.

[37] Argumentation for this see later.

[38] Pursuant to Article 6 (1) TEU and Article 51 (2) of the Charter

[39] See also Peers et al. (eds.): *The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights - A Commentary* op.cit. p.1431

the interpretation given to that Article. However, following the line of argumentation in this paragraph of the Explanations, this should be understood as a limiting interpretation related to measures to combat certain forms of discrimination.[40]

Differences regarding the protected grounds of discrimination exist between legal instruments, such as the Charter (primary law of the EU), the Race Directive[41] (secondary law) or international human rights conventions (i.e. ECHR). However, there can be no differences regarding the *ratione personae* of a specific protected ground. "Racial or ethnic origin" as a category protected by the primary and secondary law of the EU as well as international human right instruments should have the same personal scope, irrespective of the type of the legal instrument where it appears. It shall be interpreted by the EU institutions in a uniform way and in conformity with international practice. The ECHR is not just the first comprehensive treaty in the world in the field of human rights; it is also the most judicially developed of all the human rights systems.[42]

Article 14[43] of ECHR on the prohibition of discrimination and Article 1 of its Protocol No. 12 on general prohibition of discrimination do not list "ethnicity" as a protected ground, only race, colour, language, religion, national origin, and association with a national minority. However, when it is relevant in the given case, the ECtHR consequently uses the term "ethnic" (and its variations) and analyses the ethnic origin of persons concerned, due to the fact that, according to its well-established case law, race, ethnic origin and national minority are overlapping concepts with no clear limitations. In Timishev c. Russia the ECtHR found that *'ethnicity and race are related and overlapping concepts. Whereas the notion of race is rooted in the idea of biological classification of human beings into subspecies according to morphological features such as skin colour or facial characteristics, ethnicity has its origin in the idea of soci-*

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[40] Scholars for example express different views regarding the possibility of affirmative action based on Art 19 (ex Art 13). See for example de contrasting views of De Schutter-Verstichel and Toggenburg. However, this is an issue worth another in-depth analysis on the ruling of the ECJ.

[41] Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin; *Official Journal L 180, 19/07/2000 P. 0022 – 0026*

[42] Philip Alston – Ryan Goodman: *International Human Rights*. Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 891.

[43] Article 14 ECHR guarantees an accessory right applicable only in relation to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms otherwise protected by the Convention. However, this does not affect the interpretation of the personal scope of the protected grounds.

etal groups marked by common nationality, tribal affiliation, religious faith, shared language, or cultural and traditional origins and backgrounds.'[44] It should be borne in mind that there is still no legally binding definition of national minority in international law,[45] however, the attributes of national minorities are the same as for "ethnicity" in the cited case.[46]

The ECtHR adopted the same approach in Sejdić and Finci c. Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it examined the fundamental rights of two persons, one of Roma and the other of Jewish ethnic origin, both having national minority status in their state. The court found that "[d]iscrimination on account of a person's ethnic origin is a form of racial discrimination."[47]

In D. H. and others c. the Czech Republic[48] landmark case on Article 14 ECHR, the court examined discrimination in education of persons belonging to national minorities under domestic legislation[49] from a racial and ethnic origin point of view, despite the fact that Article 14 lists discrimination on ground of association with national minority as well.[50] The court gave due consideration in its analysis also to Article 13 ECT, the Racial Directive and the case law of CJEU.

It should be also noted that the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), a human rights body of the Council of Europe, defines racism as "the belief that a ground such as race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin justifies contempt for a person or a group of persons or the notion of superiority of a person or a group of persons."[51] In accordance with this definition ECRI consistently examines the situation of national minorities in the Member States.[52]

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[44] Timishev v. Russia. 13 December 2005. Application Nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00. at 13., 55.

[45] Even the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) of the Council of Europe does not define the term „national minority".

[46] See Article 6 of FCNM and the definition in legally non-binding Recommendation 1201. (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly of CoE.

[47] Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (application nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06), 22 December 2009, Para 43.; see also: *Handbook on European non-discrimination law of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and European Court of Human Rights - Council of Europe*, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2011, p. 104-106.

[48] D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic (No. 57325/00), 16 March 2006

[49] Para 14.

[50] Paras 3., 124., 139., 176.

[51] General Policy Recommendation No. 7, Definitions 1. a)

[52] See for example: ECRI Report on Romania (fourth monitoring cycle) at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Romania/ROM-CbC-IV-2014-019-ENG.pdf;

Following the same line of argumentation it is evident that the circumstance that the Charter does and Article 19 TFEU does not expressly mention national minorities cannot result in a conclusion that there is a clear difference in the primary law of the EU between discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin and discrimination based on membership of a national minority. The express reference to national minorities in the Charter "merely" underlines, makes it unequivocal that the Charter prohibits discrimination on this ground as well. This view is supported also in the recital (6) of the Race Directive, which strongly suggests that the category of race is contested and scientifically unfounded; consequently, the EU legislation avoids attempting to define the notion of discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin.[53]

Conclusions

The requirement of coherence implies that the EU should build on the *acquis* of international and European human rights law when interpreting its legislative powers. Discrimination based on "racial and ethnic origin" as enshrined in Article 19 TFEU covers discrimination based on belonging to a national minority as well. Clash of views might (and certainly would) arise regarding the constitutive elements of national minority; however, this should not be a legal obstacle when adopting EU legislation concerning national minorities. Noting that the Union have competences to adopt legislation concerning the Roma minority (whether or not the text of the treaties uses the term minority) and that "ethnicity" covers nationality, religion, language or cultural and traditional origins, the General Court could – without too much judicial activism – find that the EU indeed has competences to adopt legal acts – amongst others – concerning national minorities.

ECRI Report on Hungary (fourth monitoring cycle) at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Hungary/HUN-CbC-IV-2009-003-ENG.pdf; ECRI Report on Slovakia (fourth monitoring cycle) at http://hudoc.ecri.coe.int/XMLEcri/ENGLISH/Cycle_04/04_CbC_eng/SVK-CbC-IV-2009-020-ENG.pdf

[53] Craig-de Burca: *Eu Law Text, Cases and Materials* op. cit. p.869

Ukraine

Myroslav S. Dnistrianskyy – Oksana I Skliarska

Territorial – Political Differentiation of Ukraine: Forming Factors, Contradictions of Ethno-Cultural Relations, Prospects of Social Consolidation

Polarization of political moods in Ukraine, which was particularly evident during the parliamentary elections of the years 2007 and 2012, the 2004 and 2010 presidential elections, revolutionary events in early 2014, has once again brought the issues of territorial and political integrity of the state along with the related problems of Ukrainian identity (ethnic and political) and the choice of geopolitical orientations into focus. In both scientific and journalistic literature there have also appeared many analytical materials (by I. Bekeshkina, O. Maiboroda, L. Nahorna, M. Riabchuk, H. Perepelytsia, V. Khmelko, V. Shyshatskyi, etc.) which have accounted for the situation from different methodological standpoints, along with different political speculations as to the "imminent division" of Ukraine, "civilizational incompatibility" of its regions, etc. And while analysts were trying to understand the cause-and-effect relationship of territorial and political reality, political strategists and politicians tried to use them in fighting for their interests. This also refers to related external political environments, out of which particularly intense mass opinion pressure aims at regaining and strengthening the Soviet identity in Ukraine. This pressure is applied by Russia and aims at the recreation of Soviet political values as a pre-condition for expansion of its geopolitical base and even restoration of the empire within the former USSR.[1]

Since state and political identity of most societies is primarily based on historical and political traditions, in relation to Ukraine it is also important to outline those historical and geographic factors that have shaped the Ukrainian state and that have provided the characteristic features of Ukrainian political self-consciousness and its territorial disparities These peculiarities of the national and political movement for cultural autonomy and independence of Ukraine have

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[1] Dnistrianskyy, M.*:* Geopolitychnyi tysk Rosii ta ukrainski perspektyvy (Geopolitical pressure of Russia and the Ukrainian perspectives) In: *Universum*. №11-12, 2010. pp.4-7.

been at the core of its political history over the past two centuries, as well as to the differences in the degree of involvement of the country's regions in that historical and political process.[2] The fact that different parts of Ukraine's territory used to be part of different states having different ideological principles – from the end of the 18th c. to 1917 within the Russian and Austrian (Austro-Hungarian) empires, during the 20s, the 30s of the 20th c. within Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia – also does not contribute to common political identification of the citizens of the state. Unfortunately, even in the period of independence central political elites quite often resorted to provoking regional conflicts. And that device was applied by both central state structures and separate political forces and politicians, who contributed to further popularizing biased historical interpretations. As the result of that, there have been no serious achievements in overcoming historical barriers of mutually negative perceptions.

Thus, Ukrainian state territory is composed of an integrated historical and geographic region. However, along with that, it is an integrated formation based on the area of settlement of the state-shaping Ukrainian ethnic nation that makes up the majority of the state territory of Ukraine.[3] Therefore, Ukraine has got all the objective grounds for becoming an integrated state united by the geographic distribution of the Ukrainian people and its peaceful relations and close ties with other ethnic groups in the peripheral parts of its territory based on preserving the multicultural identity of the regions. However, territorial and consolidation processes in Ukraine both in the late 20th and in the early 21st c. have not been smooth since the Ukrainian ethnic nation remains unconsolidated, due to assimilation and acculturation in the Russian-speaking milieu of the regional groups of the South and East and, in particular, urban settlements. Following the results of the last census of the year 2001 all in all in Ukraine 14.8% of ethnic Ukrainians acknowledged the Russian language to be their native one, and in the urban surroundings the figure was 21.8%, while in the rural settings it was 2.7%. The largest percentage of Ukrainians (mainly those residents settled in regional centres and large cities) assimilated into the Russian-speaking milieu are in the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea (59.5%), Donetsk

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[2] Skliarska, O.: *Polityko-geografichni procesy v Zakarpatskii ta Chernivetskii oblastyah*. (Political and geographic processes in Transcarpathia and Chernivtsi oblast) Lviv: LNU imeni Ivana Franka, 2011. p.47.

[3] Dnistrianskyy, M.: *Etnopolitychna geografiya Ukrainy: problemy teoriii, metodologii, praktyky*. (Ethnopolitical geography of Ukraine: problem theories, methodology and practices) Lviv: LNU imeni Ivana Franka, 2006. p.224.

(58.7%) and Luhansk (49.4%) regions.[4] At the same time the degree of acculturation of ethnic Ukrainians into the Russian-speaking cultural milieu constitutes an indicator of the state of ethnic national self-consciousness for the Ukrainians for whom Russian is a mixed, "Soviet", or regional identity.

Under certain circumstances, the religious factor could improve interregional integration. However, territorial distribution of the religious allegiance and its political significance also confirms the preservation of considerable, historically derived regional discrepancies and the insufficiency of cultural combinations. Of particularly negative geopolitical value is the territorial distribution of Ukrainian orthodoxy and the absence of one, self-governed, Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Therefore, due to all the negative moments in Ukraine during the period of independence, the processes shaping an integral Ukrainian political nation and united state identity have not yet been completed.

Due to the impact of previous historical periods in the formation of the ethnic structure of regions, taking into account a wide range of factors (the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic minorities, the population structure by native tongue, degree of assimilation of ethnic and national groups, and electoral geography), the following groups of regions are taken as separate ethnic and geographic sociocultural districts: 1) Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi regions; 2) Volyn-Halychyna area (Volyn, Rivne, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil regions); 3) Podillia-Polissia area (Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi regions); 4) Central Right Bank area (Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy regions); 5) Central Left Bank area (Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv regions); 6) Dnipro-Kharkiv area (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv regions); 7) Donetsk area (Donetsk and Luhansk regions); 8) Odessa area (Odessa region); 9) Central Black Sea area (Mykolaiv and Kherson regions); 10) Crimean area (the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea) (see figure 1).

Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia regions are characteristic ones in this respect, although together they do not form an integral area. Nevertheless, individually they are similar in the features of geopolitical location, historical and geographic preconditions and some special features of ethno-national population structure as well as in public

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[4] Natcionalnyi sklad naselennya ta yoho movni oznaky. Za danymy Vseukrainskoho perepysu naselennya 2001 roku. (Ethnic composition of the population and its linguistic features. Based on National census of Ukraine, 2001) K.: Derjavnyi komitet statystyky Ukrainy, 2003. p.104.

and political activity.[5] The ethnic Ukrainian population makes up over 75% of the population, indigenous ethnic minorities (Hungarians, Romanians, and Moldovans) are provided with a cultural and educational infrastructure, however, they are poorly integrated into the general Ukrainian milieu, due to their poor command of Ukrainian. (The Ukrainian language was not studied in minority schools until 1991).

In Zakarpattia the problem of political rusynstvo remains of concern. Its ideology claims that the Ukrainian residents of Zakarpattia region constitute a separate ethnos. Censuses have proved from the very beginning that the percentage of persons among the native Ukrainian residents of Zakarpattia region that identified themselves with rusyns as a separate ethnos is very limited.

This was confirmed by the census of 2001, the methodology of which enabled all Ukrainians willing to identify themselves as a separate people. The results of the census showed that 10,090 persons identified themselves as the representatives of a "separate ethnos". That constitutes less than one per cent of all ethnic Ukrainians of Zakarpattia, and 31% of them also acknowledged Ukrainian to be their native language.[6]

As the monitoring of the latest presidential election and parliamentary elections of Ukraine shows, a considerable administrative effort, which was the result of impacts of current authorities as well as of large financial and business groups, has been perceivable in the electoral and political behaviour of the residents of Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi regions. The support of Ukrainian national democratic forces makes up from 40 to 60% of voters. The support of the Party of Regions, which was the ruling one since 2010 and that combined liberal and pro-Russian ideological principles, varied from 15 to 30%. Some 5% of voters voted for left-wing political parties here.

The Western, Volyn-Halychyna area, embracing five regions (Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil), is in general more homogenous, and it is distinguished by a high percentage of ethnic Ukrainians (over 95%), a small percentage of ethnic Russians (less than 5%) and Russian-speaking population (less than 4%). Ethnic Russians are scattered mainly in large and middle-sized cities – administrative, industrial and recreational centres. The percentage of urban residents among them exceeds 80%. In the regional centres

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[5] Skliarska, O.: *Polityko-geografichni procesy v Zakarpatskii ta Chernivetskii oblastyah*. op. cit. p.11

[6] Natcionalnyi sklad naselennya ta yoho movni oznaky. (Ethnic composition of the population and its linguistic features. Based on National census of Ukraine, 2001) Uzhgorod: Holovne upravlinnya statystyky v Zakarpatskii oblasti, 2003. p.12.

Figure 1. *Social and cultural areas of Ukraine*

Legend

○ . - Cities (regional centres)

┃ - social and cultural areas borders

⋯ - borders of regions

I - Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi regions
II - Volyn and Halychyna area
III - Podillia-Polissia area
IV - Central Right Bank area
V - Central Left Bank area
VI - Dnipro-Kharkiv area
VII - Donetsk area
VIII - Odesa area
IX - Central Black Sea area
X - Crimean area

of the area the percentage of ethnic Russians makes up from 3% (in Ternopil) to 8.9% (in Lviv). Here Russians are quite well assimilated into the Ukrainian cultural milieu. From 12 to 20% of them consider Ukrainian to be their native language, and at the same time among those who consider the language of their nationality to be their native language, as compared with other areas, the percentage of those having a fluent command of Ukrainian is quite high. Along with that, the percentage of Russians who were born in Volyn-Halychyna area is small (less than 2% of the whole population born in the area), that being one of the factors of reduction in the sympathy with ethnic Russians and ethnic majority. High degree of self-consciousness of Ukrainian residents has also encouraged higher public activity among ethnic national minorities, which is manifested in the setting-up of a wide network of ethnic national communities. The degree of support of national democratic and nationalistic forces within historical Halychyna makes up from 85 to 90%, and within historical Volyn up to 75 %. Some 10% of residents are ready to support centrist, left-wing and centrist as well as liberal democratic parties. Less than 3% of the population support communist ideology. In Volyn the influence of centrist parties, in particular the ones supported by the administrative factors can achieve 15%.

The Volyn-Halicna area has become one of the leaders in the consolidation of the national state and political nation, because of its high degree of involvement in Ukrainian history and the development of its ethnic cultural environment. However, its poor economic potential along with some objective preconditions considerably reduced its social and economic role in the general state processes. Due to the high degree of identification of the population of the area with the idea of Ukrainian sovereignty, in case state authorities deviate from the principles of constructing Ukraine as a national state, ethnic political riots and conflicts with the central authorities may appear.

The three areas of the central part of Ukraine (Podillia-Polissia, Central Right Bank and Central Left Bank), similarly to the Volyn-Halychyna area, are primary areas of Ukrainian settlement and nation-building. This determines its primarily mono-ethic nature: the percentage of Ukrainians here varies from over 85% (only Sumy region) to some 95% (Vinnytsia). In rural areas the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians exceeds 95%. The percentage of Ukrainians whose native language is Russian is a bit higher here than in Volyn-Halychyna, and it varies in the Right Bank part from 1 to 4%, while in the Left Bank area it reaches 7.6%. However, in general in these three areas the percentage of Ukrainian-speaking residents is a bit less than the percentage of Ukrainians and, what is particularly

indicative of the residents' ethnic and political identification, in all the regions of Podillia-Polissia, Central Right Bank and Central Left Bank areas the percentage of Ukrainians with Russian being their native language is smaller than the percentage of Russians with their native tongue being Ukrainian. Only the city of Kyiv and some industrial cities (Kremenchuk, Shostka) constitute an exemption from that. Though the figures for the majority of indices of ethnic identity of residents of Podillia-Polissia, Central Right Bank and Central Left Bank areas are similar, certain trends in socio-cultural indices (the degree of assimilation of ethnic Ukrainians, electoral behaviour) from the west to the east can be traced. Ethno-national minorities (Jews, Russians) in Podillia-Polissia, Central Right Bank and Central Left Bank areas are mostly settled in a dispersed way (in large administrative and industrial centres). Putylivka district, Sumy region provides an exemption, where there is a slight prevalence in terms of numbers (51.6% Russians and 47.4% Ukrainians) in favour of ethnic Russians. All the three areas of the central part of Ukraine, taking into account both its geographic location, historical importance, and the degree of Ukrainian ethnic political identity, these regions have sufficient grounds to become the core of the consolidation of Ukrainian civic nation based on the principles of national sovereignty and conflict-free development of ethnic political processes. In particular, the area is characterized by a relatively high degree of Ukrainian self-consciousness and, at the same time, a high level of sympathy with the largest ethnic national group – Russians. Therefore, in general the discrepancies in ethnic political development are poorly manifested.

All the central areas of Ukraine are in many ways distinguished for the similarity of voting patterns: on average up to 50% of residents here are ready to support national democratic forces, from 10 to 15 % left-wing centrist ones, and from 5 to 10 % communist ones. The degree of support for national democratic and liberal democratic political forces is a bit higher in the right bank regions, while that of left-wing and left-wing centrist ones in the left bank regions. At this point the readiness to provide support to effective centrist political forces and the ruling party (up to 20%) is evident. In the central part of Ukraine, a special place in the electoral ratios goes to the capital, which is characterized by low electoral activity and noticeable variability of political moods. As compared to the neighbouring regions, in Kyiv a slightly higher level of support of national democratic and liberal democratic forces is possible (up to 50%), that being primarily caused by the concentration of the Ukrainian national intelligentsia. In general, with a view to expanding the constructive influence of

the central socio-cultural areas to the western, eastern and southern regions, the expansion of Ukrainian cultural values remains a goal in regional centres and the uplifting of rural area.

Dnipro-Kharkiv socio-cultural area was inhabited by Ukrainians a bit later than the neighbouring Central Left Bank and Central Right Bank areas. A considerable influence on the formation of identity in that territory and political self-consciousness of its citizens was spurred by economic development through a high level of industrial development and the considerable land resources which constantly stimulated immigration of non-Ukrainian residents. In particular the migration went to large cities, administrative and industrial centres. Thus, according to the 2001 census, 9.6% of residents of Dnipropetrovsk region were born in the territory of Russia. Thus, today the percentage of Ukrainians within this socio-cultural area varies from 70 to 80% in the overall population, from 77% in Zaporizhzhia region to 90.4% in Dnipropetrovsk region. Over the latest period between the censuses the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians here increased by 7.8%, which is considerably higher than the average Ukrainian values. In the city of Kharkiv, in particular, it increased by 10.6%. 22% of all ethnic Russians of Ukraine are focused in the area; their percentage varies from 17.6% in Dnipropetrovsk region to 25.6% in Kharkiv region. The index of quantitative prevalence of ethnic Ukrainians varies from almost 3 in Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv regions to 4.5 in Dnipropetrovsk region. The percentage of Ukrainians who consider the language of their nationality to be their native one makes up on average over 70%. At the same time, in this area the differentiation in language assimilation of Ukrainians between rural and urban residents is more dramatic. Thus, in Kharkiv region only 66.7% of urban Ukrainian residents consider the language of their nationality to be their native language, while in the city of Kharkiv only 50.4%. Along with that, in rural areas the Ukrainian language use is more widespread. 91.8% of Ukrainians residing in villages consider it to be their native in Kharkiv region, though over the period between the censuses an increase in Russification took place in the region. At the same time the percentage of Russians whose native language is Ukrainian is on the rise. All in all, their percentage (4–6%) in the area is higher than the average in Ukraine.

Political-geographic problems of the Kharkiv-Dnipropetrovsk socio-cultural area (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv regions) are determined not only by its ethno-geographic structure, geopolitical location, but also by a considerable economic, primarily, industrial potential. In spite of the fact that Kharkiv was twice in its history in the centre of Ukrainian national and cultural uplifting

(the 20's, 30's of the 19th c. and the 20's of the 20th c.), and the whole socio-cultural area still preserves, in particular, the memory of Cossacks (those of Sloboda and Zaporizhzhia), still the ethnic political situation here is considerably influenced by its frontier location, the consequences of migration processes, which cause tensions and some threats of rioting in Kharkiv and other regional centres due to granting the Russian language the official status. In rural areas due to the deterioration of the living standards and social dissatisfaction, pro-Soviet ideas are also popular. Opposition of different election campaigns at the same time shows that, having a comparatively low level of support of national democratic political forces, the Dnipro-Kharkiv socio-cultural district can provide considerable support to right liberal and left-wing centrist pro-state political parties.

Eastern, Donetsk area is also almost fully located within the Ukrainian ethnic territory. However, due to its later mass settlement, a considerable impact of migration and assimilation of ethnically Ukrainian population in the course of economic development has produced by today a largely bi-ethnic, Ukrainian-Russian population. In the area reside 34% of all Russians of Ukraine, and of these over 11% were born in the territory of Russia. The percentage of ethnic Ukrainians in the population makes up in general over 57%, and among rural residents some 73%. Correspondingly, the percentage of Russians in the overall population makes up over 38%, and among rural residents it exceeds 20%. Ethnic Russians make up an absolute majority in two administrative districts of the rural area – Krasnodon (51.7%) and Stanytsia Luhanska (61.1%). Native Ukrainian residents according to the 2001 census constitute a minority, only some 27%. Their percentage in the period between the censuses has been reduced by some 5%.

Historical peculiarities of social and economic development have also determined the main ethnic political problems and contradictions of the Donetsk socio-cultural district. Peripheral involvement with the Ukrainian historical political process, strong regional self-consciousness opposed to the general national one, and acculturation of the Ukrainian population are contributing factors, as is the popularity of pro-Soviet ideas, which is supported by the social peculiarities reflecting the background of serious complexities in the economic transformation. The relatively higher level of industrial development of Donetsk region has also resulted in the appearance of powerful financial and industrial groups that over the last years have had the ambition to gain a dominating position in the political system of the entire Ukraine. They have imposed on the Ukrainian society a model of socio-cultural relations formed in the region that could lead to the

intensification of interregional opposition. This was most noticeably manifested in the course of the presidential campaign of the year 2004, which, due to provocations of Russian political strategists, became a generator of the riots in all the newly developed lands (the South and the East of Ukraine). This was driven by the adoption of dual, primarily Russian and Ukrainian citizenship, and the granting of the status of state language to the Russian language.

Due to the strong regional self-consciousness of Donetsk district, the dominant local economic and political elites, which in the latest election here associated with the Party of Regions, took over 70% of votes. Up to 10% of voters support the Bolshevik communist forces. The total support of Ukrainian national democratic and liberal democratic forces is very low (up to 15%). Approximately one-fifth of the Donetsk area directly or indirectly supported the pro-Russian separatists in April 2014.

Separation of Odessa region into a separate socio-cultural area is accounted for by a number of objective factors and, primarily, by the fact that this is the region with the most diverse ethnic mosaic in Ukraine. In spite of the absolute majority of the Ukrainian population according to the census of the year 2001 (62.8%), in the language structure of the region residents with Ukrainian language being their native one make up only a relative majority (less than 50%, however, that is more than the percentage of residents with Russian being their native language). In four out of 26 administrative districts, ethnic groups form the absolute or relative majority: Bulgarians make up an absolute majority in Bolgrad district (60.8%) and relative majority in Artsyz (39.0%) and Tarutyne (37.5%) district, Moldovans make up a relative majority in Reni district (49.0%). Ethnic Ukrainians make up the absolute majority in all the administrative districts but Southern Bessarabia. The degree of command of Ukrainian in the ethnic minorities' milieu is very low. Sociological research by I. Popova conducted in Odessa region testifies that in a large percentage of the population "the Russian language was imposed by the established socio-cultural setting".[7] Thus, the status of the Ukrainian ethnicity in the region, undoubtedly, does not promote the process of consolidation.

Contradictory moments of ethnic political development are mostly focused in the regional centre (Odessa) and in the historical region of Southern Bessarabia. In particular, the historical image of Odessa

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[7] Popova, I.: *Mova yak factor polyitychnoho ta kulturnoho samovyznachennya (na materialah sotciolohichnyh doslidjen v Odeskii oblasti).* [Language as factor of political and cultural self-determination (based on a sociological survey at Odessa oblast)] Etnichni menshyny Shidnoi ta Centralnoi Evropy. K., 1994. p.135

imposed on residents by modern mass media, a widespread historical mythology as components of official ideology of the city and regional elite, which provide little connection of the city with the Ukrainian cultural and political traditions. In the city there are several groups of openly anti-Ukrainian sentiment, among which the *Rodina* party is particularly aggressive.

In two regions (Mykolaiv and Kherson) of the southern, Central Black Sea socio-cultural area, which has been under Ukrainian cultural and political influence over a considerable period of time, and which in the late 18th – early 19th c. finally became a part of Ukrainian ethnic territory, the percentage of Ukrainians according to the 2001 census makes up 82% of the population. Also similar for the two regions are the percentages of Russians (14.1%). The rural population is, as in Ukraine as a whole, more of a monoethnic nature: although there are some settlements or separate communities of ethnic national minorities (Moldovans, Bulgarians and Russians), over 88% of the whole population are ethnic Ukrainians. Among urban residents the percentage of Russians is on average 18%. Only slightly higher is their percentage in regional centres and in the cities of Nova Kakhovka, Pivdennoukrainsk. Contradictions relating to insufficient Ukrainian national identification are also noticeable here, however, the destructive politicization of the residents on the basis of mobilization of regional or Soviet identities has less basis than that in the neighbouring Odesa region. Correspondingly, it is not likely that the conflicts of the whole district with the central authorities will come to the foreground. Kherson region is distinguished among the other southern regions of Ukraine for the strongest support of Ukrainian national democratic parties (up to 30%). The use of administrative resources on behalf of the capital authorities for the sake of ensuring support of centrist parties could be effective here.

The most complicated ethnic political situation that began with the proclamation of the sovereignty of Ukraine escalated in the Crimean region. As compared to general Ukrainian ratios, the region stands out for its absolute majority of ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking population. According to the 2001 census, less than half of the residents of the Crimea (49.1%) were born in the territory of the peninsula, and some 16.1% more in other regions of Ukraine. At the same time, 18.8% of citizens were born in the territory of the Russian Federation and 8.1% in the territory of Uzbekistan.[8] However, over

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[8] Naselennya Ukrainy za mistcem narodjennya ta gromadyanstvom. Za danymy Vseukrainskoho perepysu naselennya 2001 roku. (Population of Ukraine acc. to place of birth and citizenship. Based on National census of Ukraine, 2001) K.: Derjavnyi komitet statystyky Ukrainy. K., 2004. p.226

the period between the censuses, the absolute majority of Russians has been reduced considerably: all in all by 11.6%, 10.6% among city residents and by 13.3% among village residents. As a result of rapid population reduction, as well as taking into account drastic increase in the number of Crimean Tatars, the percentage of ethnic Russian population was reduced in the peninsula: in the overall population by 7.3% (from 65.6 to 58.3%), among urban residents by 5.2% (from 71.1 t 65.9%), among rural residents by 9.9% (from 55.7% to 45.8%). The absolute number of ethnic Ukrainians showed a decrease as well: by 9.5% in general and by 5.1% within urban residents, and as much as by 14.9% within rural residents.[9] The return of deported residents contributed to the reduction in the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians by 2.4% in the overall population, by 0.3% with urban and by 6.5% with rural residents. A negative factor in the course of ethnic political processes is also a considerable degree of assimilation and acculturation of ethnic Ukrainian residents that prevents them from performing cultural integration and state consolidation functions.

One of the generators of the appearance of such contradictions was the activation of a whole range of legal and illegal Russian political unions in an openly anti-Ukrainian direction, and Russia's annexation of the peninsula in March 2014 also actively contributed to the phenomenon. The fact that the relatively largest proportion of residents born in Russia lives here and that they represent mainly an ideologized strata of the society (military, party nomenclature) does not contribute to the perception of the idea of an independent Ukraine for the ethnic Russians of the Crimean region. Total support of Ukrainian national democratic forces reached 13–15%, and still that was mainly due to the electoral activity of the Crimean Tatars.

The Crimea has a characteristic range of problems relating to the return of deported residents and their integration into the Ukrainian cultural and political settings, the main aspects of which are as follows: a) social and economic ones (employment, settlement and provision with dwelling space, allocation of land plots); b) political and legal (representation of the Crimean Tatars in the administration, the status of the Crimean Tatar people and their representation); c) geocultural (meeting educational, religious needs, command of the Ukrainian language, religious and political ideology of some Crimean Tatar groups, in particular the spread of Islamic fundamentalism).

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[9] Natcionalnyi sklad naselennya ta yoho movni oznaky. Za danymy Vseukrainskoho perepysu naselennya 2001 roku. (Ethnic composition of the population and its linguistic features. Based on National census of Ukraine, 2001) K.: Derjavnyi komitet statystyky Ukrainy, 2003. p.112-118.

As a conclusion, there are enough objective preconditions for the shaping of the new Ukrainian political identity in combination with the preservation of regional identities and a deepening of territorial and political consolidation of the Ukrainian society. However, at the same time the state faces too many factors of interregional alienation created either by way of a purposeful destructive activity, or by cynical inactivity. Therefore, the negative consequences of a durable policy of provoking interregional conflicts which was conducted in the Soviet period and also in the recent times, along with the insufficiency of current steps aimed at strengthening regional contacts are obvious. Mass media does not bring into focus all the moments of historical, cultural and geographic unity of regions with the core of the country. As a consequence of that, the question remains unanswered whether Ukrainian society will be able to use its favourable objective preconditions for the political consolidation of the state, or there will be a social will to implement all the advantages that neutralize negative elements.

However, some positive elements can also be noted in regional and political trends. First of all, in Ukraine objective natural processes of citizens' self-organization on the principles of patriotism, the need to preserve integrity as well as national cultural identity have been taking place. The understanding of the fact that Soviet identity and independent Ukraine are incompatible objectives is being formed as well, though very slowly. Also, a certain potential of public counteraction to the expansionism on behalf of Russia is perceptible, too.[10]

Finally, let us state that the elimination of actual threats to territorial and political integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine as well as the creation of favourable internal and external political preconditions for its consolidation will depend not only on the Ukrainian political system, but also on a more effective self-organization of responsible citizens of all regions on the basis of general national interests. To overcome historical regional and mental alienation it is also important to bridge different regional perceptions of the Ukrainian historical process. Removing the manifestations of antagonism and supporting the manifestations of sympathy and mutual understanding is a first prerequisite.

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[10] Dnistrianskyy, M.: *Geopolitychnyi tysk Rosii ta ukrainski perspektyvy* op. cit. p.7

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