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Conditions of Minorities

Conditions of Minorities

Károly Kocsis

Changing Ethnic Patterns in the Carpatho–Pannonian Region (1989–2002)

The unprecedented economic, social, and political changes of the years after 1989 have brought about discernable changes in the former Socialist countries of the Carpatho–Pannonian Region: the natural decrease of the population increased spatial mobility and enhanced the process of the losing of ethnic identity. This, in turn, resulted in a considerable ethnic transformation in the Carpatho–Pannonian region, the population of which saw a 700,000-strong decrease of population during the examined period. Among ethnic changes, the most striking ones involved the accelerated decrease and assimilation of national minorities, the dynamic headway by the Roma population, and the increasing numbers and percentage of a population that lacks emotional attachment.

The changing ethnic patterns in the Carpatho–Pannonian region will be discussed with the help of the last two censuses[1] conducted in eight countries of the region. Since the countries in concern (except Austria) made them available in a most detailed territorial breakdown, primarily the census figures of ethnic affiliation (national, ethnic affiliation)[2] served as the basis of the research. In the case of Austria one can only infer the ethnic stratification of the population through the "colloquial language" *(Umgangssprache)* category, which has been used in Austrian statistics for half a century. In the post-socialist countries, even the figures on *mother tongue* (that look back to a great historical past and enjoy less publicity) can help one in this type of research. Hungary was the only country in Europe to introduce two questions on *"affiliation to national cultural values and traditions"* and *"language used in the family and among friends" in order to take an accurate snapshot of the "actual"* numbers of the gradually assimilating and scattered national minorities.

The differences between the character of the answers and the number of possible answers cause a serious problem when it comes to the evaluation and comparison of the figures of the censuses between 1991 and 2001. When assessing the degree of "loss of identity", one has to take into consideration that it was compulsory to answer this question in Ukraine, Romania, Austria, and, in 1990, in Hungary as well. At the censuses around 1991, with the exception of Austria,[3] one was

[1] The dates of the censuses: Hungary 1990, 2001, Slovakia 1991, 2001, Ukraine 1989, 2001, Romania 1992, 2002, Serbia 1991, 2002, Croatia 1991, 2001, Slovenia 1991, 2002, Austria 1991, 2001.

[2] The category name for ethnic affiliation is: "nemzetiség" in Hungary, "národnosť" in Slovakia, "національность" (1989), "етнічне походження" (2001) in Ukraine, "naţionalitatea" (1992), "etnie" (2002) in Romania, "?ационална, етничка припадност" in Serbia, "narodnost" in Croatia, "narodnost" (1991), "narodni pripadnost" (2002) in Slovenia, and "Umgangssprache" in Austria.

[3] The Austrian censuses make it possible to indicate dual affiliation (e.g. German–Hungarian and German–Croatian) in the "colloquial language" category.

allowed to indicate only one answer. The situation was nearly the same at the time of the last censuses with the exception that one could indicate up to three kinds of ethnic affiliation in Hungary. Naturally, this brought about a considerable increase in the number of those who indicated that they (also) had a minority ethnic affiliation. The type of population *(permanent, resident, present)* surveyed by the census is a significant factor in the research of ethnic composition. At the last censuses, the majority of the countries in the region only considered resident population. On the other hand, the *Croatian* Central Bureau of Statistics (DZS), published the ethnic figures of the 2001 census with respect to *permanent population* according to Yugoslav statistical traditions and due to nation-political reasons.[4] As a result of the census-methodological changes and problems, the comparison of the data on ethnic affiliation of the various countries is only possible with reservations and great caution.

National identity as revealed by statistics

In the examined period, the percentage of those who did not answer on their ethnic affiliation, did not give an evaluable answer or were of an unknown ethnic affiliation increased from 1.2% to 2.8%, that is, from 369,000 to 828,000 within the approximately 30 million strong population of the Carpatho–Pannonian Region. This upward turn in the "loss of national identity" and "loss of ethnic identity" can be attributed to the fact that the census-takers pointed out to the people at the 2001 census in Hungary more markedly that answering the questions on ethnicity and religion was no longer obligatory.[5] As a result, more than 570,000 (5.6%) people did not take the effort to give an answer on their ethnic affiliation in Hungary (*Table 1*). As opposed to this, a strengthening of national identity could be observed in the countries affected by the Yugoslav War. In Croatia, as a result of the deletion of the "Yugoslav" ethnic category and the social expectations regarding the open admission of one's ethnic and religious affiliation, the percentage of those without ethnic affiliation fell sharply (in the Pannonian, Central-European parts of the country,

[4] Because of this, Vukovár, a symbol of Croatian national defence, demolished following the 1991 Serb assault, and with officially 31,670 and in reality 20,301 inhabitants, ended up having a 57.4% Croatian majority on paper in 2001. As opposed to this, as far as the resident population was concerned, it was considered a city of Serb majority (51.3%) in the absence of more than 10,000 Croatians who had been constrained to leave. At this point, due mainly to the 1991 war, out of the 4,437,460-strong permanent Croatian residents only 4,020,025 lived at their permanent residence. Out of the 406,340 (9.2%) living elsewhere – because of studies, employment or as displaced people – 108,000 were living in Croatia and 226,000 abroad (www.dzs.hr)

[5] In Hungary, the non-obligatory character of the answer was due to Act XLVI of 1993 Law on Statistics of Hungary, Act LXVI of 1992 on the Recording of the Personal Data and Addresses of Citizens and Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities. (2001.évi népszámlálás. 4. Nemzetiségi kötődés. A nemzeti, etnikai kisebbségek adatai [2001 Census. 4. Ethnic affiliation. Figures on national and ethnic minorities]. KSH, Budapest, 2002, p. 9.)

from 5.1% to 1.9%). Although Serb statistics still offered the choice of "Yugoslav" ethnic identity, because of the public mood and the strengthening of the original ethnic affiliation of the population that "turned Yugoslav", the percentage of those stating a "Yugoslav" ethnic identity dropped from 9.8% to 6.8% in Vojvodina. The degree of the loosening of ethnic bonds strongly varies from territory to territory. The process intensified especially in the urbanised parts, most affected by globalisation, and in those of mixed ethnicity (in Hungary, in Budapest and conurbation, in cities in the countryside, in certain parts of mixed ethnicity in Baranya; in Vojvodina, in a most diverse population area around Szabadka (Subotica), Zombor (Sombor), and Újvidék (Novi Sad)). At the same time, almost everybody answered about his or her ethnic identity in Transylvania, Transcarpathia, and Őrvidék (Burgenland). The differences in the degree of *"loss of national identity"* greatly conform to those of "*secularisation*".[6] The percentage of those without religious affiliation is especially high in Hungary (25.4%), Slovakia (15.9%), in Muravidék (Pomurje) (14.5%), and Vojvodina (7.7%). This figure is less than 1% in the case of the Transylvanians and the population in Őrvidék who are very much devoted to their ethnic and religious values.

The overall demographic and ethnic picture

The population of the Carpatho–Pannonian Region – due to natural population decrease becoming more general and the loss due to emigration caused by economic trends and war – *dropped* from 30.2 million to *29.4 million* (by *2.4%*) between 1991 and 2001 *(Table 2)*. Natural and artificial demographic reasons influenced the population changes in the region to differing degrees. Given that the number of deaths exceeded that of live births only recently (only in 1999 and 2001), the population of *Transcarpathia* and *Slovakia grew* by *0.2%* and *2%* respectively. In *Őrvidék* and *Vojvodina*, the considerable population increase (respectively *2.5%* and *0.9%*) was due to intensified *immigration* (e.g. one third of a million Serb refugees were settled in Vojvodina). For *Hungary*, the lower value of population decrease (–1.3%) can be accounted for by positive migration, which could offset somewhat natural population decrease (3.5%). Population *dropped* in *Transylvania* (despite the high natural increase of the Roma population) and in the *Pannonian region of Croatia* (despite the settlement of large numbers of Bosnian Croatian refugees) by *6.4%* and *6.1%*, respectively. The sharp fall in Transylvania has to do with the continuous natural decrease (observed since 1992) and the emigration of half of the Germans and hundreds of thousands of Romanians. The Pannonian region of Croatia saw the flight of about 250,000 Serbs, war losses and natural decrease, since 1998.

[6] For the purposes of this study, secularised population includes those who declared themselves to be atheists or non-religious, did not answer the question on religion and denomination, or their religious affiliation was unknown at the time of the census

Conditions of Minorities

In relation to the above, from among the more than 1-million-strong ethnicities, only the population of the *Croatians* (5.3%), *Ukrainians* (3.7%), and *Slovaks* (2%) increased. At the same time, Hungarians, Romanians and Serbs, who account for about two thirds of the population of the region, could not preserve the population they had around 1991 (losses of –8.9%, –5.2%, and 4%) *(Tables 2, 3)*. The population of smaller ethnic groups (e.g. Germans, Czechs, Russians, and Bosnians) was primarily decimated in the years between 1991 and 2001 by their significant emigration to their mother countries. At the time of the 1991 censuses, the *largest* ethnic groups of the Carpatho–Pannonian region were as follows: *Hungarians* (11.7 million, 39.7%), *Romanians* (5.5 million, 18.5%), *Slovaks* (4.7 million, 16%), *Croatians* (2.8 million, 9.6%), *Serbs* (1.5 million, 5.1%), *Ukrainians, Ruthenians* (1.1 million, 3.8%), and the *Roma population* (0.6 million, 2%). The *Gypsies*, the *Slovaks*, the *Ukrainians* and *Ruthenians*, and (despite their losses during the past ten years) the *Romanians* were the *great winners of the ethnic processes* characteristic of *1941–2001*. During the same period, the number of those declaring themselves to be *Germans* fell by four fifths and that of the *Hungarians* by 4.2% in the Carpatho–Pannonian region. Because of their massive demographic losses, the percentage of Hungarians and Germans taken together fell sharply from 56.7% to 41% in the past sixty years.

State-forming nations, national and ethnic minorities

During the past decade, the total percentage of the *state-forming (majority) nations* of the Carpatho–Pannonian region stabilised around *84%* (this can be considered an average of considerable spatial differences) *(Table 4)*. The singular *fall* in the percentage of *Hungarians living in Hungary* (from 97.8% to 91.2%) was primarily offset by the significant *headway* of *Vojvodina Serbs* and *Croatians from Croatia*. In the background there lies a large-scale loss of ethnic identity of the mother country Hungarians and the refugee waves (Serb and Croatian) directed toward the mother countries during the Serb-Croatian war.

While in 1941 one fourth of the regions population could be considered a member of some *national minority*, ten years ago every seven and today every ninth person belongs to them. The *percentage* of national minorities (nearly two thirds of which is made up of Hungarians) *decreased* in most of the Carpatho–Pannonian region between 1991 and 2001 – due to emigration to the mother countries, nation change as registered in the statistics, and natural decrease caused by ageing. There were only two reasons that contributed to an increase in the percentage of national minorities – the permission to indicate multiple ethnic affiliations in statistics (Hungary) and large-scale immigration (Őrvidék–Austria)[7]. Only a small

[7] In the case of Őrvidék (Austria) – irrespective of one's official political status – every inhabitant who answered the question on colloquial language (*Umgangssprache*) and indicated a language other than German or the language of the Roma minority population, was categorised in the "ethnic minority" category

percentage (1.3% and 2.2%) of Romanians and Slovaks, two of the largest ethnic groups live in minority, while over one fifth of the native Carpathian Hungarians still live outside the present borders of Hungary *(Table 5)*. At the same time, due to their non-subsidlng natural growth and increasing ethnic identity, the *proportion* of the *Roma population*, an *ethnic minority* group lacking a mother country, reached *2%* (according to the freely provided census data in 2001).

The Roma and Hungarlan populations of the region

Considering that the Hungarian and Roma populations are by far the most numerous among the natlonal and ethnic minorities that cause internal and foreign policy conflicts in the Carpatho–Pannonian region, it is worth outlining their present demographic situation and ethnic pattern and the changes they went through during the past years.

Hungarians. The Hungarian population of the world has fallen from an estimated 15 million in 1980 to 14 million in 1990 and *13 million* today. Out of this, the 2001–2002 censuses found *11.7 million ethnic Hungarians* and *12 million Hungarian speakers living in the Carpatho–Pannonian region*. Their large-scale decrease (–8.9%) prevailed especially in their native settlement area and, within that, in the former Yugoslav member states and in the loosely defined Transylvania (–30%–12%) *(Table 6)*. As a result of the considerable demographic losses, the proportion of those who declared themselves ethnic Hungarians slid from 42.5% to *39.7%* of the total population of the Carpatho–Pannonian region between 1991 and *2001*. The decrease of the number of Hungarians was –10.9% in the case of those who live in minority, while only –8.3% among those who live in the mother country. The drop in the proportion of Hungarians was due, beyond their natural decrease (1991–2001: –3.56%), to the fact that 570,000 – presumably Hungarian – people, 5.6% of the population, did not state what their ethnicity was. Accordingly, it can be concluded that, among the Hungarians of the Carpatho–Pannonian region, *national identity* is *weakest among the ones living in Hungary* and the strongest in Transylvania and Transcarpathia where, in the area inhabited by Hungarians, the number of those not stating their ethnic affiliation was below 1%.

From among those who declared themselves *ethnic Hungarians (in the Pannonian territory), 9.3 million lived in Hungary, 1.4 million in Transylvania, 520,000 in Slovakia, 290,000 in Vojvodina, 151,000 in Transcarpathia, and 15,000 in Croatia*. With the exception of Vojvodina and Croatia, the number of Hungarian-speaking people exceeded that of ethnic Hungarians in every other macro region (especially in Muravidék (+20.6%) and Slovakia (+10.1%)). In the southern areas of the Carpatho–Pannonian region (e.g. Dél-Bánság (Southern-Banat), Szerémség (Srem), Szlavónia (Slavonia)), where Hungarians ever hopelessly struggle to survive in their diaspora and enclaves, merely 19–25% of ethnic Hungarians consid-

ered themselves Hungarian speakers. In this respect, the situation is the worst in the Slavonic Belovár-Bilogora (Bjelovar-Bilogora) county, where three fourth of Hungarians indicated that they were Croatian-speakers. The number of Hungarians fell most sharply (by 20–40%) more or less in these same territories between 1991 and 2001: in the Slovenian Muravidék, in the Austrian Southern-Őrvidék and in Budapest. At the same time, in the northeast (Ugocsa, Bereg and Central Szabolcs), the conurbation of Budapest, Northern-Őrvidék, and in the surroundings of Vienna and Bécsújhely (Neudorf) the number of Hungarians rose considerably. The ethnic area with a Hungarian majority shrank by 30 villages, out of which 23 (including formerly important district seats Szepsi (Moldava nad Bodvou) and Torna (Turna nad Bodvou)) were situated in the section of the Hungarian-Slovak linguistic border between rivers Danube and Hernád. It was due to a decrease of Hungarians exceeding that of the Romanians in the late 1990s that the currently 150,000-strong Székely capital, Marosvásárhely (Targu Mures), lost its Hungarian majority to the Romanians for the first time since its foundation. As a result of the settlement of Serb refugees and the quickly decreasing Hungarian population, by 2002 Hungarians became a minority at important places in Bácska (Backa), such as Temerin and Bajmok. The few German, Croatian, Slovak villages in Hungary, Swabian villages in Szatmár (Satu Mare) in Romania[8], and others in Ugocsa in Transcarpathia, in which Hungarians became the majority, could not offset the negative trends in the ethnic patterns of Hungarians.

The factual statistical figures presented above and in the tables and the objective (natural and artificial population change) and subjective (e.g. level and strength of national identity, its determining outside factors, assimilation, change of nation, the methodological problems of the census) factors behind the demographic changes can only be but roughly outlined in this study.

The spatial differences of natural *population change*[9] *as regards Hungarians*, date back to almost a century. Among the regions inhabited by Hungarians, due to lifestyle-change, intensifying impoverishment, the uncertainty of existence, unstable marriages, the great number of divorces, the postponed birth of children, and the family model of fewer children of in the past decade(s), today[10] there is *natur-*

[8] Great numbers of the Swabians in Szatmár (in the surroundings of Nagykároly (Carei), who had assimilated to Hungarians in the majority of cases by the 20th century, identified themselves as Germans in 1992 during the emigration craze to Germany. Following their emigration, the level of which remained lower than the emigration average of the country, the majority of those who remained returned to the category of Hungarian nationality in harmony with their Hungarian tongue. (The number of people of German nationality in Szatmár county: 6,395 in 1977, 14,351 in 1992, and 6,380 in 2002.) As a result, some villages have a Hungarian majority once again.

[9] Considering primarily the demographic opposition of the early introduction of the one-child family model in and the quickly aging Hungarian population of the Southern Parts and the high-vitality Northeastern and Eastern (Székely land) Hungarian areas.

[10] In 2000, natural growth was 1.2‰ in Kovászna (Covasna) county and 0.01‰ in Hargita (Harghita). At the same time, the natural decrease of the population of Transylvania was –1.3‰, while that of whole Romania –0.9‰.

al growth in Székely land only. The number of deaths recently has come to exceed that of births in Csallóköz (Zitny Ostrov) and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county. The level of *natural decrease* was *highest* among the Hungarians of the *Southern Parts* and became one of the main factors of their weakening.[11] In the case of *artificial population change*, the migration due to *economic* motives caused losses especially to Hungarians in the northeastern and eastern areas (Transcarpathia, the region beyond the Tisza River and Transylvania), while those caused by *political reasons*[12] reduced the number of Hungarians in Serbia and Croatia. Tens and hundreds of thousands of Hungarians sought to climb up the historically developed, ever steeper *income and economy-development* ladder *slanting from west to east*[13] not only in the relation of Ukrainians, Romanians and Hungarians, Austrians but also Hungarians and Austrians. As a result of these types of migrations, the number of Hungarians considerably grew in the surroundings of Vienna and Bécsújhely, in Northern-Őrvidék, and the conurbation around Budapest.[14]

The statistical fact of how many declare themselves Hungarians at a given time also depends on several subjective factors. Among these, the *policy of the given state and the mother country towards the Hungarian minority* (and the whole of the Hungarian nation) has an outstanding importance. The *geographic character of the settlement pattern of Hungarians* (e.g. block, enclave, diaspora) and intensity of *interethnic contacts* (especially *mixed marriages* that accelerate the assimilation of minorities) can also affect *natural assimilation* and then the *change of nation*, which appears in statistics.[15] Naturally, these factors may affect Hungarian minorities as a whole, but in the past ten years they contributed to the sharp decline mainly in the numbers of Hungarians in Slavonia, Muravidék, Northern-Őrvidék and Slovakia (primarily in big cities and along the linguistic border). The prestige of and the public mood towards Hungarians in a given country greatly influenced the *identity of the Hungarian-speaking Roma population* and the "change of nation(ality)" between the Roma, the Hungarian and the majority eth-

[11] In 2000, natural decrease was about −10 – −11‰ in the areas inhabited by Hungarians in Vojvodina and Muravidék, that is, twice the lowest corresponding values in Hungary (Budapest, Békés and Csongrád counties) (−5.2 – −4.8‰)

[12] Migration for political reasons masses of Hungarians (Hungarian man of military age living in Serbia) had to leave their home in the former Yugoslavia because of the Serb-Croatian War of 1991–1995 and the events of 1999 in Serbia (e.g. Kosovo, NATO bombings).

[13] The GDP/person differences in the Carpatho–Pannonian Region clearly reveal an income slope slanting from west to east (GDP/person, 2000, in USD): Austria 23,940, Slovenia 9,760, Hungary 4,830, Croatia 4,550, Slovakia 3,760, Romania 1,720, Serbia-Montenegro 930, Ukraine 720.

[14] The increase of the conurbation population (mostly ethnic Hungarians) around Budapest is due mainly to the headway of suburban residential areas, that is, suburbanisation.

[15] Cf.: Gyurgyík, L., Az asszimilációs folyamatok vizsgálata – komplex megközelítésben – a szlovákiai magyarság körében [Studying the Assimilation Processes Among Hungarians in Slovakia], Kisebbségkutatás 12. (2003/1.), pp. 10–43., Gyurgyík, L., A szlovákiai magyarság lélekszámcsökkenésének okai [Reasons of the Population Decrease of Hungarians in Slovakia], In: Gyurgyík, L. – Sebők, L. (eds.) (2003). Népszámlálási körkép Közép-Európából 1989-2002, Teleki László Alapítvány, Budapest, pp. 46–61.

nic group. Due to the not really Hungarian-friendly policies of Meèiar in the 1990s, thousands of *Hungarian Roma living in Nógrád (Novohrad) and Gömör (Gemer) in Slovakia* renounced their Hungarian nationality and more declared themselves Roma than Hungarian.[16] As opposed to this, after the political changes of the early 1990s, being Hungarian with an economically increasingly developed mother country nearby became once again attractive in the eyes of the (mainly Hungarian-speaking) Roma population in Transcarpathia. Accordingly, the number of those who declared themselves ethnic Hungarians increased sharply, especially in Munkács (Mukachevo) and its surroundings. Another change in Transcarpathia was due to changes in nation policy and census methodology: the Hungarian-speaking Greek-Catholics of Ugocsa (who had been recorded as Ukrainians) could freely declare themselves ethnic Hungarians, which resulted in a 10.8% increase in the Nagyszőlős (Vinohragyiv) districts' Hungarian population between 1989 and 2001.

Roma population. One third of the world's Roma population[17] lives in the Carpatho–Pannonian region, where the last censuses found *579,000* (2%) *ethnic Roma* and *291,000* (1%) *Roma-speakers (Table 7)*. Most of these live in *Transylvania* (246,000), *Hungary* (190,000) and *Slovakia* (90,000). Given that Roma people usually declare themselves belonging to the majority nation (e.g. Romanians, Hungarians, Slovaks), these numbers are far below that of those whom their non-Roma surroundings consider Roma (based on certain anthropological features, skin colour, lifestyle, social behaviour). On the basis of the figures of the 1893 registration of the Roma population[18] and some recent calculations and experts' surveys,[19] one can assume with good reason that the *number of those who could qualify as Roma was 2.6 million in the Carpatho–Pannonian region* around 2001. Among them *1.4–1.5 million live in Transylvania, 600,000 in Hungary*, and *380,000 in Slovakia*. According to these estimates, the Roma population makes up nearly 9% of

[16] Between 1991 and 2001, the number of Roma in the southern districts of Slovakia inhabited by Hungarians grew by 51.5%, while in the northern, Slovak districts by 10.5% only, much below the estimate for the whole country (37.8%).

[17] Cf. Kocsis, K., Etnikai-politikai földrajzi adalékok a Kárpát-medencei cigány (roma) kérdés vizsgálatához [Ethnical and Political Geographic Data for the Study of the Roma Question in the Carpatho–Pannonian Region]. In: Reisz T. – Andor M. (eds.) A cigányság társadalomismerete, Iskolakultúra, Pécs, pp. 32-49.

[18] A Magyarországban 1893. január 31-én végrehajtott czigányösszeírás eredményei [Results of the Registration of the Roma Population on 31 January 1893], Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények IX. Budapest 1895. pp. 98+86.

[19] Kemény, I., A magyarországi romák [The Hungarian Roma], Budapest, 2000, p. 128., Kertesi, G. – Kézdi, G., A cigány népesség Magyarországon [The Roma Population in Hungary], Budapest, 1998, p. 467., Mészáros, A., A cigányság helyzete, életkörülményei 1993 [The Situation and Circumstances of the Roma Population], Budapest, 1994, p. 27., Podolák, P., Národnostné menšiny v Slovenskej republike z hľadiska demografického vývoja, Martin, 1998, p. 91., Vaňo, B., Projection of Roma Population in Slovakia until 2025, Infostat, Demographic Research Centre, Bratislava, 2002, p. 13.

the Carpatho–Pannonian region's populalton and thereby becomes the fifth largest ethnic group (the largest are the Hungarians, the Romanians, and the Croatians). Their number probably exceeds that of the Hungarians in Transylvania. The *spatial differences in the ethnic identity of the Roma* (affected by interethnic contacts and the ethnic policies of the state) are revealed by fact that 32% of them declared themselves ethnic Roma in Hungary, 29% in Transcarpathia, 24% in Slovakia, and 17% in Transylvania. Only 6–8% (26.2% in Slovakia) consider their own language(s) to be their mother tongue. In general, more accept their own ethnic Roma status than their Romani mother tongue. The only exception are the Roma of Slovakia and Slovenia (Muravidék), where fewer dare declare their ethnicity officially due to the majority society's lower levels of ethnic tolerance. Out of the ones who qualified as Roma at the 2001 Hungarian census, 12.2% spoke some Roma language and 21.5% felt affiliation to Roma cultural values and traditions.

The Roma population is spatially concentrated in the northeastern, eastern, non-mountainous, plain-bordering, and hilly areas of the Carpatho–Pannonian region *(Figure 1)*. In Eastern Slovakia: Gömör, Szepes (Spis), Sáros (Saris), Southern Zemplén (Zemplín), surroundings of Kassa (Kosice); Northeastern Hungary: Nógrád, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg counties, Central areas around the Tisza River; Transylvania: areas in Szatmár, Bihar (Bihor), Arad, Temes (Timis) counties bordering the plain and in the Transylvanian Basin. The Roma are present in considerable numbers in Southern Dunántúl (Baranya, Somogy counties) in Hungary, in the Serbian Banat, in Belgrade, Budapest, and Bratislava. Although significant Roma migration took place from east to west and from the villages to the cities in the last fifty years, the main localities where they live remained the same as at the time of the 1893 registration of the Roma population. They live mostly in less urbanised, traditionally rural areas of a mixed population as far as their ethnic and religious composition is concerned, where it is easier for the Roma to find their place in the local social division of labour. Those 40 villages, in which the majority of the population consider themselves Roma are still the villages of these areas (24 in the Transylvanian Basin, 9 in Borsod Abaúj-Torna, and Baranya counties, and 7 in Eastern Slovakia).

Between 1991 and 2001, the Roma population grew by the greatest extent in Northern Hungary, the Budapest region (by 50–70%), the Transylvanian Partium (34–39%), the districts of Southern Slovakia inhabited by Hungarians (51%), Bácska (57%), and Muraköz (Medimurje) (51%). This is due to their high natural growth, their migration related to economic reasons, and, last but not least, ethnic assimilation. This latter process means that at the last censuses a greater number of Hungarian-speaking Roma, who earlier declared themselves Hungarians, now declared themselves Roma as a result of the growing identity of the Roma (especially in Southern Slovakia, Northern Hungary and the parts of the Romanian Szatmár, Bihar, Szilágy and Arad counties inhabited by Hungarians).

Following the transition to democracy and market economy, the former slow but ongoing social integration of the Roma population dropped to a level charac-

teristic decades ago. The privatised companies laid off the unskilled Roma workers before everybody else. Under the new circumstances, these workers lost every hope of succeeding at the new, competitive labour market. Apart from a narrow circle of Roma entrepreneurs, the former relatively secure livelihood of the now unemployed Roma disappeared. Tension grew to the utmost between the Roma and majority society that also found itself amongst difficult economic circumstances, producing conflicts and showdowns some of which even caught the attention of international public opinion. The hopeless Roma, motivated by economic and political reasons, often tried to better their circumstances through international migration from the east to the west. This caused serious international conflicts between the former Socialist source countries and the "Westerns" states frightened of the masses of Roma immigrants, and resulted in the re-introduction of visa requirements.

The Future

Recent demographic figures suggest that the *population of the Carpatho–Pannonian region* will *steadily decline* over the next decades, and the gains from migration due to EU accession and the high natural growth rate of the Roma population will not be able to counterbalance this. As a result of globalisation, the process of *loss of nationality* is expected to *intensify*, and the further weakening of ethnic identity is expected to *continue*, especially in the urbanised areas. It is quite probable that the spatial concentration of ethnic groups, assimilation, and the natural decrease of population will make the *proportion and numbers of national minorities* (thus, that of Hungarians as well) *decrease* faster. As opposed to those areas, where the Roma population and, due to their economic appeal, the extent of immigration of foreign ethnicities will dynamically intensify (e.g. Austria, Hungary, Slovakia), the proportion of *state-forming nations* will continue to *increase* in the territory of the Southern Slav states and in Ukrainian Transcarpathia. Recently several estimates of demographers have been published on the future changes of the highly reproductive *Roma population*[20]. According to these, it seems probable that the Carpatho–Pannonian region will have a 3.6 million strong Roma population by 2050.

[20] Hablicsek, L. (1999), A roma népesség demográfiai jellemzői, kíserleti előreszámítás 2050-ig [Demographic Characteristics of the Roma Population Projection Until 2050] KSH Népességtudományi Kutató Intézete, Budapest, p. 49., Vaňo, B., op. cit. 2002, p. 12.

APPENDICES

Table 1.

Declaration of ethnic identity and secularization at the censuses in the Carpatho–Pannonian Region (1991, 2001)

Territory	"yes"		"no"		proportion of "secularized" population
	1991	2001	1991	2001	2001
Hungary	100.0	94.4	0 0	5.6	25.4
Slovakia	99.9	99.0	0 1	1 0	15.9
Kárpátalja/Transcarpathia (Ukraine)	100.0	100 0	0 0	0 0	
Erdély/Transylvania (Romania)	100 0	100.0	0 0	0.0	0 3
Vajdaság/Vojvodina (Serbia)	90.2	93.2	9.8	6.8	7.7
Pannon-Croatia	94.9	98.1	5.1	1.9	4 9
Muravidék/Pomurje (Slovenia)	98 0	94.5	2.0	5.5	14.5
Őrvidék/Burgenland (Austria)	100.0	100.0	0.0	0 0	0.5
CARPATHO–PANNONIAN REGION	**98.8**	**97.2**	**1.2**	**2.8**	**12.9**

"yes" = proportion of population that answered about national and ethnic affiliation (%)
"no" = proportion of population that did not answer about national and ethnic affiliation, is of unknown nationality, or indicated a regional (e g of Vojvodina, Bácska) or a non-existent (e.g. "Yugoslav") nationality (%)
proportion of "secularized" population = proportion of population that is atheist, non-religious, did not answer to questions on religion, denomination, is of unknown religion and denomination (%)

Table 2

Changing ethnic composition of the various areas of the Carpatho–Pannonian Region (1991–2001)

	Year	Total population	Hungarians	Slovaks	Ukrainians	Romanians	Serbs	Croatians	Slovenians	Germans
Hungary	1991	10,374,823	10,142,072	10,459	690	10,740	2,905	13,570	1,930	30,824
	2001	**10,198,315**	**9,299,619**	**17,693**	**6,168**	**7,995**	**3,816**	**15,597**	**3,025**	**62,105**
Slovakia	1991	5,274,335	567,296	4,519,328	30,478	247				5,414
	2001	**5,379,455**	**520,528**	**4,614,854**	**35,015**		**434**	**890**		**5,405**
Kárpátalja/Transcarpathia (Ukraine)	1991	1,245,618	155,711	7,329	976,749	29,485				3,478
	2001	**1,254,614**	**151,516**	**5,695**	**1,010,127**	**32,152**	**9**	**19**		**3,582**
Erdély/Transylvania (Romania)	1991	7,723,313	1,603,923	19,446	50,372	5,884,142	27,163	4,030		109,014
	2001	**7,225,738**	**1,416,844**	**17,066**	**49,375**	**5,393,400**	**20,700**	**6,721**		**53,158**
Vajdaság/Vojvodina (Serbia)	1991	2,013,889	339,491	63,545	22,217	38,809	1,143,723	98,025	2,730	3,873
	2001	**2,031,992**	**290,207**	**56,637**	**20,261**	**30,520**	**1,321,907**	**76,312**	**2,005**	**3,154**
Pannon-Croatia	1991	3,206,726	20,032	5,026	5,260	674	384,936	2,548,941	12,488	1,916
	2001	**3,010,452**	**15,017**	**4,233**	**3,901**	**367**	**149,946**	**2,711,974**	**6,912**	**1,961**
Muravidék/Pomurje (Slovenia)	1991	89,887	7,637	10	2		280	1,511	77,546	80
	2001	**82,359**	**5,386**						**69,990**	
Őrvidék/Burgenland (Austria)	1991	270,880	6,763					19,460	204	239,097
	2001	**277,569**	**6,641**	**415**				**16,283**	**181**	**242,458**
CARPATHO–PANNONIAN REGION	1991	30,199,471	12,842,925	4,625,143	1,085,768	5,764,097	1,559,007	2,685,537	94,898	393,696
	2001	**29,460,494**	**11,705,758**	**4,716,593**	**1,124,847**	**5,464,434**	**1,496,712**	**2,827,796**	**82,113**	**371,823**
	1991	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	2001	**97.6%**	**91.1%**	**102.0%**	**103.6%**	**94.8%**	**96.0%**	**105.3%**	**86.5%**	**94.4%**

Table 3

Changing ethnic composition in the Carpatho–Pannonian Region (1941, 1991, 2001)

Ethnic groups	Number of members (thousand people)			Proportion (%)		
	1941	1991	2001	1941	1991	2001
Hungarians	12,221	12,843	**11,706**	50.0	42 5	**39.7**
Romanians	3,370	5,764	**5,464**	13.8	19.1	**18.5**
Slovaks	2,518	4,625	**4,716**	10.3	15 3	**16.0**
Croatians, Bunjevac, Sokac	2,089	2,686	**2,828**	8 5	8.9	**9.6**
Serbs	1.154	1.559	**1,497**	4.7	5.2	**5.1**
Ukrainians, Ruthenians	635	1,086	**1,125**	2 6	3 6	**3.8**
Roma population	181	464	**579**	0.7	1.5	**2.0**
Germans, German-speaking Austrians	1,649	394	**372**	6.7	1.3	**1.3**
Slovenes	65	95	**82**	0 3	0.3	**0.3**
Czechs, Moravians	70	79	**60**	0.3	0.3	**0.2**
Montenegrins	–	50	**38**	–	0 2	**0.1**
Russians	11	54	**33**	0.0	0.2	**0.1**
Bosnians, Muslimans	3	30	**27**	0 0	0 1	**0.1**
Other ethnic groups	471	102	**105**	2 1	0 3	**0.4**
Population of unknown ethnicity	–	369	**828**	–	1.2	**2.8**
Total population	**24,437**	**30,199**	**29,460**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Table 4

Changing proportions of majority nations and minorities (1941–2001; %)

Territory	Proportion of state-forming nation			Proportion of national minorities			Proportion of the Roma population		
	1941	1991	2001	1941	1991	2001	1941	1991	2001
Hungary	95 7	97.8	**91.2**	4 0	0.9	1 3	0 3	0.8	1 2
Slovakia	67.5	85.7	85.8	31 3	12.8	11 5	1 2	1 4	1.7
Kárpátalja/Transcarpathia (Ukraine)	58.8	78.4	80.5	41.1	20.6	18.3	0.1	1 0	1 1
Erdély/Transylvania (Romania)	55 9	73 6	74 6	41 1	23 8	**21.9**	1 4	2 6	**3.4**
Vajdaság/Vojvodina (Serbia)	36.2	56 8	65 0	63.5	32 2	**26.7**	0.3	1.2	1 4
Pannon-Croatia	69 3	79 5	**90.1**	30 1	15 2	7 7	0.6	0.2	0 3
Muravidék/Pomurje (Slovenia)	76 2	86 3	85 0	22 9	11 8	9 5	0.9	0.8	1.2
Őrvidék/Burgenland (Austria)	80 6	88.3	87 4	17 2	11.7	12.5	2.2	0.0	0.1
CARPATHO–PANNONIAN REGION	73.4	**83.9**	**83.7**	25.8	**13.4**	**11.5**	0.7	**1.5**	**2.0**

Table 5

Population and proportion of minorities among the chief ethnic groups of the Carpatho–Pannonian Region (1991, 2001)

Ethnic groups	Total		Number of members		Change in the number of members of minorities (%)	Proportion of members of minorities (%)	
	1991	2001	1991	2001	1991–2001	1991	2001
Hungarians	12,842,925	**11,705,758**	2,700,853	**2,406,139**	–10 9	21 0	20 6
Romanians	5,764,097	**5,464,434**	79,955	**71,034**	–11 2	1 4	1 3
Slovaks	4,625,143	**4,716,593**	105,815	**101,739**	–3 9	2.3	2.2
Croatians	2,685,537	**2,827,796**	136,596	**115,822**	–15 2	5.1	4 1
Serbs	1,559,007	**1,496,712**	415,284	**174,905**	–57 9	26.6	11.7
Ukrainians	1,085,768	**1,124,847**	109,019	**114,720**	+5.2	10 0	10.2
Roma population	463,753	**578,991**	463,753	**578,991**	+24.8	100 0	100 0
Germans	393,696	**371,823**	154,599	**129,365**	–16.3	39.3	34.8
Slovenes	94,898	**82,113**	17,352	**12,123**	–30 1	18 3	14 8

Table 6

Changing population and proportion of those who declared themselves ethnic Hungarians in thevarious areas of the Carpatho–Pannonian Region (1991–2001)

Territory	Ethnic Hungarian population					Hungarian-speaking population					tongue/ethnicity	
	Number		2001/ 1991 (%)	Proportion		Number		2001/ 1991 (%)	Proportion		1991	2001
	1991	2001		1991	2001	1991	2001		1991	2001		
HUNGARY	10,142,072	9,299,619	91.7	97.8	91.2	10,222,529	9,548,374	93.4	98.5	93.6	100.8	102.7
Budapest	1 993,123	1 603,511	80 5	98 8	90 2	1 997 611	1 617 717	81 0	99 0	91 0	100 2	100 9
Pest county	934,693	994,127	106 4	98 4	91 7	939.602	1 006 481	107 1	98 9	92 9	100 5	101 2
Borsod-Abauj-Zemplén county	727.630	684,418	94 1	95 5	91 9	757,837	717 191	94 6	99 5	96 3	104 2	104 8
Heves county	325.542	301,756	92 7	97 3	92 6	332 395	311 753	93 8	99 4	95 7	102 1	103 3
Nógrád county	219,841	204,367	93 0	96 8	92 8	223.741	210 428	94 0	98 5	95 5	101 8	103 0
Hajdú Bihar county	539,546	518,787	96 2	98 3	93 8	545 015	525 742	96 5	99 3	95 1	101 0	101 3
Jász-Nagykun Szolnok county	416,728	384,470	92 3	97 7	92 4	424 400	393 510	92 7	99 5	94 6	101 8	102 4
Szabolcs Szatmár Bereg county	546,389	541,857	99 2	95 5	93 1	566,804	559 395	98 7	99 0	96 1	103 7	103 2
Bács Kiskun county	534,768	511,844	95 7	98 2	93 7	534 557	514 283	96 2	98 1	94 1	100 0	100 5
Békés county	399,315	368,363	92 2	96 9	92 6	397 873	370 383	93 1	96 6	93 1	99 6	100 5
Csongrád county	434,266	402 908	92 8	99 0	93 0	435 140	405 106	93 1	99 2	93 5	100 2	100 5
Fejér county	416,273	403,984	97 0	99 0	93 0	417 246	406 325	97 4	99 2	93 6	100 2	100 6
Komárom-Esztergom county	308,799	292 209	94 6	98 0	92 3	309 320	295 271	95 5	98 1	93 3	100 2	101 0
Veszprém county	378,744	352 797	93 1	99 1	94 4	379 450	354 975	93 5	99 3	95 0	100 2	100 6
Győr-Moson Sopron county	420,048	412,272	98 1	99 0	94 8	418,810	411,842	98 3	98 7	94 7	99 7	99 9
Vas county	269 117	253 466	94 2	97 5	94 5	269,044	252 977	94 0	97 5	94 4	100 0	99 8
Zala county	299 873	280 163	93 4	97 9	94 2	299 393	280 549	93 7	97 7	94 3	99 8	100 1
Baranya county	395 470	359 781	91 0	94 5	88 3	391 296	362 463	92 6	93 5	89 0	98 9	100 7
Somogy county	334,556	311,309	93 1	97 1	92 9	336 059	314 179	93 5	97 5	93.7	100 4	100 9
Tolna county	247,351	233,656	94 5	97 5	93 6	246,936	235,804	95 5	97 3	94 4	99 8	100 9

Territory	Ethnic Hungarian population					Hungarian-speaking population					longue/ethnicity	
	Number		2001/ 1991 (%)	Proportion		Number		2001/ 1991 (%)	Proportion		1991	2001
	1991	2001		1991	2001	1991	2001		1991	2001		
SLOVAKIA	**567,296**	**520,528**	**91.8**	**10.8**	**9.7**	**608,221**	**572,929**	**94.2**	**11.5**	**10.7**	**107.2**	**110.1**
Pozsony/Bratislava district	32,934	27,434	83.3	5.4	4.6	36,088	31,070	86.1	5.9	5.2	109.6	113.3
Nagyszombat/Trnava district	134,205	130,740	97.4	24.8	23.7	-	133,904	-	-	24.3	-	102.4
Nyitra/Nitra district	216,414	196,609	90.8	30.2	27.6	-	211,595	-	-	29.7	-	107.6
Besztercebánya/Banská Bystrica district	85,427	77,795	91.1	13.0	11.7	-	88,377	-	-	13.3	-	113.6
Kassa/Kosice district	95,524	85,415	89.4	12.9	11.2	-	104,181	-	-	13.6	-	122.0
KÁRPÁTALJA/TRANSCARPATHIA	**155,711**	**151,518**	**97.3**	**12.5**	**12.1**	**166,700**	**158,729**	**95.2**	**13.4**	**12.7**	**107.1**	**104.8**
ERDÉLY/TRANSYLVANIA	**1,603,923**	**1,415,844**	**88.3**	**20.8**	**19.6**	**1,619,735**	**1,431,093**	**88.4**	**21.0**	**19.8**	**101.0**	**101.0**
Fehér/Alba county	24,765	20,682	83.5	6.0	5.4	23,466	20,055	85.5	5.7	5.2	94.8	97.0
Brassó/ Brasov county	63,558	51,470	81.0	9.9	8.7	63,103	51,108	81.0	9.8	8.7	99.3	99.3
Kovászna/Covasna county	175,502	164,055	93.5	75.2	73.8	177,687	166,481	93.7	76.2	74.9	101.2	101.5
Hargita/Harghita county	295,104	275,841	93.5	84.7	84.6	297,533	278,128	93.5	85.4	85.3	100.8	100.8
Maros/Mures county	252,651	227,673	90.1	41.4	39.3	255,597	230,727	90.3	41.9	39.8	101.2	101.3
Szeben/Sibiu county	19,309	15,478	80.2	4.3	3.7	18,058	14,242	78.9	4.0	3.4	93.5	92.0
Arad county	61,011	49,399	81.0	12.5	10.7	60,518	48,318	79.8	12.4	10.5	99.2	97.8
Hunyad/Hunedoara county	33,849	25,321	74.8	6.2	5.2	31,449	22,947	73.0	5.7	4.7	92.9	90.6
Krassó Szörény/Cara Severin county	7,876	5,859	74.4	2.1	1.8	7,074	5,200	73.5	1.9	1.6	89.8	88.8
Temes/Timi county	62,866	51,421	81.8	9.0	7.6	61,088	48,238	79.0	8.7	7.1	97.2	93.8
Bihar/Bihor county	181,703	155,554	85.6	28.4	25.9	185,668	161,520	87.0	29.1	26.9	102.2	103.8
Beszterce Naszód/Bistrita Nasaud county	21,098	18,394	87.2	6.5	5.9	19,667	17,227	87.6	6.0	5.5	93.2	93.7
Kolozs/Cluj county	146,186	122,131	83.5	19.9	17.4	144,625	120,794	83.5	19.6	17.2	98.9	98.9
Máramaros/Maramus county	54,902	46,250	84.2	10.2	9.1	54,297	44,956	82.8	10.1	8.8	98.9	97.2
Szatmár/Satu Mare county	140,392	129,998	92.6	35.0	35.2	156,668	143,597	91.7	39.1	38.9	111.6	110.5
Szilágy/Salaj county	63,151	57,318	90.8	23.7	23.1	63,237	57,555	91.0	23.7	23.2	100.1	100.4

Territory	Ethnic Hungarian population					Hungarian-speaking population					Iongue/ethnicity	
	Number		2001/ 1991 (%)	Proportion		Number		2001/ 1991 (%)	Proportion		1991	2001
	1991	2001		1991	2001	1991	2001		1991	2001		
VAJDASAG/VOJVODINA	339,491	290,207	85.5	16.9	14.3	344,667	284,205	82.5	17.1	14.0	101.5	97.9
Northern Bácska/Backa district	98 914	87 181	88 1	48 2	43 6	-	88 464	-	-	44 2	-	101 5
Western Bácska/Backa district	27 329	21 825	79 9	12 7	10 2	-	20 500	-	-	9 6	-	93 9
Southern Bácska/Backa korzet	65 777	55 128	83 8	11 9	9 3	-	52 286	-	-	8 8	-	94 8
Northern Bánság/Banat district	89 941	78 551	87 3	50 0	47 4	-	79 779	-	-	48 1	-	101 6
Central Bánság/Banat district	33 971	27 842	82 0	15 3	13 4	-	27 981	-	-	13 4	-	100 5
Southern Bánság/Banat district	18,544	15,444	83 3	5 6	4 9	-	13 136	-	-	4 2	-	85 1
Szerémség/Srem district	5 015	4 236	84 5	1 6	1 3	-	2 059	-	-	0 6	-	48 6
PANNON-CROATIA	20,032	15,017	75.0	0.6	0.5	17,823	11,310	63.5	0.6	0.4	89.0	75.3
Belovár-Bilogora/Bjelovar-Bilogora county	2,017	1,188	58 9	1 4	0 9	1 006	295	29 3	0 7	0 2	49 9	24 8
Eszék-Baranya/Osijek-Baranja county	12,198	9 784	80 2	3 3	3 0	12 011	8 307	69 2	3 3	2 5	98 5	84 9
Vukovár-Szerém/Vukovar-Srijem county	3 128	2 047	65 4	1 4	1 0	2,398	1 190	49 6	1 0	0 6	76 7	58 1
MURAVIDÉK/POMURJE	7,637	5,386	70.5	8.5	6.5	8,174	6,498	79.5	9.1	7.9	107.0	120.6
ÖRVIDÉK/BURGENLAND	6,763	6,641	98 2	2.5	2.4	6,763	6,641	98.2	2.5	2.4	100.0	100.0
CARPATHO-PANNONIAN REGION	12,842,929	11,705,758	91.1	42.5	39.7	12,979,945	12,017,779	92.6	43.0	40.8	101.1	102.7

Note 2001 / 1991 (%) = change in the number of ethnic Hungarians or Hungarian speakers between 1991 and 2001 %
Mother tongue/ethnicity : proportion of Hungarian speakers in relation to that of ethnic Hungarians in 1991 and 2001 (ethnicity = 100%)

Table 7

Changing population and proportion of those who declared themselves ethnic Roma in the various areas of the Carpatho–Pannonian Region (1991–2001)

Territory	Ethnic Roma population					Roma-speaking population					tongue/ethnicity	
	Number		2001/ 1991 (%)	Proportion		Number		2001/ 1991 (%)	Proportion		1991	2001
	1991	2001		1991	2001	1991	2001		1991	2001		
Hungary	142 683	189,984	133 2	1 4	1.9	48 072	48,438	100 8	0 5	0.5	33 7	25.5
Slovakia	75.802	89,920	118 6	1 4	1.7	77 269	99,448	128 7	1 4	1.8	101 9	110.6
Kárpátalja/Transcarpathia (Ukraine)	12,131	14,404	118 7	1 0	1.1	2,491	2,871	115 3	0 2	0.2	20 5	20.0
Erdély/Transylvania (Romania)	202,685	246,454	121 6	2 6	3.4	84 718	110,197	130 1	1 1	1.5	41 8	44.7
Vajdaság/Vojvodina (Serbia)	24,366	29,057	119 3	1 2	1.4		21,839			1.1		75.5
Pannon-Croatia	5,423	6,237	151 9	0 2	0.3	6 428	6,971	108 4	0 2	0.2	118 5	84.6
Muravidék/Pomurje (Slovenia)	683	970	142 0	0 8	1.2	1,026	1,206	117 5	1 1	1.4	150 2	124 3
Őrvidék/Burgenland (Austria)		303			0.1		303			0.1		
CARPATHO–PANNONIAN REGION	463,753	578,991	124.8	1.5	2.0		291,373			1.0		50.3

Figure 1


Proportion of Ethnic Roma Population in 2001
Proportion of Ethnic Roma Population (in%)
- 1,00
1,01 - 2,00
2,01 - 5,00
5,01-10,00
10,01-
Source: The ethnic affiliation of the population based on official censuses in Austria 2001 (every-day language), Croatia 2001, Czech Republic 2001, Hungary 2001, Romania 2002, Serbia 2002, Slovakia 2001, Slovenia 2002, Ukraine 2001
BRATISLAVA
BUDAPEST
ZAGREB
BEOGRAD

Conditions of Minorities

Figure 2



Conditions of Minorities

Pál Péter Tóth

One Decade*

(International Migration Affecting Hungary between 1990 and 2000)

About two decades ago few people would have imagined that the system, which aimed at creating a world free of exploitation and promising material and intellectual progress, would collapse as the 20th century came to a close. Due to this transformation and parallel to the elimination of the Bolshevik-type power and political structure and institutional system, fundamental changes took place in the countries under the Soviet sphere of influence such as Hungary. The paper seeks to explore one aspect of these changes: the evolution of international migration in Hungary between 1990 and 2000 and its possible development in the near future.

However, this objective, due to deficiencies and the professional and methodological problems in this field, cannot be fully accomplished. The great migration wave that bore down on the country in the early 1990s and required quick arrangements, made it impossible for the institutions of international migration to develop gradually in accordance with the changing circumstances and for a staff of new attitude and qualification to take their place. Several problems also arise due to the inaccuracy of the migration data we have: the measuring of international migration and the gathering of related data is a more complex task than the investigation of other demographic factors. It covers both the movements of foreigners who arrive in Hungary and return home or travel to a third country, and that of Hungarians staying long-term abroad and than coming home.

1. International migration of Hungarian citizens between 1990 and 2000

Following 1990, it was a legitimate demand that, parallel to the national research on foreign citizens who immigrate to Hungary, the migration of Hungarian citizens should also be examined. However, even though the attitude towards migration has changed, we still have no yearly data on the number of Hungarians who leave the country or return home.[1] Very few declare officially that they leave and we only

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[1] According to Par. 2 of Article 26 of Act LXVI of 1992 on the Registration of Personal Data and Addresses of Citizens, the person who "leaves the territory of the Republic of Hungary with the intent of settling abroad or stays abroad for more than three months, shall make declaration on this at the notary of the competent municipal self-government or the competent foreign representation."

know the number of those who renounce their Hungarian citizenship.[2] Accordingly, it is impossible to assess the number of those who stay long-term abroad or who return home in a given year, since we only know about those who officially report their transfer. For this reason, we attempted to explore the international migration of Hungarian citizens with the help of foreign sources.[3]

From among the countries of Europe, Hungarians primarily emigrated to Austria and Germany prior to World War II. Besides these two, Holland, France, England and Italy, and, overseas, the USA and Canada were other important destination countries. The figures of the late 20th century indicate that these countries continue to attract Hungarian migrants. In the past years, more than 80 percent of Hungarian citizens registered abroad lived in Germany. It was followed by Austria, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, and Holland. Even Belgium received between 720 and 1020 Hungarian immigrants per year during the 1990s. Their number is much lower in rest of the countries *(Table 1)*.

Table 1

Number of Hungarian nationals registered in **European countries,** 1990–1999

Countries	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
	Registered Hungarians living in Europe									
	% N = 36 437	% N = 24 183	% N = 64 741	% N = 74 358	% N = 75 169	% N = 73 563	% N = 73 104	% N = 72 882	% N = 69 279	% N = 82 656
Austria	n. a.	43 65	n. a.	n. a	n. a.	n. a	n. a	n. a.	n. a	n. a.
Azerbaijan	n. a.	n. a.	0.01	n. a	n. a	n. a	0.00	0 00	0.00	0 00
Belgium	n. a.	3 11	n. a.	0.97	0.98	n. a	1.22	1 30	1.39	1 63
Denmark	n. a.	n. a.	0 45	0.39	0.40	0.45	0 46	0.54	0.53	0.60
Finland	n. a.	1 27	0 58	0.52	0 51	0.55	0.57	0.56	0 66	0.81
France	7.92	n. a.	n. a.	n. a	n. a.	n. a	n. a.	n. a	n. a	n. a.
Germany	86.80	n. a.	87 12	82.62	82 74	78.84	79 33	77.88	80.41	83.04
Greece	2.43	n. a.	1 42	1.28	0.75	0.73	0 75	0 80	0.83	n. a.
Holland	n. a	4.29	n. a	1.59	1.65	1.54	1 55	1.60	1 84	2 24

[2] From among the Hungarian citizens who resided abroad for longer periods between 1990 and 2000 altogether 6,785 reported this to the mayor's office. The greatest number of declarations on intended emigration was submitted in 1990. The number of declarations fell in the years that followed, increased again after 1995, but following 1998 became negligible again (with only 332 declarations submitted in 2000).

[3] The figures on Hungarians who arrive in various countries with the intent to settle there will be examined with the help of the publication *Recent demographic developments in Europe 1999*. Council of Europe Publishing, 1992–1999. The handbook only includes data that were sent to the EU by the individual states. Accordingly, data is not or only sporadically available on the former Socialist countries and Austria. This is especially disturbing in the case of Austria where 1991 was not the only year when the number of Hungarian citizens exceeded 10,000.

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Countries	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
	Registered Hungarians living in Europe									
	% N = 36 437	% N = 24 183	% N = 64 741	% N = 74 358	% N = 75 169	% N = 73 563	% N = 73 104	% N = 72 862	% N = 69 279	% N = 62 656
Iceland	n. a.	0.07	0.03	0.04	0 05	0 04	0.05	n. a.	0.06	0 07
Italy	2 73	4.76	2.25	1.81	2 62	2 70	2.95	3 26	3.81	n. a.
Liechtenstein	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	n. a	n. a.	n a	n a	n. a.
Norway	n. a.	0 96	0.34	0.29	0 28	0.28	0.28	0 30	0.33	0.38
Portugal	0.10	n a	n. a	n. a	0 10	0 11	0.11	0.11	0 13	0.15
Romania	n. a.	n a.	n. a	0.07	0 05	0 05	0.04	0 03	0.04	0.04
San Marino	n a.	0.00	n. a	0.00	0 00	0 00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Slovenia	n a	0.22	0 09	n. a	n a.	n a.	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.07
Spain	n a	0.78	0.43	0.29	n a.	0 28	0.30	0 32	0 43	0.57
Sweden	n a	13 05	n. a	n a	n. a.	4 38	4 17	4 04	4.22	4.71
Switzerland	n a	19.53	7.27	6.09	5.86	5.69	5.41	5 07	5.26	5 68
UK	n a	8.27	n. a	4.03	3 99	4.35	2 74	4 12	n. a.	n. a.
Europe total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

n a. No data is available in the source.
* The Hungarians living in East Germany numbered 13,424 on 1 January 1990.
Source. Recent demographic developments in Europe. Council of Europe Publishing, 1992–1999.

The number of Hungarians registered abroad, after the instability of 1990 and 1991 – with moderate fluctuation between 1992 and 1999 – has been stable and balanced. Their number, after the figure of 64,741 in 1992, first increased significantly, by nearly 13 percent and then, by slightly more than 1 percent, rose above 75,000. After this peak in 1995, their number gradually decreased. Only the years 1998 and 1999 indicate considerable drops of nearly 10 percent. The changes were basically caused by the shifts in the number of Hungarians registered in Germany.

The figures on Hungarians immigrating into European countries are in *Table 2*. Not only the data of several countries (e.g. Austria, France, Italy, etc.) but also data on several years are missing in this case as well. Germany was the number one destination country. The proportion of Hungarians migrating there ranged from 84 to 95 percent. Their number was nearly 30,000 in 1993. Following that peak, the number of Hungarian immigrants to Germany dropped by more than 50 percent by 1998. In the meanwhile, the number of Hungarians immigrating to Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Sweden, Romania, and, to a lesser extent, Finland, Poland, and Slovakia, hardly changed from one year to another. The number of those who migrated to Canada and the US (data from 1991) was far below that of the immigrants who chose Germany.

Table 2

Number of Hungarians migrating to European countries, Israel, Canada, and the USA, 1991–1998

Destination countries	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
	Number of Immigrant Hungarians							
	% N = 20,971	% N = 1,348	% N = 30,049	% N = 27,768	% N = 21,350	% N = 22,293	% N = 19,927	% N = 14,249
Belarus	n a	n. a.	n a	n. a	n. a	n. a.	n a.	0.04
Belgium	0.05	7.28	0 42	n. a.	n. a.	0.74	1.03	1.49
Canada	3.54	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n a	n. a.	n. a.
Croatia	n a.	n a	n a.	n. a	n. a.	n. a	n. a.	n. a.
Czech Republic	n a	n. a.	n. a.	0.09	n. a.	n. a	n. a.	n a.
Denmark	0.57	5.94	0 42	0.55	0.50	0.83	0.81	1.24
Estonia	n a	n. a.	0.00	n. a	n. a.	0.00	n. a.	0 02
Finland	0 45	4.46	0.06	0.14	0.10	0 19	0.27	0.58
Germany	79.89	n a.	95.35	89.50	92.75	87.41	89.75	80.35
Greece	n. a.	n a	0.24	0.28	0.60	0.51	n. a.	n. a.
Holland	1.11	22.73	0.87	0.81	1 42	2.06	2.76	3 94
Iceland	0.04	0 30	0 04	0.03	n a	0.04	0 04	0 06
Israel	1.10	n. a.	n. a	n. a.	n a	n. a.	n a	n. a.
Latvia	n. a.	n a	n. a	0.01	0 00	n. a.	n a.	0 02
Lithuania	0.31	0 74	n a	n. a	n a	0 00	0.03	0.01
Luxembourg	0.15	3.64	0.13	0.21	0 30	0.36	0 35	0.48
Macedonia	n a.	n. a.	n a	0.00	0 01	n a	n. a	n a.
Moldavia	n a.	n. a	n. a.	n. a.	0.00	n. a	n. a.	n. a.
Norway	0.14	2 82	0.18	0 17	n a.	n. a.	n. a.	n a
Poland	0.15	2.82	0.18	0.06	0.12	0 17	0 19	0.24
Romania	n. a.	7.88	0.30	0.22	1.31	0 46	1 76	2.92
Russia	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a	0.01	0.00	n a	0.61
San Marino	0.01	n. a	n. a.	n. a	n. a.	0.00	n a.	n a.
Slovakia	n. a.	3.57	0.15	0.13	0.17	n. a.	0.19	0.22
Slovenia	n. a.	n a.	0.01	0 01	n. a.	0.01	0.01	0.02
Spain	n. a.	n. a.	0.04	0.07	0.07	n. a	n. a.	n. a.
Sweden	1.61	15.08	0.50	0.70	1 01	0.98	1 13	1 13
Switzerland	2.13	22.73	1.10	1.08	1.17	1.16	1 71	2.50
Ukraine	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	0 90	0 44	0.43	n. a.	n. a
United Kingdom	1 43	n. a.	n. a.	5 04	n. a.	4 49	4 13	n. a
USA	7 31	n. a.	n a	n. a	n. a	n a	n. a	n a
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

n. a.: No data is available in the source.

Source: Recent demographic developments in Europe 1999. Council of Europe Publishing, 1992–1999.

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The number of Hungarians who emigrated from European countries during the examined period shows considerable fluctuations *(Table 3).* In 1992, the number of emigrant Hungarians was nearly 50 percent lower as compared to 1991, while, in 1993, it grew almost fivefold as compared to 1992. In the years that followed, this number dropped from over 30,000 to 25,000 by 1996 and then, by 1998, to 18,000. As it was mentioned above, we have no information on what was the next destination of these migrants.

Table 3.

Number of Hungarians emigrating form European countries, 1991–1998

Country	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
	Number of emigrant Hungarians							
	% N = 9,919	% N = 5,508	% N = 26,433	% N = 30,638	% N = 26,328	% N = 25,124	% N = 20,307	% N = 16,207
Armenia	3.38	n a	1 27	n. a.	n a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.
Belgium	n. a.	1 09	0 32	n a.	n a	0 35	0 69	0.63
Croatia	n. a.	n. a.	n. a	n. a	n a	0.01	n. a.	n a.
Denmark	0 67	1 09	0 39	0 42	0.28	0 38	0 47	0 62
Estonia	n a	n. a.	0.00	n a	0 03	0 01	n. a	n. a.
Finland	0.19	1 16	0 12	0.13	0.08	0.12	0.14	0.24
Germany	90.54	n. a	81.82	83.55	85.56	76.97	89.39	83.92
Holland	1.05	3.01	0.69	0.45	0 67	0.94	1 13	1.52
Iceland	0 09	0 02	0 03	0.00	0 01	n. a.	0 04	n. a.
Latvia	n. a.	n a	n a	0.00	n a	n. a.	0 01	0.03
Lithuania	0 03	0 11	0.00	n a	n a	n a	n. a	n. a.
Luxembourg	0 08	0.15	0 07	0 08	0.04	0 05	0 11	0 35
Moldavia	n. a	n. a.	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	n. a.
Norway	0 34	0.71	0.10	0.14	n a	n. a.	n. a.	n a.
Poland	0.15	0 16	0 03	0.03	0.04	0 04	0.06	0.03
Romania	n a.	85.80	13 90	5 79	9 53	5.91	6.32	6.94
Russia	n. a.	n. a.	n a.	n. a.	0 12	0.12	0 09	0.58
Slovakia	n. a.	0.33	0.05	0.03	0.03	n. a.	0.07	0.11
Slovenia	0.02	n. a.	0.02	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	0.01	n. a.
Sweden	0.78	2.11	0 35	0 60	0.52	0.49	0.67	0.37
Switzerland	2.68	4.27	0 82	0 77	0 65	0.91	0 81	1.36
Ukraine	n. a.	n. a.	n a	2 76	2 43	2 55	n. a	n a
United Kingdom	n a	n a	n. a	5 22	n. a	11.14	3 27	n. a.
Europe total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

n. a · No data is available in the source

Source: Recent demographic developments in Europe 1999. Council of Europe Publishing, 1992–1999

In 1998, a total of 14,249 Hungarian immigrants were registered in European countries (See *Table 2*). The number of migrants exceeded this by 3,958 in 1998. Both the place of origin of the Hungarians immigrating to the individual countries and the destination of those migrating on from among them is unknown. For this reason, it is impossible to establish the number of those who arrived from or left to Hungary and, naturally, we do not know the reasons of their immigration and further migration either. However, we can legitimately infer from other sources that, under the changed political circumstances, a part of those who emigrate from Western European countries returns to Hungary after having reached retirement age.

Overall, the migration data on Hungarian citizens indicate that Germany is preferred to other EU countries as a destination country. According to the situation on 1 January 1998, 55,700 Hungarian citizens lived there. One year later their number was only 52,029. The proportion of Hungarian citizens among the total number of foreigners living in Germany is a negligible 0.7 percent.[4] In 1998, 14,036 Hungarian citizens arrived in Germany. Considering that 12,805 Hungarian citizens emigrated from there in the same year, we receive a net migration of 1,231 to Germany for 1998. From among the foreigners living in Germany, 278,662 were granted citizenship in 1997, among them 911 Hungarian citizens. In 1998, the number of new Germany citizens increased to 291,331 but with only 652 Hungarian citizens being among them.[5]

In light of the data above, the curve of the Hungarian population registered on January 1 in European countries between 1990 and 1999 is like the segment of a slightly one-sided hill. As compared with 1990, their number grew by 26 percent by 1996 and then, until the end of the decade it gradually decreased again. Due to this drop, the total number of Hungarian citizens in the countries included in the table did not reach 63,000 on 1 January 1999. Furthermore, it is likely that, at the same date, the overall number of Hungarian migrants did not exceed 80,000 even if we add the Hungarian immigrants to Austria, Italy and Germany.[6] *In conclusion, based on the data gathered so far, one could assert that about 100,000 Hungarian citizens lived in the various countries of the world at the end of the 20th century.*

Let us now consider those who renounced their Hungarian citizenship *(Table 4)*. It might be surprising to see that the transition to democracy and market economy did not bring about a change in the number of these people in the past years. Between 1960 and 2000 the number of those who renounced their Hungarian citizenship remained more or less the same from year to year. Following 1990, just as before, about 1,000 people renounced their Hungarian citizenship every year.

[4] The number of foreigners residing in Germany on 31 December 1998 was 7,319,500. One year later, on 31 December 1999 their number was 7,343,600.

[5] Statisches Bundesamt Stat. Jahrbuch 2000. 65., 66., 80 , 82.

[6] According to the data of *Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich*, the number of Hungarians employed in Austria was 9,632 in 1995, 9,164 in 1996, 8,865 in 1997, and 8,675 in 1998

Table 4

Number of people who renounced their Hungarian citizenship, 1990–2000[7]

Year	Number of people
1990	1,184
1991	436
1992	1,148
1993	2,084
1994	1,688
1995	1,413
1996	1,022
1997	887
1998	850
1999	778
2000	748
1990–2000	**12,238**

2. Foreign citizens staying long-term in Hungary between 1990 and 2000

From more than 150 countries of the world a total of 232,417 persons immigrated to Hungary between 1990 and 2000 (in the largest number in 1990 and the smallest in 1994). Following 1994, the number of immigrants increased from year to year with their numbers exceeding 20,000 in the last two years of the 1990s. During the same period 101,243 foreigners left the country. During the decade nearly 100,000 people were granted Hungarian citizenship: part of them arrived in Hungary before 1990, others during the examined period. People of refugee status numbered 5,208.

The data contained in *Table 5* are fundamental for migration research during the examined period. They reveal the number and proportion of total arrivals (immigrants and people of other status) and total departures (immigrants and people of other status) by country groups.[8] Among the arrivals and departures the citizens of neighbouring countries predominate. Furthermore, the number of those who leave the country for some reason is significant as compared to the arrivals. It is conspicuous that while in the case of neighbouring countries the proportion of departures in relation to the arrivals is 32.6 percent, it is close to or greater than 70 percent in the case of the other country groups.

[7] See: Tóth, Pál Péter. A nemzetközi vándormozgalom népességszám ot befolyásoló szerepéről [On the Impact of International Migration on the Population] In Schengen A magyar–magyar kapcsolatok az Uniós vízumrendszer árnyékában Budapest: Lucidus Kiadó p 203.

[8] We will refer to immigrant and other status foreign citizens arriving in and leaving the country as *arrivals* and *departures*.

Table 5.

Number and proportion of arrivals and departures (foreign citizens) between 1990 and 2000

Groups of Countries	Arrivals		Departures	
	Number	%	Number	%
Neighbouring Countries	162,357	69.9	52,977	52.3
EU Member States	21,625	9.3	14,509	14.3
America	6,027	2.6	4,293	4.2
Other Countries	42,401	18.2	29,464	29.2
Total	**232,417**	**100.0**	**101,243**	**100.0**

Naturally, the net values of the migration affecting Hungary in the 1990s can be but partially established on the basis of the data above. Nevertheless, these figures are noteworthy. The balance of all arrivals and all departures is +131,174, and the balance is also positive in the case of every individual country group (ranging between +67.4 percent with respect to the citizens of neighbouring countries and +28.8 percent with respect to those of North American countries).

The percentage/year values of the arrivals indicate European predominance (*Table 6*). Their proportion exceeded 80 percent of all the arrivals, especially in the first half of the 1990s. It reached the lowest value in 1996–1997 (71.4 percent) but then it returned on the growth path and amounted to 85.5 percent by 2000. Looking at the examined years as a whole, 83.1 percent of all arrivals came from some European country with 69 percent from the neighbouring countries, 8.1 percent from the EU Member States, and 6 percent from other European countries. Only 3 percent came from the American continents, 12.3 percent arrived as citizens of Asian countries, and 1.2 percent came from Africa. Accordingly, altogether 16.5 percent of the arrivals came from outside Europe. (The proportion of people of unknown citizenship was 0.4 percent.)

Table 6

Distribution of arriving foreign citizens by citizenship, 1990–2000

Country	Year of Entry											Immigration average (1990–2000)	Total
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000		
Austria	111	124	69	55	92	136	144	154	130	156	156	121	1,327
Belgium	17	33	20	19	27	27	23	33	28	32	47	28	306
Denmark	10	6	8	19	13	11	8	11	13	9	22	12	130
Finland	22	27	14	18	23	52	47	36	84	147	132	55	602

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Country	Year of Entry											Immigration average (1990–2000)	Total
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000		
France	73	60	73	79	91	110	173	189	181	195	188	126	1,412
Germany	533	439	312	314	427	443	579	641	677	820	785	543	5,970
Great Britain	149	160	151	116	153	198	188	208	183	174	149	166	1,829
Greece	222	326	202	216	271	198	186	163	68	66	66	180	1,984
Holland	41	44	60	49	56	69	113	104	91	80	88	72	795
Ireland	8	4	6	10	10	12	17	13	12	13	22	12	127
Italy	54	81	66	73	82	80	88	73	77	95	99	79	868
Luxembourg	–	–	–	1	2	2	2	1	–	–	1	1	9
Portugal	9	3	1	1	4	7	6	3	8	5	5	5	52
Spain	16	17	8	4	23	17	16	14	12	17	16	15	160
Sweden	78	73	56	57	73	53	74	79	75	77	66	69	761
EU Total	1,343	1,397	1,046	1,031	1,347	1,418	1,664	1,722	1,639	1,886	1,842	1,485	16,332
Croatia	–	–	162	169	159	219	155	173	311	189	168	155	1,705
Romania	29 617	10 940	6 489	6 068	4 272	5 101	4 161	3,979	5,504	7 845	8 694	8,443	92,870
Slovakia	–	–	26	141	155	233	277	268	403	594	1 034	285	3,131
Ukraine	–	–	1 149	1 223	1 392	1 324	1 426	1,390	1,766	2,420	2,427	1,320	14,517
Yugoslavia	426	4 030	3 201	4 976	2,294	1 301	870	836	1,490	2 490	1 777	2,154	23,691
Neighbouring c. Total	30,043	14,970	11,027	12,577	8,272	8,176	8,889	8,648	9,474	13,538	14,300	12,356	135,914
Norway	17	13	2	19	54	128	112	110	120	145	181	82	901
Poland	760	191	240	238	257	307	221	199	152	62	75	246	2,702
Russia	–	–	373	322	368	525	517	371	504	431	311	338	3,722
Switzerland	24	36	32	37	39	32	42	57	53	79	75	46	506
Turkey	137	156	82	75	74	126	136	122	97	93	92	108	1,190
Other European	1 956	2 242	380	141	172	244	231	263	306	455	385	617	6,785
Other European Total	2,904	2,638	1,109	832	964	1,362	1,259	1,122	1,232	1,265	1,119	1,437	15,806
Europe Total	34,290	19,005	13,182	14,440	10,583	10,955	9,812	9,490	12,345	16,689	17,261	15,277	168,052
China	658	2 067	348	488	521	1 206	1 781	1 740	1 282	1 185	1 066	1,122	12,342
Israel	146	162	68	82	77	176	193	163	175	215	217	152	1,674
Japan	63	107	76	45	88	93	61	95	135	145	163	97	1,071
Mongolia	46	55	194	120	51	77	178	250	316	290	118	154	1,695
Syria	131	81	43	51	71	92	68	94	58	69	45	75	823
Vietnam	135	113	100	143	109	142	309	366	517	378	199	228	2,511
Other Asian	511	391	493	447	478	415	399	347	448	345	409	428	4,683
Asia Total	1,690	2,976	1,322	1,376	1,395	2,201	3,009	3,055	2,931	2,827	2,217	2,254	24,799
Canada	66	56	70	39	58	59	73	54	60	77	48	60	660
United States	460	431	347	319	444	469	525	411	444	441	365	423	4,656

Conditions of Minorities

Country	Year of Entry											Immigration average (1990–2000)	Total
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000		
Other American	113	97	48	38	52	56	53	41	55	69	71	63	693
America Total	639	584	465	396	554	584	851	506	559	587	484	545	6,009
Libya	78	53	42	50	67	98	131	67	34	41	34	63	695
Other African	428	243	117	144	170	119	99	129	121	124	123	165	1,817
Africa Total	506	296	159	194	237	217	230	196	155	165	157	228	2,512
Non-Europe Total	2,835	3,856	1,946	1,966	2,186	3,002	3,890	3,757	3,645	3,379	2,858	3,029	33,320
Other and Unknown	117	113	67	66	55	51	32	36	62	63	65	68	747
Total	37,242	22,974	15,195	16,472	12,824	14,008	13,734	13,263	16,052	20,151	20,184	18,374	202,119

Table 6/a

Distribution of arriving foreign citizens by citizenship, 1990–2000

Country	Year of Entry											Total
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	
Austria	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.2	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7
Belgium	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Denmark	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1
Finland	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.3
France	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.8	1.3	1.4	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.7
Germany	1.4	1.9	2.1	1.9	3.3	3.2	4.2	4.8	4.2	4.1	3.9	3.0
Great Britain	0.4	0.7	1.0	0.7	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.9
Greece	0.6	1.4	1.3	1.3	2.1	1.4	1.4	1.2	0.4	0.3	0.3	1.0
Holland	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4
Ireland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Italy	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4
Luxembourg	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-	0.0	0.0
Portugal	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Spain	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Sweden	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4
EU Total	**3.6**	**6.1**	**8.9**	**6.3**	**10.5**	**10.1**	**12.1**	**13.0**	**10.2**	**9.4**	**9.1**	**8.1**
Croatia	-	-	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.6	1.1	1.3	1.9	0.9	0.8	0.8
Romania	79.5	47.6	42.7	36.8	33.3	36.4	30.3	30.0	34.3	38.9	44.1	45.9

Conditions of Minorities

Country	Year of Entry											Total
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	
Slovakia	-	-	02	09	12	17	20	20	25	29	51	1.5
Ukraine	-	-	76	74	109	95	104	105	110	120	120	7.2
Yugoslavia	11	175	211	302	179	93	63	63	93	124	88	11.7
Neighbouring c. Total	**80.7**	**65.2**	**72.6**	**76.4**	**64.5**	**58.4**	**50.2**	**50.0**	**59.0**	**67.2**	**70 8**	**67.2**
Italy	-	-	25	20	29	37	38	28	31	21	15	1.8
Norway	00	01	00	01	04	09	08	08	07	07	09	0.4
Poland	20	08	16	14	20	22	16	15	09	03	04	1.3
Switzerland	01	02	02	02	03	02	03	04	03	04	04	0.3
Turkey	04	07	05	05	06	09	10	09	06	05	05	0.6
Other European	53	98	25	09	13	17	17	20	19	23	19	3.4
Other European Total	**7 8**	**11.5**	**7.3**	**5.1**	**7.5**	**9.7**	**9.2**	**8.4**	**7.7**	**6.3**	**5.5**	**7.8**
Europe Total	**92.1**	**82.7**	**88.8**	**87.7**	**82.5**	**78.2**	**71.4**	**71.4**	**76.9**	**82.8**	**85.5**	**83.1**
China	18	90	23	30	41	86	130	131	80	59	53	6.1
Israel	04	07	04	05	06	13	14	12	11	11	11	0.8
Japan	02	05	05	03	07	07	04	07	08	07	08	0.5
Mongolia	01	02	13	07	04	05	13	19	20	14	06	0.8
Syria	04	04	03	03	06	07	06	07	04	03	02	0.4
Vietnam	04	05	07	09	08	10	22	28	32	19	10	1.2
Other Asian	14	17	32	27	37	30	29	26	26	17	20	2.3
Asia Total	**4.5**	**13.0**	**8.7**	**8.4**	**10.9**	**15.7**	**21.9**	**23.0**	**18.3**	**13.0**	**11.0**	**12.3**
Canada	02	02	05	02	05	04	05	04	04	04	02	0.3
United States	12	19	23	19	35	33	38	31	28	22	18	2.3
Other American	03	04	03	02	04	04	04	03	03	03	04	0.3
America Total	**1.7**	**2.5**	**3.1**	**2.4**	**4.3**	**4.2**	**4.7**	**3.8**	**3.5**	**2.9**	**2.4**	**3.0**
Libya	02	02	03	03	05	07	10	05	02	02	02	0.3
Other African	11	11	08	09	13	08	07	10	08	06	06	0.9
Africa Total	**1.4**	**1.3**	**1.0**	**1.2**	**1.8**	**1.5**	**1.7**	**1.5**	**1 0**	**0.8**	**0.8**	**1.2**
Non-Europe Total	**7 6**	**16.8**	**12.8**	**11.9**	**17.0**	**21.4**	**28.3**	**26.3**	**22.7**	**16.8**	**14.2**	**16.9**
Other and Unknown	**0.3**	**0.5**	**0.4**	**0.4**	**0.4**	**0.4**	**0.2**	**0.3**	**0.4**	**0.4**	**0.3**	**0.4**
Total	**100 0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100 0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

During the examined period, among all foreign arrivals, immigrants numbered nearly 15 percent less than those of some other status *(Table 7)*.

There is a significant difference between the immigrants and those of some other status. A part of those who stay here long-term, if they comply with the conditions set out in the laws and regulations, may receive immigrant status. Most of them aim at receiving Hungarian citizenship, which necessarily involves employ-

ment and a new way of living. As opposed to immigrants, this *element* of aspiring for Hungarian citizenship is missing from the life strategy of those foreign citizens who hold some other status. Among them we can find owners of institutions, companies, banks, plants and firms of mixed ownership and foreign interest, and a part of those who work in the country as foreign employees for shorter or longer periods. The missing *element* of aspiring for Hungarian citizenship is also seen in the fact that the proportion of arrivals from EU Member States and North America is significantly higher (18.2 percent) among those of other status than among the immigrants (2.2 percent). Due to geographic proximity and other reasons discussed above, the proportion of the citizens of neighbouring countries is also high among those of other status but not so considerably as among immigrants. Another significant difference is that while 59.6 percent of the immigrants were former citizens of Romania, their proportion was less than 30 percent among those of other status.

Table 7.

The number of foreign citizens of immigrant and other status and their proportion in relation to the number of all arrivals, 1990–2000

Country Group	Arrivals Total	Immigrant		Other Status	
		Number	%	Number	%
Neighbouring countries	162,357	95,886	59.1	66,471	40 9
EU Member States	21,625	2,617	12.1	19,008	87 9
America	6,034	371	6.2	5,663	93 8
Other Countries	42,401	8,346	19 7	34,055	80.3
Total	**232,417**	**107,220**	**46.1**	**125,197**	**53.9**

The proportion of arrivals of other status fluctuated significantly by country groups. However, there is a clear difference between arrivals from the neighbouring states and the rest of the world in this case as well. This is manifest, first, in the fact that the proportion of immigrants vs. other status individuals arriving from neighbouring countries is 51.9 percent and 40.9 percent respectively. And, second, in the fact that 96.6 percent of all immigrants are arrivals from neighbouring states. However, this is not the full story. According to the data, the majority of foreign citizens of other status who arrive here to stay long-term are also citizens of the neighbouring countries. The reason is that former Hungarian citizens and their descendants, that is, people who consider themselves ethnic Hungarians also live in these countries, in territories annexed to them following WWI and WWII. Due to the changed political circumstances, it was therefore natural that a part of those who emigrated from the neighbouring countries chose Hungary, the mother country, as their destination.

As indicated above, 69.9 percent (162,357 people) of the foreigners entering Hungary during the examined period arrived from the neighbouring countries,

with the overwhelming majority of them being Hungarian.[9] This means that, contrary to the typical pattern, most of the immigrants to Hungary belong to the same ethnic population, speak the same language, and cherish the same culture and traditions that the majority population. Accordingly, the majority of the immigrants arrive not to an unknown state of different language, culture and history but, in a way, migrate to a different spot within their former "homeland". This is a fundamental characteristic of international migration directed to Hungary.

Among the neighbouring countries, as it is well known, Romania holds the largest ethnic Hungarian community.[10] This is manifest in the proportions of those arriving from the neighbouring states: 62 percent of them used to be Romanian citizens. They are followed by those from the former Soviet Union (17.7 percent), the former Yugoslavia (17.5 percent), and the former Czechoslovakia (2.8 percent). The proportion of those from Romania is significant even when they are compared with the number of total arrivals. Their predominance was most evident in 1990, when they made up 76.6 percent of all arrivals. After that their proportion decreased – primarily due to the increasing number of those arriving from Yugoslavia because of the war –, but it still ranged between 32 percent (in 1997) and 46.9 percent (in 1991).

After the low point in 1997, the proportion of those arriving from Romania in relation to the number of all arrivals increased again and it reached 43.3 percent in 2000. We can expect the same trend to continue and it is quite probable that the ethnic Hungarian immigrants coming from Romania will remain the largest group of foreign citizens entering Hungary.

The ratio of the sexes is balanced among the arrivals and the foreigners staying in Hungary but, in both cases, there has been a gradual increase in the proportion of women. In the first half of the decade, there were more men among them. Following 1995, the 7–10 percent advantage of men eroded and, as a result, their proportion was only 1.6 percent greater than that of women in 2000. This was due to the higher proportion of males among the arrivals coming from non-neighbouring countries – the proportion of women among those coming from neighbouring countries is 1.6 percent greater than that of men (in other words, their male-female ratio is 49.2–50.8 percent). This basically corresponds to the male-female ratio of those arriving from Romania. Examining the male-female ratio of the foreigners living in Hungary, the gradual decrease of the males resulted in a 2.6 percent majority of women by 2001. This means that, while the male-female ratio was 1000 to 728 among the foreigners living in Hungary at the beginning of the 1990s, it was 1,000 to 886 in 1995, 1,000 to 936 in 2000, and 1,000 to 1,054 in 2001.

[9] In the study we regard Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, all disintegrating in the 1990s, as "unified".

[10] According to the 2001–2002 censuses, 520,528 ethnic Hungarians were living in Slovakia (2001), 40,583 in Austria (2001), 16,596 in Croatia (2001), 6,243 in Slovenia (2002), 293,207 in Serbia and Montenegro (2002), 151,516 in Ukraine (2002), and 1,434,377 in Romania (2002).

There is a significant, 9 percent difference between the two groups of arrivals (immigrant and other status) with respect to the male-female ratio: the share of men among the immigrants is 47.4 percent and, among those of other status, is 56.4 percent.

The distribution of arrivals by age is favourable. The share of the 0–19 age group is 24.3 percent, that of the 20–59 age group is 66.8, and those above 60 make up 8.9 percent of the arrivals. The largest group, 63.9 percent of the total, consisted of people between 15 and 39. In the breakdown by sex, this same age group formed the majority again: 64 percent of all men and 63.6 percent of all women belonged to this group. Among men the 30–39 age group stands out with 21 percent, among women the 20–24 age group with 20.4 percent. Among all the arrivals the 30–39 age group has the largest share with 19.3 percent. The distribution by age for men and women is different in the case of arrivals from neighbouring countries and those from EU Member States. In these cases the proportion of the various age groups – with the exception of the 40–49 and 50–59 groups – was above 10 percent. For example, in 1990, the 0–14 and 60+ age groups made up 28.2 percent and 18.8 percent of the arrivals respectively. These proportions dropped to 4–8 percent by the mid-1990s but then took an upturn again. The proportion of those in the 60+ age group increased primarily among those arriving from Romania and Ukraine. Since those in this age group generally do not migrate by themselves, we can talk about a "practice" of secondary migration: they migrate to follow their children. Although the 0–14 age group only made up 7.7 percent of all the arrivals in 2000, the proportion for the next age groups was 10 percent or more. The proportion of those above 50 has been increasing since 1997. As compared to the mid-1990s, their proportion doubled and exceeded the 11 percent of all arrivals in the last two years of the decade. Examining the distribution of the arrivals by sex and age, we find each year that the proportion of women was higher than that of men until the age 24. Between 25 and 49 men dominated, while the share of women was greater by a few percentage points among the 50+ group. The mean age of arrivals has been fluctuating in function of the shifts described above. The mean age of men has been above 30 since 1992 and that of women since 1993. The mean age of men rose above 33 in 1994 and that of women in 1996. The mean age was 33.3 years in 2000.

The age structure of immigrants is slightly different from that of all arrivals: the proportion of young people is higher among them (26 percent of the immigrants belong to the 0–19 age group and, from this, the share of those between 0 and 14 is 17.2 percent). The 60+ age group makes up 12.1 percent and the 20–59 age group 61.9 percent of the immigrant arrivals. Among immigrants the proportion of the 20–29 age group is the highest with 29.6 percent. In the case of both sexes, and also when taken together, most people belong to those between 20 and 24. In so far as the age distribution of male immigrants is concerned, we could hardly get better proportions than these. Among them the share of the 0–19 age group is 26.7 percent, that of the 20–59 is 61.6 percent, and that of the

60+ is 11.7 percent. Although the proportion of the young is slightly higher (by 0.7 percent) and that of the old is slightly lower (by 0.4 percent) than in the case of all the immigrants, this does not significantly influence the age distribution of all the immigrants. As compared with men, the proportion of women is 1.4 percent lower under the age of 19, and 0.7 percent higher above the age 60. These figures, together with those that indicate the increasing proportion of women in the total population, indicate the deterioration of the population's distribution by age.

When the age distribution of immigrants and that of the arrivals of other status is compared, we find that among these latter the proportion of younger people is higher (23.8 percent), and that of the older is lower (5,3). This means that the proportion of those in the 20–59 age group can exceed 70 percent among them – as opposed to the 61.9 percent of the immigrants. In the case of the arrivals of other status the age groups with a ratio over 10 percent expand especially among the men. 68.2 percent of men and 68.1 percent of women belong to the 15–39 age group. However, if only men's age distribution is examined among the arrivals of other status, the proportion of the 0–19 age group is 21.4 percent, and that of the 60+ age group is only 4.3 percent. The proportion of the economically active age group is 74.3 percent. All in all, the age distribution of the arrivals of other status is more favourable than that of the immigrants, which can be explained by the fundamental difference in the purpose of their migration.

The distribution of entering foreign citizens by family status is known only for the period between 1995 and 2000. Consequently we only analyse the data of 97,412 people. The most important trend of the examined 6 years is that the proportion of unmarried people increased both among men and women. The proportion of unmarried men increased from 46.5 percent in 1995 to over 52 percent. In the case of women, the proportion of the unmarried went from 42.5 percent to 48.1 percent by the end of the decade. Parallel to this, the proportion of married men dropped significantly from 50.7 percent to 44.4 percent and that of married women from 49.5 to 45.3 percent. The proportion of widows and the divorced stagnated with the difference that generally there are six times more widows than widowers and the proportion of divorced men is also much lower than that of divorced women. *(Table 8).*

Table 8 contains the data on the distribution of foreign arrivals by sex and profession. In the case of men the proportion of construction industry workers, in the case of women the proportion of students is the highest. When the two sexes are considered together, students dominate by 19.5 percent. This is especially so when we also add the university and college students (3.4 percent). Students are followed by *industrial and construction industry professions* (15.4 percent) and *professions requiring higher education qualification* (11.4 percent), the *unemployed* (7.9 percent) and *professions not requiring special skills* (6.8 percent). *Agricultural and sylvicultural* professions (0.4 percent), *machine operators, mechanics, drivers* (0.8 percent), *university and college students* (3.4 percent), and *homemakers* (3.8 percent) are present in small proportions.

Table 8.

Distribution of foreign arrivals by sex and profession

Profession	Men	Women	Together
Legislators, administrative and business executives	8 9	3.7	6 5
Professions requiring higher education qualification	11 4	11 3	11 4
Other professions requiring higher or secondary education qualification	4 5	5.9	5.1
Office and management professions	5.1	6 8	5.9
Services	5.1	5.8	5 4
Agricultural and sylvicultural professions	0.4	0 2	0.4
Industrial and construction industry professions	20.4	9 6	15.4
Machine operators, mechanics, drivers	1.3	0 1	0.8
Professions not requiring special skills	7.2	6 2	6.8
Unemployed	4.8	11 5	7 9
Homemakers	1 5	6 3	3 8
Retired	4.9	6 6	5 7
University and college students	3 4	3 4	3 4
Other student	19 1	20 0	19 5
Unknown	1 7	2 1	1 9

When certain units at the professions' list are merged, besides the clear predominance of the *unemployed, dependant* category (34.6 percent), the joint proportion of *professions requiring higher education qualification* and *industrial and construction industry professions* also becomes significant (41.7 percent). Beyond them, the categories of *legislators, administrative and business executives* and the *professions not requiring special skills* also have a share over 6 percent each year. It is to note that the proportion of *agricultural and sylvicultural professions* is below 0.5 percent. The proportion of the *unemployed, dependant* category is high and includes 50.3 percent of the women and 34.8 of the men. Within the *unemployed, dependant* category, *homemakers* constitute 3.8 percent, the *retired* 5.7 percent and the *students* in primary, secondary and tertiary education 19.5 percent.

Let us look at the distribution of professions that account for the lowest proportions by sex. With the exception of the *homemakers* and the *legislators, administrative and business executives*, we can find the same professions in the case of both sexes, though not in the same order: *agricultural and sylvicultural professions, machine operators, mechanics, drivers, university and college students*, and unknown. The *homemaker* category does not figure in the case of men, and the category of *legislators, administrative and business executives* is not among women's professions. Apart from these two, the other proportions coincide. Looking at the most frequent professions, they follow each other in a different order. Among men *industrial and construction industry professions* are first followed by *other students*, among women *other students* comes first followed by *unem-*

ployed. Professions requiring higher education qualification come third in the case of both sexes. This is followed by *legislators, administrative and business executives* and *professions not requiring special skills* in the case of men and by *industrial and construction industry professions* and *office and management professions* in the case of women. All those taken together who have a profession that presumably required a university or a college degree constitute 28.2 percent of men and 24.3 percent of women, which are rather significant values for both sexes. The proportion of the retired began to increase after 1998 and, after having been around 5–6 percent, it was close to 9 percent in 2000. This trend is expected to continue in the following years and, together with the similar processes in Hungary, further damage the ability of the working population to support the others.

Naturally, the patterns of distribution by profession among immigrants do not significantly differ from that of the all arrivals although there are characteristic shifts in their case. Among immigrants, the proportion of *professions requiring higher education qualification* plus the *professions requiring higher or secondary education qualification* make up 21.7 percent. The *industrial and engineering industry professions* have a share of 15.8 percent and the *unemployed, dependant* category 44.6 percent. Primarily students (among them primary school students) and retired people belong in the latter category. *Office and management professions* make up 5.9 percent and the people working in the *tertiary sector* 4.9 percent. The proportion of those in the *agricultural and sylvicultural professions* is insignificant: 0.5 percent. Looking at the professions' distribution by sex, the greatest shift concerns the *unemployed* and the *industrial and construction industry professions.* 49.7 percent of women and 39.1 percent of men belong in these categories. In *industrial and construction industry professions* the proportion of men is 22.6 percent, that of women is 9.6 percent.

Among the people of other status the proportion of *professions requiring higher education qualification* plus the *professions requiring higher or secondary education qualification* make up 18.4 percent. The *industrial and engineering industry professions* have a share of 14 percent and the *unemployed, dependant* category 40.2 percent. The 8.2 percent of *legislators, administrative and business executives* is also significant. The male-female ratio in the case of these categories is as follows: there are much less men in the *unemployed, dependant* category, while their proportion is moderately higher among *legislators, administrative and business executives.* Among the people of other status, as compared to men, the proportion of women is considerable in the *unemployed, dependant* category (52.5 percent). It is a plausible explanation that many of them stay in Hungary as wives of men of similar status. The difference in the proportion of men and women is also significant in *senior professions requiring higher education qualification*: it is 24.4 percent to 1.7 percent, respectively.

There are characteristic differences in the territorial distribution of immigrants and people of other status. While the majority of the latter (58.4 percent) settled in Central Hungary, the proportion of immigrants does not reach this percentage in

any of the regions. Their presence is relevant in Central Hungary and in the Southern Great Plain, although their combined proportion in these two regions is still only 55.6 percent. The divergence in the territorial distribution of the two groups can be explained by their substantially different place at the labour market: the presence of the overwhelming majority of the people of other status is clearly connected to the areas more developed in terms of industry, services, and commercial activity.

3. Foreign citizens who remigrate or migrate on

Between 1990 and 2000, a total of 101,243 foreign citizens (43.6 percent of the arrivals) left Hungary and returned home or migrated on to a third country. Some of them arrived during the examined period, others before that. Their decision to migrate on is a natural phenomenon. We have no information on how these two groups (immigrants, those of other status) related to each other and, based on the data available, the reason of their departure cannot be established either. As mentioned above, the two groups of arrivals entered the country with different, easily discernible objectives in mind. This difference had an impact on how many decided to migrate on from the two groups. According to the data, there is a clear and definite difference between the remigration or further migration of the immigrants and the people of other status. Among the immigrants, only 1.1 percent gave up their original plans. With the exception of the citizens of EU Member States (13.3 percent of them migrated on), the number and proportion of those who changed their original plans is negligible (though it is to note that the number of people of immigrant status was insignificant among the citizens of Asian, African and American countries). Those were the most persevering in sticking to their plans who arrived from the neighbouring countries: only 0.7 percent gave up their goals. This cannot be by chance. We pointed out above that most of them were ethnic Hungarians and migrated to Hungary to become Hungarian citizens. The majority of immigrant status terminations were registered between 1990 and 1997 and concerned primarily German (326) and Romanian (697) citizens. In the case of Romanian citizens this means that only 1.1 percent of them changed their plans during the 1990s.

In the case of immigrants it is to be pointed out that 24.8 percent of those who remigrated from among them belonged in the 0–19 age group, and 7.6 percent to the 60+ age group (their proportion is similar among immigrants). In the case of the young people the difference is not significant, it is only 2.8 percent, but it is 18.1 percent in the case of the elderly. Although this increases the mean age of the population, it does not cause problems because the number of those who migrate on from among the immigrants is negligible.

Those who remigrate have a more proportionate distribution by profession as compared with the whole of the immigrant group (with the exception of the category of *legislators, administrative and business executives*). Their distribution by region had a balanced pattern in the country (ranging from 9.7 to 15 percent), except in the Central Hungarian region, from where 29.9 percent of all immigrants left.

Based on the remigration and further migration data of foreign citizens of other status, they seem a very mobile group as compared with the immigrants. Nearly 80 percent of them left Hungary during the examined period *(Table 9)*. There is no information on how many of them arrived before or during this period. Their mobility, as against the immigrant group, is independent of the country groups. The greatest difference (11.6 percent) in seen between the citizens of EU member states and the other countries of the world. It is conspicuous that the migration pattern of people of other status arriving from the neighbouring countries is not different from that of the other country groups. This indicates that a part of the citizens of the neighbouring countries arrive not with a long-term strategy of settling and moving here but with that of being employed in Hungary. The reasons why 80 percent of the people of other status remigrated or migrated on between 1990 and 2000 were: the unpredictability of the transformation of the structure of Hungary's economy, the instability of the transition, the changing demand of the labour market and its quick, fundamental transformation.

Table 9.

Arrivals of other status and the number and proportion of those who migrate on, 1990–2000

Country group	People of other status	Departures from among the people of other status	
	Number	Number	%
Neighbouring countries	66,471	52,279	78.6
EU Member States	19,008	14,161	74.5
America	5,663	4,285	75.7
Other countries	34,055	29,315	86.1
Total	**125,197**	**100,084**	**79.9**

The distribution of the departing people of other status by age leads us to the same conclusions as in the case of the immigrants. Among those who left, the 0–19 age group had a share of 4.6 percent, which is 15.2 percent less than in the case of the people of other status category, while the 60+ age group had a share of 43.2 percent, which is 22 percent more than their proportion among all foreign citizens of some other status. The distribution of the departing people of other status by profession is similar to that of the arrivals of similar status, and the territorial distribution of the two groups is much the same as well.

4. Foreigners living in Hungary

The data on foreigners staying in Hungary is analysed next. Their number, irrespective of when they arrived – is always indicated as of 1 January. That is, we examine those foreigners who stayed in Hungary in the year preceding it.

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According to the data of 1 January 1993, 123,184 foreign citizens stayed in Hungary in 1992 *(Table 10)*. We have no data on the number of foreigners living here from earlier years, so 1992 will be considered the base year. The number of foreigners staying here increased by 5.8 percent by 1993 and the increase continued over the years but its pace slowed down. With the exception of one year, 1997, when the rate of increase was 3.9 percent, the number of foreigners grew by 1.2 to 1.7 percent per year. The total increase between 1992 and 1999 was 19.6 percent, with the number of foreigners living in Hungary exceeding 150,000 by 1999. However, in 2000, their number dropped by 28 percent (–43,097 people) in relation to 1999. The explanation of this significant difference is that everybody whose residence permit expired as of 1 January 2001 was deleted from the database. Accordingly, after 1 January 2001 only the people holding a valid residence permit figured in the database. They numbered 110,028 people.[11]

Table 10.

Number of foreign citizens living in Hungary and their distribution by sex, 1993–2001

Year	Number of foreign citizens			Distribution of foreign citizens (%)		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1993	71,287	51,897	123,184	57 9	42.1	100.0
1994	69,256	61,454	130,710	53 0	47.0	100.0
1995	73,210	64,891	138,101	53 0	47.0	100.0
1996	74,382	65,572	139,954	53 1	46.9	100.0
1997	77,476	65,030	142,506	54 4	45.6	100.0
1998	79,295	68,968	148,263	53 5	46.5	100 0
1999	77,834	72,411	150,245	51 8	48 2	100 0
2000	79,101	74,024	153,125	51.7	48.3	100.0
2001	53,578	56,450	110,028	48.7	51.3	100.0

The citizens of neighbouring countries predominated every year the category of foreigners staying in Hungary. Their proportion fluctuated between 58 and 62 percent. At the same time, the proportion of the citizens of EU Member States was between 4.8 and 11.7. 1997 was a turning point as regards the presence of EU citizens in Hungary: their proportion jumped from 5–7 percent to 10–11 percent. Among the foreign citizens staying in Hungary, the citizens of Asian countries made up the largest chunk of the people arriving from countries outside Europe *(Table 11)*. In 1996, their total proportion exceeded 10 percent of all the foreigners staying in Hungary. Their proportion rose above 12 percent in 1997 and has remained there ever since. The proportion of the citizens of American and African countries is not significant: it never exceeded 3 percent and 2 percent, respectively.

[11] Nobody examined what happened to the deleted 43,097 people. Most of them probably had left the country but there might have been others who had not been deleted before due to some administrational mistake. Others might have stayed on in Hungary without having their residence permit extended.

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Table 11

Distribution of foreign citizens living in Hungary by citizenship, 1995–2001

Country	Year of residence						
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Austria	616	694	872	1,031	990	1,053	694
Belgium	113	143	174	196	214	221	113
Denmark	41	62	77	82	100	104	41
Finland	100	134	187	224	253	303	243
France	364	443	611	771	956	1,036	511
Germany	2,289	3,087	3,505	8,985	9,396	9,631	7,493
Great Britain	631	760	955	1,140	1,317	1,378	624
Greece	1,362	1,588	1,810	1,972	1,925	1,903	710
Holland	191	264	374	472	568	585	324
Ireland	22	37	61	77	92	97	38
Italy	514	568	655	734	752	793	542
Luxembourg	3	5	6	8	7	7	5
Portugal	28	31	39	40	45	50	22
Spain	54	79	96	106	112	119	64
Sweden	319	383	469	530	604	627	299
EU Total	**6,647**	**8,278**	**9,891**	**16,368**	**17,331**	**17,907**	**11,723**
Croatia	305	532	688	995	1,069	1,162	917
Romania	68,439	65,705	61,579	62,130	57,357	57,343	41,561
Slovakia	231	461	600	1,110	1,571	1,717	1,576
Ukraine	3,501	4,432	5,625	7,733	9,898	11,016	8,947
Yugoslavia	6,213	15,492	14,884	14,116	9,916	10,943	8,623
Neighbouring c. Total	**78,689**	**86,622**	**83,376**	**86,084**	**79,811**	**82,181**	**61,624**
Norway	77	172	310	411	521	573	607
Poland	4,628	4,521	4,297	4,471	4,386	4,144	2,279
Russia	277	1,124	1,708	2,624	2,809	3,002	1,893
Switzerland	186	211	265	306	373	422	330
Turkey	483	560	660	760	791	820	455
Other European	31,930	20,923	20,051	12,927	18,062	16,735	14,286
Other European c. Total	**37,581**	**27,511**	**27,291**	**21,499**	**26,942**	**25,696**	**19,850**
Europe Total	**122,917**	**122,411**	**120,558**	**123,951**	**124,084**	**125,784**	**93,197**
China	3,469	4,276	6,639	7,809	8,306	8,861	5,819
Israel	518	619	890	1,030	1,177	1,186	781
Japan	314	394	479	547	656	706	431
Mongolia	528	562	700	864	1,071	1,227	738
Syria	679	703	821	894	909	906	583

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Country	Year of residence						
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Vietnam	1,276	1,323	1,596	1,839	2,193	2,447	1,893
Other Asian	2,851	3,542	3,879	3,731	3,931	3,993	2,358
Asia Total	**9,635**	**11,419**	**15,004**	**16,714**	**18,243**	**19,326**	**12,603**
Canada	277	329	390	452	475	507	235
United States	1,700	2,008	2,420	2,835	3,132	3,261	1,636
Other American	918	860	912	923	905	909	617
America Total	**2,895**	**3,197**	**3,722**	**4,210**	**4,512**	**4,677**	**2,488**
Libya	402	484	654	720	721	694	204
Other African	1,679	1,726	1,834	1,939	1,873	1,865	1,029
Africa Total	**2,081**	**2,210**	**2,488**	**2,659**	**2,594**	**2,559**	**1,233**
Non-Europe Total	**14,611**	**16,826**	**21,214**	**23,583**	**25,349**	**26,562**	**16,324**
Other and Unknown	**573**	**717**	**734**	**729**	**812**	**779**	**507**
Total	**138,101**	**139,954**	**142,506**	**148,263**	**150,245**	**153,125**	**110,028**

Table 11/a

Distribution of foreign citizens living in Hungary by citizenship, 1995–2001 (%)

Country	Year of residence						
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Austria	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6
Belgium	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Denmark	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Finland	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
France	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.5
Germany	1.7	2.2	2.5	6.1	6.3	6.3	6.8
Great Britain	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.6
Greece	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2	0.6
Holland	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3
Ireland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Italy	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Luxembourg	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Portugal	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Spain	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Sweden	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3
EU Total	**4.8**	**5.9**	**6.9**	**11.0**	**11.5**	**11.7**	**10.7**
Croatia	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8
Yugoslavia	4.5	11.1	10.4	9.5	6.6	7.1	7.8
Romania	49.6	46.9	43.2	41.9	38.2	37.4	37.8

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Country	Year of residence						
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Slovakia	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.7	1.0	1.1	1.4
Ukraine	2.5	3.2	3.9	5.2	6.6	7.2	8.1
Neighbouring c. Total	**57.0**	**61.9**	**58.5**	**58.1**	**53.1**	**53.7**	**56.0**
Norway	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6
Poland	3.4	3.2	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.1
Russia	0.2	0.8	1.2	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.7
Switzerland	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
Turkey	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4
Other European	23.1	14.9	14.1	8.7	12.0	10.9	13.0
Other European c. Total	**27.2**	**19.7**	**19.2**	**14.5**	**17.9**	**16.8**	**18.0**
Europe Total	**89.0**	**87.5**	**84.6**	**83.6**	**82.6**	**82.1**	**84.7**
China	2.5	3.1	4.7	5.3	5.5	5.8	5.3
Israel	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7
Japan	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4
Mongolia	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.7
Syria	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5
Vietnam	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.5	1.6	1.7
Other Asian	2.1	2.5	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.1
Asia Total	**7.0**	**8.2**	**10.5**	**11.3**	**12.1**	**12.6**	**11.5**
Canada	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2
United States	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.1	1.5
Other American	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
America Total	**2.1**	**2.3**	**2.6**	**2.8**	**3.0**	**3.1**	**2.3**
Libya	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.2
Other African	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	0.9
Africa Total	**1.5**	**1.6**	**1.7**	**1.8**	**1.7**	**1.7**	**1.1**
Non-Europe Total	**10.6**	**12.0**	**14.9**	**15.9**	**16.9**	**17.3**	**14.8**
Other and Unknown	**0.4**	**0.5**	**0.5**	**0.5**	**0.5**	**0.5**	**0.5**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

At first, the distribution of foreigners living in Hungary by sex showed a clear prevalence of men. In 1992, their proportion was nearly 58 percent with that of women being slightly more than 42 percent. With the exception of the last two years, the predominance of men endured, although to a decreasing proportion. In the early 1990s the difference was greater than 15 percent, it dropped to 7 percent by 1997 and to 3.4 percent by 1999. After that, their proportion not only balanced but also tipped toward women by 2000, who were in a majority by 2.6 percent that year. Resulting from these changes, the male-female ratio among the foreigners living in Hungary went from 1,000 to 728 to 1,000 to 1,054 by the end of the decade.

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Looking at the distribution of foreigners living in Hungary by sex, not in general but by country groups, the period between 1994 and 1996 indicates male predominance among the citizens of the EU Member States. After that, the proportion of women exceeded that of men although by 1–2 percent only. In the case of the neighbouring countries, 1998 was the turning point in this respect. As of 1 January 1999, the male-female ratio was basically balanced, but women became the majority by 2000. When looking at the distribution of those arriving from Asian countries by sex, a completely different picture opens up. In their case we can see a twofold or somewhat higher male predominance in each of the years. This is even more like this in the case of the citizens of African countries: the number of men was four or five times higher than that of women. There was male prevalence among the citizens of American countries as well but, apart from the last two years, its extent was not significant.

The age composition is another important demographic characteristic of the group of foreigners living in Hungary. The changes of the group's age structure cannot be examined in the years of the early 1990s, as we only have data for the years between 1995 and 2000. The data of 1996 significantly deviate from the years before and the years after both for men and women. The reason in unknown.

The most numerous groups among the foreigners living in Hungary were age groups 30–39 and 40–49 followed by age group 25–29. Among men the proportion of the 30–39 group was always 3–5 percent larger than among women. In the 40+ age group women were always in a slight majority (by 1–2 percent). All these taken together make the age structure of foreign women staying in Hungary older than that of men's.

The territorial distribution of foreign citizens living in Hungary is uneven. Nearly 50 percent of them live in Central Hungary, with their proportion fluctuating between 45 percent (in 1994 and 2000) and 53 percent (1999). The Southern Great Plane is the second most popular area among them. Their proportion here exceeded 19 percent of all foreigners in the first three years and then stabilised around 14–15 percent. Their proportion is lowest in Western Transdanubia with 4.5–5.7 percent. It is 2–2.5 percent more than that in Northern Hungary. Their proportion was higher by a similar extent in Central Transdanubia and the Northern Great Plains.

The exceptionally high proportion of foreigners in Central Hungary is due primarily to their great number in the capital. Csongrád is the only county that runs close to Pest county. Every year about 42–43 of foreign citizens staying in Hungary were living in Budapest. The capital was followed by Szeged, Nyíregyháza, Debrecen, Kecskemét, Tatabánya, Székesfehérvár, Hódmezővásárhely, and Zalaegerszeg. In these county-rank towns the Hungarian-foreigner ratio fluctuated between 1,000 to 38 (In Szeged) and 1,000 to 9 (in Zalaegerszeg).

Although we have no accurate and comprehensive data on work permits, it is important to survey the data we do have just to get an idea about them. Without touching upon the problems related to these data, it should be pointed out, first, that there is a contradiction between the data on migration trends and those on work permits. Second, it is easy to see that the range of countries the citizens of which

received a work permit is rather narrow. Furthermore, among them, the proportion of Polish, Chinese and even Romanian citizens seems disproportionately low. Third, the most conspicuous fact is that according to the data available, nobody (asked for) received a work permit from among the citizens of EU Member States and the US between 1994 and 2000 *(Table 12)*. Nevertheless, the number of work permits issued increased with every year. The reason of the drop in 1996 is unknown. If we consider the data of 1994 and 1995 only to be informative and take 1996 as the base year, then the number of permits issued increased by 16.3 percent in 1997. This percentage halved in 1998, but then, in 1999, darted to 22.9 percent in relation to 1998. This trend, though at a slower pace, continued in 2000. Most permits were issued to Romanian citizens each year. Not counting those belonging to *other* countries, the citizens of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia followed.

As regards the number of work permits, the citizens of Slovakia and China came 4th and 5th. In the last year of the decade the ranks turned out different. Romanian citizens remained first with 49.2 percent of those having a work permit. They were followed by the *other* countries category (14.8 percent), the former Soviet Union (14.4 percent), Slovakia (8.7 percent), China (5.9 percent), and the former Yugoslavia (4 percent). Looking at the territorial distribution of issued or extended work permits, in conformity with the territorial distribution of foreign citizens living in Hungary, Central Hungary predominated. In 1994, 62.4 percent of the work permits were issued or extended in Central Hungary. It was followed by Central Transdanubia, Western Transdanubia, the Southern Great Plain, and Southern Transdanubia. These data, despite the deficiencies, provide information not only on the territorial distribution of foreigners holding a work permit but also on the proportions of work done by legally employed foreigners.

Table 12

Number of work permits issued and extensions authorised by citizenship, 1994–2000

Country	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
	Number						
China	476	982	544	773	1,190	1,739	2,374
Czech Republic	15	26	25	28	47	68	81
Poland	1,411	2,163	1,252	1,449	1,057	641	357
Romania	10,803	13,171	9,218	10,909	11,862	16,982	19,774
Slovakia	753	859	696	1,140	803	1,254	3,508
Soviet	3,044	2,930	3,047	3,852	3,544	4,896	5,783
Vietnam	117	141	115	229	324	465	764
Yugoslavia	2,206	1,623	1,044	1,192	1,114	1,431	1,602
Other	5,931	4,190	4,355	4,672	6,369	6,662	5,960
Total	**24,756**	**26,085**	**20,296**	**24,244**	**26,310**	**34,138**	**40,203**

Country	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
	%						
China	1.9	3 8	2 7	3.2	4.5	5.1	5 9
Czech Republic	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0 2	0.2
Poland	5.7	8 3	6.2	6.0	4.0	1 9	0.9
Romania	43.6	50 5	45.4	45.0	45 1	49 7	49.2
Slovakia	3.0	3 3	3.4	4 7	3.1	3 7	8.7
Soviet	12 3	11 2	15 0	15 9	13.5	14 3	14 4
Vietnam	0.5	0 5	0.6	0 9	1.2	1 4	1.9
Yugoslavia	8 9	6.2	5.1	4 9	4.2	4 2	4.0
Other	24 0	16.1	21 5	19 3	24 2	19 5	14 8
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

5. Prospects of the near future

Following the transition to democracy and market economy, several factors – together and at the same time – influenced the developments of the migration processes affecting Hungary: the consequences of modern history, the anti-migration policy of the recent past, Hungary's accession to the European Union, and the circumstances created by a globalising world economy. Beyond these, the following factors will clearly have an impact on the development of migration processes in Hungary in the coming decades:

- the pressure deriving from the population decrease and ageing population;
- the migration endeavours of the ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries (let us not forget that, should need arise, we would have to ensure that they find refuge in the country);
- more intensive connections with the processes of globalisation and, parallel to this, the labour force demand of the economy that is expected to contribute to the increase in the number of the participants both of long-term and temporary migration processes;
- the return of a part of those or the descendants of those who left Hungary following WWII, but especially in 1956–57 and the subsequent decades.

Yet, due to the country's particular situation, it is impossible to see how the number of those who come here as temporary migrants will develop in proportion to the number of those who come from the neighbouring countries to settle here. The migration data of the past decade indicate that Hungary is not only a destination country for the ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries but it is both a destination and transit country for the citizens of several countries of the world. Yet, no research has been conducted to reinforce this statement, which otherwise seems obvious and, to a certain extent, can even be supported by facts. Namely, we have no information on the proportion of those – within the indi-

vidual country groups – who consider their stay in Hungary as a temporary stop in their migration to Western Europe or overseas, and, among the departures, we do not know the proportion of those who return home permanently or temporarily or move on from Hungary to Western Europe or overseas. This question is even more clearly manifest as regards the new citizens of the country. However, currently we have no information on how many of those who were granted Hungarian citizenship after 1990 considered Hungary a transit country and live today in a different country of the world.

It is difficult to predict the consequences of the efforts that seek to connect Hungary into the international flow of workforce more expressly. One of the developments of the next decade will probably be that, subject to this process, it will become clear as to what extent Hungary will become an emissive and a recipient country. The extent of population decrease in Hungary and the ageing of the population structure will also become clear In the next two decades, and we will see what remedial population policy measures will be Introduced in order to stop these processes. Should this take place, the attitude to the migration of ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries into Hungary will have to become clear-cut in Hungary. These factors, the unresolved internal tensions of the Central and Eastern European countries, and other, unforeseeable events, make it impossible to see whether the volume of international migration affecting Hungary will remain at its present level or will significantly increase. In lack of accurate migration data, it can only be assumed that we cannot count on positive net migration balance in the longer run. It is an intriguing question as to how and to what extent the country's EU accession will influence the number of foreigners living in Hungary, their citizenship, and composition by sex, age and profession.

The migration data of the 1990s reveals that it would be urgent to clarify Hungary's ideas in relation to the migration of the ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries. There is a question that cannot be ignored: should we promote the emigration of these people in order to solve the population and workforce problems of Hungary, or should we tone down or curb their emigration efforts? It is problematic, however, whether we can reject the application of those ethnic Hungarian Austrian, Romanian, Croatian, Ukrainian, Serb, Slovak, and Slovene citizens who or whose parents or grandparents found themselves in a minority situation and became citizens of other countries against their will, due to the decision of the Great Powers? Considering all this, it is impossible to ignore the (future) consequences that the immigration of ethnic Hungarians to Hungary will have on the present and the future of the Hungarian communities of the neighbouring countries.

The actual contents and specific character of the present stage of international migration are mostly indiscernible as yet for several reasons: in part, because of the dysfunctional consequences of the migration of the recent past; and, in part, because the foundation of the European Union and its enlargement create completely new conditions for the migration of the European citizens. The 9/11

terrorist attacks against New York and Washington had a peculiar impact on these processes: even the countries characterised by liberal immigration policies tightened the conditions of international migration. At the same time, the fight against terrorism, and the wars in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Israel, etc. resulted in the migration of masses. However, besides this, the demands of globalisation, especially the increasing demand for temporary migration, also have an influence entailing an expanding migration process and the liberalisation of its conditions. Besides all this, it is not clear how the present population decrease of the Western European countries and their ageing populations will affect the migration process.

We can conclude that, during the next decade, the following factors will be crucial as regards the developments of international migration: the overpopulation of the most undeveloped countries; the migration pressure of the population of these countries; the growing income inequalities in the various countries; the workforce demand of the globalising world economy; and the population decrease in the industrialised countries. There are various ways to react to these challenges: either by relaxing the conditions of international migration or by further tightening the current framework. However, one must not forget that both solutions – even temporary ones – involve not only advantages but also a series of social problems in both the emissive and recipient countries.

Conditions of Minorities

Lajos Balázs

Peasant "Population Policy" and Present Demographic Problems A few, summarizing remarks

First of all, about the motivation of the author to conduct research in this field, that is, why the researcher of transitional customs ventured unauthorized into the territory of the demography of Hungarians.

His motivation was of a dual nature. First, he was intrigued about the social, scientific, ecclesiastic, political, etc. rhetoric of the allegedly or seemingly fatal decrease of Hungarian population. Second, he felt a certain lack; as if the science of ethnography had been missing (or had been ignored) from the research of an issue that can indeed be considered a national problem. Therefore, it was certainly not the "have a finger in every pie" mentality that governed the author.

It was precisely this failure and beating the air that urged him to believe that the analysis of negative demographic indicators cannot be considered as a narrow, professional, welfare or (party) political question. Instead, a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach and the consideration of every possible factor (mental, ideal, depth-psychological motivations) are essential, even if some may seem unimportant or even anachronistic. They surely reveal more from the hardly perceptible *yes-no* mysteries of procreation and one's desire to have a child than the shocking statistical indicators, which are nothing more but alarm signals. The author firmly believes that the *understanding of any demographic situation* requires, in general and even more so in crucial periods, the *examination of a community's, a nation's education and culture in its entirety; nearly all segments of culture* (even the culture of children's games) *need to be surveyed in order that more resources of fertility and vitality could be found welling up from somewhere deep or existing latently.* This, in turn, can help us understand and find the harmful alterations, both the irreversible and the reversible ones, and those that can be made good in our days (the convertibility of the scale of values), so that they all could be potentially and effectively corrected.

Based on his studies and research, the author assumed that many manifestations and branches of folk culture, one of the pillars of national culture, directly or indirectly can also provide some solution for our present-day problems. These pillars always looked for answers and solutions for fundamental questions and challenges of life, and they never looked for the sake of search only.

His research experience and results concerning birth, marriage, and death in peasant society were directly responsible for making the author, although he is not an expert of population growth and the science of demography (merely understands it on the level general knowledge), deduce nevertheless something

from the life and world outlook and the knowledge on the perpetual phenomena of life in the hear of the Székely Hungarian community's population philosophy. Not dogmatically, though, since peasant society has never fallen and still does not fall back on a doctrine or on any "elaborate" theory in any matter. Their attitude can be discovered and grasped from the algorithm of their decisions in certain situations of life, their work and lifestyle, their religious life and tales, and their idioms and proverbs that condense their wisdom into a few words.

The author started out to verify his assumption on population changes in Csíkszentdomokos (Transylvania). He had conducted research on transitional customs there for three decades and felt that the village was particular with respect to its population. Despite deficiencies of data, it is evident that its population has been gradually increasing, with smaller stops, for centuries. The trend has been clearly upward during the past 150 years. It is beyond doubt that in the Székely land, and certainly among the villages of Csík county, it is one of the larger villages. As far as its birth rate is considered, it is or was the first in the row. The unique demographic situation of Szentdomokos – it produced the largest of population reserves in all Székely land – caught the attention of sociographic literature as early as the early 20th century and the inter-war years.

What could be the secret behind this demographic phenomenon?

The author's research proves that the secret is certainly not what György Bözödi claimed, i.e. that the people of Szentdomokos know nothing about birth control and, therefore, the great number of children is to be explained by the fulfilment of their primary instincts.

On the contrary. A myriad of data shows that the techniques of family planning, birth control and abortion were known in Szentdomonkos and among all Hungarian peasants. Due to the abortion act of Ceausescu, the author himself had a chance to take note of a large number of various abortion techniques applied at home (and leaning on vast pool of latent knowledge) that, as often as not, led to tragedy.

Research has revealed that the community's attitude to life is strongly child-centric. Dezső Szabó also sensed this during his research on dialects in the early 20th century and József Venczel formulated the same opinion in the inter-war years.

It was proved that the answer to the "Why would a peasant family in Csíkszentdomokos would want children?" question lies in the context of conscious (not instinctive) decisions to have children. Based on a wider and more complex group of motives, which derive from the pragmatic life philosophy of the peasants, the author points out that the answers and arguments are defined by material, financial, social, societal, religious, national, emotional, and other factors relating to one's view of life.

You need children because then you have heirs to your property, you can lean on them when you get old, they nurse you when you are sick, they carry the father's name on and the family line goes on, they are there to bury the parents,

they make life worthwhile, they are a source of happiness, they make a family, unique Hungarian characteristics are preserved in them, they make their parents proud, then you have somebody you can wait for to come home, and because children are a blessing of God that you must accept.

If the peasants in Szentdomonkos, and not only there, do have an ideology as to why they want children, they must also have a corresponding strategy. And this makes the second important result of the author's research and his contribution to a better understanding of the subject matter of population increase.

However, before elaborating on that is to be noted that the author has also considered the historical causes of population change in Székely land and drawn conclusions from them as to the present.

In his book on a village of border guard soldiers, Professor Ákos Egyed mentions that the main function of the village, besides carrying the burden of military service, was – and this was similar in Szentdomonkos – to "provide a framework for agriculture and animal husbandry... and reproduce the community. The *population of the military village* practically *multiplied*..." (Italics by the author.) It might be another piece of important information that the "border guard was not allowed to sell his property without the permission of his superiors". This probably meant that there was control imposed over the living conditions and obligations. The author argues that these data indirectly indicate the presence of birth control, and the preservation and motivation of natural population growth. The obligation of "collective military service" that, according to the records, Hungarian kings introduced as early as the 12th century, the obligation of the "reproduction of the community", and the right to free leasehold were all related and had not only political and economic but also demographic consequences.

Concerning population strategy, it is not a sign of exaggeration or grandomania to use the popular term, *strategy*, with respect to a society and its life that had to put up with so much prejudice in the past. One could even venture to say that in peasant society, although not dogmatically, the term strategy can seem more apt than in some of the conceited, highly organized living conditions controlled by educated professionals. One can argue that the autonomous, introverted peasant society, which in many respects was believed a closed society, developed a permanent and stable operational system for the preservation of their life and existence, an operational model, a set of norms, and limited individual action and freedom. The culture of the customs of peasant community developed from this shared internal will and objectives. The author considers this a particular legal system that regulated almost all of the actions of its members by attaching affirmative and prohibitive tags to them.

In other words, peasant society did have laws in the legal sense, and "internal politics" in a political sense. Offences were sanctioned according to their customs, that is, their peculiar laws and "politics".

These reflections of ethnographic character aim at revealing a modern and useful trait: that peasant society developed a rather complex "child policy" and

"demographic policy", and maintained them across its whole culture and not only in a few narrow and occasionally surfacing fields as it happens in present-day society. It is important to point out that all this operated and became established under the guise of tradition. This meant that the whole system was put in perspective, which contributed to guaranteeing its successful operation. The peasant was socially, economically, and existentially interested in making it work, he realised this, and acted in accordance. It is outstandingly exemplary that, by its presence in the cultural, moral and religious context, the issue of procreation, child bearing, and the nurturing of children was naturally present in the people's everyday life and consciousness. It became a sheer necessity similar to any other everyday and constant essential element of life.

Accordingly, the *peasant model*, which considers the issue of population increase a complex system, can serve as an *essential and fundamental lesson* for today's society. It is the acknowledgement of the fact that *population increase is a constant and collective (social) issue that involves and affects everybody.* The members of a community can relate to it neither distantly nor with indifference or cynicism. The views on infertility and the "accounting for" one's infertility before the public opinion of the village can serve as interesting examples in this respect. Quite frequently, infertility was considered a milder crime and, in part, it is often categorized as such even today. Just as childbirth, infertility was an issue and a problem to the individual and the community at the same time. It was not acknowledged without fuss in the family or on the level of the village. Both female infertility and male sterility were disparaged and seen as shameful, and induced abortion was morally condemned. Instead of not having children at all, it actually happened that the husband overlooked an extramarital affair if that was how the woman could "find the seed".

The strategy of having a child at all costs is the answer to the problem of infertility. The author could have hardly found closer agreement between ideal and actual efforts than between the problems of his interviewees and those of the heroes of fairy tales.

The counterpart of the woman of Szentdomonkos who attends the parish feast, vows fast and the ninth, prays for pregnancy and does hydrotherapy, is the poor woman of the tales who prays as follows: "Oh, my Lord, my God," she sighs, "grant me but a little child, as big as a bean, and I shall praise you until I die." This is how the want of a child could result in the birth of Babszem Jankó (hero of a folktale similar to Tom Thumb), the Snake Prince and many others, who were all conceived in a state of intensive yearning for a child. "The queen raised her hands toward the skies and said: 'Dear God, why am I not worthy of having a child? If you don't want to grant me a child, grant me at least a little snake, so that I could have an offspring of my own."

The answers of the interviewees in Szentdomonkos have revealed that not the birth of children but childlessness put the family in danger. The Hungarian proverb, literally translated as "I have a slice of bread in more" has the same

message. It not only means that one has a child but, with pre-Christian symbolism, it is also a beautiful metaphor of blessing and growth. Babszem Jankó brings not more poverty into poverty but riches, he does not reduce the family to poverty, as we can so often hear it today, but lifts it up. The family begins to prosper: "Jankó surprises his father, who has been ploughing with two sickly oxen, with six ox-carts." He "pulls the cart out of the mud" (what a finely dramatised metaphor!), and then assumes a mission: has a mace made from twelve carts of iron and goes off to fight the world. He returns to his old parents (remember the motivations of the people in Szentdomonkos) who now live in a castle but it is still their son who gives them real delight. And pride, too!

At the question of a lord "Who is driving the ox, who is ploughing, who is cracking the whip ..., who is responsible for all this wonder?", the old man answers: "Well, my lord, just *my son*, Babszem Jankó! ..."

These were only a few examples of what a great joy a child means is in Szentdomonkos and, in fact, through the message of folk tales, in Hungarian peasant thinking in general. It is thanks to them that life assumes a meaning in the life of several folk tale heroes who make a tenacious effort – both actually and spiritually – to have this joy at last.

Ilona Budai (protagonist of a ballad) and other similar women raise another issue: a peculiar interpretation of freedom. One does not necessarily have to live in a traditional community in order to see how having or not having a child changes the way society (community) regards a woman. This was a factor indeed that shaped the community's and society's judgement of human quality.

The woman who rejects her child, while it is in an embryonic state, shares the fate of Ilona Budai, Beautiful Kata Bán, the Heartless Mother etc. who all leave their children. Ilona Budai, who is free to decide between child and money, comes face to face not with another hero in the ballad but a crucial situation of the human existence. Her situation entails an existential question. She realises the inferiority of her existence as a person and a mother and of her instincts for the first time when she sees a bison carrying a calf among her horns: "My God, my dear God! / A beast, a beast of spirit". Subsequently, both her outer and inner worlds become empty and fall apart: "I have become like a tree by the road / Whoever passes me, cripples my limbs / Cripples my limbs and tramples them in the mud."

According to the view characteristic of ballads (which is neither national nor popular but universal), the physical and human beauty of a woman looses its worth when she is fruitless.

The women in Szentdomonkos considered abortion a sin, even when performed right after conception. Their logic, just as the logic of traditional Japanese culture, is simple: the first minute, the first hour, the first day is a part of the nine months. An embryo counts as an individual life since the very first moment of its inception.

The sack is not opened for the sake of just one piece of grain, says a proverb. This is another strategy. The birth of a child achieved at all costs is a special situa-

tion. In the peasant society of Székely land (and not only there) the refusal of having just one child was a question of principle. The meaning of the proverb is clear: we want more children.

The four-child model in Szentdomonkos – one for the mother, one for the mother, one for the homeland, one for death – and the three-child model of the tales are answers to real individual, family and social needs: the security of the parents (see several motives above), the needs of one's homeland and nation, which are not necessarily to be understood in a heroic sense. Today one's homeland needs excellent teachers, professors, priests, doctors, engineers, scientists, artists, statesmen, politicians and skilled workers. In order to become one, the "talented child" has to leave his home and take upon a mission outside the family, as does the third son in the tales. His mission is to establish contacts with other communities or distant relatives, exchange goods, make a fortune, gather knowledge and gain experience, marry, and, finally, return home, from where he started out and where he can put his experiences to the use. The example of Babszem Jankó proves how much this is so.

One day, Babszem Jankó says to his mother: "I can see now, mother, I must leave. I shall go and see the world... His mother tells him in vain: 'Don't go my son anywhere!', Babszem Jankó keeps on repeating that he must leave." Later, when he meets a man, he answers at his question: "*I am off to see the world.*" (Italics by the author.)

In other tales, the parents regard their son(s)'s request as natural, without detaining him, they pack food for him (biscuits baked in ashes), and let him go. There is scarcely no trace of emotional farewell present, there are no words of advice encouraging him to return, and the thought of definitive leaving does not even occur, since his return is taken for granted.

In other words, the wisdom of the peasants' way of looking at society, which in real life becomes tangible in their customs and, in the tales, in the wishes, proverbs etc., is that somebody has to stay at home (with the parents) to secure the family's, the basic unit's security, while somebody has to leave in order to develop and maintain new associations, social structures, alliances, and interest and professional groups. The pool of children, the qualities and reserves of man supply guarantee the qualities of those who leave, their mental and physical strength (which automatically reminds the author of the designers and builders etc. of the Hungarian pavilion at the Hannover World Fair). The token of quality is quantitative child supply. A community (family, village, nation) can only be effective and successful if there is a chance for selection, if there is a surplus of supply. Otherwise, the pressure of the selection of the least fit and its defensive logic starts functioning. If there is no son who could leave, the family becomes isolated. If there is only one son and he leaves, the parents will not have anybody to support them.

It is known that talented, able and fit-for-life children of balanced personality come from where, with a hunt of exaggeration, "they are so numerous as the

holes in a riddle or even more". Yet, this situation, as described in a tale, did not bring about ruin or despair.

The author's research has expressly revealed a message of folk culture and popular society model: only that nation can meet the challenges of today's ever complex world that reproduces and increases its human resources both quantitatively and qualitatively. When, with every year, increasingly more stop than start working it generates first latent and then erupting anguish with strain praying on the individual's psyche and then emerging on the level of society.

It is still another strategy, although it may clearly seem inhuman according to current public opinion, that the peasant society – that of Székely land for certain – sought to ensure the human resources of society through the abundance of supply, while today it has become a task of health service. It is in this context that one can understand the "one child for death" part of the family planning model in Szentdomonkos. In other words, community guaranteed that society was in good shape through natural selection. They healed the sick children and those who were born sick (see the stunning accomplishments of popular medicine) but they did not necessarily save those "unfit for life", they did not standardize death as we do today, and they often had to face the death of their babies.

Who has no child has neither joy nor sorrow, says a saying. Child strategy is related to one's emotional life. "Neither delight nor sorrow" hints an equal chance for both, accepts both, and endorses the dialectic of emotions. It formulates the real harmony of joy and sorrow in the negative, and indicates that the child is one of the sources of the universal need of humans for joy.

It has been mentioned that a peasant needs children so that somebody could inherit, take over, and further expand his fortune and estate. This expresses a life philosophy of economic nature, which is, in fact, an indirect version of the peasant's survival strategy. In essence it means that one has to have reserves and thereby prevent unexpected blows that may primarily strike from the outside. There are at least two conditions to this: long-term planning and a guarantee that one's property gathered with pain would not fall into the hands of a stranger. Occasionally, the guarantee that the property would be "in good hands" was even more important than having a person to nurse the old parents. This derives from the traditional peasant attitude to work, according to which work and its achievements are factors that influence human qualities and hierarchy, and from the moral commandment that the value produced by work have to be appreciated. The peasant family, with its distinct life, can be considered a miniature model of a people, a country, or a nation: the heads of the family, the parents, have to ensure survival and subsistence, and guarantee that the fortune and the estate of the family will have owners and heirs.

The author believes that the presence of children in many genres of folk culture and that the community finds it important and necessary to care for and educate children are other manifestations of the strategy of child cult. There are a lot of customs, rites, poetry, beliefs and magic practices etc. that conduct positive "pro-

paganda" for children, childbirth, and family. A similar notion is present in the folklore of other European peoples as well. This culture takes a position against the currently growing tide, popularised by the media, suggesting that only misery and distress awaits the children of today. This is the essence of the tale entitled "Daftville". The people of a nearby village name a place Daftville because its people, since their babies will have to die once, always start crying when children are born. The metaphor is clear, there is no need to go into detail about its more general interpretation. It is just to hope that Hungarians will never have to suffer from the same stigma.

In conclusion, it is to be pointed out that the author seeks not to force an obsolete culture onto the present but to introduce that culture's energy-generating mentality. He believes that the fundamental questions on human existence have not changed, and the human, individual, national motives of life have also remained the same. It is the attitude toward them that is damaged, transformed, and changed.

The author finds that returning to a model that is anachronistic in several respects can still be a solution to the problems of population growth. He believes that his reflections do not offer a solution in themselves but only as a part of a macro system of solutions, the development of which he considers pressing.

He believes that the ideals, spirituality, faith, moral standards, legal customs, optimistic world view and, last but not least, the pragmatism of peasant culture (that reflects a continuity of existence and an ideal built on human relations and the mutuality of family members and can thus better ward off all perils), can truly be a life philosophy offering security and progress to modern-day Hungarians. Naturally, in a different dimension and interpretation, but society would only have to find the keys of convertibility.

Tradition, which protects and transmits shared values and scales of values – and today's people, with all the insecurities, can feel this more intensely than ever before – means not only insistence on the past, as some may believe, but a safety net of communities against outside, alien, and adapted threats that erode our culture and attitude to life and devalue one's humanity.

Minority Culture

Minority Culture

János Péntek

The Present and Future Prospects of Hungarian Higher Education in Romania[1]

The survey of Hungarian higher education institutions, types of training and specialisation in Romania was compiled before the end of 2003. Partly because of its findings and partly in the light of the general quantitative and qualitative features of Hungary education in Romania, it is timely and necessary to draw the attention of the Romanian and Hungarian bodies and responsible officials concerned to the alarming symptoms of the present situation and certain, already perceptible future trends. At the same time, the author wishes to propose for consideration urgent steps and decisions that might be able to prevent further unfavourable developments.

The first version of the survey did not aim at comprehensiveness: it did not cover (nearly) absent but necessary specialisations, postgraduate (masters and Ph.D.) training, the workshops and institutions of scientific research, the infrastructure, or the support institutions. Yet, enough data is available on them from the descriptions of the given institutions to make it safe to comment on their content-related and professional problems. The author is aware that the opinion set out here, although makes an effort to be objective, is surely not free of subjectivity, mistakes, or deficiencies. However, the only purpose of this study is to start off a discussion and hopefully inspire favourable processes in harmony with the interests of the community. Recent accomplishments and the undeniable expansion are mentioned neither in detail nor ostentatiously. Yet, this does not mean that they are disregarded and should not suggest that the generous work and exceptional merits of some of our colleagues and a few public figures is not acknowledged.

As this study aims at pointing out orders of magnitude, proportions, content and quality indicators, and perceptible trends, no references are made to the publicly available accurate and detailed statistical figures and sources. Furthermore, the study focuses on internal processes and phenomena by analysing the responsibilities and opportunities of the heads, officials, and professors of the Hungarian institutions Instead of trying to find excuses and answers in educational policy in general. By doing so, it seeks to make up for the nearly total absence of analyses of similar character. The ones available usually provide detailed descriptions but pay little attention at processes and problems. And, from among the causes, they normally refer to two – demographic decrease and Romanian educational policy – which people often acknowledge with a sense of fatalism and thereby turning out of our reach.

[1] The paper was presented in a lecture introducing a discussion at the meeting of the heads of Hungarian higher educational institutions in Kolozsvár (Cluj Napoca) on 5 March 2004.

Analysis of the present situation

1. The institutional network, considered Hungarian higher-education network in Romania on the basis of the dominant language of education, is extremely heterogeneous with respect to the institutions' status, size, traditions, professional weight, financing, and other factors. It is undoubtedly a positive development that, although with delay, the wave of differentiation and the increasingly more mass educational character of European higher education have appeared within this network. This was due not to natural economic and social demands but primarily to freedom – that one was free at last to leave the narrow frameworks and the pressure of the centralized and ideological state control behind. The disappearance of exclusive state control over education is a wonderful experience and opportunity for minority communities but it does not offset the deficiency or failure deriving from the unsuccessful efforts to establish an independent Hungarian public university. One can only regret how much the implicitly accepted principle of the foundation of new institutions has been damaged. According to it, a new specialisation should remedy a deficiency and, therefore, have a complementary character; furthermore, the new features should not weaken the already established positions. Unfortunately, this principle has been ignored in practice.

The network's general feature is the uncertain and vulnerable situation of its institutions: the network has acquired a status neither legally, neither in permanent professional accreditation nor in the budget which could ensure its relative independence. Naturally, university and institutional autonomy is not of an absolute character anywhere, but, in this respect, Hungarian higher educational institutions in Romania are much below any desirable standard. This greatly restricts the scope for action and reduces their responsibilities of the heads of institutions. In public institutions, basic level financing is relatively secure but this means less independence from the mother institution and, professionally, from the Romanian colleagues. Although financing is of a higher level in foundation, ecclesiastic institutions and institutions of other status, it is also uncertain. Moreover, since this financing is of a political background and mediation, the teachers are exposed to political influence and ecclesiastic control, which can also influence professional choices and assessment. Uncertainty and vulnerability are also enhanced in these institutions by the ongoing accreditation process of faculties and institutions, and the difficulties of obtaining a licence for launching specialisations and courses. This provisional character might even encourage quality in the framework of rule of law free from ideological prejudice, but in view of the Romanian circumstances, it is more of a demoralizing factor.

2. Parallel to the dramatic expansion of higher education, Hungarian public education is in a steady regress. Despite the expansion of the institutional structure, the improvement of the status of Hungarian education and the continuous assistance from Hungary, the percentage of students doing a Hungarian secondary

school-leaving examination dropped below the national average in the second half of the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the Hungarian population in Transylvania was first among the Romanian ethnic minorities in this respect (and 9th as regards university qualification), while today little more that 40% of the students reach this level (note that this is a percentage value, which is in no relation with the demographic decrease!). Due to this drop, the number of those who do the secondary school-leaving examination in Hungarian (about 6000) has approached the admissions margin of higher education, so there is no chance for a quantitative expansion of higher education in the next 3–4 years. Therefore, the reserves of qualitative development also become scanty in lack of a selective background.[2] At present, approximately 30–40% of the Hungarian-speaking students in higher education (about 8–10,000 students out of 25,000) receive Hungarian-language education in this framework. Despite the striking expansion of the past years, this percentage, when compared to international figures, is very low: it is not only far below the Finnish, the international front runners, but also Hungarian figures. (Hungary has about 10 million inhabitants, out of which 400,000 people study in higher education. This would infer not 25,000 students in the case of the 1.5 million Transylvanian Hungarians that we have at present, but 60,000 students at least. As for the Romanian proportions: in the 2001–2002 school year 570,000 people studied in higher education out of a population of 22 million. This proportion would correspond to 40,000 higher education students in the case of the Hungarian minority. The shortfall is therefore 15,000 as compared to the Romanian and 35,000 to the Hungarian average. Let's put this differently: the number of students in higher education is 40 for every 1000 inhabitants in Hungary, 26 in Romania and 15.5 among the Hungarian minority in Romania.)[3] This obvious shortfall indicates fewer opportunities at home, and motivates many young people, especially those who live close to the border, to continue their studies in Hungary.

One must not forget what experiences also reveal: one fourth of the young people go on to the institutions of Hungarian higher education every year. Yet, this not necessarily the best one fourth, since the continuation of one's studies is currently motivated not by abilities and personal ambition but by money and family background.

[2] According to a statistical figure (not verified by the author), the number of those who could have made it into the institutions of Hungarian higher education at the 2003 entrance exams exceeded that of those who passed the school-leaving exam in Hungarian in the same year. This is plausible, since there are distance learning courses and further education that usually attract graduates. There are others (and, hopefully, there will be increasingly more of them) who do the school-leaving exam in Romanian and continue the university in Hungarian, and still others who enrol to the Hungarian department of e.g. the Babeş–Bolyai University without knowing any Hungarian (however, this involves the danger of the department loosing its Hungarian character linguistically, which would damage its very substance).

[3] The figures on Romania were published by the Ministry of Education in: *The present time in the education of national minorities in Romania. Achievements in the 2001–2002 school year and perspectives* (10–11. p.).

In addition, there is another essential figure: there are about 600 teachers in Hungarian higher education but, due to their young age or the discriminative character of the system, only less than half of them have some scientific record (usually a Ph.D. degree).[4] The professional recognition of Hungarian teachers is all the more difficult because the system, which, in conformity with European standards, is becoming increasingly standardized in Romania with respect to the assessment of publications, almost completely ignores Hungarian-language periodicals and publishers. This is especially disadvantageous for young researchers in the fields with the greatest number of Hungarian-language publications: in humanities and social sciences.

The small community of teachers is constrained to commute because of the low and unequal wages and unnecessary duplication, which also loosen educational discipline. Therefore, one can already conclude that the former positions of Hungarian higher education weakened parallel to or as a result of expansion. This is a negative phenomenon not only because of the overwork and commuting required of the teaching staff but also because it leads to overproduction at certain faculties entailing potential difficulties of retraining to related fields in future.

3. Despite its remarkable expansion, differentiation, and diversification, the Hungarian-language education is still extremely restricted and distorted with respect to its selection of faculties. This is one of the reasons why the majority of Hungarian youth are still constrained to study in Romanian. Most striking are the deficiencies that persist in agrarian specialisations, and in the fields of economy, law, and engineering. Due to the distorted nature of the present range of faculties, the situation of natural sciences is on the decline as well. Regarding the fields of theology, humanities, pedagogy and health care, the range of faculties is relatively full. Oversupply and quantitatively excessive training can emerge in certain fields, which can truly become a risk factor if a student only takes up one major. In general, the situation is better in branches that offer prospects of a less secure livelihood as opposed to the fields that ensure one more security socially and professionally.

4. The present institutional network, which under no circumstances can be considered a system, has evolved through the political decisions and local initiatives in a way that professional considerations hardly had a chance to get across. Furthermore, due to a lack of institutional autonomy, this network is still easily influ-

[4] Decline and the weakening of positions continued in certain public institutions. At the Kolozsvár Art Academy, where one third of the students are Hungarian, a Hungarian department would have had great prospects ten years ago. Out of the former 70 Hungarian professors it only has 5 at present. At the Music Academy, with the retirement of renowned Hungarian professors, there are only one or two young Hungarian teachers left. The former position of the Hungarian faculty (mainly including professors) at the Medical University in Marosvásárhely (Targu Mures) has eroded, and the signs of decline can be demonstrated and perceived at the Babeş–Bolyai University as well.

enced and manipulated from the outside. The forums of various levels express the interests of the individual institutions, groups of professors, or local lobby groups. At the same time, no body exists that would impartially represent overall professional requirements, the prospective demands of the ethnic community and the interests of the youth and their parents, and formulate all these in the form of recommendations. Minimum control and the lack of coordination or, at least, wise insights, results in a general frittering away of intellectual and educational resources in duplications in training of dubious value. Based on the above-mentioned survey on higher education, the institutional and training framework of teacher training seems absolutely chaotic (training is conducted at distant learning and correspondence courses, at the Romanian public university which has no Hungarian department, at the levels of secondary and tertiary education, in one- or two-major systems, in seven cities and at ten institutions). Unfortunately, it is real substance that gets lost in this chaotic abundance: the thorough training of kindergarten and primary school teachers for a most exacting teaching career. The consequences of this situation can already be felt in so far as students lack most necessary knowledge and skills in orthography, creative writing, and reading comprehension. At the same time, the choice of fashionable courses offered in several institutions (and, occasionally, in a one major system), such as public relations and communication, seems accidental and, with respect to the future of the students, risky. The author believes it is unjustified to make certain elite fields, such as philosophy and sociology, part of mass education and offer them at several institutions (or even at distance learning courses!). It should be considered whether the introduction of the one-major system is desirable in journalism and political science.

Parallel structures are also present in the operation of support institutions. Accordingto the author, it was not necessarily wise to establish an independent lecture note publisher at Sapientia, when such a workshop has been successfully operating and supplying every higher education institution in the framework of the Transylvanian Textbook Council (Erdélyi Tankönyvtanács). Furthermore, research workshops, "institutes", and other support institutions related to higher education are also scattered almost beyond comprehension. From this chaotic situation, "suspicious" groups and manoeuvring individuals can profit, while the professionally trustworthy workshops have only to lose. The support institutions that, parallel to the Bolyai Társaság, have undertaken the mediation of assistance available for the Hungarian instructors of public universities through tenders, are increasingly becoming each others' rivals.

5. Consequently, the individual regional centres narrow-mindedly compete each other, many outside "guardians" interfere unwarranted in the everyday life of the institutions, the foundation schools confront public universities, unnecessary parallelisms are created, and there is rash "overproduction" of graduates in certain fields that do not offer competitive skills for real life. The gradually evolving multi-

polarity of higher education establishes the foundations of an unhealthy professional rivalry, which, in turn, leads to elbowing. Increasingly more would like to have a share of the available financial sources, external or internal budgetary appropriations, and assistance. However, money pushes the rational professional considerations into the background, it weakens what it should, in fact, strengthen, it produces significant and unjustified disproportionateness in the wages, and lures even the most sober of people to do things that cause harm to the common cause. Rashness and the dissipation of intellectual capacities results in an irrational use of the scarce financial resources, rivalry instead of healthy competition, allurement instead of the appreciation of the teaching staff, servility instead of the performance oriented motivation of the students, and feudal respect for authority instead of open mentality. The lack of discipline and responsibility is primarily related to these phenomena, which have been on the mind of the Hungarian public opinion in Romania for some time with good reason. These developments can devalue Hungarian higher education with respect to that available in Hungary or in Romanian.

6. As a development, one could justifiably call historic, the new higher educational institutions have produced intellectual urbanization in some regions and townships important for Hungarian language and culture. However, it is still unsure and dubious how the faculties and departments of the geographically far institutional units will be successfully set up. The arrangement and running of the professional and personal relations and the internal university network seems an even more complicated task. The less centralised character of Hungarian higher education can bring about the provincialisation of the new institutions, which can have far-reaching consequences. Opinions and efforts questioning the central role of Kolozsvár are increasingly prevalent, with some preferring to establish the new centre of Hungarian higher education in Transylvania in Marosvásárhely. An independent public university in Kolozsvár could have been a true institutional and intellectual centre. It seems that, in lack of independent departments, the present university in Kolozsvár will perform this role increasingly less, while, for Sapientia, it is a problem in itself just to overcome its own internal problems. Unprincipled and rash rivalry can further disarrange institutional relations.

7. As regards Hungarian higher education in Romania as a whole, it is rather alarming that primarily and to an increasing extent external factors determine the choice of profession and specialisation of the youth: the courses offered by the local institution, the easiness of being admitted (preferably without an entrance examination), a chance for a diploma with little intellectual effort and at the lowest possible cost, the fashionable character of a given specialisation, etc. Fundamental factors, such as the skills and interests of the student, or the security of livelihood that a specialisation can offer, have become secondary. Due to this, there were no Hungarian applicants in the past years for such important majors (or

major combinations) as physics–chemistry, biochemistry, and mathematics–physics. Moreover, although these have an excellent educational background, closing them down has become a real possibility. The "emergency measure" applied in 2003, the enrolment of a few students who do not speak Hungarian at the Hungarian department in Kolozsvár, entails different risks.

Right now it is obvious that not the principles of demand and supply determine development. Instead, distorted supply and local training opportunities drive the students toward forced paths. Hardly any apply to the more difficult natural science majors, which would, however, offer great career prospects. At the same time, there are masses enrolling to the softer social science majors or those that promise some kind of a "missionary" activity with respect to their own communities. There are more general questions, which concern higher education in Romania as a whole: to what extent will the diplomas obtained in the present system be authentic and equivalent to others, and what opportunities can the acquired knowledge ensure amongst the competitive circumstances of market economy?

Expected development of external factors and conditions

Apart from educational policy, which is expected to be unpredictable in the next five years, Hungarian education in Romania as a whole, including higher education, might have one more, perhaps last chance due to the following changes:

1. Ten-grade education, which is soon to become obligatory, can improve the situation of public education as a whole. It can help decrease the drop-out rate, increase the prestige of education and knowledge, and can significantly improve the proportion of students who do a secondary school-leaving exam. This latter figure should reach Hungary's 70% rate and, despite the demographic bottom, thereby increase the number of students applying to tertiary institutions by 3–4,000 students per year. This pool can be a main quantitative and qualitative reserve for higher education.

2. Another factor that might improve the prestige of education and learning is the educational assistance that, in compliance with the Status Law, is due to every student studying in Hungarian. Assistance programmes and tenders that were announced for talented students in a disadvantageous situation socially and as regards their linguistic environment can also be encouraging.

3. In accordance with international expectations, the general structural reform of higher education takes place in conformity with the common European model: the institutions will have to comply with an evolving multi-stage education.

The creation of great integrated structures is expected in certain centres in the near future, and the place and relative autonomy of Hungarian institutions will have to be found within these. This can influence – threaten or improve – the situa-

tion of the institutions of the most important centres: Kolozsvár, Marosvásárhely, and Nagyvárad (Oradea).

The standardization of the assessment system of publications is also likely to continue. The chances for publication in Hungary, as they count as international publications, can be an advantage. At the same time, however, the prestige of publishers and periodicals in Romania and the value of their publications can diminish if the responsible Romanian forum rejects them.

4. Accession to the European Union can have an enormous impact. Its influence will be felt in Hungary starting from 2004, and, as Hungarian higher education in Romania depends on that of the mother country to a great extent, the changes will affect several Hungarian minority regions. Romania is also expected to join the EU in a few years, which will bring about further positive and negative consequences. It is likely that studying and, even more so, working and living in Hungary and the EU will become more attractive to the young people. Furthermore, it cannot be ignored that competition caused by foreign and not easily accessible higher educational institutions in the European area or their branches in Romania will intensify and become more open.

Vision and strategy

Strategy planning and the formulation of a vision is not the duty of this paper. However, the interests of the national community, the youth and our future make it urgent for us to outline both strategy and vision with an understanding of each other's opinion. Or, at least, with an effort to cooperation. Not the far away future is what counts here. When we refer to the pressing of time, it is not because of the advanced age of my generation. We do not have such a hard time any more. But, with the expected twists and turns, the young people, our children, will not find it easy at all to strike roots and stay here.

It is useless and pointless to talk about strategy if we consider everything that happens to us as an act of fate of minority life. Moreover, it is advisable to separate the problems that can be dealt with relatively autonomously (e.g. the question of quality) from those that would require a comprehensive transformation on the level of national educational policy and from those that derive from the even more general European and Integration processes. This new approach entails that we cannot continue to assign responsibility to others.

1. The present situation justifies the question: What is the reason for the basically general lack of coordination and planning in the development and operation of Hungarian higher education? Everything suggests that we dragging along the chaotic "development" path with a delay of five or six years, characteristic of the whole of Romanian higher education. The only difference is that in our case there is no authority or forum from which one could expect professionalism and the rep-

resentation of common interests. (This is evidently not in the interest of the Romanian educational authority, while the existing Hungarian bodies of educational policy are powerless individually.) One has the feeling that the decisions, which in the end proved to be long-term ones and, at times, tragic, have been determined exclusively with an eye to local interests or the interests of individuals, groups, or current policy. There has been no reaction whatsoever to the well-meaning and repeated calls for coordination by the Bolyai Society and the Centurion Society. The heads of institutions could only be brought around for continuous consultation and coordination by a respected professional body, which, independent of all interests, would play a supervisory role with its opinions and recommendations, and would have enough weight to influence both the decision-makers and supporters in Hungary and the key figures of Hungarian higher education in Romania. In the processes toward mass education and differentiation, the preservation of quality is a general problem in European higher educational institutions. The integration initiatives, the introduction of the credit system, the accreditation requirements and quality control, and the adoption and observation of common models all aim at ensuring quality.

The institutional system of higher education in Romania can only be developed as a whole. Every new idea should be coordinated with the existing structures, and uniformly high standards should be established for both teaching staff and students. Otherwise, in lack of continuous coordination and wise considerateness, it becomes a real risk that Hungarian higher education in Transylvania is relegated into complete provincialism.

2. The development and effectiveness of the true autonomy of universities has to be promoted, the financial stability of the institutions has to be ensured, and the important, high-level quality faculties and courses have to be assisted in every possible way so that they could obtain the security offered by accreditation. However, any effort is hopeless as long as the principle behind today's insecurity is observed, that is: anybody who provides financial assistance can interfere in the operation of the institutions. It is of utmost importance to have solid and relatively autonomous university institutional units (departments, faculties, independent universities). However, none of this can be achieved without effective political guidance.[5]

It requires further preparations to prevent any damage to Hungarian higher that the upcoming national introduction of the new university model may entail. Hungarian higher education should be able to obtain and maintain its due positions in

[5] Recent elections at Babeş–Bolyai University demonstrated clearly that, in relation to autonomous faculties, the scattered departmental groups (and even the departments) are in a disadvantageous situation when it comes to representation. It was also proved that the years-long common efforts of the teaching staff aiming at autonomous faculties can become uncertain in a second in lack of solid institutional structures.

undergraduate and the postgraduate master and Ph.D. programmes as well. It is to be assumed – not on the basis of resentful suspicion but on that of past experiences – that, under the new system, the Romanian educational authority will attempt to limit Hungarian higher education to undergraduate programmes. It is also a question whether Hungarian families will be able to bear the costs associated with the multi-stage system and the increasingly more general tuitions across Europe. In order to offset this, the master and Ph.D. schools (2nd and 3rd stage) should be designed well in advance. Evidently, this requires more than the efforts and well intentions of those concerned: the effective assistance of educational policy will also be indispensable. Autonomy and modernization are two challenges that can be better met jointly than separately by the institutions.

3. As a long term but gradually obtainable objective, the proportion of Hungarian students doing the school-leaving exam needs to be increased. It should reach 70% per class, with at least two thirds falling to Hungarian public education (given that many continue to study in Romanian). However, since these efforts can only show results in the long term, the number and percentage of the students doing the school-leaving exam is not expected to grow in the next 3–4 years. Not so much in quantitative as in qualitative development, the opportunities of higher education of the close future are connected with the level of public education, the non-obligatory framework of the secondary school cycle, and the prevailing (or not prevailing) policy of equal opportunities. Starting out from these considerations:

a) It is fundamental to raise the standard of Hungarian public education: the lack or inferior level of the first few grades can make the pupils and the parents opt for Romanian education. Primary schools have to be maintained in diaspora and small villages even if the number of children is low. This is essential regarding the future of a given locality.[6] Not only the foundation and opening of new schools have to be made public prior to the beginning of the school year, but the list of closing classes, grades and schools. In each of these cases, the causes and the responsibility of the parties and persons involved have to be examined.

The continuous internal assessment (independent of the educational authority) of the individual Hungarian institutions on the basis of jointly established objective criteria is just as desirable as the publication of the assessment results. This would inform the parents, provide incentives for assistance, and inspire the teaching staff of the schools.

b) Regular talent scouting and talent promotion is needed in the lower grades (in rural neighbourhoods as well!) in the framework of the national school system. The public mood and this system should encourage and assist young tal-

[6] The closing down of a school can entail the abandonment of the village. Therefore, in this sense, its consequences are comparable to those of the conscious destruction of villages

ents and lay an emphasis on the importance of knowledge and learning. A cult of knowledge has to be popularised.

The mother tongue foundations of Hungarian education, the solid place of the Hungarian language among the subjects, and a favourable regard for it are essential conditions for improving the standards. The attitude, which considers not the Romanian language but the basic mother tongue knowledge and culture a burden at school, and seeks to alleviate it, can prove to be catastrophic. As an absurd outcome of this process, one can receive ethnic Hungarian education that is not conducted in Hungarian.

c) It is indispensable to raise the standard of teacher training. For this, suitability requirements have to be taken into account and students have to receive high quality theoretical, especially psychopedagogic and methodological training. The situation of teacher training has to be sorted out as soon as possible, taking the following path: It should be taught full-time in colleges, in a one-major system, with a more limited number of participating institutions and students.
d) It is a task primarily of local self-governments and the county educational authorities to make the teaching profession attractive in the rural environment by ensuring appropriate circumstances, and to provide assistance to the local school and the local teachers' community.
e) The professional and financial assistance of schools that have a Hungarian faculty and diaspora education requires fundamental improvements.

4. The professional body that is to be set up has to analyse the entire existing institutional network: the indicated unnecessary parallelisms, the deficiencies present in the use of intellectual and financial resources, the phenomena of oversupply and undersupply in certain fields, the (nearly) absent but necessary specialisations both in the undergraduate and graduate stages. A survey of (nearly) absent but necessary majors has to be prepared as soon as possible, possibly also indicating which majors taught in Romanian attract Hungarian-speaking youth the most. It would be important to know in detail the actual situation of the majors that are "endangered" despite an appropriate professional background. Similarly, the present opportunities of the master and Ph.D. courses also need to be surveyed (taught not necessarily in Hungarian but by professors who presumably do not discriminate against Hungarian applicants).

Based on the surveys, the responsible body would elaborate its recommendations and strategy as regards future developments covering the following: the rational and resolute basic rearrangement of the present institutional system; the proportion of important courses, élite courses and courses that provide secure livelihood; the assessment of the demands and possibilities of development (demand meaning interests determining the future of the community and not personal ambitions); the rational and pragmatic ranking of all the things that need to be done, etc.

This body should take a stand on discipline and responsibility by elaborating a code of ethics for the teaching staff.

5. Strategy and an effective higher educational system entail one more requirement. This is a condition related to minority policy which determines the situation and the future of the whole minority community: equal opportunities have to be ensured to young Hungarian graduates by providing them posts – appropriate to their qualifications, in accordance with a quota based on the size of the community, and without any restriction and discrimination – in the Romanian higher educational, scientific, cultural, financial, and public administration institutions, decision-making bodies, and the state administration. The disproportionateness that derives from the dominant position of the majority population in the state institutions should end, since, in many cases, not necessarily financial pull factors but the lack of domestic prospects leads to migration.

6. By stressing the need for coordination, we do not argue for centralization. However, we believe that the institutional network can fall apart without a strong base institution. One of the basic objectives of strategy would be not a centralised but a coordinated and harmonised network, which might even operate as a whole of institutions joined together. This paper does not aim at inspiring a debate on which city should host this base institution. It is maybe not due merely to local bias that we believe that intellectually, linguistically, and professionally Kolozsvár continues to offer the most to the Hungarian students who study in Transylvania. However, should Kolozsvár want to remain an intellectual centre with its university atmosphere, scientific institutions, and current professors, the Hungarian character of Kolozsvár needs to be made more attractive. This requires a cosy centre, a dormitory that could be regarded as a second home, where Hungarian students studying at different universities could gather together. It could help the students with foreign language courses, IT services, a reference library, or even with social assistance.

No doubt, the next years will bring new tests and temptations. Significant changes are expected in the life of the institutions and in that of the whole community. However, the fundamental question will persist: what can we offer to the new generations of Hungarian youth in Transylvania, and what can Romanian higher education and the world offer to them?

Those present at the meeting of 5 March 2004 agreed that

1. there is need for continuous consultation and coordination between the heads of institutions;
2. the present paper and the minutes recording the ensuing debate have to be sent out to all heads of institution (especially to those not present), and the head of the various educational bodies;
3. the material has to be published;
4. consultations need to start with academic forums in Hungary on the establishment of an independent advisory council.

Minority Culture

Béla Pomogáts

Hungarian Minority Literature (Hungarian Literature in Transylvania and the Historic Upper Hungary)

National minority and national literature

All European literatures have regional traditions and workshops. The mentality of literature is different in London and Edinburgh, in Berlin and Munich, in Paris and Provence, although in terms of their most important, inherent feature – language –, we always only refer to English, German, or French literatures. Hungarian literature, which, as folkloristic works reveal, has been present in Europe since the Hungarian Conquest (late 9th century) and its written form since the 13th century, has also had its regional traditions. These were different in Transdanubia, always closer to the great currents of European culture as the westernmost province of the country, and in Transylvania, which was constrained to pick up these currents under the influence of eastern domination – the proximity and, for some time, the rule of the Ottoman Empire.

However, Hungarian literature is divided not only by regional differences but also by the fact that, subsequent to the Great War, the peace treaty divided most of the territory of historic Hungary (two thirds of it) among the successor states of Austria-Hungary, annexing one third of the ethnic Hungarian population (3.5 million people) to the neighbouring countries. Accordingly, the formerly homogeneous national literature became a literature of four and then seven countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia – later Slovakia –, Romania, Yugoslavia – later Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and the Soviet Union – later Ukraine). Thereby the "Trianon" system of Hungarian literature was established (as defined by the Treaty of Trianon of 1920). It transformed somewhat following the fall of the Central European Communist regimes and the Soviet satellite state system, and the disintegration of the post-WWI Czechoslovak and Yugoslav formations.

The Hungarian literatures that developed in the successor states of Austria-Hungary are not simply successors of the former regional cultures of Transylvania, Upper Hungary, and the Southern Parts. Not even in the case of Transylvanian Hungarian literature, which had very rich regional traditions (the intellectual legacy of the independent Transylvanian principality of the 16th and 17th centuries) to lean on. Cultural regionalism had at most a complementary role in the evolution and historical development of Hungarian literature in Transylvania, Slovakia (Upper Hungary), and Vojvodina (Southern Parts). As revealed by the literary debates in the three regions, it was due exclusively to historical pressure that the regional programme developed. It was due to this pressure that a literary sys-

tem – literary journals, publishers, and literary societies – had to be developed for the Hungarian communities outside the borders.

The development and running of a system of literary institutions was easiest in Transylvania, given that it had its own cultural and literary traditions dating from the late Middle Ages, and that Transylvanian citles, which had a clear Hungarian majority in the inter-war years (Kolozsvár (Cluj Napoca), Nagyvárad (Oradea), and Marosvásárhely (Targu Mures)), had an extensive Hungarian school system and press and a solid basis of intellectuals. The development of Hungarian culture in Upper Hungary and the Southern Parts required greater efforts even though these too had ancient Hungarian cultural centres: Pozsony (Bratislava), Komárom (Komárno), and Kassa (Kosice) in Upper Hungary and Szabadka (Subotica) the Southern Parts.

In the post-WWII decades exactly these cities lost their Hungarian majority and most of their institutions. Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia all pursued ethnocratic nation strategies of varying intensity and, in conformity with the Communist regimes' administration practices, these strategies never lacked aggressive methods. Resulting from this, the ethnic structure and character of the former Hungarian cities transformed completely.

A polycentric model of Hungarian national literature developed with the presence of minority Hungarian literatures. However, this system is rather different from those polycentric cultures (English, French, German, and Spanish) that are common formations in modern European and universal culture. That is, the general phenomenon of "one language – more nations" lays the basis for universal literary polycentrism of modern world literature and, resulting from this, we can distinguish between the English literatures of Great Britain, Northern America, Canada, Australia and even Africa. Hungarian literature is completely different. The Hungarian literatures of Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, etc. all belong to the literature of one nation: the literature of the Hungarian nation. There is one national literature, just as the historical changes since Trianon did not bring about the development of different Hungarian identities either. On the contrary, every Hungarian community detached from the mother country in 1918–1920 considers itself an authentic part of a Hungarian nation that is homogeneous as regards its language, culture, history, and traditions.

Therefore, the polycentric model of Hungarian literary culture derives from the fact that, beside the literature of the mother country, the ethnic Hungarian minorities also developed their own literatures – not the least to preserve their national identity. (Due to the peace treaties of WWI and WWII, today significant Hungarian national minorities live in several Central European countries: 1.5 million people in Romania, 550,000 In Slovakia, 160,000 in Ukraine, 300,000 in Serbia, 10-15,000 in Croatia, Austria, and Slovenia, altogether about 2.5 million Hungarians – their numbers decreased by 1 million in the past 80 years!) The situation of Hungarian emigrant communities that left for Western states in 1945, 1948, and 1956 is similar: most of them never gave up their Hungarian identity and, possessing a "dual identity", still consider themselves part of the Hungarian nation.

Minority Culture

The minority Hungarian literatures developed in the neighbouring countries after the Trianon decisions had two sources to draw from: regional and universal national literatures. The background of this duality was in part "literary ontological" and, in part, literary historical. On the one hand, Hungarian minority literatures relied on their own regional traditions, since these traditions – the historical and cultural traditions of Kolozsvár, Nagyvárad, Marosvásárhely, Pozsony, Kassa, and Szabadka – offered solid resources. The richer they were the more natural the foundation of minority literatures could be. On the other hand, the whole of Hungarian literary tradition and contemporary literature in Hungary played a fundamental role in the early stages and the development of Hungarian minority literatures. Not only the former homogeneous national literature but also the values, endeavours, and institutions brought about by their separate development enriched the new, minority literatures.

Today, Hungarian minority literature in Transylvania (Romania) and Upper Hungary (Slovakia) have a more than eight-decades-long past to look back to. Generations of writers grew up, literary institutions ceased to exist and were revived. These literatures endured years of hardship and struggles during the forty years of Communist dictatorship when, primarily in Transylvania and to a lesser extent in Upper Hungary, one had to fight against the state strategy aiming at liquidating Hungarian national culture and national identity through aggressive means. A new era and new opportunities opened up for minority Hungarian cultures with the transition in Central European politics beginning in 1989–1990. The democratic transformations provided for the freedom of literature and the renewal of the institutional system, although they were not enough to ensure the conditions of a solid perfection of minority literatures. A new era has begun for Hungarian literatures of both Transylvania and Upper Hungary which are now in a closer relationship with the literary world of Hungary and enrich national literature with valuable new works: works also worthy of the attention of European audience.

Hungarian literature in Transylvania

Hungarian literature went through considerable changes in the past 15–20 years. First, the earlier realistic narrative style has been substituted by narration based on the approach of post-modern literature. This rendered the traditional viewpoint of the narrator, formerly defined primarily by the intent of depicting and interpreting historical and social reality, more personal and relative. Second, the traditional community–nation testimonial and missionary character of Hungarian literature gave way to a more meditative, philosophical mentality. These changes are perceptible in the works of Miklós Mészöly, György Konrád, Imre Kertész, Péter Nádas, and Péter Esterházy, several of which have attracted the attention of the European audience.

No similar fundamental changes have occurred in Transylvanian (and, in general, minority) Hungarian literature, although the post-modern literary transformation

of the late 20th century did leave its mark on them as well. Transylvanian Hungarian literature hardly broke with its own traditions at all. In fact, after the historical transition starting in 1989, it returned to the traditions developed in the inter-war years by Lajos Áprily, László Tompa, Sándor Reményik, and Jenő Dsida in poetry, Károly Kós, József Nyírő, Sándor Makkai, and Áron Tamási in narrative literature. Accordingly, present-day Transylvanian Hungarian literature can still be placed into a conceptual space defined by cultural regionalism ("Transylvanianness") and universality ("Europeanness"): it draws from regional traditions and experience, but always seeks to put it in a universal perspective and aims to capture European mentality. On the other hand, it also seeks to answer the questions of the national (minority) community and, to accomplish this, it shatters the communication barrier of national rhetoric and reaches perfection in autonomous creation. It was in this sense that the works of poets Sándor Kányádi and András Ferenc Kovács and writers András Sütő and István Szilágyi came to represent the simultaneous presence of commitment toward the community and sovereign creation.

The revolution of Christmas, 1989, which brought an end to the Communist regime in Romania, brought about whole new circumstances in the life of Transylvanian Hungarian literature which had virtually fallen victim to the dictatorship of the 1980s. Then, state censorship, the literature policing administration silenced every sovereign literary opinion and the literary papers were mostly constrained to serve the official propaganda. Under the rather strict control of censorship only one publisher in Bucharest, Kriterion Könyvkiadó, headed by Géza Domokos, managed to preserve Transylvanian Hungarian culture with some success. This proves indeed the courage and perseverance of the director of the publishing house.

The fall of the Ceausescu regime opened the way to an unobstructed operation and perfection of the literary institutional system. The journal *Korunk* (Our Age), published in Kolozsvár since 1926 with columns on social sciences, literature, and the arts and edited by Lajos Kántor, became a true workshop for intellectuals. It took upon the task of interpreting and serving not only Transylvanian culture but also that of all Hungarians. Replacing the *Utunk* (Our Path) literary journal in Kolozsvár, *Helikon*, edited by István Szilágyi, was launched and, as succeeding journal *Igaz Szó* (True Word) in Marosvásárhely, the journal *Látó* (Seer) was also published (edited by Béla Markó and György Gálfalvi). Zsolt Gálfalvi became editor of weekly *Hét* (The Week) in Bucharest and Zsolt Szabó that of *Művelődés* (Culture) in Kolzsvár. They both transformed these magazines into workshops that ensure the cultural advancement of Transylvanian Hungarians. The journal *Székelyföld* was launched in Csíkszereda (Miercurea-Ciuc), a cultural centre of the Székely region in Eastern Transylvania, while the magazine *Várad* was launched in Nagyvárad. Kriterion in Bucharest that had endured decades of struggles received companions as new publishing houses were established: Polis in Kolozsvár, Mentor in Marosvásárhely, Pallas-Akadémia in Csíkszereda. Beyond these, about a dozen enterprises publish books of authors both from Transylvania and Hungary.

Primarily the narrative brought novelties in Transylvanian Hungarian literature, as in the new atmosphere of freedom this genre offered the widest range of opportunities for the exploration and interpretation of reality. Poetry, thanks to its metaphoric formulations, could always testify about the terrible experiences of Transylvanian Hungarians more freely. One of the most renowned writers of Hungarian national literature, András Sütő of Marosvásárhely, has been present in universal Hungarian literature for decades. The "lyric sociography" *Anyám könnyű álmot ígér* (Mother is Promising a Light Dream), published in 1970, was his first literary success. This poetic report of documentary authenticity on the historical hardships of a Transylvanian (Mezőség) Hungarian diaspora community laid the foundations of an entire school: as long as censorship in Bucharest tolerated it, books on the afflictions of Transylvanian Hungarians appeared one after another. Among others, works of biographic and sociographic inspiration by Gyula Szabó and György Beke were published. Following the fall of Communism, Sütő recounted his personal and community experiences in several volumes: *Fülesek és fejszések között* (Among Squealers and Axemen), *Szemet szóért* (Eye for Speech), *Erdélyi változatlanságok* (Immutabilities in Transylvania). A great inspiration of these works was the event when, in the spring of 1990, during the peaceful demonstration of Hungarians in Marosvásárhely, Sütő was seriously wounded by the enraged Romanian counter-demonstrators: he lost one eye.

The tragic experiences of the Transylvanian Hungarian community promoted the development of the genre of the historic novel, which had always been popular in Transylvania (see the works of Károly Kós, József Nyírő, and Sándor Makkai during the inter-war years). Subsequently, Gyula Szabó continued this narrative tradition with his historical novel entitled *A sátán labdái* (Satan's Balls), published in five volumes. The volumes dubbed as "historical reports" describes the painful story of the fall of the Transylvanian principality in the second half of the 17th century. The trilogy of János Pusztai entitled *Tatárjárás* (The Tatar Invasion) also recalls the historical past of Transylvania. It alludes to the hardships of modern-day Transylvanian Hungarians by depicting the destructive events in Hungary at the time of the 13th-century Tatar invasion.

István Szilágyi of Kolozsvár is one of the most outstanding figures of Transylvanian Hungarian literature and, in fact, Hungarian literature in general. He wrote his novel parabola entitled *Agancsbozót* (A Tangle of Antlers) during the Communist regime but it was only published subsequent to its fall. It sets out the dehumanising power of tyranny through the means of the absurd. The heroes of the novel are at the mercy of some power unknown to them, their personalities gradually dissolve under the pressure of aggression, and they only manage to regain their humanity through a desperate revolt. A more recent novel of István Szilágyi, entitled *Hollóidő* (Raven Time), has been widely praised in professional circles. It recalls the Hungarian world of the late 16th century, the age of Ottoman occupation, when, while at the mercy of the alien conquerors, the inhabitants of a small Hungarian market town search for a way of life worthy of human beings. Two

kinds of human behaviour clash in this dramatic historical framework: one professes the rightness of survival, the other that of resistance. This is a typical minority dilemma and, in truth, both approaches can be right. Accordingly, the author seeks not to decide between the two but to depict the absurd operation of history, thereby establishing the novel's historical philosophical message.

The depiction of the past seeks to find a way through the inquiries of the recent past and the present. These questions are raised more directly by the narratives on the experiences of contemporary Transylvanian Hungarian society, the novels of Tibor Bálint, Sándor Fodor, István Sigmond, Mária Kozma, and György Lőrincz. Transylvanian Hungarian literature suffered great losses in the last years of the dictatorship with the migration of several outstanding Transylvanian writers to Hungary, such as György Beke, Pál Bodor, Géza Páskándi, Ádám Bodor, László Csiki, Zoltán Köntös-Szabó, and Attila Vári. They continue to consider themselves Transylvanian Hungarian writers, but their works are published and find their audience in the framework of Hungary's literature.

The narrative tradition has always been strong in Transylvania. Its poetry only came to the forefront in the inter-war years when Transylvanian Hungarian lyric poetry became a mediator of the experiences of a national community forced into minority status. The poetry of the post-WWII years continued this mission, especially with the poets who started their careers in the 50s and 60s. Their poems provide an authentic picture on the hardships of the minority community.

Two poets have to be mentioned from the years preceding 1989; both deceased during the transition years: János Székely and Domokos Szilágyi. János Székely reflected on ethical questions of intellectual life in the 20th century, and, in his poetic world, applied a dramatic view on historical existence. Domokos Szilágyi, who committed suicide at the age of 38, was one of the greatest talents of modern Hungarian poetry. His works started out under the influence of avantguard schools and expressed a desire to live life more fully. Yet, he desired this fuller life in vain in the deceptive world of the dictatorial system. His voice turned more gloomy and, finally, tragic. He was a moralist poet, who tried to protect the endangered moral values through irony, but at last could not but realise that poetry itself, the truth, and sincerity were all far too vulnerable.

One of the most popular and intriguing poetic accomplishments is that of Sándor Kányádi. He complemented the folkloristic and realistic voice aiming at simplicity of his early works with elements of avantguard poetry. Always in tune with his natural calling, he could identify with the community around him and profoundly endure the dramatic experiences and the conflicts of the survival struggle of that community. His poems – for example the poetic rhapsody *Fekete-piros* (Black-Red) on the endangered life of Transylvanian Hungarian diaspora or the poetic requiem *Halottak napja Bécsben* (All Souls' Day in Vienna) mourning over the decay of Hungarians tormented by the events of the 20th century – depict the tragic experiences of the national community with a richness of thoughts and mythological force. Sándor Kányádi is a poet of the nation. At the same time, he is a

European poet in the sense that his poetry has treated the painful tragedies of the 20th century consistently and depicted the intellectual, emotional, and moral horizons of that tragic century with sagacity.

Aladár Lászlóffy of Kolozsvár also sought to interpret the Transylvanian, Hungarian, and European experiences of the past decades: he reflected on the future of human culture, revealed true and lasting values, and recalled orientative messages of the past. The avantguard also influenced his earlier works, but his mature poetry professed the ideals of historic firmness and integrity and the loyalty to the community by classicising the traditions of Transylvanian Hungarian poetry, showing substantial poetic force, and, at times, revealing smart poetic ingenuity. Beside Sándor Kányádi and Aladár Lászlóffy the poetry of the following poets is worthy of attention: Csaba Lászlóffy, László Király, Árpád Farkas, Béla Markó (who has been playing an outstanding role in Romanian political life as the president of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania and deputy prime minister of the government in Bucharest), Emese Egyed, and István Ferenczes.

András Ferenc Kovács is an exceptional figure of younger Transylvanian Hungarian poetry. His works could establish a unity of Transylvanian poetry of the inter-war years, modern Hungarian poetry connected to the journal *Nyugat* (The West), and the traditions and styles of postmodern poetry. He treats words and forms with ease, but his works also express a fear for the fate of Transylvanian Hungarians. He suggests that poetry should provide cure in the solution of the internal conflicts of human personality and human community. János Dénes Orbán, Vince Fekete and Attila Sántha are other great promises of younger Transylvanian Hungarian poetry.

Theatrical traditions in Transylvanian Hungarian culture are greater than those of dramatic literature: Kolozsvár has always been a centre of Hungarian theatrical culture, and Transylvanian intellectual life has traditionally promoted Hungarian drama. In the inter-war years Transylvanian dramatic literature revived, and the plays of Károly Kós, Count Miklós Bánffy, and especially Áron Tamási also achieved success among the audience in Budapest. In the past forty years there were as many as four Transylvanian writers to leave their mark on Hungarian dramatic literature: András Sütő, Géza Páskándi, István Kocsis, and János Székely. Their dramas are usually historical and philosophical parabolas, and almost always depict the nature of tyranny and the inhumanity of defencelessness and vulnerability. On the Hungarian stage especially the historical tragedies of András Sütő *Egy lócsiszár virágvasárnapja* (A Horse Coper's Palm Sunday) and *Csillag a máglyán* (A Bright Star at the Stake) had success.

Hungarian literature in Slovakia

The literature of the former Upper Hungary, annexed to the Czechoslovak state subsequent to WWI, advanced with more difficulty than Transylvanian Hungarian literature. Given its geographic proximity to Budapest and that most of its talent-

ed writers came to settle in the Hungarian capital, the region's Hungarian literary traditions and institutions were much less developed earlier. Yet, historical necessity did bring Hungarian literary institutions to life and started the career of several important writers: among them, the leftist Dezső Győry and a priest of the Premontre Order, László Mécs. Both, although starting out from different political presuppositions, were promoters of militant humanism and clearly turned against the expanding Fascism during WWII. This militant character was also present in the works of Zoltán Fábry, who lived in seclusion in a small mining town near Kassa. He played a prominent role in the protection of minority rights during the times of anti-Hungarian government policy between 1945 and 1948.

It was due exactly to the retorsions applied against the Hungarian minority that Hungarian literature in Slovakia only recovered and found its voice with delay, as late as the 1960s. Then a system of Hungarian cultural and educational institutions developed at last and the younger generations trained in them undertook the cause of Hungarian literature. Institutions were established in Pozsony: the journal *Irodalmi Szemle* (Literary Review) and the publisher Madách Könyvkiadó. After 1989–90 more of them were set up: the literary journal *Kalligram*, the publisher Kalligram, and two other publishers in Dunaszerdahely (Dunajská Streda): Nap and Lilium Aurum. The Society of Hungarian Writers in Slovakia also came to life.

The successes of Slovakian Hungarian narrative literature are connected to Gyula Duba and László Dobos. Gyula Duba began his career with comic works and continued it with sociographic ones, in which he authentically depicted the transformation of Hungarian peasant society in Southern Slovakia. He summarised his personal experiences in his novels *Ívnak a csukák* (The Pikes Are Spawning) and *Örvénylő idő* (Whirling Times). László Dobos played a significant role in public life as minority politician (minister of the Slovak government in 1968) and cultural organiser (first director of publisher Madách Könyvkiadó). As a writer, he had a great impact (comparable to that of Zoltán Fábry) on the self-knowledge of Hungarians in Slovakia. In his novel entitled *Földönfutók* (Outlaws), he recalled the post-WWII retorsions against minorities – the forced resettlement and deportation of the Hungarians of Upper Hungary. His novel, *Egy szál ingben* (In Just a Shirt), was a reflection on the historical ordeals of the Hungarian minority community. In this work, original in its poetic character, he merged the potentials of sociographic "reality literature" and the novel parabola of mythical meaning.

The prose of Lajos Grendel, essentially an original version of postmodern Hungarian narrative literature, has brought novelties to recent Hungarian literature. His novels *Éleslövészet* (Live Firing), *Galeri* (The Gang), and *Áttételek* (Metastases) depict the inner traumas of minority Hungarian society in detail, and also ponder over the experiences and world view of his generation that gained consciousness in the1970s. Later he revealed an inclination toward absurd literature. Besides, he is an excellent short-story writer, a master of all kinds of forms: from the classical short story forms to the stories constructed on paraphrase.

Minority Culture

Similar to Transylvania, poetry reacted more directly to the events of community existence in Upper Hungary as well. This poetry started out with the interpretation of rural society surrounding the Slovakian Hungarian writer in his youth just to arrive at the examination of the philosophical and moral conflicts of people in a modern world. Árpád Tőzsér also recalled the experiences of his childhood spent in the Central Slovakian Gömör (Gemer) region and only then turned to an original interpretation of the Slovakian Hungarian intellectuals' identity. Questions and meditation became dominant in his poems, as revealed by volumes *Történetek Mittel úrról, a gombáról és a magánvalóról* (Stories on Mr Mittel, the Mushroom, and the Noumenon) and *Mittelszolipszizmus* (Mittelsolipsism). The poet examines the characteristics and mental structure of Central European existence (including Hungarian experiences) with objectivity.

László Cselényi, from the same generation, also became a follower of poetic modernity through the poetic depiction of personal experiences. His style merges the structure constructions of the neo-avantguard and the mythical approach, and, in compositions and a language that stylisticly satisfy the requirements of both, he reflects on the historical experiences of Hungarians in Slovakia and his personal realisations. His longer poetic composition entitled *Jelen és történelem* (Present and History), provides a comprehensive overview on the conflicts of minority existence. Sándor Gál, who lives in Kassa (city in Eastern Slovakia), assesses his personal experiences related to minority life and the community experiences of the Hungarians of Southern Slovakia as poet, narrator, sociographer, and essayist. His compilation of interviews, *Mélyutak* (Hollow Roads), provides an analysis on these community experiences. Other poets who should be mentioned are László Tóth and Imre Varga, who moved to Hungary, and László Barak, who lives in Dunaszerdahely. László Barak of Pozsony has produced important works as sociographer and essayist.

Hungarian writers in both Slovakia and Transylvania have been working closely with the literary life of Hungary since the early 1980s. They became members of the Hungarian Writers' Association after 1989, their works have been present in Hungarian journals, the Hungarian publishing industry and the book market, and they have been awarded various cultural prizes by the Republic of Hungary. Transylvanian András Sütő, Aladár Lászlóffy, Domokos Szilágyi, and Slovakian Árpád Tőzsér were decorated with the highest literary honour, the Kossuth Prize, while Transylvanian Samu Benkő and Lajos Kántor were decorated with the highest scientific honour: the Széchenyi Prize. Beside the spiritual unity of the literatures of Hungary and the Hungarian minorities outside the borders, the institutional unity of Hungarian literature has also more or less recovered. This also contributed to the widely demanded "unification of the nation", the realisation of which can be best promoted by European integration.

Minority Culture

Szilvia Szoták

Hungarian as an Endangered Language in Austria with Special Regard to Burgenland Province

On the timeliness of the issue of endangered languages

According to data published by UNESCO, of the world's 6,000 languages 52 percent have fewer than 10,000 speakers, 28 percent fewer 1,000, and 10 percent fewer 100. 83 percent of the languages are spoken within Individual countries and their future depends on the policies of a given government. It is also to note that 49 percent of the world's population speaks one of the ten major languages (English, Spanish, German, French, Arabic, Chinese, etc.)

The issue of endangered languages is not a new phenomenon, yet, it can always be considered timely. Although several languages became extinct in the course of history (Sumerian, Hittite etc.), their decay has never been so dramatic as today. There is no chance to turn the tide, although UNESCO believes that, with good intent, even endangered languages can be saved. There are examples to prove this, though negative examples are far more numerous.

Only eight elderly people spoke the *Ainu* language, also used on the island of Hokkaido, in the late 1980s. With the assistance it has received since, it has been saved from extinction. Irish Gaelic, a Celtic language, was also saved by effective official language policy. Since Irish-language exam has been made a prerequisite of receiving a diploma, the proportion of the population that can speak it increased from 3 to 11 percent.

What is an endangered language?

The category of endangered languages includes languages that have fewer and older speakers of lower social status and esteem, are not taught as a mother-tongue at school, and their domain of use, prestige, and state assistance are diminishing.

Various theories have been elaborated on endangered languages:

Dorian (1980) points out three features of language death:

(a) fewer speakers,

(b) fewer domains of use,

(c) structural simplification.

Krauss (1992) compares languages to endangered biological species and defines three categories:

1) *moribund:* languages no longer being learned as mother-tongue by children;

2) *endangered:* languages which, though now still being learned by children, will – if the present conditions continue – cease to be learned by children during the coming century;
3) *safe:* languages with official state support and very large numbers of speakers (e.g.: English, Spanish, German, French, Arabic, Chinese, etc.).

Fishman uses an eight-stage scale, with the most threatened languages being at stage one: these are used only by socially isolated, old people. Stage two refers to a group that is socially integrated but is beyond child-bearing age, and, at stage three, there are those who master the language only orally, with no literacy.

What can we do to save endangered languages?

This question inspires several further questions and raises numerous problems: Should moribund languages be saved? Should the smallest languages, those with fewer than 100 speakers be saved? Is it necessary to artificially intervene in the life cycle of a language?

Certain researchers, like ***Edwards*** (1985:86), believe that we should do nothing but accept changes in language use (even extinctions) as normal. Languages are born, others become extinct. According to others, especially in the case of a moribund language, it is important to document the language and record as much data as possible. This is the opinion of ***Sarah Gudschinsky*** (1974) who worked with the last known speaker of Ofaié1, and gathered valuable information for linguistics. According to her, it is necessary to gather as much information as possible on moribund languages in order to safeguard linguistic diversity for posterity, expand our knowledge on languages and, last but not least, promote the idea of western philosophies that knowledge in itself is valuable.

Considering the various options, it is necessary to attempt to save the languages and develop programmes for the revival of languages. It should be therefore a priority for science and researchers to document the endangered languages and try to save them or slow down the extinction process. This, to a great extent, depends on the attitude of the individual states and the extent of financial resources available for language salvage. Furthermore, it also depends on the hard work of enthusiastic researchers and the development of effective programmes in harmony with the individual local circumstances. These intervention programmes have to take into consideration the causes of language extinction: the anti-minority policy of a state, which leads to assimilation sooner or later; migration; natural disasters; economic assimilation, etc. It is generally accepted that not only the number of speakers but also their low social status determines the future of a language and turn it into an endangered language. If the social status of its speakers is lower than that of the speakers of the majority language, the prestige of their mother tongue also diminishes. One also has to remember that in the competition of opposing languages the speakers of the surviving language will have more and better social and economic opportunities.

Struggle to prevent the extinction of languages

Around the world, several organisations and research groups work to save languages. ICHEL, FEL and TERRALINGUA are among the most important ones.

ICHEL (International Clearing House for Endangered Languages) was set up as part of the Asian and Pacific Linguistic Department operating under the Intercultural Studies Institute of the University of Tokyo. Its objective is to conduct research on endangered languages around the world and especially in the Asian and Pacific region. Its members do field research and collect, analyse, and convert to electronic format already published and unpublished materials (texts, dictionaries, phonetic materials). They regard the storage of linguistic data in a format (html) accessible to all as their most important task. Their newsletter provides information of their work. ICHEL plays an important role in the coordination of activities[1] and joins forces with every organisation that shares its objectives[2]

The ICHEL database currently contains the following:

- The UNESCO "Red Book on Endangered Languages"[3]
- Corpuses of various languages (texts, fieldwork notes, recordings, etc.),
- text editors,
- fonts necessary for printing texts of various languages.

FEL (The Foundation for Endangered Languages) has a more popular aims: it supports and assists the documentation, safeguarding and promotion of languages, and seeks to raise awareness of the endangered languages through all channels and media. It aims at supporting the use of endangered languages in all contexts (at home, in education, in the media, and in social, cultural and economic life). The organisation monitors linguistic policies and policy decisions, and seeks to influence the appropriate authorities where necessary. It provides not only financial assistance to the documentation of endangered languages but also facilities for training and the publication of results. It collects information on the endangered languages and disseminates it as widely as possible.

TERRALINGUA is an organisation that works for the conservation of linguistic and biocultural diversity. It aims at preserving all forms of the world's linguistic diversity, irrespective of their political, demographic, or linguistic status.

[1] ICHEL has joined forces in the dissemination of knowledge on endangered languages with a worldwide network of endangered languages, which operates under the leadership of Dr T. Matthew Ciolek at the computer centre of the Research School of Asian and Pacific Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra, Australia

[2] Linguistic Society of Japan, Linguistic Society of America, German Linguistic Society, etc.

[3] 'Red Book on Endangered Languages"

The "Red Book"

The Project on Endangered Languages was adopted as a UNESCO Project in 1993. The "Red Book on Endangered Languages" is a comprehensive work that includes every activity related to endangered languages. It is a common project ran with the participation of the various research centres all around the world. Currently, it contains information on numerous languages: on Asia and Pacific languages[4] (compiled by S. A. Wurm and S. Tsuchida), African languages[5] (by B. Heine and M. Brenzinger), South American languages[6], (by Mily Crevels and Willem Adelaar), Northeast Asian languages[7] (by Juha Janhunen and Tapani Salminen), and European languages (Tapani Salminen). Data can be retrieved through the individual research centres, e.g. the data on the endangered languages of Europe are stored in Finland.[8]

The Red Book identifies six categories of languages:[9]

1. **extinct languages** (other than ancient ones): *Gothic, Dalmatian, Cornish, Manx Gaelic, etc.*
2. **nearly extinct languages** with maximally tens of speakers, all elderly: *Judeo-Crimean Tatar, etc.*
3. **seriously endangered languages** with a more substantial number of speakers but practically without children among them: *Vepsian, Leonese, Yiddish, etc.*
4. **endangered languages** with some children speakers at least in part of their range but decreasingly so: *Burgenland Croatian, Irish Gaelic, Scottish Gaelic, etc.*
5. **potentially endangered languages** with a large number of children speakers but without an official or prestigious status: *Corsican, Lombard, etc.*
6. **not endangered languages** with safe transmission of language to new generations: *Croatian, Slovenian, Slovak, Hungarian, German, French, etc.*

On the initiative of Stephen Wurm, Australian professor of Hungarian origin, Tapani Salminen was asked in December 1993 to compile the European section of the UNESCO Red Book on Endangered Languages. The researcher classified the 94 languages in Europe into three groups.

A. 77 autochthonous European languages, including:

a. 25 Finno-Ugrian (Uralic): *Lappish languages: South, Ume, North, Lule, Pite, Inari, Skolt, Kola, Ter, Kildin, Akkala, ...etc.*

[4] www.tooyoo.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/Redbook/AsiaPacific/index/html
[5] www. tooyoo.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/Redbook/Africa/index/html
[6] www. tooyoo.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/Redbook/SAmerica/SA_Index.cgi
[7] www.helsinki.fi/~tasalmin/nasia_index.html
[8] www.helsinki.fi/~tasalmin/europe_index.html
[9] Data source: www.helsinki.fi/~tasalmin/europe_report.html

b. 43 Indo-European: *Rusyn, Frisian, Gothic, Gaelic, ...etc.*
c. six Turkic languages: *Chuvash, Bashkir, Karaim, Crimean Tatar, Nogai, Gagauz*
d. Kalmyk
e. Cypriot Arabic
f. Basque

B. Eight other languages confined to Europe:
a. Romani
b. 7 Jewish languages

C. Nine diaspora dialects[10]**:** Burgenland Croatian, Molise Croatian, Caucasian Turkmen, Pontic Greek, Italiot Greek, Arbëreshe Albanian, Arvanitaka Albanian, etc.

Naturally, it is not by chance that the languages of the European section of the Red Book are presented in detail. Let us proceed now to the structure of the Red Book, and see what data the researchers compiled on the world's languages before drawing their conclusions.

The data gathered on the languages were condensed into seven points. The first three contain general information: variations, geographical location, relationships. Point 4 includes (should include) the most important information. This reveals the categorisation of the examined language *(extinct, nearly extinct, seriously endangered, endangered, potentially endangered, not endangered languages).*

Although the questions would, in theory, cover every important data, it is unfortunate that we do not have every piece of information for most of the languages, that is, the "data sheets" are not filled out.[11] The data sources are not indicated accurately either.

Below is the data format of the Red Book, revealing the questions that the researchers asked. The footnote presents the information compiled by Salminen on Burgenland Croatian[12]:

[10] The languages in groups A and B are not differentiated in the index, while those in C (diaspora dialects) are only marked or numbered in the county indices if they have exclusive language users in a given country.

[11] It is to note that these data also come from the home page that stores the data of endangered languages in Europe www.helsinki.fi/~tasalmin/europe_report.html

[12] Burgenland Croatian
1. Variant(s):
2 Geographical location: *Austria: Burgenland*
3 Relationships *a diaspora dialect of Croatian/South Slavonic/Indo-European*
4. Present state of the language: *ENDANGERED*
(a) children speakers probably a number of children learn the language, but they are not likely to become active users

The data format of the Red Book:
Name of language:
1) **Variant(s):**
2) **Geographical location:**
3) **Relationships:** (isolated, in distant relationship with known language/languages, in close relationship with known language/languages, dialect, etc.)
4) **Present state of the language:**
   a) children speakers:
   b) mean age of youngest speakers:
   c) distribution by sex:
   d) total number of speakers, members of the ethnic group:
   e) degree of speakers' competence:
5) **Sources:**
   i) information (about the language):
   ii) published and unpublished material (of the language):
   iii) competent scholar(s) and institution(s):
6) **Remarks:**
7) **Compiler:**

State of affairs in Austria

In the UNESCO Red Book's country index the following languages are listed under Austria: Hungarian, Czech, Slovene, Burgenland Croatian, Alemannic (incl. Swiss German in Vorarlberg), Bavarian (incl. Austrian German), and Romani. (The language of the Slovaks, who were also recognised as an autochthonous minority, is not included even though Professor Salminen gathered the data in 1993.)

From among these, Burgenland Croatian and Romani are categorised as endangered. After having read the information in the Red Book, the question occurred automatically: why Burgenland Croatian is an endangered language and why Burgenland Hungarian is not? Although it is well-known that the Croatian ethnic group has been representing its interests more resolutely and, together with

(b) mean age of youngest speakers: –
(c) distribution by sex: –
(d) total number of speakers, members of the ethnic group: *in the 1970s, approx. 28,000 speakers, now probably much less*
(e) degree of speakers' competence: not known exactly, but varies among areas, and, presumably, among age groups

5 Sources: –
(i) information (about the language): –
(ii) published and unpublished material (of the language): *a little*
(iii) competent scholar(s) and institution(s): –

6. Remarks: *Burgenland Croatian is said to differ extensively from Croatian proper, intelligibility being difficult*

7 Compiler: Tapani Salminen, Helsinki, 31 Dec. 1993

the Slovenes, communicating its problems better than the other autochthonous minorities, this probably cannot in itself answer the question above.

Geographic location

Out of the ethnic groups considered autochthonous in Austria (Slovene, Slovak, Croatian, Hungarian, and Roma), Burgenland Croatians (16,283) and Hungarians (6,641) are the most numerous in Burgenland. The name of the Croatians expressly refers to this. As regards the geographic location of the two groups, they predominantly live in Burgenland and Vienna but in inverse proportion: there are more Hungarians (15,435) in Vienna than Croatians (2,456).

The members of Hungarian enclaves were settled in Burgenland by the kings of the 11th and 12th centuries for border guard duty. They formed an outer linguistic enclave as early as the 16th century and the use of German loans was relatively high in their communication.

Apart from a few diaspora communities in Northern Burgenland[13], Burgenland Hungarians live in two main enclaves today: in Felsőpulya (Oberpullendorf) in Central Burgenland and in three villages located about 40 kilometres far from it in Southern Burgenland: Felsőőr (Oberwart), Alsőőr (Unterwart), and Őrisziget (Siget in der Wart). The descendants of the former border guards could retain the privileges of the lower nobility up to the 19th century and their Hungarian identity is in strong connection to these former patents of nobility.

To a lesser extent, there is a "pro-Hungarian" population as well. They usually originated from German-speaking Austrian middle-class families and became Hungarians at the turn of the 20th century because they attended Hungarian schools and, in their eyes, Hungarian embodied middle-class culture.

The Hungarians who live mostly in Vienna and surroundings and at the provincial capitals, emigrated or fled to Austrian territory in various periods. They arrived in significant numbers after World War II and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, but it must not be forgotten that Hungarians have been living in Vienna in considerable numbers since the times of the Monarchy. Although today generally the emigrants of 1956 come into one's mind when Viennese Hungarians are mentioned, it was due to the earlier presence of Hungarians, back during the times of the Monarchy, that their community was accepted as an autochthonous ethnic group in Austria.

The Croatians migrated from Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slovenia to the eastern territories of the former Western Hungary and Lower Austria between 1533 and 1584 because of the Ottoman advance and the resettlement plans of Austrian and Hungarian landlords. Today their majority lives in the following villages: *Kelénpatak (Klingendorf), Darázsfalu (Trausdorf), Mosonújfalu (Neudorf), Füles (Nikitsch), Szabadbáránd (Grosswarasdorf), Oszlop (Oslip), Cinfalva (Siegendorf), Zárány*

[13] The remaining Hungarian inhabitants of eight former manors. They have nearly completely assimilated because, for them, Hungarian was the language of the servants

(Zagersdorf), Frankafalva-Alsópulya (Frankenau-Unterpullendorf), Csajta (Schachendorf), Csém (Schandorf), Bándolon (Weiden bei Rechnitz). (The list is not complete.)

Their language, Gradiste Croatian, reflects the 16th-century archaic state of the language and forms a linguistic enclave. Burgenland Croatians use this regional language that evolved over the centuries at schools and in the media as well. The written version of Croatian regional language evolved during the age of the Counter-Reformation and the Baroque.

The media plays a great role in the efforts aiming at modernising the language; the Burgenland Croatian dictionary had the same aim. Its first volume was published in 1982 and today there are plans to compile various specialty dictionaries.

Political and legal situation

The political background always has to be considered in a research on the tragic situation of minority languages, and the events of the 20th century did bring about truly dangerous turns in the life of minority languages. The first significant political transformation in the life of the Hungarian minority in Burgenland came about with the Trianon Peace Treaty that brought an end to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and, with the redrawn borders, brought Burgenland under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Austria. Burgenland's autochthonous Hungarians found themselves in a minority situation, while, for the Croatians of the same areas, minority life was not a novelty at all. The Hungarian intellectuals of the area fled to the mother country. The Hungarian minority had no representation in the Austrian Parliament for decades and its interests were always relegated into the background.

The "philosophy of the ethnically and linguistically homogeneous nation-state" prevailed: German was the country's official language even though the country was multinational and multilingual. Minority rights, granted in theory, could not be attained in practice, due usually to financial problems.

No explicitly Croatian and Hungarian parties are known today but there are minority representatives in the ranks of the parties (e.g. several Croatian politicians among the Greens). BMKE (Cultural Association of Hungarians in Burgenland), the first civil organisation among the ethnic Hungarians recognised by the Austrian Parliament, was established in 1968. The Croatian Cultural Association (HKD) of Burgenland was founded in Vienna much earlier, in 1934.

Minorities have crossed the former ideological limits and reoriented politically. The Information Centre of Austrian Minorities was set up during this process in the early 1980s and has become a coordinator of political activities.

Considering the legislation in effect, it can be established that the same documents concern the Croatians and the Hungarians.[14] There is one important excep-

[14] *Peace Treaty of Saint-German, (1920/303), Articles 66–69*
Federal Constitution (1930/1), Article 8, amended by 2000/68, Article 8

tion, which, however, meant an advantage for the Croatians and disadvantage for the Hungarians: the State Treaty of 1955, (1955/152), Articles 6–7 regulated the rights of the Croatians and the Slovenes but ignored other ethnic groups. The official authorities reject the requests and demands of the Hungarian ethnic group exactly with reference to these articles that do not enumerate the Hungarians among the autochthonous minorities. Furthermore, the financial assistance that Article 7 guaranteed to the Croatians has not been available to Hungarians.

It was only 21 years later that the *1976 Law on Ethnic Groups (1976/396)* named the Hungarian and Czech minorities as ethnic groups, and recommended to them to set up their own ethnic group councils. The Hungarian ethnic group council was set up first in 1979. However, this law does not mention any right to actual contributions; it only refers to the possibility of submitting proposals: "the ethnic councillors may submit proposals for the improvement of their situation..."[15] The provisions and deficiencies of this Law significantly reinforced minority identity in the 1980s.

Naturally, there is a huge gap between legal possibilities and the realities of everyday life, but this study does not plan to touch upon that in detail. Yet, practice proves that there is no state or local self-government that offers minority rights on a plate. They can be asserted under the influence of internal pressure (a minority is ready to fight for its rights), or under external, international pressure. This external pressure became manifest after 1989 once again. The opening of borders led to an increased interest in minority languages. Especially the takeover of conservative and other governments of expressly national orientation in the Central and Eastern European countries made an impact on Austrian minority policy. The Slovene organisations formed their ethnic group council in 1989. In 1992, the Viennese Hungarians were also recognised as a part of the Hungarian ethnic group. In the same

State Treaty of 1955, (1955/152), Articles 6–7
Education Act for Minorities in Burgenland (BGBl. Nr. 641/1994), Article 1
1976 Law on Ethnic Groups (1976/396), enacted on 7 July
Federal Government Decree on the Establishment of Ethnic Group Councils (1977/38), (1993/895)
Federal Government Decree on the Use of the Croatian Language at Public Offices (1991/6)
Topography Decree in Burgenland (2000/170)
Decree on Hungarian as an Official Language (2000/229)
Decree on the Dues of Ethnic Group Council Members 1979, 2002
Education Act for Minorities in Burgenland (1998/136)
Act on Kindergartens in Burgenland (1990/7).

[15] Excerpt of a 1979 speech of Kreisky "...the ethnic council is not a society of home folks or fellow countrymen, but indicates people who have been living in the territory of Austria; this is the Hungarian ethnic group." In.: Őrségi füzetek, p. 14.

At first 8, today 16 people can represent the interests of the Hungarians, there are four government party, four ecclesiastic and 8 other representatives (members of civil societies). Eight come from among Viennese, eight from among Burgenland Hungarians. The Ethnic Group Council, set up in 1999 after a two-year pause, is headed by Ernő Kulman, mayor of Felsőpulya. The Ethnic Group Council is essential for the Hungarians because, as an organisation, it is in contact with the Chancellor's Office that decides on the financial assistance of minorities.

year, following the dismantling of Czechoslovakia, the Slovak ethnic group council was set up. The official recognition of the Roma and Sinti minority as an ethnic group in 1993 came as a surprise. Following this, the relative peaceful coexistence of this minority only lasted until the 1994-95 bomb attempts.[16]

Social characteristics

The social changes characteristic of the 20th century and especially of the post-war years – industrialisation, centralization, the development of mass communications, etc. – speeded up the assimilation of linguistic minorities in Burgenland as well. Although, as regards religion, the Hungarian population of the villages of Burgenland belong to various denominations (Alsóőr and Felsőpulya are Catholic, Felsőőr is Calvinist, Őrlsziget is Lutheran, the Croatians are Catholic), they are on the same level as regards their social position. The farmers (who appreciated work and lower nobility) and the intellectuals (civil servants, lawyers, teachers...) mostly belonged to the Hungarian minority, while the bourgeois, money-centred industrialists and businessmen were mainly German speakers. The Hungarians despised the Germans, the Germans despised the Hungarians. (Cf. Susan Gal 1979.) Usually neither the different denominations nor the different ethnic groups intermarried. (The author's data gathered in Pulya has revealed that, in case of marriage, parents accepted another ethnicity more easily than a different denomination.) The intellectuals fled to Hungary after the Trianon Peace Treaty and Germans filled their places. The farms went bankrupt during the post-WWII competition. With the disintegration of the farming communities that preserved tradition, the majority of Hungarians found themselves closer to the state language. They made their living either in some factory farther away or, after studies, in an office job. German became the language of everyday communication and Hungarian became restricted to family use. At the same time, families often thought that, for the sake of the children, they had to lay an emphasis on German, or did not feel it important any more to pass on the Hungarian language to their children. With commuting and the decay of traditions, the number of mixed marriages grew, which also led to language change and assimilation.

The life course of the Croatian ethnic group was similar: they too found themselves in a new country after the Trianon Peace Treaty. Formerly, the Hungarian cities of Sopron, Győr, and Szombathely were considered important administrative centres for Croatians too, since young Croatian teachers and priests often studied there and Croatian-language papers and textbooks were printed in these cities. After the disintegration of the farms, many Croatians made their living in Vienna, which also contributed to assimilation.

[16] In 1994, a bomb attempt was directed against the bilingual school in Klagenfurt, and several minority representatives received letter bombs. The bomb attempts in Croatian village Stinacz in Burgenland and the Roma group of Oberwart – there were four casualties in the latter – revealed new, so far unknown types of aggressive attacks against minorities

Minority languages in everyday life

Croatians were faster to recognise that they had to fight for their minority rights even though, in theory, those were guaranteed by law. As it was mentioned above, the 1955 State Treaty did in fact provide a legal framework for that. Societies and individuals were fighting for the survival of the Croatian language and culture, but achieved their results not exactly with the help of politicians. Their societies were recognised as the representatives of the minority in political issues. These civil organisations[17] – they are more numerous with more active and varied activities, more up-to-date and informative home pages than the organisations of the Burgenland Hungarians – issue various publications, preserve and gather folklore traditions, organise cultural and scientific programmes and language courses for children and adults, realise minority rights and organise Croatian entertainment. Although the figures of the 2001 census indicate that there were more ethnic Hungarians than the Croatians, on a national scale they received less state assistance. However, as it was mentioned, the first Hungarian civil organisation in Burgenland was set up in 1968; by then, Croatian civil life had been able to claim significant achievements.

Today, Croatian is an official language in six districts of Burgenland and, following the Topography Decree of 2000, 47 bilingual place-name signs were placed out. Under the same law, 4 bilingual Hungarian-German signs could also be set up. Today Gradiste Croatian is the ecclesiastic language of the Bishopric of Kismarton.

Austrian public TV channel ORF's Burgenland studio has been running a Croatian office since 1978. It broadcasts a 50-minute programme in Croatian from Monday to Saturday and a 30-minute one on Sunday. The same office includes the Hungarian editors who write the Hungarian-language news for ORF and edit and prepare the Hungarian radio and TV programmes. ORF broadcasts six times a year the 30-minute "*Adj Isten magyarok*" programme and four times the trilingual *"Servus-Zdravo-Szia"*.

Croatian daily *Hrvatske Novine* was first issued in Győr in 1910, then moved to Vienna and finally to Kismarton. The bishopric publishes the religious Croatian periodical *Glasnik.* Further important Croatian publications are *PUT* and *Novi Glas*, and there exist some local papers as well. The most significant ethnic Hungarian publication is *Őrség* (published occasionally). Other publications are: *Hírhozó* (Messenger) and *Őrvidéki Hírek* (Burgenland News).

Following Trianon, Croatian and Hungarian language education worked until the beginnings of National Socialism but no total prohibition came subsequently

[17] Major organisations: Kultúregyesület Nagybáránd (KUGA, Cultural Society in Nagybáránd), Burgenlandi Horvát Kultúregyesület (Croatian Cultural Society in Burgenland), Horvát Kulturális és Dokumentációs Intézet (Croatian Cultural and Documentation Institute), Horvát Sajtóegyesület (Croatian Press Society), Pannon Intézet (Pannon Institute), Tambura Csoportok (Tambura Groups), etc.

either. Today the Education Act for Minorities in Burgenland provides guarantees for bilingual education and its several variants. The Act also allows monolingual classes, in which case the state language has to be taught in six hours per week. However, no such class exists in Burgenland. Bilingual education is possible in most of the settlements, which basically means that the children of various linguistic competences study their mother tongue as a foreign language in four hours per week. Differentiated education is not possible because of the low number of applicants. Hungarian can be taught as a foreign language at a facultative course in any school (1-2 hours per week)[18] if there are at least five applicants. Unfortunately, there is no exact data on the number of children who were studying Hungarian or Croatian in 2003 but, according to estimates, about 6–700 children were studying in Hungarian.

Demographic data

Table 1.

The population of Burgenland in numbers from 1920 up to the present:

	Total population	German	Hungarian	Croatian	Other
1920	294,849	221,185	24,867	44,753	4,044
1923	286,179	226,995	15,254	42,011	1,919
1934	299,447	241,326	10,442	40,500	7,179
1951	276,139	239,687	5,251	30,599	599
1961	271,001	235,491	5,642	28,126	1,742
1971	272,119	241,254	5,673	24,526	666
1981	269,771	245,369	4,147	18,762	1,493
1991	263,092	237,516	6,763	19,109	1,494
2001	277,569	242,458	6,641*	16,283	12,187

*4407 Austrians, with 3,274 born in Austria (1,937 are foreigners)

Table 2

Figures of the 2001 census (only Austrian citizens are included!):

	Croatian	Roma	Slovene	Slovak	Czech	Hungarian
In Austria	19,374	4,348	17,953	3,343	11,035	25,864
In Burgenland	16,245	263	70	108	189	4,704
In Vienna	2,456	1,806	2,396	4,741	7,769	15,435

[18] The following data are worth a thought: a teacher of Northern Burgenland has been teaching Hungarian in 22 hours per week, commuting between 9 settlements.

Minority Culture

The 2001 census had a surprising outcome: according to it, the Hungarian was the largest, officially recognised ethnic group in Austria. The officially published figures have revealed that there were 40,583 who could speak Hungarian (as well). It is due to the complex and inconsistent assessment system of the statistical office that this number does not necessarily represent the actual situation. The system distinguishes between Austrian citizens and foreigners, but it also counts those who have a permanent address. In the case of the Croatians, this is the first time that Gradiste (Burgenland) Croatians and Croatians are counted separately. When a person indicated both, it was then decided arbitrarily, based on one's place of birth, whether that person counted as a Burgenland Croatian or not.

Table 3 indicates that, apart from Burgenland and Vorarlberg, the number of those who use Hungarian has increased in every Austrian province. As compared with 1991 (33,459), the significant growth is due to the fact that the welfare migrants of the 1980s were granted citizenship in the meanwhile. (One has to live in Austria continuously for 10 years in order receive citizenship.) Beyond group 1 (19th century Hungarians) and group 2 (Hungarians emigrated after 1956), a third group appears, especially in Vienna, as a result of recent historical events: the group of Hungarians from the former Yugoslavia, the historic Upper Hungary, and Transylvania, who have been settling in Austria since the 1980s.

Table 3

	1991	2001	Change between 1991 and 2001
Burgenland	**6,763**	**6,641**	**–122**
foreigner	4,973	4,704	–269
native	1,790	1,937	147
Vienna	**13,519**	**15,436**	**1,917**
foreigner	8,930	10,686	1,756
native	4,589	4,749	160
Lower-Austria	**5,440**	**8,083**	**2,643**
foreigner	2,389	4,790	2,401
native	3,051	3,293	242
Styria	**1,863**	**3,115**	**1,252**
foreigner	836	1,652	816
native	1,027	1,463	436
Upper-Austria	**3,218**	**3,849**	**631**
foreigner	1,182	2,344	1,162
native	2,036	1,505	–531
Carinthia	**490**	**738**	**248**
foreigner	247	313	66
native	490	425	–65

	1991	2001	Change between 1991 and 2001
Salzburg	**793**	**1,095**	**302**
foreigner	432	551	119
native	361	544	183
Tirol	**671**	**956**	**285**
foreigner	347	469	122
native	342	487	145
Vorarlberg	**702**	**671**	**–31**
foreigner	302	375	73
native	400	296	–104
Austria	**33,459**	**40,583**	**7,124**
foreigner	19,638	25,884	6,246
native	13,821	14,699	878

Why is Hungarian an Endangered Language in Burgenland?

The first measure of the endangered status of a minority or a language is its population or the number of its speakers: Burgenland Hungarians (Austrian citizens) are in 4,704, the Croatians in 16,245.

Although there are children speakers who use the language at least in their private sphere, they use it increasingly less and they are not likely to become active users since their linguistic competence is low. In the 2001/2002 school year 660 children studied Hungarian in Burgenland. About 20 percent of them study it in bilingual schools in 4 hours per week, the others in less than that. Although data is only available partially, it is possible to draw conclusions about linguistic competence. In 2000, in the kindergarten of Felsőpulya, 75–80 out of 110 children attended Hungarian classes with 90 percent of them being German speakers: Austrian children or the children of Hungarian parents who did not speak Hungarian any more.

The prestige of Hungarian is lower than that of the state language and, for the majority of the people it does not entail any economic and social advantages. Naturally, some make their living by speaking Hungarian, but people in general need German to earn a livelihood. Positive changes have occurred since 1989 because with the borders being open again, new economic opportunities presented themselves and it was in the interest of German-speaking Austrians and Hungarians, who had forgotten their mother tongue, to speak Hungarian again.

The present education of the language in Austria is unfit to ensure the survival of languages. The linguistic competence of the children, who study Hungarian as a foreign language, cannot be high with only 1–4 hours of lessons per week. The children who start taking Hungarian in this system arrive at a basic level by the time of the matriculation examination. (No relative bilateral treaties have been signed between Hungary and Austria in this respect, so there is no external pressure that could encourage changes.)

Neither the Educational Act (it is not in the interest of Austrian language policy) nor the Hungarian minority has formulated it what the objectives of minority education should be. There are no proper textbooks, and the existing ones cannot be used in differentiated education. There are no teacher's books and the central curricula do not follow the children's actual knowledge. The work of the teachers is not coordinated either. Besides, the teachers who teach Hungarian have no training in Hungarology, and they would need the help of the mother country in this respect.

Although the Educational Act would make monolingual education possible, it seems there is no demand for that. Among the autochthonous Hungarians in Burgenland hardly any literary or other Hungarian-language publication is published.[19] The area of language use has narrowed down to four villages with mainly elderly speakers.

Finally, let us consider whether Burgenland Hungarian has been documented or not. The renowned linguist born in Felsőőr, Samu Imre, described its main features in his Felsőőri Tájszótár (Felsőőr Dialect Dictionary) (1973). Susan Gal conducted research in Felsőőr in 1974–75 and wrote several fundamental works that have become reference points to Hungarian linguistics. Although one cannot dispute her conclusion about the termination of the process of language change in Burgenland, it has to be pointed out that, since than – in the last moment – positive changes have also taken place in that language area. With common effort, Burgenland Hungarian could be saved from extinction, since languages can live as long as people can speak them.

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[19] Exceptions: In February 2001, a music CD appeared entitled 'Wir singen ungarisch', with kindergarten children singing Hungarian songs under the direction of Viola Karal and Katalin Kóger They are also authors of a trilingual (German, Hungarian, Croatian) songbook for children published in 2002.

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Minority Politics and Minorities Rights

Minority Politics and Minorities Rights

László Szarka

The Legal Institution of Dual Citizenship as a Means of Dealing with Minority and Migration situations

The legal institution of dual citizenship is considered by a part of international literature, especially legal literature, a controversial solution that, by seeking to identify or correlate national and ethnic affiliation with the dimension of citizenship, may destabilize the rights and responsibilities connected to a given state territory, tax system and administrative, socio-political etc. public distribution system. Another part of literature regards the institution of dual citizenship as the most general (though temporary) way of solving legal inequalities that accumulate because of the varying citizenship classification of the people living within a given state.

Although everybody agrees, and this can be considered a universal principle in European legal practice, that adherence to one's original citizenship can be a reason neither for discrimination nor, on the part of the recipient country, for encumbering the obtainment of the right of citizenship, dual citizenship, which makes the cancelling or bypassing of pre-emptive rights possible, has sparked passionate debates throughout Europe. These especially became manifest during the public debate that accompanied the amendment of Germany's citizenship law.

Prior to discussing the contradictions and the possible consequences of dual citizenship, which is a far-reaching problem even if we do not go beyond Hungary's case, it is expedient, by starting out from the fundamental differences between national and citizenship affiliations, to throw light on the difference between the objectives of Hungarian minority policy (ethno- and identity policy) and Hungarian immigration policy.

National community, ties of citizenship

It is said that nations are communities imagined and described by poets, artists, linguists, and historians that the activity of politicians cannot but circumscribe. As opposed to this, states are clearly held together by constitutional principles and laws framed by lawyers, and their outer and internal borders and rules are controlled by a myriad of political institutions. Naturally, the nation-state constantly attempts to merge these two kinds of entities, here with aspirations of homogenization degenerating into ethnic cleansing, there with tailoring the borders to fit the "body of the nation". The events of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in the 20th century revealed how tragic the outcome of these endeavours can be.

In the dual citizenship issue not so much the nation building and state organising visions of poets, historians, and lawyers clash as the two camps with oppos-

ing (positive or pessimistic) views on the consequences dual citizenship entails. The well-meaning nation builders see a means of "returning home" and "national unification" in it, and the lawyers who feel positively about it welcome dual citizenship, which offers a temporary status in all respects, as the fastest possible way to emancipate "immigrant minorities" and to integrate refugees who, in cases, arrive from faraway countries. Accordingly, dual citizenship counts as an advantageous solution in both of these approaches.

On the other hand, a significant part of the nation builders – many politicians and advisors of Fidesz Hungarian Civic Party and the leading officials of the Hungarian parties in Slovakia and Romania – believe that dual citizenship provided by Hungary would strengthen the migration potential of Hungarian minority communities, intensify resettlement into Hungary, make tangible the motives for migration that are already present in the strategy of families, and lay the foundation of decisions by younger and more highly qualified groups to migrate. Furthermore, these same people criticise initiatives taken in Vojvodina and Transcarpathia by saying that they are contrary to minority self-government and autonomy efforts and are limited exclusively to nation building in Hungary.

According to the approach of the lawyers and politicians who see a threat in dual citizenship to the present aspects and interests of state and citizenship, it would bring about – in terms of claims encompassing, even without resettlement to Hungary, the whole range of inarticulate, general, historical, and subjective rights of citizenship – the collapse of the entire institution of Hungarian citizenship. This is a vision which the leftist criticism – which, in an effort to oppose the original version of the Status Law, frightened the people with Romanian employees flooding the Hungarian labour market – so effectively confronted with the potential consequences of the Status Law's nation building logic.

Considering how much the ethno-political processes of the second half of the 20th century changed with respect to the post-WWII situation – analysed by István Bibó and believed to be resolvable through tailoring the state borders to fit ethnic borders –, one has to concede that not even the EU framework can make state and nation coincide in Central Europe, the Baltic region or the Balkans in the early 21st century. In reality, it cannot be in the interest of anybody in the region to have true nation states at the price of serious conflicts and complete international isolation. (For pure nation-states could be only formed in Europe with forced migration, forced assimilation, or the stirring up and tackling of international conflicts.)

The coincidence of the two kinds of entities and the reintegration of Hungarians outside the borders cannot serve as a basis for nation building and state organisation favourable to Hungary. Instead, positive changes can come from regional and autonomy policies: these can ensure the natural relatedness of the region's Hungarian and non-Hungarian ethnic and national communities, their communal rights and peaceful interethnic relations. Furthermore, Central and Eastern European intercultural models need to be developed that not only respect the diversity

of languages and cultures but also promote the mutual learning and use of these languages. Naturally, this also requires the enhanced protection of Hungarian culture and language with the munitions provided by EU regulation.

Dual citizenship, common citizenship, EU citizenship

Naturally, this foreign and nation policy approach could entail a **common citizenship** (for the Visegrád countries, Hungarian-Slovenian, Hungarian-Slovak, Hungarian-Austrian etc.) conceivable on the score of the logic of EU citizenship or **temporary dual citizenship** for foreign citizens and their children who arrive in a given state. The migration of the integrating Central and Eastern European region's population will undoubtedly accelerate. In this possible framework, the communities speaking a common language and the interregional economic and cultural relations will ensure enhanced advantages on the labour market and in the preference of schools. Therefore, instead of trying to ignore migration on the labour market and ethnic migration, one has to elaborate appropriate immigration policies for their management. These should ensure advantages for those immigrants who are more receptive, speak the Hungarian language, are competitive at the labour market, are able to arrange their settlement in Hungary, and can quickly integrate thanks to their culture, qualification, and family relations.

Since the territory of states will never coincide with the territory inhabited by a nation, debates will always fork into two directions: toward an emphasis on the absolute priority of the interests of the state and toward a demand on the priority of the interests of the nation. Therefore, we run against the dilemma of sovereignty and national self-determination, which had been proved irresolvable with the logic of the nation-state.

On the other hand, considering that at least six-seven different legal statuses and groups of various affiliation belong to the current Hungarian cultural national or Hungarian linguistic community, the problem becomes even more far-reaching. These groups are as follows:

1. The members of the largest group – those who declare themselves Hungarians and are Hungarian citizens – have gotten used to the present situation, and they see any potential change more as a threat than an advantage. This behaviour could be accounted for by the fear deriving, on the one hand, from the relatively more solid economic and social circumstances as compared to the neighbours and, on the other, from the easily rallied resistance of the neighbouring countries with respect to Hungarian national questions.
2. Besides the Hungarians in Hungary, there are ethnic Hungarians minority communities in the neighbouring seven countries with their legal status varying from state to state and probably continue to vary in the following years. The Slovenian and Croatian cultural autonomy and, in part, territorial autonomy, the still rather shaky cultural autonomy in Vojvodina, the natural autonomy of the Hungarian majority localities in Slovakia (which, however, lack

equipment and have to put up with legal deficiencies), the community in Transcarpathia left to the discretion of the central government both on the regional and municipal levels, and the Hungarian community in Romania dependent on the actual Hungarian-Romanian relations, comprise altogether of 2.5 million people who can have many different relations with Hungary. The linguistic, cultural and national identities and ties, the family and labour market etc. relations attach minority Hungarians not only to Hungary, while the economic factors of livelihood and the attachment to one's homeland tie them primarily not to Hungary.

3. Another kind of virtual community of different status is formed by those who resettle in Hungary from the seven Hungarian minority communities. Or, as they say, they "come out" from Transylvania, "come home", "come over" from Slovakia and Vojvodina, "come round" from Burgenland and Muravidék. From among the 150–200,000 Hungarians from outside the borders, who lived here, worked here, studied here, and had a residence permit or commuted regularly, at best 3,000–4,000 people granted Hungarian citizenship on the average in the past years.
4. The EU membership of four countries of the region, the possible membership of Romania and Croatia, and the longer outsider role of Serbia and Ukraine further complicate the situation and the legal possibilities of those living in neighbouring countries. Following May 2004, the legal environment of the EU is likely to curb the scope for action of Hungarian minority policy much more than before with respect to its assistance and citizenship policies. Travel and contact opportunities have extremely expanded for the current and future EU minorities, and most of them, by being bi- or multilingual, can become beneficiaries of the integration process. However, the Hungarian minorities of the countries not joining the EU might remain among the losers. Therefore, it is not accidental that the demand for dual citizenship found response in Vojvodina and Transcarpathia in 2003. Yet, there are many other ways to improve the situation of these communities more effectively than with the institution of dual citizenship: with the expansion of cross border trade, the concentration of assistance policy etc.
5. The situation of the members of the Western European, Scandinavian and overseas Hungarian diaspora is fundamentally different. A significant part of them has never actually been a Hungarian citizen because they were born in Transylvania or in Yugoslavia. Most of them belong to the '56 immigrants who, for some reason, have lost their citizenship (or, in the case of their children, never applied for it). They used to be Hungarian citizens and, according to the law, their citizenship could be easily renewed. The issue of the Hungarian diaspora and the introduction of dual citizenship for the Hungarian minorities are not to be confused, just as the demand for citizenship by those who resettle in Hungary and those who stay in their homeland are also separate issues. Still, it is clear that many demand citizenship with the political

intention behind the demand also being express. With respect to the of conditions of Hungarian citizenship in lack of a permanent residence in Hungary, the German regulation seems most realistic (although the unveiled cases regarding the abuses of the quite high quality German social care made even the Germans wonder whether the full extension of the rights of citizenship would make sense).

6. The communities of the various, Hungarian-speaking ethnicities of Hungary, who declaredly possess a dual – Hungarian and ethnic – identity, form a separate group: not with respect to Hungarian citizenship but regarding their belonging to the Hungarian national community. And where is the place of the Hungarian-speaking Roma population living outside the borders but within the universal Hungarian nation? And the place of those hundreds of thousands who, at the last census, answered neither about their mother tongue nor about their nationality and, therefore, we have no information on how they classify themselves. Yet, the 21st century Hungarian nation can only be based on self-assessment, collective solidarity, and the acceptance of linguistic and cultural community.

The extension of Hungarian citizenship to the enumerated communities can only happen in conformity with the regulations regarding the present citizenship of the applicants, and by marking out a clear dividing line between permanent settlement and citizenship rights without settlement in Hungary. In this latter case, the state budget should cover the costs associated with the extension of the rights of citizenship.

It is clear that the educational, cultural, public health and social security rights, all included in the sphere of citizenship rights, and the range of various stratum-specific benefits can only be made fully available to those who pay there taxes elsewhere and not to the Hungarian state budget. In this respect, the Status Law's assistance scheme seems a convenient solution: it entails the gradual extension of citizenship rights, especially cultural and educational rights, and stratum-specific benefits, the opening up of bodies and organisations closed for foreign citizens, etc. A second solution could be the extension of citizenship rights made more or less strictly conditional upon the payment of taxes. A third possibility would be to consider the logic of the system of conditions and guarantees of the institution of EU citizenship. However, this would require an even greater level of coordination and agreement with the neighbouring countries than the first two, and so much the more because this would entail transforming citizenship rights in part into common legal standards.

The principles of Hungarian minority policy

The solutions enumerated above only hint at the difficulty the problem. The situation seems even more complex when considered as regards its minority and

identity policy aspect. There have been seven items present in Hungarian minority policy of which we should not renounce.

1) The principle of non-violence, valid since the times of Teleki and Bethlen, has stood the test of every criticism.
2) Nobody has questioned the right and principle of belonging to a universal Hungarian national community either. (An approach criticised the certificate issued in accordance with the Status Law for being a new criterion of "Hungarianness" – since the beneficiaries have to be registered. The author believes that this approach is wrong: despite opposition and biased criticism, it has never meant a new self-definition of the national community.)
3) Hungarian minority policy has also understood that the impact of the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, unfair with respect to ethnic groups, could be best reduced by guaranteeing the right of minority Hungarians to their homeland, promoting solutions that make staying and securing a livelihood there possible and also ensure equality before the law there. In international law, this principle only becomes relevant with respect to guaranteeing the rights of self-government.
4) The principle of guaranteeing Hungarian national identity, as a principle of minority protection, is probably the most persistent item of Hungarian minority policy. (Besides the free use of the Hungarian language, culture and religion, national identity naturally involves solidarity with the universal Hungarian national community, the often denied and prohibited access to the assets of national culture, national self-definition, and the respect for national symbols.)
5) The fifth principle, necessary for the Hungarian minority communities and Hungary in complying with the previous ones, is the free, unhindered maintenance of contacts between the national community formed by Hungarians of various citizenship and their communities.
6) The Hungarian governments in office are bound – since 1990 it is their constitutional obligation – to financially assist the culture and community life of Hungarian minorities outside the borders and living in diaspora. Due to the Status Law, the extent of this assistance can multiply in the coming years, but, as shown by analyses, its effectiveness and institutional framework are far from being perfect.
7) Finally, a principle that evolved on the basis of the lessons learned from the minority policy of earlier eras and was dubbed the Antall doctrine. According to it, the Hungarian governments in office consider the position elaborated by the (majority of) political representatives of Hungarian minority communities normative: it is to be represented internationally with respect to the given country of the minority community in question. In the practice of the past fifteen years this has increasingly come to mean that the Hungarian government seeks to formulate a mutually acceptable common position at negotiations and in the framework of the Permanent Hungarian Conference (MÁÉRT) and other coordination forums.

The introduction of the institution of dual citizenship may substantially transform these principles of Hungarian minority policy (and, first of all, identity or nation policy), by questioning the priority of communities in the homeland; by confronting the bilingual people of dual attachment, who are attached economically and existentially to their homeland and live within its institutional structures the dilemma of migration; and by jeopardizing the political and personal basis of the efforts of self-government.

What other risks does dual citizenship involve? Let's recall Meèiar's offer! At his negotiations with Gyula Horn in Győr, the Slovak prime minister, founder of his state, sensing the possible consequences of the intensifying will to migrate among ethnic Hungarians, their employment in Hungary, and the free choice of school, proposed to Hungarian prime minister Gyula Horn to mutually facilitate the cumbersome process of resettlement. The nation-state atmosphere and the public mood of the neighbouring country, in so far as dual citizenship would set this process in motion, would be happy to agree to the emigration of masses to Hungary.

Various research projects have been conducted on the consequences of dual citizenship: one by the Ferenc Balázs Institute and the Migration Research Group of the Minority Studies Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences two years ago, another by István Horváth, Valér Veres, researchers in Kolozsvár (Cluj Napoca). The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ) also conducted public opinion polls (Népszabadság, 11 December 2003). These all show that current migration potential is primarily regulated family relations and the situation at the labour market. According to certain opinions, the rather limited receptivity of the Hungarian labour market constitutes the greatest risk factor, while others believe that the already present structural unemployment in Hungary could only be relieved by the easily controllable employment of Hungarians from outside the borders as set out in the Status Law. However, the risk of ethnic emigration continues to seem considerable, especially from the cumulatively disadvantageous situation of Hungarian communities in Transcarpathia and Vojvodina.

Further risk factors are: the size of the minority communities in concern (also recognised internationally); the limited range of Hungary's protective positions and opportunities; persistent tension as regards social and economic policies between Hungary and Ukraine, Hungary and Serbia, and, in part, Hungary and Romania; and, in a sense, the role of generation and qualification factors in the increased migration potential (in so far as the Hungarian communities that stay at home can lose, in a short time, their most highly qualified and productive members who would also ensure demographic reproduction). The consequences of this loss are already perceptible in the Székely land region afflicted by internal migration.

Minority policy or migration policy?

Even the discussion above reveals a great dividing line that could, surprisingly, stay in the background throughout the passionate (and, with respect to Vojvodina,

campaign-like) debates on the granting of dual citizenship. Is it allowed, is it possible, is it necessary to make a distinction between the Hungarians outside the borders who stay in their homeland, in the country of their current citizenship, and the Hungarians outside the borders who have already taken up residence in Hungary or arrive here with the intent of permanent settlement or commute regularly?

Although emotional engagement in politics usually rejects all kinds of distinctions, this behaviour cannot be relevant in this question. Dual citizenship, in European practice – from France to Finland, from Germany to Spain –, belongs under the instruments of immigration policy and that of integration policy, which helps the integration of foreigners, and not in that of nation or minority policies that aim at assisting fellow nationals abroad. That is, the right of dual citizenship is the due of foreign citizens who reside in the given country for a given length of time (usually ten years) or married a citizen of that state or are the descendants of a citizen. Substantial restrictions apply to preserving one's original citizenship. In Spain, for example, one has to hand in the passport issued by the country of origin, and in Finland only consorts can keep their original citizenship parallel to their second, Finnish citizenship. Accordingly, the institution of dual citizenship primarily serves to maintain neither the citizenship of emigrated Spanish, Germans, or Finnish nor that of minority communities living in the neighbouring countries. This becomes possible only through agreements made with the countries in concern or the legislation of those countries.

The extension of the institution of dual citizenship to include every single Hungarian community outside the borders is a purely theoretical scheme, although this "global solution" lies concealed behind the ideas formulated in Vojvodina, Transcarpathia and by the World Federation of Hungarians (MVSZ) and in an MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) proposal. This approach can be and should be excluded in the Hungarian case for the following reasons:

a) Due to geographical closeness, social and subsistence differences and, in general, the great migration potential, the institution of dual citizenship can become, as a solution to the minority issue between two or more neighbouring countries, a facilitator and cause of the migration of masses.
b) On the part of the legislature and public administration of the state in concern, dual citizenship may give rise to discriminative reactions, which are unforeseeable, restrictive, and justifiable by international law.
c) The majority of the neighbouring countries would consider the emigration of Hungarian minorities a positive development, which means that it is in their interest to encourage migration trends and receptiveness in Hungary.

The institution of dual citizenship serves completely different purposes in the case of immigrant minorities, historical minorities (integrated for centuries) and minorities possessing a strong national identity (and, due to this, partially integrated or not integrated), and in the case of ethnic minorities that do not have a homeland. In the case of immigrant minorities, the purpose is the preservation of

dual identity in some form or another, the regulation of immigration, and the gradual integration of immigrants into the majority society without the immigrants having to give up their original attachments. The preservation of dual identity is a task equally important in the case of immigrants and national minorities, but it should be guaranteed not by dual citizenship but by identity rights and identity policy. There is no need for dual citizenship if the state wants to satisfy the cultural, linguistic and religious demands of the various types of minorities and consider their contacts with their homeland a prominent task and manage it accordingly.

When original citizenship is kept, the institution of dual citizenship can produce new types of differences, exceptions and special situations, which not necessarily help the strengthening the already shaky national solidarity.

The choices of Hungarian regulation

With respect to citizenship in Hungary, the following five alternatives and their variants can be distinguished in connection with minority Hungarians and diaspora Hungarians:

a) Hungarians outside the borders should not be granted any advantages in acquiring Hungarian citizenship, irrespective of their knowledge of languages, the Hungarian citizenship of their ascendants, their family relations, and their historical and national attachments
b) the benefit offered by the Citizenship Act in force is sufficient to deal with a particular historical, linguistic and identity policy situation
c) only the emigrated, diaspora Hungarians should have their lost citizenship back if the legislation of their current country also allows for this
d) minority Hungarians should receive far more concessions in acquiring Hungarian citizenship. It seems that nobody wants to oppose already effected migration plans, since everybody is aware that we only have one life to toy with. In the case of those who resettled because of better openings, happier and more secure family circumstances, higher quality education and health care, and the demand for the linguistic and cultural community, the following choices can be considered:
   - application for citizenship and proof of settlement in Hungary would be enough
   - they could receive citizenship at once but, beyond residence, they would have to show proof of employment or some other source of income in Hungary
   - no resettlement is necessary, every Hungarian living outside the borders is granted citizenship by inherent right but have to applies for it (the choice supported by MVSZ and József Kasza, president of the Federation of Hungarians in Vojvodina)
   - every Hungarian living outside the borders is collectively granted citizenship by the Hungarian state on the basis of historical right.

e) according to the original design of the Status Law, the Hungarian legislature should establish Hungarian status abroad, which for those obtaining the certificate, depending on the possibilities allowed by the budget and international law and the bilateral treaties signed with the given state, would provide for part of the citizenship-like rights associated with the status in their own regions and in Hungary (cultural, educational, stratum-specific rights, etc.)

According to the author, this final alternative is the most appropriate. First, it makes it possible to acquire part of the rights of citizenship without resettlement. Second, it is an open system, which can be further expanded and regulated bilaterally through the agreement and cooperation of the neighbouring countries. Third, it promotes the maintenance of contacts with Hungary but does not hinder the efforts of autonomous national community building. And fourth, it does not produce unnecessary illusions, and ethnic Hungarians would have to fear retaliation less during in case a nationalist government takes office.

Professional analyses – with tentative conclusions

While writing this study, the author compared four substantial, comprehensive, and publicly available analyses. On the connections between legal theory and minority and nation policy relevant to dual citizenship, the compilation in issues 2-3 of 1999 of periodical *Magyar Kisebbség* (Hungarian Minority) contained useful references. The studies by István Benyhe, Imre Borbély, József I. Csapó, Gábor Harrach, Gábor Zsolt Pataki, Attila Varga, and Judit Tóth were the first professional analyses of the topic in the early preparatory stage of the Status Law. Besides an intermediary solution by Imre Borbély on the Hungarian legal status abroad, the analysts close to MVSZ urged a global solution and assumed that the notion of dual citizenship was extendable to all Hungarians. In her study, Judit Tóth clearly argued and, in her further writings on this subject continued to argue in favour of maintaining the strict regulation of the rights of citizenship.

The visa requirement Hungary introduced towards Ukraine and Serbia-Montenegro induced debates among Hungarian parties in Vojvodina. Their initiative during their election campaign set in motion the second wave of debates in autumn 2003. Then, the work of Budapest Analysis shed light primarily on the contradictions involved in the question. The written opinion of the group of experts who looked at the issue at the request of President of the Republic Ferenc Mádl also took a rather cautious approach. At the same time, they indicated that "the decision to facilitate acquiring citizenship can only be sensible if it contemporaneously promotes the idea that the Hungarians living in neighbouring countries also belong to the Hungarian nation, promotes their prosperity in their homeland and strengthens their Hungarian national identity." In his position statement, the president delegated the decision to MÁÉRT.

Most recently, Boldizsár Nagy, by analysing the contradictions in the contexts of state-citizen-civilian, and national community and community of citizens,

arrived at the conclusion that complementing Hungarian citizenship with the original citizenship is more likely to entail undesired conflicts and contradictions than a desired strengthening of national identity and solidarity.

In sum, the lessons of the four professional analysis materials can be formulated in four concluding remarks.

1) The institution of dual citizenship, imagined as an easier way of acquiring Hungarian citizenship than the current method, transcends and rewrites the logic of the Status Law, which is also considered fundamentally important by the initiators: instead of the plans helping prosperity in one's homeland by providing assistance, benefits and easier contacts, the approach diverted to the level of citizenship rights can only lead to a dead-end solution or the replacement of minority and nation policies with immigration policy instruments.
2) This is especially true for countries outside the EU: the granting of Hungarian citizenship to a large number of applicants living outside the EU Member States is sure to run into massive international resistance. The ruling of 20 April 2004 by the German Constitutional Court clearly indicated this. Naturally, the Hungarian government and legislature can bring sovereign decisions concerning the majority of citizenship rights, but it cannot adopt anything contrary to European citizenship and the effect of the Schengen Treaty.
3) Intensifying resettlement and immigration (which are likely to happen despite any regulation), and the effective administration of the consequent, increasingly gloomy, protracted citizenship affairs could be probably managed by a rational and practical implementation of the current law in force. The offensive condescension to and lecturing of immigrants, who have once made the difficult decisions to emigrate and resettle, can involve, through their family members who stayed at home, not just the abandonment of resettlement plans but emotional estrangement and preference of other target countries.
4) Although ethnic Hungarian minority communities can have different legal statuses and the neighbouring countries have different relations with the EU, Hungary shall aim at making international public opinion understand that despite its 20th century divisions, the awareness of Hungarian cultural and linguistic unity and national community has survived and Hungarian national identity is a basic reflex of identification and self-definition of the members of Hungarian minority communities. Therefore, the cultural, linguistic and identity policy unity of the Hungarian nation is a unique ethnopolitical and cultural phenomenon in Europe that requires special protection and consideration. Furthermore, in Hungarian-Hungarian relations, the logic of the "cooperation agreements" concluded with the minority communities should be emphasized so that a constant, predictable strategic course could prevail in the policies towards Hungarians outside the borders.

As regards Hungarian citizenship, its benefits should more clearly and transparently come across to ethnic Hungarians who settled in Hungary. On the other hand, it is better to treat dual citizenship as a temporary solution that can last until the EU membership of the country of origin and can only become full-fledged with resettlement to Hungary. Its actual content can be determined by the number of applicants and the extent of budgetary resources. However, this solution would, in effect, entail the same possibilities inherent in the cultural and educational rights, rights to maintain contacts, and benefits guaranteed by the Hungarian legal status, which, in essence, could also be achieved through the amendment of the Status Law.

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Toso Doncsev

The Hungarian Minorities Act*

"[...]a myriad of unforeseeable accidents can happen in any age; but the age itself is not an accident: its features are marked and unmistakable."

José Ortega y Gasset: "The Modern Theme"

In his speech celebrating the 60th anniversary of the existence of the Soviet Union on 20 December 1982, Yuri Andropov, general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), declared that differences between nations will survive much longer than differences between classes. Thereby he crushed a dogma, which was about the peoples and ethnic groups of the Soviet Union becoming one nation under Socialism. One decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the nightmare of a classless society has vanished, but the demand for ethnic identity continues to grow despite the unifying processes of globalisation. The late head of KGB (Committee of State Security) surely knew the currents whirling in the deep. Yet, he might not even have suspected that a time was approaching when life would finally formulate its true objectives and the political systems built on alien, anti-human, and utopian ideologies would crumble like houses of cards.

When presenting the Hungarian Minorities Act, it is essential to say a few words about the era in which it was conceived. The fifty years preceding the fall of Communism marked an abnormal age: viable institutions that had existed for centuries either ceased to exist or the party-state sought to deny their legitimacy. In a country controlled by the party it was impossible from the very first to legislate about the rights of social groups that, as feudal-capitalist leftovers, were destined to perish anyway. Only a secret party resolution was adopted about the officially non-existent and yet, problematic Roma population.

As opposed to the ideological mainstream that propagated official optimism, the few foreshadowing endeavours were refreshing exceptions. Among these latter, there were a concept drafted by Mihály Samu in 1979 and a bill by András Baka in 1988 and, as a sign of the changes under the Németh cabinet, the bill prepared by Gáspár Bíró at the Secretariat of National and Ethnic Minorities led by Csaba Tabajdi.

* Edited version of a speech given at the conference Minority Legal Norms in Hungary and Southeast Europe, held on 7–9 November 2003

Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, despite certain points in common, is not a direct result of the previous bills but a peculiar offspring of the transition. Civil society, primarily a minority formation, the Round Table on Hungarian National and Ethnic Minorities, played a crucial role all through its formulation.

The transition in Hungary affected the political, economic and intellectual spheres to differing degrees. Peculiar events were going on in the life of Hungarian minorities with the socio-political developments of 1989–1990 also influencing minority communities. In 1990, the former Yugoslavia that ignored ethnic identity dissolved and democratic societies of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes were set up in Hungary. The Roma population also emerged from under the guardianship of the Patriotic Popular Front and created, this time freely, several organisations.

The other minorities also established or revived their associations. The first inter-minority formation, the Alliance of Ethnic Groups *(Nemzetiségi Unió)*, which sought to represent the common case of minorities in Hungary, was formed in 1990. The political changes exerted their influence from two directions: from the direction of the new, democratic government and that of minority society. The demand for the enactment of minority rights simultaneously emerged at both sides.

In the early 1990s, both the domestic and foreign policy situation was favourable for the regulation of minority rights. The agreement of parliamentary parties necessary in principle and in practice came about regarding NATO and EU accession, and the Hungarians living outside the borders and minorities living in Hungary. The human rights and minority protection requirements and recommendations formulated by the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe also pointed towards a more favourable management of the minority issue in Hungary. The regulation started out from the minority provisions of the Constitution. After the democratic elections, in August 1990, the Antall cabinet established the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities (ONEM), the central body responsible for domestic minority issues. Once the minorities rejected the bill prepared by the Ministry of Justice in autumn 1990, ONEM started to draft its own version.

The Minority Round Table was set up on 30 January 1991 at the initiative and authorisation of the minority organisations and with the purpose of providing a framework that united domestic minorities and articulated the fundamental objectives of minority society. The Round Table developed its own system of representatives, organisation, and operations, prepared an outline for legislation, and formulated its own bill. In May 1991, bringing an end to the original routine of rotation for the sake of effectiveness and efficiency, it unanimously elected a permanent president, a secretary, and a negotiating delegation the composition of which regularly changed according to predetermined rules. At ONEM's suggestion, instead of the coordination of two drafts, the parties began working on a consensus bill. Following three months of strained efforts, the draft that both parties accepted was ready by September 1991. The representatives of the Round

Table also participated at the subsequent inter-ministerial coordination and the negotiations with the MEPs of the parliamentary parties.

The Round Table remained a non-governmental, non-corporate and non-registered body throughout its work, and it was maybe due to this character that it could successfully represent the main objectives of the minorities: the drafting of a bill in harmony with their interests and the winning of public opinion and majority society to the minority cause. Naturally, the Round Table did not lack sharp, internal quarrels. The differing opinions occasionally led to utmost tension but interests were nonetheless successfully coordinated, tensions were eased and, in crucial situations, a display of unity was achieved for almost three years. It was an admirable accomplishment indeed to cooperate with several dozens of organizations of a dozen minorities and, at the same time, conduct continuous coordination and debates with the government as well.

The Round Table used standard and novel forms of representation and assertion of interests and applying pressure where needed, and used various means of public and secret negotiations; it used its personal relationships to lobby at MEPs and managed to win renowned experts and university professors to draft the Round Table's professionally established political objectives. It described its position at Hungarian and international forums and built substantial relationships with the leaders of Hungarian organisations and parties outside the borders and the president of the republic. The government, motivated by a sense of responsibility toward all Hungarians, also sought agreement. It was aware that it can truthfully intervene for the rights of Hungarians outside the borders only if it reached agreement in the case of minorities within the country. The adoption of the bill required a two-thirds majority, so its approval also needed the support of the opposition. Their factions, though to a differing degree from party to party, also declared their solidarity with the approach of the Round Table.

The printed and electronic media were also sympathetic to the Round Table's efforts. It was due to their fruitful cooperation that the Hungarians realised at all that not only Hungarians live in minority outside the borders but that Hungary was a multiethnic state as well: nearly every tenth person belonged to one ethnic group or another.

According to ONEM and press information, no writings or statements appeared that opposed the Act. The media felt the minority issue to be a new, interesting phenomenon and, according to the classic casting of the time, gave a wide range of opportunities to the critics of governmental conceptions and the champions of opposition positions. Officers of the Round Table appeared on the screen with their frequently broadcasted interviews. Thereby they helped society become more open and the minority communities more informed and strengthened in their identity. The public sphere became the primary means of applying pressure. When in early 1992 the Round Table and the government clashed because the latter, against previous agreements, wanted to withdraw the Roma population from under the jurisdiction of the Act, the Round Table managed to make the govern-

ment back down through the mobilisation of Hungarian and foreign public opinion. The government was constrained to return to the coordinated, consensus version. Prior to tabling the bill, the government charged a commission to continue the negotiations. The commission was headed by a minister without portfolio responsible for the field and comprised of delegates from the competent ministries (Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Finance) and the president and experts of ONEM. The government delegation conducted negotiations with that of the Round Table for several days between 8 and 19 May 1992. They discussed every provision of the draft and, in the majority of cases, reached an agreement. Despite the difficult negotiations, the minorities' overall view on the Antall government was – as opposed to the opinion of its vehement critics – that it largely respected and took into consideration the claims of civil society.

The Round Table remained in contact with the parties during the parliamentary stage, it made its voice heard in the Committee on Human Rights, Minority and Religious Affairs, that is, it followed the whole legislative process.

On 7 July 1993, the National Assembly adopted an Act that, despite the changed circumsances of transition, enjoyed the support of most minority organisations due to its unchanged principles and the fact that, as the Round Table demanded, the scope of duties and authority of national self-governments was expanded and they were also granted the necessary financial guarantees.

The Minorities Round Table, as a civil organisation, achieved an unparalleled political and social accomplishment. It was able to integrate and mobilise national and ethnic minorities living in Hungary, and, by displaying and representing their interests and cooperating with the government, the parliamentary parties, and the media, it effectively and successfully asserted their interest. It was an equal to the government during the formulation of regulations, the shaping of the minority institutional structure, and the elaboration of multi-channel financing. It was an example of harmonious cooperation throughout the negotiations based on mutual understanding.

Looking back to the past ten years, one can assert with proper pride and delight that minority and majority managed to create a new, autonomous, and automotive world from scraps.

And now, let's take a closer look at the Act, which is still in effect.

The Minorities Act is the result of a six-party compromise that was developed on the basis of the draft jointly elaborated by the government and the Minorities Round Table. As usual in the case of social agreements, the parties actively involved in the preparations were not fully satisfied by the result. However, it would have been nearly impossible to frame an Act that would have suited each and every claim of the thirteen minorities in Hungary (whose social and historical experiences and traditions differ considerably). The greatest virtue of the Act lies in its existence: it is an opportunity, a framework, and a reference and a starting point for improvement and a closer compliance with the diversity and challenges of life.

Minorities wanted the Act to make the assertion of their interests more effective. But is it possible to talk about common interest in the case of thirteen minorities? It seems so, since it is a fundamental interest of all national and ethnic minorities to survive as such and yet, not to suffer any disadvantage due to their minority existence. The Act stipulates these demands in Articles 15 and 16: "The preservation, fostering, strengthening and passing on of their minority identity is the unalienable collective right of minorities" and "It is the right of minorities to cultivate and develop their historical traditions and language, to preserve and enrich their intellectual culture, and their culture as incarnated by physical objects." On the other hand, Point 5 of Article 3 declares: "Any form of discrimination against minorities is prohibited." The experiences of the past ten years proved the presupposition true that there would be marked differences in the aspirations of the Roma and the other minorities. The main objective of the latter was the preservation of identity and the fostering and promoting of diversity based on their cultural features. Other purposes of safeguarding of interests and assistance only came after that. As opposed to this, the importance of the two was reversed in the case of the Roma population. The misinterpretation of the Act not once resulted in misunderstandings since its provisions are not suitable for the management and even less for the solution of the minorities' economic and social problems. The Act was not enacted with that purpose. When this became manifest, it was proved by governmental practice – in various packages of measures under the Horn and Orbán cabinets – that existing social tensions can be dealt with other laws or other legal instruments.

Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, which went through smaller amendments in 1994 and 1999, consists of a Preamble and nine chapters. These are: Basic Provisions, Individual Minority Rights, Rights of Minorities as Communities, The Governments of Minorities, The Local Spokesperson for Minorities, The Cultural and Educational Autonomy of Minorities, Language Use, Assistance to Minorities, the Financial Management and Property of Minority Governments, and Closing Provisions. The structure of the Act and the 64 Articles and appended Sample forms reveal that nearly half of the Articles deal with local and national minorities, the rules of their formation and operation (the Chapter on the local spokesperson can also be included here, together with Chapter 8 on the assistance to minorities, the financial management and property of minority governments, and two points of the Closing Provisions on the minority compensation fund and the once-off allocation of property). From a formal point of view, one could object to all this, just as against the fact that the amendment of the Act on Local Minorities (that is, the detailed regulation of direct and indirect minority government elections) figures among the Closing Provisions. However, as regards its content, it is vital that the "sine qua non" of the practice of minority rights and the operation of their institutions, that is, financial assistance is also included in the Act (Chapter 8 deals with it in detail).

The Preamble reflects the spirit of the whole Act, and is thereby endowed with a unique significance of principle. Besides referring to general legal principles that

served as starting points for the drafting of the Act, it enumerates significant international legal documents. It is a special feature that the Act formulates not only universal standards that regulate the relationship between minority and majority, but also actual objectives of Hungary that are to be achieved in the short run: "In preparing this Act, the National Assembly of the Republic of Hungary is guided by the vision of the establishment of a Europe without frontiers, reduction and elimination of the disadvantages which result from living in a minority, and the development of the democratic institutional structures necessary to achieve these goals."

The Act offers a relatively effective solution for the problem of the scope of individual rights. Besides guaranteeing the free acknowledgement and manifestation of identity as an inalienable right of the individual, it prohibits registration. It provides the following definition based on the most generally accepted, Capotorti definition: "For the purposes of the present Act a national or ethnic minority (hereinafter 'minority') is any ethnic group with a history of at least one century of living in the Republic of Hungary, which represents a numerical minority among the citizens of the state, the members of which are Hungarian citizens, and are distinguished from the rest of the citizens by their own language, culture and traditions, and at the same time demonstrate a sense of belonging together, which is aimed at the preservation of all these, and the expression and protection of the interests of their communities, which have been formed in the course of history." [1. § (2)] The Act further specifies scope of individual rights when it makes it subject exclusively to Hungarian citizenship [1. § (1)] and provides further interpretation by stating that it "does not apply to refugees, immigrants, foreign citizens settled in Hungary, or to persons of no fixed abode." (2. §) The Act provides not only a definition but also enumerates ethnic groups that is considers autochthonous and thereby renders the present situation clear-cut (otherwise the term "one century" would be disputable in the case of certain minorities): "In accordance with this Act the following ethnic groups qualify as ethnic groups native of Hungary: Bulgarian, Gypsy, Greek, Croatian, Polish, German, Armenian, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovakian, Slovenian and Ukrainian." 61. § (1). At the same time, the Act leaves open the possibility of recognising other minority groups. If they "meet the requirements specified in this Act, they may submit a petition related to this subject to the Speaker of the National Assembly if supported by at least 1,000 voters who declare themselves members of this minority." 61. § (2). This possibility was maintained as a compromise solution for the Jews living in Hungary, although they took advantage of it neither then nor later. However, the representatives of the Chinese did demonstrate a readiness of initiative, although this was due to the misinterpretation of the text. The Macedonians and Cumanians have also expressed their interest.

The Chapter on Individual Minority Rights, beyond the general legal principles, includes a new and interesting element: it reflects real life and recognises dual or multi-affiliation.

The most important part of the Hungarian Minorities Act, even as to its international bearing, is the recognition the collective rights of minorities, and the stipula-

tion that it is the right of minorities to preserve, foster, strengthen and pass on their minority identity, to cultivate and develop their historical traditions and language, to preserve and enrich their intellectual culture, and their culture as incarnated by physical objects, to hold their own events and celebrate their own feasts free from disturbance, to establish civil organisations, as well as local and national self-governments, to establish and maintain extensive and direct international contacts. Furthermore, public service television and radio stations shall ensure that national and ethnic minority programmes are produced and broadcast and the government shall promote the reception of radio and television programmes from the kin state. Article 20 of Chapter 3 refers to the representation of minorities in the National Assembly and the establishment of the office of the Ombudsman for National and Ethnic Minority Rights. The first ombudsman was elected in 1995 and has been successfully operating ever since. As opposed to this, the National Assembly has so far rejected the representation of minorities twice: in 1993 and 1998.

Minority self-governance is a completely new institution of collective rights. The Act, with the exception of the national minority self-government, integrates local minority self-governments into that of the system of the townships, towns, or the districts of the capital city. And, although the concept of the Act seeks to establish individual-based cultural autonomy, it also indicates the possibility of the territorial autonomy with the institution of minority municipal governments.

A minority municipal government can be established if more than half the members of the elected body have been elected as candidates of one national or ethnic minority and more than half of the minority representatives vote affirmatively to declare their municipality a minority municipal government. The Act seeks to guarantee through local minority self-governments that minority rights are realised in the course of local public affairs management. The legislators, according to their intentions, assumed that members of a particular minority will initiate the formation of their own self-government, choose candidates among themselves for the preservation of their identity and the representation of their interests, and vote for these candidates at the local elections. However, not only people affiliated with the given minority community made use of the opportunities in economic and public life guaranteed by the Act. It is in part because of these irregularities that the Act needs to be made more accurate. The Act makes possible the formation of any of the three forms of self-governments on the local level: a minority municipal government or an indirectly formed local minority self-government ("if more than 30% of the members of the municipal government have been elected as candidates of one particular national or ethnic minority, the representatives may form a minority self-government [...] with a minimum of 3 members per minority") or a directly formed local minority self-government in accordance with the provisions of the Act in force on the election of local government representatives and mayors. One minority in one settlement may establish only one local minority self-government according to the order established above. The scope of duties and authority of local minority self-governments differs from that

of municipal self-governments, so no dual administration can be present. The local minority self-government shall decide within its authority – and within the framework of the regulations of municipal governments – the questions assigned to it by law. The most important authority of the minority self-government is that any municipal government decree affecting the minority population (local basic education, local media, the promotion of local traditions and culture, and the collective usage of the language) may only be made with the approval of the minority self-government that represents this population. The same is true in the case of the appointment of heads of minority institutions. In the absence of a minority self-government, the opinion of the spokesperson for the minority (the candidate of a particular minority who receives the largest number of votes of that minority at the local elections), or in the absence of a spokesperson, the opinion of the local association of the given minority is necessary.

The mayor's office, established by the municipal government, is obliged to help the work of local minority self-governments.

The national self-government – one for each minority – is elected, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Act, by minority electors. That is, by representatives elected municipal or local minority self-government representatives at the last local elections. Spokespersons are also members of the electoral body that elects the board of representatives of the municipal government. At local electoral meetings, in their absence, the directly elected electors have the same function. This election system aims at providing representation to the entire minority population of the country (despite the scattered settlement pattern) in the electoral body that elects the national minority self-government.

The scope of duties and authority of the national minority self-government was defined as to favour primarily the representation of interests and the establishment of the educational and cultural autonomy of a given minority. The national and local minority self-governments are not in a hierarchic relationship. The national self-government decides independently on its own affairs; on the core curriculum of minority education (except for higher education) it has the right of agreement. It may state its opinion, seek information, submit proposals, seek measures, and has the right of co-operation in any question relevant to the situation of minorities. The national self-government represents the given minority against the state.

Language is a fundamental feature of minorities living in Hungary. Chapter 6 on The Cultural and Educational Autonomy of Minorities the Act enumerates the languages used by minorities and, in the case of the Roma population it mentions both Romani and Beash. The Act includes only the most important rules concerning the educational and cultural issues of minorities. Those concerned can find further instructions regarding implementation in the provisions of public and higher educational regulations. In accordance with Article 43 Point 2 of the Minorities Act, children belonging to a minority may be educated in their mother tongue or "bilingually" (in their mother tongue and in Hungarian). The permissive rule becomes compulsory at the request of the parents or legal representatives of eight students

belonging to the same minority group. The provision includes the guarantee that the extra costs of minority education are to be met by the state as well as the municipal government but never by the parents. It is another principle included in the Act that public educational system has to ensure that students acquire knowledge of their people. The members of minorities can participate in training at foreign institutions teaching in the relevant minority language, the state shall support the employment in Hungary of visiting lecturers from the mother country, and, to relieve the disadvantages of the Gypsy minority in the field of education, specific educational conditions may be introduced. The minority government may assume control of an educational institution if it can ensure the maintenance of the same standards of education but, in the case of a transfer, the amount of state subsidy granted to the institution may not be reduced.

In the field of cultural rights, the state supports the collection of material monuments of minority cultures, the establishment and enrichment of public collections, the publication of books by minorities, and the publication of their periodicals.

The right to free language use is mentioned several times in the Act but it is also discussed in a separate chapter. The use of mother tongue is to be ensure in every field of public life and politics, in the National Assembly and the meetings of local self-governments. The acts and announcements are also made in the language of the minority, the minutes of the local self-governments, besides Hungarian, can also be recorded in the mother tongue of the given minority, the forms used in the course of administrative procedures can also be available in the language of the minority, and signs bearing the names of settlements and streets, public offices, and companies undertaking public services may also be read in the mother tongue of the minority.

The use of the mother tongue is also ensured in the administration of justice. A person belonging to a minority has the right to choose his/her own first name and the first name of his/her child freely, and to have the first and last name of his/her child registered under the conventions governing the orthography of the mother tongue. The Act reveals a strong intention of protecting the language of minority communities.

The Act, in accordance with its significance, deals with the financial assistance of minorities in a separate chapter but it also touches upon it in the Closing Provisions. Accordingly, the state budget provides additional standard assistance for the kindergarten education of minorities and for their mother tongue (bilingual) schooling; it ensures the operation of the governments of national or ethnic minorities with direct assistance or through the budget of municipal self-governments; it supports, although not fully, the operation of national or ethnic civil organisations. The state provides once-off allocation of property to the national self-governments and, for two fiscal years, sets aside a fund for the premises of national self-governments and the compensation of costs related to providing premises to local self-governments. The fund provides financial assistance to the projects of minority self-governments and civil organizations. All in all, the state guarantees the minimum financial tools needed for the operation of the public life and institutions of minorities.

In sum, the Act, at the time of its adoption and ever since, has been dealing with the issue of minorities living in Hungary in a way that suggests progress even on a European scale. Its provisions have properly managed to concretise the principles formulated in its Preamble. There is no space here for further analysing the positive results of the Minorities Act, although the golden rule states that the worth of an Act can be measured by the accomplishments it gives rise to. In the general assessment of the Act one cannot ignore the time and the circumstances of its enactment. It was drafted three years after the collapse of Communism, in a post-Socialist country that had just freed itself from under foreign occupation and was struggling through the process of democratisation. In a rich and solid state with centuries-long democratic traditions, like Great Britain, there was no need either for a minorities act or for state assistance to revive the nearly extinct Welsh tongue. In Hungary, where every civil initiative had been prohibited or considered suspicious at the least for fifty years, where civil society had been in ruins, and where the standard of life, economic production and financial well-being had fallen below former levels, nothing could have been achieved without the financial guarantees of the state. The lack of elegance of the structure of the Act, the repetitions, e.g. the inclusion of Article 68 of the Constitution, reveal the distrust minorities had toward the state because of negative former experiences. Their distrust was not completely unfounded, since despite repeated promises, the representation of minorities in the National Assembly has not been achieved and the reference to other pieces of legislation also made the honouring of promises doubtful. Yet, it is to be acknowledged that, with the minority elections of 1994 and 1995, a new and operable institutional system of minority self-governments was established at last. For several thousands of fellow citizens who belong to a minority, the system of self-governments has provided, besides the preservation of identity, a democratic school of public life and a stage where civic pride and civil courage could be acquired. Thereby, the minorities contributed to the development of the democratic institutional system, the strengthening of the rule of law, and the development of tolerant and, at the same time, proud public spirit and a readiness for initiatives. The practice of the past ten years also proved that, in essence, the Act works. Therefore, besides the indicated structural errors and redundant parts only the outdated sections or those that absolutely require changes need to be amended. Primarily the rules of minority elections have to be reviewed and regulated. However, it is rather sad that self-government resulted in considerable dysfunctions as regards mother tongue use. Despite the guarantees of the Act, the use of mother tongue not only faded in administration but, in general, Hungarian has made headway. On the other hand, the development of the cultural autonomy of minorities has shown progress. The experiences thus prove that good legislation is not enough; one also has to make use of the freedom it provides. It is time that we all realise: freedom consists not only in waiting for some better future of our liking. Freedom is an extraordinary resource that our will can work into a most wonderful shape.

Balázs Vizi

European Integration and Minority Languages[1]

Linguistic rights

States consider it just natural that their citizens understand each other, use the same language, and that there is a single language to provide for the cohesion of the political and social structure of the state in the fields of culture, education and public life.

Yet, one also has to face the fact that, in a given state, the dominant language, which is often given an exclusive official status by the force of the constitution, may not be the mother tongue of all citizens. For some, the dominant language is almost like an innate ability: they receive it as their mother tongue. On the other hand, others, like members of a linguistic minority, who, as equal citizens of the same state, ought to be endowed with the same rights and obligations, have to learn the dominant language as a foreign language. Exactly this difference is supposed to be overcome by also granting the members of minorities special linguistic rights under international law. However, the determination of the sphere of minority language use is, in many parts, still a major problem: is it enough to ensure language learning opportunities (e.g. limited number of language classes at school), or should they be granted extensive mother-tongue teaching and the use of minority languages in the administration and public life.

There is by no means consensus concerning (minority) rights related to language and language use. Some regard free language use as a universal right that every person is entitled to regardless of being a member of an indigenous minority in a given county or a recent immigrant. Furthermore, free language use have to be facilitated in all fields of life and in one's relations with the state administration (e.g. with the help of interpreters).[2] Others insist that linguistic rights are not absolute rights but belong among the rights of national and ethnic minorities. Therefore, they can only be interpreted in the context of minority-related sections of constitutional or international law and, accordingly, they are institutional rights (e.g. the running of schools with education in the minority language is required).[3]

[1] Edited version of the speech held at the meeting of Anyanyelvápolók Erdélyi Szövetsége (Transylvanian Association of Mother Tongue Cultivation) in Sepsiszentgyörgy on 24 January 2004

[2] About this linguistic human rights approach see, for example T. Skutnabb-Kangas, *Linguistic Genocide in Education – Or Worldwide Diversity and Human Rights?* Mahwah (New Jersey), 2000, Lawrence Erlbaum

[3] For the more traditional institutional approach of international law see, for example F. De Varennes, *Language, Minorities and Human Rights* The Hague, 1996, Martinus Nijhoff.

However, both approaches entail a problem that goes beyond law: how can the legitimacy of minority language use be convincingly justified? Today, many theoreticians of the dominant liberal democracy find it difficult to justify it from several respects. Nobody calls in doubt that all have the right to talk in the language they prefer. But the question is: does the state have any obligations in this regard?

Focusing on the notions of social equality and justice, some argue that language, similar to religion, can only be one's private business in a liberal democracy. Just as all can exercise their religion freely, all are free to choose the language they use in their private life. Accordingly, the dominant or non-dominant status of the languages depends on the number of their speakers, their diffusion, and the power of the individual linguistic groups. Just as no denomination can complain for not having enough members, the number of the people speaking a language cannot be relevant for the state. For whatever happens, the state should stay neutral as regards its citizens' individual linguistic identity. However, in the time of modern nation states this argument can easily be refuted, as nobody can imagine a linguistically "neutral" state: it is essentially a political decision to choose language for the administrative, judicial or educational systems of a given state, with the selection of one language meaning, in turn, the non-selection of the other languages and their exclusion from state life. Certainly, not every language spoken in a country can be an official language at the same time, but the more official languages there are in a state, the more democratic it can be considered.

Yet, the number of democracies with more official languages is few. Apart from a few exceptions (e.g. Spain or Belgium), it is not a typical arrangement in Western Europe either. This phenomenon is usually explained with two contradicting arguments. According to the first, many believe that language use is, in reality, not an identity forming factor, but merely a means of communication. Therefore, if everybody speaks the same language, a state has better chances to be effective without having to renounce its deeper religious, ethnic, and national identity. It is then a logical result of the rules of numbers that the language of the majority ends up being the common language. However, if nothing else, the example of several minorities of our region clearly seems to disprove this approach: in many cases exactly language has an identity forming power and it is never merely a means of communication, a relay of the dialogues of speakers, but also the carrier of a culture, in this case, minority culture.

The second, often asserted argument is based on the assumption that goes right in the face of monolingual states: according to it, national identity is based on language and, in the age of nation states, nothing else but the knowledge, the use, and the adoption of a state forming nation's language can serve as a measure of loyalty to the country. For example, John Stuart Mill regards all efforts aiming at establishing monolinguality in a state as expressly useful and state-strengthening phenomena. The loyalty toward the state can be primarily ensured through the adoption of the language and culture of the state, so the preservation of minority languages and identities is dangerous and can bring about the dissolution of the state.

These arguments are probably well-known to everybody, based on experiences in everyday life. So how can the right to minority language use be then justified with liberal arguments? Kymlicka, the renowned Canadian philosopher, rather convincingly, returns to the roots of liberal democracy in answering this, and asks: what makes a society just and what makes the members of society equal? He answers by giving an interpretation of real social equality.[4] As opposed to formal equality (proclaimed as law-based and neutral), one can only talk about real equality when people can enjoy the rights they are entitled to as citizens within their very own social and national culture. Accordingly, the state institutions and policies have to reflect the features of society and, should society be multilingual, the state should reflect this and be multilingual as well. Naturally, not every single language spoken in a country can be asserted – but it is certainly not imminent that this should happen.

Within society, a linguistic minority community preserves its unique culture and language as long as it is able to. Examples prove that certain languages and linguistic communities wane, disappear, and assimilate even without outside coercion. This means that if, for example, a community lives too scattered, in smaller groups and, given its numbers, cannot ensure its own linguistic reserves In the educational and administrative institutions by not meeting the personnel needs the operation of these institutions requires, they would probably fall back on the majority language having lost the community advantage of the minority language. Yet, by providing for the institutional system, the state should make certain that all linguistic communities have equal opportunities irrespective of their size and proportion. The state must guarantee that educational, administrative, cultural, political, or judicial institutions are run in the mother tongue in the case of every linguistic community that is able to perform the tasks involved in its own language.

There can only be true equality among citizens regarding their language use if no person has to learn a language other than his or her mother tongue in order to exercise his or her fundamental rights as a citizen. This is natural for the state-forming majority, but those speaking a minority language are also entitled to this right.

Certainly, putting this in practice Is not easy and the realisation may require different solutions in different states, but, evidently, it is not impossible either.

In the light of the argument above, what can be said about the international recognition of minority language use in Europe? To what extent do international minority protection initiatives reflect the notion of equality? Despite our tentative hopes, we will see that rather little.

The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is the most important document with respect to the international recognition of minority languages. The protection of minority languages came up at the Council of Europe as early as 1983,

[4] See, for example, W Kymlicka, *Multicutural Citizenship* Oxford, 1995, Oxford University Press. On language use, see W Kymlicka – F. Grin, 'Assessing the Politics of Diversity in Transition Countries' in F. Daftary – F Grin (eds), *Nation-Building, Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries*. Budapest, 2003, LGI/ECMI. pp 8–15

but the international document to pronounce this, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (hereinafter Charter), was only adopted in 1992. Following its adoption, however, in lack of the necessary number of signatories, it could not enter into force until 1 March 1998. In any case, thanks to its diffusion and recognition today, it has become a document of major importance. (Despite that 13 of the 30 signatory states have not yet ratified it and integrated it in their national legislation.)[5]

Interestingly enough, the Charter started out not from the presupposition of linguistic equality, but from the fact that the disappearance of smaller languages may jeopardize the cultural heritage of Europe. It is a fact that non-official languages have ended up on the verge of extinction, in part due to government policies of assimilation or the indifference of the state and, in part, as the Explanatory Report says, due "to the inevitably standardising influence of modern civilisation and especially of the mass media".[6] Therefore, the Charter, as opposed to other international minority protection documents adopted by the Council of Europe and OSCE[7], aims not at protecting the minority (in this case, linguistic minority), but seeks to protect and promote regional or minority languages. Having regard to the sensitivity of states the recognition of the value of minority languages manages not to declare that minority languages entail a minority community and, beyond the language, other politically sensitive (e.g. national) identity differences in a given country.[8]

The prevailing idea of the Charter is that regional or minority languages should be protected according to their rightful place with respect to the cultural function of language and in the spirit of multilingualism and multiculturalism.

The Charter is made up of three parts. The first includes general provisions, such as the definition of regional or minority language. The second enumerates the "objectives and principles" of the Charter, which are equally binding to all signatory states. The third part enumerates the measures undertaken broken down to specific activities in language use.

Yet, the power of the specific provisions of the Charter diminishes in the light of two factors: the "right to choose" from among the undertakings (the states, under certain conditions, can define which provisions they believe to be binding in their case), and the strong presence of flexible rules that expand the scope for action of the states.

[5] E.T.S. No. 148. See at: The Treaty Office of the Council of Europe <*http://www.conventions.coe.int*>

[6] Explanatory Report to the Charter (hereinafter: Explanatory Report) Section 2. See at: <*http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Local_and_regional_Democracy/Regional_or_Minority_languages/*>

[7] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – prior to 1994, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). With respect to linguistic rights, Articles 32.1 and 34 of the Document Of The Copenhagen Meeting Of The Conference On The Human Dimension Of The CSCE (1990) are of utmost importance. For other OSCE minority protection documents, see Majtényi B. – Vizi B. (eds.), *A kisebbségi jogok nemzetközi okmányai* [International Documents on Minority Rights] Budapest, 2003, Gondolat Kiadó-MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet, pp. 189–211.

[8] On the importance of minority attributives cf.: P. R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, New Delhi, 1991, Sage, pp. 11–41.

The "as far as reasonably possible" and the "number considered sufficient" expressions occur among the specific provisions of the Charter on several occasion. They grant considerable freedom to the states in deciding what kind of measures they take with respect to minorities, and what minority demands they wish to recognise concerning language use.

Similar to most international minority protection documents, the implementation of the obligations undertaken by the states under the Charter is not complemented by an international court or any forcing and legally sanctioning mechanism. Therefore, states can only be called upon to account for the implementation on a political level at the most.

The significance of the Charter lies in the fact that it looks at the minority issue in a creative way; the spirit and wording of the Charter seeks to respect the fears of the states regarding the impairment of their territorial sovereignty and yet ensure proper protection and assistance to language use, one of the most essential elements of minority identity. The whole approach of the Charter aims at a balanced development of relations between speakers of majority and minority languages. It seeks to help the speakers of regional and minority languages integrate into majority society in a way that they also retain their own language during this process. However, as the Charter gives considerable freedom to the signatory states regarding the implementation of its provisions, it could not produce a breakthrough: those states seem to be more generous in their undertakings who have already been effectively promoting the protection of the rights of their minorities in their rules of law anyway.

Nevertheless, the Charter may assume special political significance, given that its approach to regional or minority languages is much in tune with that of similar initiatives within the European Union. One of the major challenges the EU faces is finding a balance between its scope of authority and the sovereignty of its member states (national sovereignty). With eastern enlargement, dealing with linguistic and cultural variety has only become more pressing. Before the enlargement 50 linguistic minorities lived within the EU and their number doubled afterwards.[9] The scope of authority of the European Union, as we will see, continues to expand in the fields of cultural policies and the protection of human rights. Furthermore, several resolutions have already been adopted by the European Parliament to secure EU assistance to minority languages (even if most of these initiatives have not actually been turned into specific measures).[10] Every such initiative has struggled

[9] Cf.: <*http://www.eblul.org*>

[10] There is one outstanding among the minority protection related resolutions of the European Parliament, the one tabled by MEP Gaetano Arfé, and also known as Arfé Resolution: "Community charter of regional languages and cultures and on a Charter of rights of ethnic minorities", adopted on 16 October 1981, OJ 1981 No C 287, p. 106.; "Resolution of the European Parliament On measures in favour of minority languages and cultures", adopted on 11 February 1983, OJ 1983 No. C 68/103.; "Resolution on the languages and cultures of regional and ethnic minorities", adopted on 30 October 1987, OJ No. C 318, p. 160.; and "Resolution on linguistic and cultural minorities in the European Community", adopted in 1994, OJ 1994 No C 61, p. 110.

with the problem of formulating the responsibility towards minorities given that certain member states (e.g. Greece and France) refuse to recognise that national, ethnic, or linguistic minorities live in their territory.

At the same time, enlargement also revealed that the problems of minorities can influence European integration. Therefore, it is a major achievement that we have an international document today aiming at preserving the linguistic diversity of Europe and that it has also been adopted by the majority of the older, and, in the case of certain countries, under the pressure of the EU, most of the new member states as well. With respect to a more effective enforcement of the Charter, it can foreshadow some progress that, together with the Charter, the minority protection initiatives adopted by the EU also concentrate on the use and preservation of *minority languages.*

On EU policies that also affect minorities

The minority policy approach of the EU is ambivalent in several respects: even though the EU has been paying special attention at pronouncing its unity in cultural, linguistic, and regional diversity since the adoption of the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht in 1992, in practice it is difficult to asses as to what extent the policies of Brussels can prevail over the policies of the member states in questions related to linguistic minorities.

Since Community law makes no mention of minorities, the anti-discrimination policy of the EU is especially important from the point of view of the minorities living in its member states. The prohibition of disadvantageous discrimination gives rise to freedom and equal opportunities at the labour market in accordance with the economic principles of the EU and, at the same time, entails the extension of social rights. Accordingly, the Council was under great pressure to introduce an anti-discrimination clause. This came about in the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force on 1 May 1999. Article 13 authorises the Council to "take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or *ethnic origin*, *religion* or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation" [italics by the author]. It is worthy to note that discrimination based on one's belonging to a linguistic community does not figure in the enumeration above even though linguistic minority communities that often suffer disadvantageous discrimination as regards their language use and acquisition of their mother tongue, live in great numbers in the member states of the EU.[11]

[11] Cf. *EUROMOSAIC Report*. Brussels, OOPEC, ISBN 92–827–5512–6. Nevertheless, it proves the significance of Article 13 that the Commission submitted an anti-discrimination package to the European Parliament in 1999 aiming at elaborating three Council directives. One of these, the Racial Equality Directive, focuses on discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin. It is to note that the Directive sets out that "The prohibition of discrimination should be without prejudice to the maintenance or adoption of measures intended to prevent or compensate for disadvantages suffered by a group of persons of a particular racial or ethnic origin." (Article 17) This means that positive discrimination applied to protect the rights of minorities does not infringe the individual's right to equal treatment.

At the same time, the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, adopted in 2000 and inserted in the constitution of the European Union, explicitly promotes the cultural and linguistic diversity of the member states. Its Article 22 sets out that "the Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity."[12]

Minority languages and linguistic minorities

Within the EU one is likely to find the most auspicious actions with respect to the linguistic rights of minorities (more exactly, with respect to minority languages).

In the field of cultural policy, the EU has a complementary jurisdiction with respect to the member states, that is, it can effectuate community measures in matters not regulated by the member states. Article 151 of the Amsterdam Treaty calls upon the Community to "contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity". The Article also states that the "Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty." Yet, many are very critical about what this actually mean in practice and implementation, and many argue that the respect for cultural diversity does not obviously involve the respect for minority cultures.[13] In any case, it is important to note that presenting multicultural Europe as a value politically can also have a positive effect on minorities.

As regards culture, several programmes have been launched (in part, prior to Maastricht), which, among others, provide financial assistance to research related to minority language and educational and translation projects that seek to preserve and develop these languages.[14]

However, language and language use in present-day Europe have not only cultural but also considerable social and economic significance. The relative weakening of the states and the corresponding strengthening of the role of individuals and organisations in this field may render the Community-level regulation of issues regarding language use especially important.

Some believe that the failure of previous minority protection measures of the EU is due not simply to the lack of political will but to an underlying indifference: as regards the essence of the EU, which is economic integration, it makes no differ-

[12] For an analysis of the Article and the Charter's further possible relevance to minority protection, see Schwellnus, Guido. *"Much ado about nothing?" Minority Protection and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights*. Constitutional Web-Papers, ConWEB No. 5/2001. *<http://les1.man.ac.uk/conweb>*

[13] Cf.. Biscoe, *op. cit.* pp. 92–93. For more on the role of culture in integration, see Mitsilegas, Valsamis, Culture in the Evolution of European Law: Panacea in the Quest for Identity? In: Bergeron, J. H. – Fitzpatrick, P. (eds), *Europe's Other. European Law Between Modernity and Postmodernity.* Dartmouth, 1998, Ashgate. pp 111–129 , and De Witte, Bruno, The Cultural Dimension of Community Law In *Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law*, 1995 Vol 4. Book 1 pp 229–299.

[14] CULTURE 2000 Programme provides the context It brings together ARIANE, which encouraged book publishing and especially translations, RAPHAEL, which promoted the protection of European cultural heritage, and KALEIDOSCOPE, which assisted co-operation between countries in the fields of art and culture *http://www europa eu.int/comm/culture/eac/c2000-index_en html*

ence what language one uses. As opposed to this, it is not to be forgotten that local communities are more directly connected to the EU's market networks today when communication has assumed new heights of importance. As, for example, the 1996 *Euromosaic* study[15] indicated, economic relations do affect language use and this set limits especially to the chances of survival of endangered minority and regional languages. Since member states are not able any more to eliminate the unfavourable consequences of an ever deepening integration on their own, the intervention of the top economic regulator in this field, the EU, is not merely a question of good will but that of legal responsibility (if we take the preservation of linguistic and cultural diversity seriously).

Besides, the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* have certain "side effects" that, in the life of the people, are of utmost importance. It is anything but of no consequence in this field, i.e. culture, where community policies and those of the member states complement each other, how the objectives of the EU get across in the policies of the member states. Not every member state has reached the point where it would extend the responsibility of the promotion of regional and cultural diversity to include national or lingulstic minorities. Although this issue has already made it into the political parlance of the EU institutions, it is still difficult to say what specific instruments will be used in the end despite the EU's shortcomings of legitimacy and democracy.[16]

Despite several initiatives – such as the establishment of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL) under the financial assistance of the European Commission, or the launching of research and educational programmes, e.g. MERCATOR, which deals with the use of minority languages, or the *Euromosaic* study on the situation of linguistic minorities in the EU –, the EU institutions do not expressly stand up for the use of minority languages.

The basic problem present with respect to minority languages corresponds to the insecurity present in the operation of the European Union: where is the EU heading, what will the future of integration bring? Considering that the development of a superstate, a European federation, is rather unlikely even in the long run, the fundamental question persists: what will fall under the scope of integration and what will remain under the member states' sovereignty. At present, the sharing of powers between the EU and the member states in the field of cultural and linguistic policies results not in effective and clear, but rather incoherent efforts. Although over decade has passed since the Maastricht Treaty introduced shared powers in cultural policies, EU initiatives in this field are rare and still strike one as novelties. The Commission points to the principle of subsidiarity,

[15] European Commission, *Euromosaic: The Production and Reproduction of the Minority Language Groups in the European Union*. (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1996)

[16] Niamh Nic Shuibhne, *EC Law and Minority Language Policy*. The Hague, 2002, Kluwer Law International pp 33–60.

while member states are happy to retain control over the majority of cultural and linguistic policies. This, however, is nothing more but political division, since the EU bodies would have the right under law to intervene more effectively.

Similarly, although it would be possible to extend the rights related to EU citizenship without fundamentally modifying the institution of national citizenship, the efforts aiming at this have not succeeded so far. Although the interests of integration would require the EU institutions to take action for the promotion of linguistic diversity wherever they have a chance to do so, it is clear that member states are able to assert their political will successfully even against the interests and objectives of integration and, their promoters, the Commission and Parliament that are to promote and represent these interests and objectives.

It is not by chance that the argument went slightly off track after the introduction on linguistic rights. The Linguistic Charter of the Council of Europe and the ambiguous position of the EU on the language use of minorities clearly reflect a state-centric model. This might even be considered natural.

However, this has an important consequence: in an international context, the promotion of the use of minority languages falls under consideration not based on the equality of citizens but, at best, on cultural diversity. And this is a great difference. The realisation of the effective equality of citizens is a fundamental and inviolable principle of modern democracies. If this, according to the above, were unambiguously extended to language use, it would ensure a multilingual institutional system in every state that considers itself a democratic state. As against this, the notion of linguistic diversity seems to reflect the opinion that minority languages deserve respect and protection as any other cultural field, e.g. as archaeological finds or folklore. In this respect, it is up to the states in which fields of life they guarantee this respect and protection to linguistic minorities. Naturally, it is indisputable that the persecution and the prohibition of minority languages would be unacceptable in the eyes of international public opinion today and, considering the experiences of the past century, this is a considerable achievement in itself. However, the rights associated with the language use of minorities are far from being at the place they deserve: among the constitutional guarantees that ensure effective equality among citizens.

Minorities history

István György Tóth

Missions and Missionaries among the Csángó Hungarians in Moldova in the 17th Century

Most of the detailed and reliable sources on the life of the Csángó Hungarians in the 17th century are found today in the archives of The Holy Congregation of Propaganda Fide (Sacra Congregazione de Propaganda Fide) in Rome. After the 1622 foundation of the Congregation (a College of Cardinals controlling missions around the world), information multiplied on the life and religious life of the Csángó Hungarians of Moldavia and the use of their mother tongue. The missionaries among them included few Hungarians: most of them were Italian, Bosnian, or Polish, with the question of ethnicity being entirely alien to their ideas shaped by notions of the Counter-Reformation.[1] Their reports on the number of the Csángós, the language use, the language of the sermons and the confessions, and the Csángó customs and beliefs are the best sources we have from those times – though they require critical reading.[2]

Moldavia was an important missionary field for the Congregation of Propaganda.[3] It was a Christian satellite state of the sultan, in which most of the vojvodes and the majority of the population observed the Greek Orthodox religion but the country also had a significant, mainly Hungarian and, to a lesser extent, Saxon, Catholic population. Polish and Hungarian Jesuits, Italian Conventual and Bosnian Observant Franciscan friars provided them cure of souls who often ended up desperately fighting among themselves for the churches and missions. There was a large Catholic population in Moldavia, Hungarians mainly, but they had neither a permanently resident bishop nor enough priests for every Catholic parish.[4]

Although Moldavia was a vassal state of the sultan, the Islam was not a menace to the Catholic population. The Lutheran and Calvinist reformations had an impact

[1] Prosperi, Adriano, *L'Europa cristiana e il mondo: alle origini dell'idea di missione. Dimenzioni e problemi della ricerca storica*. 1992. pp. 189–220. *Histoire du christianisme* 8. Le temps des confessions. Ed. Marc Venard. Paris 1992. pp. 561–593.

[2] More details in: *Litterae missionariorum de Hungaria*. Ed. István György Tóth. Roma–Budapest 2002. I–II., especially the Introduction and pp. 27–68., and *Relationes missionariorum de Hungaria et Transilvania 1627–1707*. Ed. István György Tóth. Roma–Budapest 1994. pp. 6–17.

[3] Tóth, István György: Ahogy Róma látott minket. Magyarország és Erdély a Propaganda jelentéseiben a 17. században [As Roma Perceived Us. Hungary and Transylvania in the Reports of the Propaganda in the 17th Century]. In: *Századok*, 136 (2002) 3. pp. 547–581.

[4] More details in *Moldvai csángó-magyar okmánytár [Archives of the Csángó-Hungarian of Moldavia]*, I–II. Benda Kálmán (Ed.), compilation by Kálmán Benda, Gabriella Jászay, Győző Kenéz, István György Tóth, Bp. 1989. Second, revised one-volume edition: Bp. 2003. Critical discussion of the literature of the issue in the introductory study by Kálmán Benda, with bibliography, especially pp. 12–20.

on the Catholic Hungarians of Moldavia in the 16th century but both were relegated into the background by the 17th century.[5] It was assimilation into the dominant population, the Greek Orthodox Romanians, that threatened the Catholic Hungarians of Moldavia in the 16th century and later, in the mid-19th century, as well. It was this threat that Rome tried to fight by having missionaries sent to Moldavia.

Missionaries of various orders and several nationalities arrived in Moldavia.[6] They were mostly Italians and Polish, but Greeks, Bulgarians, Bosnians, Armenians, and Hungarians also were among them. Naturally, this meant that while the few Franciscan Hungarians from Transylvania and the Jesuits from Habsburg-Hungary understood their Csángó Hungarian believers, this caused a substantial problem for the Greeks or the Italians. Actually, it happened that they heard the confessions with the help of interpreters, which was hardly reconcilable with the law of the seal of the confession.[7]

The élite character of the order influenced the missions of the Jesuits all around the world and, therefore, in Moldavia as well. Much fewer Jesuit than Franciscan missionaries worked in the world but they were much better qualified than their Franciscan brothers – which resulted in a condescending attitude on the part of the Jesuits.

The first Jesuit missions were launched in Moldavia prior to the foundation of the Congregation, in the late 16th century. Giulio Mancinelli, one of the organizers of early Jesuit missions in the Balkans and the founder and head of their mission in Constantinople, visited Moldavia in 1586. In 1588, Polish Jesuits Stanislaus Varsevicius, Justus Rabb, and Johann König-Schonovianus evangelised in Jászvásár (Iasi).[8] Pál Beke, the most important missionary in Moldavia in the 17th century, served at the Jesuit mission of Kolozsmonostor (Cluj-Manastur) after having concluded his university studies in Graz. He went to Moldavia in 1644 and, from there, he even made it as far as Csöbörcsök, a Hungarian village in Tatarland.[9] Supported by the vojvode of Moldavia, he organized a school in Jászvásár. The Jesuits had ambitious plans with their mission in Moldavia. The Hungarian Jesuit, Pál Beke, missionary in Transylvania and Moldavia, began his report in

[5] Craciun, Maria, Orthodox Piety and the Rejection of Protestant Ideas in XVIth century Moldavia. In: *Ethnicity and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe.* Ed. Maria Craciun-Ovidiu Ghitta. Cluj 1995, pp. 70–91.

[6] The best Hungarian overview of the religious orders conducting the missions: Török, József, *Szerzetes- és lovagrendek Magyarországon [Monastic Orders and Orders of Knighthood in Hungary].* Bp. 1990. passim.

[7] Tóth István György: Diákok (licenciálusok) a moldvai csángó magyar művelődésben a 17. században [Students (licenciates) in the Csángó Hungarian Culture in 17th Century Moldavia]. In: *Az értelmiség Magyarországon a XVI–XVII. században.* Zombori István (Ed.) Szeged 1988. pp. 139–148.

[8] Peris, Lucian, *Le missioni Gesuite in Transilvania e Moldavia nel Seicento.* Cluj-Napoca 1998. pp. 93–119.

[9] Benda, Kálmán: Csöbörcsök. Egy tatárországi magyar falu története a 16–18. században [Csöbörcsök. The History of a Hungarian Village in Tatarland in the 16th–18th Centuries]. *Századok* 1985. (119) 4. pp. 895–916.

1644 in a way characteristic of his orders endeavours: he wrote about Moldavia, from where it was easy to reach Tatarland, which was bordering on the Chinese Empire.[10]

The Jesuits sent few but qualified priests to Moldavia, and laid a great emphasis on education and winning the élite. At the beginning of their mission, they requested an audition before the vojvode and sought to establish the best possible relations with the boyars of the vojvode's court. They were responsible for teaching the children of the boyars at the Jesuit school of Jászvásár, which was the top educational institution in Moldavia at the time. Yet, the work of the few, though learned and enthusiastic Jesuit missionaries cannot be compared to that of the Franciscan friars who evangelised among the Hungarian population of Moldavia.

Bosnian Franciscans carried out missionary work of great importance among the Csángó Hungarians of Moldavia in the mid-17th century. They began their work, so far from their Bosnian homeland, in the 1640s.[11]

The Congregation appointed Bosnian Franciscan Marco Bandini missionary bishop of Moldavia in 1643.[12] He had already proved his missionary abilities as prefect of the order's mission in the surroundings of Temesvár (Timisoara), and had also learned the language of the Romanians living in Temes (Timi) county. At the suggestion of The Holy Congregation of Propaganda Fide, Pope Urban VIII nominated Bandini archbishop of the Bulgarian Marcianopolis. His life – parts of which have been discussed in detail by Croatian, Romanian, German, and Hungarian historians – is a proof that one can understand the true significance of the 17th-century missionaries by stepping out of the framework of historiographies that think in terms of national histories. These missionaries evangelised in all territories of the Northern Balkans that had surrendered to the Ottomans and become either their vilayets or vassals. Bandini studied in Italia, was a Franciscan father superior in Bosnia, episcopal vicar in Slavonia, missionary in Hungary, in the world of diverse ethnicity of the Temesköz, titular archbishop in Bulgaria, and the bishop of the Catholic Csángó Hungarians in Moldavia. Therefore, one can discover the importance of his missionary activity only by regarding these territories as one unit.

[10] *Archives of the Csángó-Hungarian of Moldavia* ... 270. Barbu, Violeta. *Rezidentele Iezuite din prima jumatate secolului al XVII-lea in vestul Transilvaniei strategii misionare* Verbum (Bucarest) 1995–1996 7 pp. 279–283.

[11] Tóth, István György: Szent Ferenc követői vagy a szultán katonái? Bosnyák ferencesek a hódoltsági misszióban [Followers of Saint Francis or Soldiers of the Sultan? Bosnian Franciscans in the Mission in Territories under Ottoman Occupation]. *Századok* 134 (2000) 4. pp. 747–799.

[12] Veress, Andrei, Scrisorile misionarului Bandini din Moldova (1644–1650). *Academia Romana, memoriile sectiuni istorice.* III/VI. 13. Bucuresti 1926. pp. 333–397. Tóth, István György, A missziós fahazból az érseki trónra. Marco Bandini bosnyák ferences miszionárius levelei a hódoltságról [From Missionary Timber House to the Archiepiscopal Throne. The Franciscan Missionary, Bosnian Marco Bandini's Letters on the Occupation]. In: *Ezredforduló-, századforduló-, hetvenedik évforduló.* Ünnepi tanulmányok Zimányi Vera tiszteletére. J. Újváry, Zsuzsa (Ed.). Pilisczaba 2001. pp. 164–227.

Marco Bandini was head of the Bosnian Franciscan mission near Temesvár from 1626 to 1631.[13] He learned Romanian during these years and, upon his return there in 1939, he confessed nine Romanian-speaking believers in Székács village. He reaped the advantages of his knowledge of Romanian when he became apostolic administrator of Moldavia.

Marco Bandini left for Moldavia in September 1644. The vojvode, however, greeted him with considerable hostility. Bandini, an Observant Franciscan and apostolic administrator, clashed both with the Italian Conventual Franciscan friars, evangelising in Moldavia, and Polish Dominican Jan Zamoyski who, although lived far, in Poland, held the title of Bishop of Bákó (Argeş-Bacau) and considered Moldavia his own diocese. Bandini also came into conflict with the Greek Dominican and future Bishop of Csanád, Giacinto Macripodari, who also laid claim to the office of the Bishop of Moldavia. In his evangelising activities, Bandini leaned on a Hungarian Jesuit missionary, Father Pál Beke. Beke accompanied him and interpreted for him when he visited the churches. With the help of the Hungarian Jesuit, Bandini prepared a valuable report, which became the most important source on the life of the Csángós in Moldavia in the 17th century. Bandini died at his apostolic administrator's seat, in the Moldavian Bákó on 27 January 1650.

Marco Bandini was not alone when he left for Moldavia, that faraway and unknown missionary province: several Bosnian and Bulgarian Observant Franciscans followed him there. Observant Franciscan Fra Elia, who was said to be Bosnian, arrived in Moldavia from Constantinople in 1645. Tommaso a Carnengrado, another Bosnian Franciscan, was vicar of Moldavia and prefect of the monastery of Bákó in 1653. Mariano a Sarajevo also evangelised in Moldavia between 1651 and 1655. He arrived in Transylvania in 1630 but then he left the new mission rather quickly and returned to Bosnia. However, after the establishment of the Transylvanian Franciscan custody in the 1640s, we find Fra Mariano in Transylvania again, carrying out missionary work. He went to Moldavia from there in 1645. Later he was elected head of the Transylvanian custody and, at the call of Archbishop Bandini, left for Moldavia where he became vicar-general.

From among the Franciscans working with Bandini, Observant Franciscan Pietro Parchevich, descendant of an illustrious Bosnian-Bulgarian family, played a most significant role later on. Bandini chose the former student of the Italian Illyrian College of Loreto as his secretary in the Bulgarian Csiprovác in 1644. Following the death of Bandini, Pope Innocent X appointed Parchevich vicar apostolic of Moldavia (he was also Archbishop of Marcianapolis) and, in 1656, Pope Alexander VII granted him the archiepiscopal title of the late Bandini. However,

[13] Juhász, Kálmán, Műveltségi állapotok a Temesközben a török világban [Cultural Situation in Temeskóz in the Ottoman World]. Cluj 1935. (*Erdélyi Tudományos Füzetek* 76.) pp. 10–19 Idem, *Das Tschanad–Temesvarer Bistum waehrend der Turkenherrschaft 1552–1699.* Dülmen in Westfalen 1938 pp. 208–240. Fodor, Pál, A temesvári vilajet a török hódoltságban [Vilajet Temesvár under Ottoman Occupation]. In: *In memoriam Barta Gábor* Lengvári István (Ed.). Pécs 1996. pp. 195–208.

Archbishop Parchevich spent more time in the courts of foreign sovereigns, performing diplomatic missions as the envoy of the Habsburgs, than in his dangerous and poor diocese.[14]

Bosnian Franciscans could not strike roots in Moldavia. In the country, apart from the few merchants and others who happened to get there, there was no sizable Catholic population of Southern Slav mother tongue, there was no Catholic nobility to patronise the Bosnian Franciscans as in Transylvania, and no Bosnian merchants lived there who would have provided a solid basis for the mission as in Belgrade or Temesvár. Consequently, Bosnian Franciscan missionaries were at a disadvantage as compared with their Hungarian, Polish, and Italian brothers. After the death of their respected leader, Archbishop Marco Bandini in 1650, they were constrained to leave Moldavia and withdrew into Transylvania.

Two other nationalities played a very active role in the missions among the Csángó Hungarians in Moldavia in those times. Although the majority of the Greeks and the Bulgarians turned Orthodox later on, there were many Catholics among them in the 17th century, and their missionaries took a prominent part in the religious life of Moldavia.[15]

Bernardino Quirino was a Greek Franciscan from Crete. He joined the Franciscan order in Constantinople and studied in Italy. As Bishop of Argyes and then Bákó, he was the bishop of the Catholics of Moldavia at the end of the 16th century. He was probably killed by the invading Tatars in 1604. He turned to Pope Clement VIII with a detailed report in 1599. Besides the life of the Catholics in Moldavia, he reported on the Lutheran and Calvinist ministers from Transylvania, from whom he had confiscated "heretical", that is, Protestant books in Hungarian and illegal Bible translations, all of which he burned afterwards. Niccoló Quirini, rescuer of the monastery of Csíksomlyó, was in all probability Bishop Quirini's nephew. In order that the monastery would not remain unoccupied after the death of the Hungarian Franciscans, the Catholic nobles of Transylvania called in a Franciscan missionary of Cretan origin from the monastery of Tirgoviste in Havasalföld (Wallachia) in 1624.[16] Fra Niccoló arrived in Havasalföld probably with the Franciscan missions in the Balkans, which started out from Constantinople. Since the chronicles of the order call him Miklós Querinus, it is justified to assume that he was a relative, probably the nephew of Bishop Bernardino Quirini, who was also of Cretan origin and arrived in Moldavia from Constantinople. Niccoló Quirini

[14] Pejacsevich, Julian, Peter Freiherr von Parchevich, Erzbischof von Marlianopel. *Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte* LIX (1880), pp. 589–590.

[15] Tóth, István György. Ez a faragatlan nép annak hisz, amit lát ... Katolikus misszionáriusok a török Temesváron [This Rough People Believe in What They Can See... Catholic Missionaries in Ottoman Temesvár]. In: *Tanulmányok Szakály Ferenc emlékére*. Ed. Fodor Pál–Pálffy Géza–Tóth István György Bp. 2002. pp. 373–414.

[16] *Magyar Ferences Levéltár*, Budapest, *Stefanita rendtartomány iratai*, 1. doboz, Inquisitionales litterae circa dilapidationem bonorum conventus. 1624. Cf. Galla, Ferenc, *Harminckilenc kiadatlan Pázmány-levél [Thirty Nine Unpublished Letters by Pázmány]*. Vác 1936. p. 114.

remained in Csíksomlyó, guarding the monastery and its equipment, until 1626. Then Hungarian Franciscans arrived and he could return to Havasalföld. However, in 1625 he had turned the assets of his monastery, Trigoviste, stored in Csíksomlyó, over to Andrea Bogoslavich, a Dalmatian Franciscan missionary who led a rather adventurous life. In 1623 Bogoslavich prepared the first report on the Catholics of Moldavia for The Holy Congregation of Propaganda Fide.

Girolamo Arsengo (†1610), the next Bishop of Bákó, was also a Catholic Greek from the island of Chios. Before arriving in Moldavia he had evangelised in Poland, Moldavia, and Havasalföld as a Conventual Franciscan.

The Bulgarian Franciscans played an important role in the history of Moldavia. Gabriel Manchich Thomasi had served for six years among Bosnian Franciscans at the mission in Krassóvár (Carasova) in the Temesköz (Temeskuz) in the late 1640s before becoming one of the most ambitious and learned and, at the same time, most troublesome member of the Northern Balkan missions. He evangelised in Transylvania, Havasalföld, and Moldavia in the 1650s and 1660s, he was appointed prefect of the Franciscan mission in Havasalföld and Moldavia, and then obtained the title "vicar apostolic of Transylvania, Havasalföld, and Moldavia". At the time of the Habsburg-Transylvanian-Turkish war between 1658 and 1664, he often appeared in the court of the Polish king, the vojvodes of Moldavia and Havasalföld, and the princes of Transylvania. He wrote partof his reports in code writing, he was a genuine secret agent. However, the detailed report he promised to write about the Catholics of Moldavia was never realised.

Bulgarian Franciscan Pietro Diodato played a major role in Hungarian and Transylvanian history and among the Catholic Hungarians of Moldavia, the Csángós as well. Diodato, the most prominent head of the Bulgarian Catholic Church in the 17th century, was commissioned in 1642 to visit Transylvania as apostolic visitor, but he could not accomplish this task. However, in 1641, Diodato wrote a report on the life and religiousness of the Catholic Hungarian Csángó. His detailed report, in which he also discussed the Greek Orthodox population and touched upon the relations between the Catholics in Moldavia and Transylvania, was the most detailed document on the religious circumstances of Moldavia that reached the Cardinals in Rome to that date.[17]

Besides Jesuits and Franciscans, Dominicans also took part in the missions in Moldavia, although to a lesser extent.

Dominican Giacinto Macripodari, future Bishop of Csanád, was one of the most interesting Dominican missionaries in Moldavia. Macripodari was born on the island of Chios, under Ottoman rule, in the early 1610s, consequently the Moldavian sources often refer to him as Giacinto Ischiota. He studied theology in Paris for four years, between 1632 and 1636. Then he became vicar and taught at the Dominican monastery of Chios. Subsequently he worked in the Christian

[17] *Moldvai csángó-magyar okmánytár* ... 204–230.

quarter of Istanbul as the vicar of the Dominican monastery. His sermons had great success both in Greek and Italian.[18]

The learned Macripodari became the confessor of Alexander von Greiffenklau, imperial envoy to Constantinople, in 1645. This connection and assistance gave an impulse to his carrier and helped him to the mitre. In 1645, although he was still living in Constantinople, he was appointed custodian canon of Esztergom. He arrived in Vienna in the same year and King Ferdinand III nominated him, at the intercession of the envoy of Istanbul, the bishop of the Macedonian Skopje. After that, since the Dominicans held important positions in Bákó in those times, he sought to obtain its episcopal seat.[19]

There were several rather active Dominican missionaries in Moldavia, although the (mostly Franciscan) sources did not paint a positive picture of them at all.

Although the Dominicans came only third after the Jesuits and the Franciscans in importance in Moldavia, the relative importance of those missions was still much more significant than that of their activity in Hungary. There are several factors to account for this: the Dominicans had two monasteries in Moldavia at the closing of the Middle Ages and, in the Moldavian mission, which had only a few priests, some of them rose to important offices. Furthermore, the influence of the Dominican missionaries was considerable in the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul and especially among the Tatars of the Crimea as well.

Dominican Giacinto Franceschi da Ossimo was the Moldavian vicar of the Bishop of Bákó. Despite his Italian name, he was probably of Greek origin. He worked as a missionary in Jászvásár in the early 1630s and then went to Csöbörcsök in Tatarland. He served there in 1633 and he had a Catholic wooden church built. After 1638, he was parish priest in Bákó and, at the same time, Bishop of Bákó and the vicar of Zamoyski. Leaving the Moldavian mission behind, he left for Poland in 1649.

Macripodari left Istanbul and went to Moldavia in 1646, where he stayed in its capital city, Jászvásár, and tried anything in order to become the Catholic bishop. He travelled to Poland several times – according to his Franciscan opponents he trafficked in various goods. Macripodari probably knew it well that even though had the support of the (naturally, Greek Orthodox) confessor of Vojvode Lupu Vazul, he would not achieve anything in the vojvode's court without presents. Besides, it is likely that he wanted to obtain the title of the Bishop of Bákó from the Polish king, the liege of Moldavia.

Many backed the plan of Macripodari to become Bishop of Bákó, including the vojvode himself. There were many Greeks among the boyars and the merchants of the court who, although they were Orthodox, got on well with a fellow Greek,

[18] Tóth, István György, Koszovóból vagy Mezopotámiából? Missziόspüspökök a magyarországi török hódoltságban [From Kosovo or Mesopotamia? Missionary Bishops in Hungary under Ottoman Occupation] *Történelmi Szemle* 41 (1999) 3–4. pp. 279–329.

[19] *Archives of the Csángó-Hungarian of Moldavia* .. 311. 331–333. 400–401 521–522.

the Chian Macripodari. However, the Franciscans impeded his appointment. As a result of his efforts, wrote their leader, Marco Bandini, the "vojvode's eyes gradually opened to the truth". Although the vojvode supported the Greek Dominican at first, the Bosnian Franciscan Bandini managed to get the post in the end, and Macripodari left Moldavia. In 1658 King Leopold I of Hungary appointed him Bishop of Csanád, and he lived in Nagyszombat as the assistant bishop of the Archbishop of Esztergom.

Besides Greek, Bosnian, Italian, and Bulgarian friars, Transylvanian Hungarian Franciscans also appeared in Moldavia in the 17th century. Kázmér Damokos, missionary bishop of Transylvania, and the Transylvanian Armenian István Taploczai, guardian of Csíksomlyó, wanted to take over the Franciscan monastery of Bákó for the Transylvanian custody.[20] Accordingly, in 1670, they made an agreement with Pietro Parchevich, apostolic administrator of Moldavia. However, their planned Moldavian mission was not realised: their friars were too few even for the Catholics of Transylvania.[21] Thus, not the Transylvanian Franciscans went to Moldavia but, quite the contrary, the Moldavian Franciscans played an important role in the Catholic missons and education in Transylvania at the end of the 17th century. Following 1683, the outbreak of the war and the incursions of the Tatars, the Italian Conventual Franciscans fled from Moldavia to Transylvania, where they ran a mission and a school in Esztelnek (Estelnic) and Kanta.[22]

The Observant Franciscans usually considered the Conventual Franciscan missionaries their rivals but the Bosnian friars managed to evangelise hand in hand with the Dalmatian Conventual, Fra Simone, who was close to them geographically and, due to the shared Croatian language, linguistically as well. Fra Simone – as so many fellow friars – used several names. Because of this, researchers regarded the two Franciscan figures, Simone Appoloni da Veglia and Simone Miserchich da Sebenico two separate persons. The "two" Fra Simone occur alter-

[20] *Fekete könyv. Az erdélyi ferences kusztódia története* [Black Book. History of the Transylvanian Franciscan Custody]. Madas Edit (Ed.). Szeged 1991. pp. 40–43. Boros, Fortunát, A protestáns fejedelmek kora [The Age of Protestant Princes]. In: *Az erdélyi katholicizmus múltja és jelene*. Dicsőszentmárton 1925. pp. 61–82. Tóth, István György, Az első székelyföldi katolikus népszámlálás. (Szalinai István bosnyák ferences jelentése 1638-ból) [The First Catholic Census in Székely land (Report by Bosnian Franciscan István Szalinai from 1638)]. *Történelmi Szemle* 1998. pp. 61–85. Lukács, István, *Dramatizált kaj-horvát Mária siralom Erdélyből* [Dramatised Kajkavian-Croatian Mary's Lament from Transylvania]. Bp. 2000. pp. 167–175.

[21] Boros, Fortunát, *Az erdélyi ferencrendiek* [Transylvanian Franciscans]. Cluj-Kolozsvár 1927. pp. 64–92. Boros, Fortunát, *A csíksomlyói harminckét confrater* [Thirty Two Confraters of Csíksomlyó]. Cluj-Kolozsvár 1923. pp. 31–39. Galla, Ferenc, A csíksomlyói ferencrendi kolostor viszontagságai Bethlen Gábor idején [Hardships of the Franciscan Monastery in Csíksomlyó under the Rule of Gábor Bethlen] *A gróf Klebelsberg Kuno Magyar Történetkutató Intézet évkönyve*. IV. Bp. 1934. pp. 283–302.

[22] Benda, Kálmán, Ferences iskola Esztelneken a XVII. században [Franciscan School in Esztelnek in the 17th Century]. In: *Az értelmiség Magyarországon a XVI–XVII. században*. Zombori István [Ed.]. Szeged 1988. pp. 131–138.; Sával, János, *A csíksomlyói és a kantai iskola története* [History of the Schools in Csíksomlyó and Kanta]. Szeged 1997. pp. 173–176., 354–356.

nately in the *Archives of the Csángó-Hungarian of Moldavia* (the author took part in its compilation) as parish priests of Galac (Galati). The author discovered certain documents in the Holy Spirit Convent of Zagreb, in the archives of the province, that not only prove that the Dalmatian Fra Simone Conventual Franciscan was actually one person, but also help us reconstruct the life of this missionary from the island of Krk (Veglia in Italian). When he left Moldavia after decades of missionary work, he was elected guardian of the monastery in Trieste. In the years that followed, he held the offices of custos, perpetual definitor, and pater provinciae, and died in his province around 1677.[23]

The missionaries in 17th century Moldavia included Observant, Reformed, and Conventual Franciscans, Jesuits and Dominicans, and Greeks, Bulgarians, Polish, Italians provided cure of souls for the Catholic Hungarians of Moldavia. This variety disappeared at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, the mission of the Italian Conventual friars came to dominate in the Catholic church in Moldavia, which became a source of considerable conflict between the Csángó Hungarians, who insisted on the Hungarian language, and the Italian missionaries, who understood Romanian much more easily.[24]

[23] *Archives of the Csángó-Hungarian of Moldavia*...I. 242–248. 261–262. 281–285. 352–360. 369–376. 380. 400. II. 459–466. 487. 503. 524–525. 779. 790. On the life of the missionary in his pwn province: Samostan Sveti Duh, Zagreb, Archivum provinciae Dalmatiae OFM Conv, Registrum provinciae Dalmatiae, Acta Congregationis provinciae annorum 1655., 1662., 1664., 1666. 1669., 1670., 1673., 1674. A konventuális ferencesek misszióira: Franciscus Monay: *De provincia Hungarica ordinis fratrum minorum conventualium memoriae historicae*. Romae 1953. pp. 12–19.; Kowalská, Eva, Kláštory františkanov na Slovensku a národnostný problém v 17–18. storici. *Slovensky národopis* 41 (1993) 3. pp. 304– 312. *Archivum generale ordinis fratrum minorum conventualium*, Convento Santi Apostoli, Róma, prov. Ungheria S/XXX: A. 1. busta 1. Fasc. 1.

[24] Tocanel, Pietro, *Storia della Chiesa Cattolica in Romania. Il vicariato apostolico e le missioni dei frati minori conventuali in Moldavia*. Padova 1960. III/1. pp. 3–52.

Minorities History

Emil Niederhauser

The Bocskai Uprising and Europe

It should not be a problem to revive these events, they are rather well-known. István Bocskai, a nobleman with properties in Transylvania was born in 1557 and became captain-in-chief of the Várad castle (Oradea) in the 1590s. In 1595, with respect to the war posterity would call the Fifteen Years' War, Emperor Rudolph, king of Hungary, concluded an agreement with Prince Zsigmond Báthori of Transylvania. Bocskai was enthusiastic about the agreement and won a battle against the Turks in the same year. He was also a staunch supporter of Habsburg rule in Hungary. Yet, Rudolph did not trust him (did he trust anyone?), and kept him in his court in Prague between 1602 and 1604.

In the meanwhile, the Fifteen Years' War, sparked by Ottoman provocations in the early1590s, had already been going on. In Habsburg-Hungary, the population of which was mainly Protestant, Rudolph intensely promoted Counter-Reformation. The absolutism of Vienna caused considerable offence to the orders in Hungary (that is, Hungarian orders even according to our present views). The trial of István Illésházy at the Diet of 1604 was among the chief sources of antagonism. Illésházy, as the landlord of Bazin (Pezinok) and Szentgyörgy (Svätý Jur) market towns, was planning to allow his bondsmen to free themselves from servitude, which enraged the nobility. Later, Rudolph unfoundedly accused him of treason, and he could only escape to Polish territory with the help of his benefactors at the court. Furthermore, the government enacted, in addition to the acts adopted at the Diet, Act 22 aiming at curbing Reformation. All this, together with the ever more frequent confiscations of property, encouraged the opposition of the Hungarian orders. The outbreak of a feudal revolt was in the air.

Transylvania elected Bocskai prince (with respect to Transylvania, this needed the subsequent approval of the Ottoman sultan, otherwise the orders could elect anyone they pleased). Considering the prevailing circumstances in Hungary, Bocskai opted for leaving the Habsburg alliance and, instead, he concluded an agreement with the Ottomans (the confusion of the period is clearly seen in the fact that the castles in Bihar (Bihor) county under his rule were constrained to continue self-defence against the attacks of Turkish troops well into the autumn of 1604).

Bocskai made another alliance that year: with the Hajdú (Heyduck) in October. The Hajdú forces of several tens of thousands constituted mainly of fugitive bondsmen and others living at the periphery of the social structure. They raided the war-stricken areas and caused various injuries to landlords. Bocskai saw it clearly that this causes alarm among the nobility, so he launched the first of the reforms that would make his reign a unique experience. He did not try to force the Hajdú, who pursued fighting as an occupation, back among the bondsmen, but made them settle in market towns in the eastern Hungarian region that is still

called "Hajdúság". They were granted the "freedom of the Hajdú", which meant that they did not belong under the jurisdiction of landlords but, in exchange, they were obliged to take up arms at the order of the prince. In the Europe of the age, where usually mercenary armies fought each other, Bocskai thus obtained an exceptional army of his own.

Due to the injuries it had endured at the hands of Rudolph, the discontented nobility sided with him. He regarded the role he played in the defence of Protestantism as true Biblical ardour: for him it was a struggle in defence of the freedom of religion against the Habsburgs. It was this heavenly mission he set out to accomplish subsequently. He arrived in Kassa (Kosice) in early November 1604 and managed the anti-Habsburg campaign from their practically throughout the duration of his reign. He entered into a large-scale, open battle with the armies of the emperor only once, at Edelény, but he lost. However, he could use the Hajdú perfectly to make the enemy uneasy In a kind of warfare that we would call guerrilla warfare today. The alliance with the Hungarian orders made it possible for him to occupy much of Habsburg-Hungary, the territory of present-day Slovakia and Transcarpathia, in a short time. The Protestant orders even proposed that he be elected king of Hungary but Bocskai rejected the idea. However, he did concede to being elected prince of Hungary at the Diet assembled in Szerencs on 20 April 1605. With subsequent settlements, he managed to solve the Hajdú problem to the liking of the nobility.

He ruled for less than three years. He was seriously ill during the last months of his reign, his contemporaries suspected poisoning. This is unlikely but the true account of his death has not yet emerged. Towards the end of his life, he sought reconciliation with the Habsburg sovereign. After long negotiations this was achieved on 23 June 1606 when his delegates signed a peace treaty in Vienna that guaranteed freedom of religion for Protestants and the privileges of the orders (in effect, of the nobility and the aristocracy). He acted as mediator in peace negotiations with the Ottomans. This peace treaty was signed in the tents by the mouth of the Zsitva River on 11 November and it formally ensured peace for years to come – more exactly, until 1663 – between the two archenemies. The stock of properties occupied prior to the peace treaty remained practically unchanged.

The short reign of Bocskai fundamentally transformed the circumstances of Hungary and Transylvania, their bilateral relations and, as it will be revealed, their international relations as well. It was Suleyman the Magnificent who considered Transylvania his own creation and the contemporaries also regarded it as such. As opposed to this, Bocskai formulated the need for an independent Transylvania in his political will: "As long as the Hungarian crown is in the hands of a nation stronger than us, the Germans, and the Hungarian kingdom depends on the Germans, it is necessary and right to have a Hungarian prince in Transylvania for your protection and benefit. And, should God grant that the Hungarian crown fall in Hungary in the hands of a Hungarian who is to be crowned king, we urge the Transylvanians that instead of breaking from him or opposing him, help him according

to their abilities and take up its service according to long-established rules." For the next, nearly 300 years, this advice determined the fate of the country.

So far, we discussed Hungary and Transylvania. However, two other players have also been indicated who had a say in the Hungarian affairs of the age. One is the Habsburg Empire. It had reached the expansion it possessed in those times a century before but the roots of the empire went back to the 13th century. While in Europe absolutism had already gained ground as the most modern form of government, the Habsburg Empire had a peculiar structure: apart from the German-speaking territories which in effect it did not have in its power, it was still a vast state formation of countries and provinces. It had an absolutistic regime in Vienna but feudal structures lingered in other parts. Feudalism was rather strong in Hungary and stable in Bohemia – the Battle of White Mountain is still to come. Moreover, the Habsburg Empire had been in constant rivalry with the French monarchy, which sought hegemony in Europe.

Besides the constant French menace, the Empire also inherited the Ottoman burden with Hungary, since two thirds of the original Hungarian territory was, in one way or another, under the rule of the Ottomans. Accordingly, the Empire had to watch itself at two fronts. The Ottoman power seemed formidable and unshakable back in the early 17th century. Virtually none of the contemporaries realised that the Ottoman Empire entered a phase of decline with the death of Suleyman. It had made its living from the continuous conquests and the occupation of new countries that it could plunder. This, however, came to an end. The sources of revenue became scarcer and the internal relations grew confused. The central government lost its strength. Furthermore, similar to the Habsburgs, the Ottoman Empire also had to watch itself at two fronts, because at its eastern borders there lay the Persian Empire under the rule of the Safavid dynasty. Shiites had the power in Persia, while Sunnis ruled the Ottoman Empire. The Turks fought a long war against Persia between 1578 and 1590 and, in 1598, one of the many Jelali revolts in the Anatolian central areas reduced the power of the Ottomans. At the same time, Persia enjoyed one of its golden ages during the reign of Abbas I (1587–1629). This was the reason why the Empire was more than eager to make peace in 1606. The Ottomans managed to achieve the same with Persia only in 1612, and, before making that peace, they could not regain their full strength. However, neither Kassa nor Vienna could fathom this from the distance, so the alliance Bocskai made with the Turks seemed a rational step at the time.

Bocskai established his principality independent of the Habsburgs, defined its political duties in relation to the Habsburg Empire, and outlined the protection and the promotion of the feudal Hungarian world. Yet, he also had another vision. He was already an adult when István Báthori became king of Poland and it formed a union with Transylvania. When Bocskai turned to Poland, Sigismund III reigned in Poland, a member of the Vasa dynasty. He was originally king of Sweden but the Swedish deposed him in 1604 because of his devotion to the Catholic faith. He became entangled into war with Sweden for the same reason, with the

hegemony over the Baltic Sea being at stake. The Polish nobility was not satisfied with him because of his attempts at introducing absolutism, of which they had gotten unused to. Bocskai contacted the Polish orders and supported them against the king in the hope of another potential Polish-Transylvanian union. However, this opportunity vanished with his death, because alliances, at a time when the feudalist orders were relegated into the background throughout Europe, were possible only on the basis of dynasties. Therefore, the Polish assistance that could have replaced that of the Turks, could not be obtained.

The more we travel to the West, the fewer chances arise as to potential alliances. The pushing out of the Ottoman Empire from Europe at the beginning of the Fifteen Years' War did manage to stir some support. However, in the long run, the powers on the shores of the Atlantic had more at stake in overseas conquests and the economic exploitation of the occupied territories. The Dutch East Indies Company was practically founded as a private enterprise in 1602 that received assistance from the state. Later on it became a model for other similar companies that could boast about considerable economic success. This preyed on the mind of the European powers that were not directly threatened by the Ottomans and, therefore, did not seek to force of the Ottomans out of Europe.

The internal strife within the Habsburg dynasty, the family discord, as put by Austrian poet Grillparzer in the 19th century, just made things worse, although did not bring considerable changes in the foreign relations of the Empire. The German states (they were in more than 300 at the time), the majority of which adopted the religion of Martin Luther, were naturally sympathetic to Bocskai even if he was a follower of Calvin, not Luther. However, their individual positions did not count much back then and a common position could not be expected from them at all. French foreign policy turned to the Easter-European region only decades later. No matter how we look at it, there was no chance to achieve more than the actual results of the 1606 Peace Treaty.

So far, we looked at the events from a Hungarian perspective only, considering the way they took place or, more exactly, as the contemporaries must have perceived them. However, there is another side to this coin: the events as perceived not from a Hungarian historical perspective but from that of other ethnic groups in concern and present-day nations.

As we shall see, these perspectives considerably differ from one another. With respect to the war of independence, it has been mentioned that it mostly took place in the territory of present-day Slovakia. Naturally, there is a given course of events. However, from the Slovak perspective, there is no reason to have any positive national significance attached to them. Their historians point out the massive financial and human losses caused by the warfare that lasted months. (How lucky that with the military equipment of the time the war could not go on in the winter and both sides got some rest.) Naturally, we must not forget about the German and Austrian perspectives either. In the case of the Germans, the denomination is the main factor, as the Protestants found the struggle for religious freedom justified and legitimate. Accordingly, in effect, they supported the Hungarian approach. The

Catholics, the Austrians first of all, sensed revolt against the legitimate power; in other words, the Hungarians turned against modern absolutism. Therefore, they rejected the Hungarian position and Austrian historiography only grasped an expression of Hungarian rebelliousness.

These were the nations directly involved in the conflict. There are other ethnic groups affected by it: the Romanians who conceive the events of these few years still in another light. For the events include also the actions of Mihai Viteazul (in Hungarian Vitéz Mihály) in Transylvania preceding those of Bocskai. He occupied Transylvania on the authority of Rudolph, which is merely an unpleasant episode for the Hungarians. On the other hand, for the Romanians it is the first and, for quite some time, the only successful attempt at creating a unified Romanian state comprising all Romanians. It is a different question that Mihai Viteazul did not aim at forming a truly unified Romanian state, as that idea was rather alien to those circumstances. Mihai was a very enthusiastic and keen crusader who, from a religious point of view, found it essential that the heathens be driven out from Europe. If he only had a chance for that as an ally of Rudolph, then was the solution he accepted.

There is still another Hungarian ethnic group that could have its own national perspective of these events: the Croatians. They had also lost great territories to the Ottomans and had assumed a clearly anti-Turk position by the time of these events. The perspective of the Serbs is less clear-cut. Most of them supported the anti-Turk position but they also had to remember that the Ottoman conquests had involved many Serb troops fighting on the Turks' side. Besides the Ottoman conquest, they also had the possibility of a future autonomous development within the Ottoman Empire to consider.

As regards the present-day Turkish perspective, one needs to understand that both modern Turkish historiography and, following its example, public opinion distance themselves from the history of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, they cannot pretend as if they had nothing to do with a period that lasted centuries. For this reason, though the disapproval of the Ottoman rule is basically obligatory, they do not reject the possibility of an alliance between the Turks and the Hungarians against the Habsburgs. The Habsburg Empire, similar to France, was a traditional enemy of the Ottoman Empire at the time. One could point out the hybrid and outdated character of the Habsburg state formation, against which the Ottoman Empire at least managed to represent something positive.

For Western European historiography and their national perspectives, these events make no more than an episode in the history of Europe. With respect to the traditional war against the Habsburgs, it did not occur at the time that Hungarians could receive assistance. It became timely a few decades later and then did play a role in the French national perspective. The historiography of western societies did not bother much to consider the question. Naturally, one could also look at a supranational historical perspective; however, it developed only subsequent to these events.

One last perspective to consider is that of the Polish. Independence and Polish autonomy dominates their view even today. Accordingly, Sigismund III, who toyed

with the possibility of cooperation with the Habsburgs, does not receive a high mark according to the assessment by the Polish perspective. As opposed to this, they consider it positive that the Polish orders toyed with a possible relationship with Transylvania, the records of which had already proved effective. Furthermore, the Polish republic of nobles also had a few clashes with the Ottoman Empire, while the actions of the Protestants against the Catholic Habsburgs were not popular any more as Recatholicisation had already become a settled case.

Today's readers may find disillusioning the diverse national perspectives which may also entail a dangerous kind of relativism: if the same events can be considered according to various perspectives, how are we to make out the historical truth. Yet, the case here is that the historian, decades and centuries after the events, knows much more about their background and the motives behind them than even the most erudite and most well-informed statesmen of the age. However, the historian has his own problems: his possibilities are limited by the sources, since a new source can emerge at any time and make a completely new interpretation necessary. We have to accept the diversity of national perspectives. It is possible that this diversity will vanish in one or two centuries with the European Union but this is yet something we cannot take for granted.

Let's return to the Hungarian perspective: the beginning of the paper suggested that the 1606 Peace Treaty could be concluded as a result of the exhaustion or weariness of the enemies. Another hypothesis suggests it could happen because the Fifteen Years' War came to a deadlock. However, recent studies question this opinion: according to these, the Habsburg Empire achieved dominance and driving the Ottomans out of Europe became a real possibility. It was this possibility that the attack of Bocskai and the orders shattered. This hypothesis probably does not stand when formulated in such an extreme way, but there is no way we could test it as one cannot put history to the test.

This overall picture might seem a killjoy in a sense, but one will get used to the diversity of a unified Europe. All in all, the Hungarian perspective reveals certain episodes that can be appreciated and celebrated today. The uprising broke out because of the injuries suffered by the Hungarian orders. However, these were injuries that affected the entire population of the country through the constant presence of wars and destruction. The uprising marked a fundamental turning point in the political situation of the country (countries). Several measures of the previous reprehensible and bad policies could be eliminated – even if only temporarily in the majority of the cases. Furthermore, Bocskai solved an important social problem with the settlement of the Hajdú. Several problems would emerge again and again but some were settled permanently. Moreover, one cannot forget the international fame of Bocskai. Not only the fame he enjoyed back then but about the one he enjoys now. The statue of the statesman and sovereign who took up arms for the freedom of religion is still there at the Reformation Monument in Geneva. These few facts gathered above are in themselves enough to fully justify the Bocskai commemoration.

Minorities History

Tamás Stark

"Malenki Robot" – Hungarian Forced Labourers in the Soviet Union (1944–1955)[1]

Since historiography has kept silent about the "malenki robot" phenomenon in Hungary, the dark chronicle of Soviet occupation has mainly lived on and spread within families and as oral tradition. In the Hungarian territory occupied by the Red Army, armed men gathered people from the streets and took them away with the excuse of the removal of ruins. The expression "malenkala rabota" (a little work) was used to justify their actions and to offer reassurance. It indicated that there will be need for the work of the civilians, though for a short time only. Today, the expression, perceived as "malenki robot" by the Hungarians, evokes memories of deportation to the Soviet Union and forced labour.

On 25 July 1945, at the Potsdam Conference, Stalin told Truman and Churchill about the post-war situation of the Soviet Union: "I usually do not complain but now I must say that we are in an extremely difficult situation. Due to our enormous losses, we do not have enough men and, if I revealed the true circumstances of my country, I should burst into tears."[2]

Stalin, just as in Yalta before, indicated that he wanted to use the prisoners of war (POW) of the enemy countries in the territory of the Soviet Union to offset, at least in part, the great human and financial losses incurred by his country. Therefore, the Soviets regarded the work of POWs as reconstruction and compensation duty. Considering the truly huge losses of the Soviet Union, the Western Powers *de facto* recognised his claim for POW work. However, did the demand for forced labour by foreigners emerge really just because of the damage caused by Nazi Germany and its allies?

Lavrenti Berija, commissar of the interior, issued a decree on 19 September 1939, only few days after the invasion of Poland by the Soviet Union, on the organisation of a new camp system using POWs and interned civilians as labourers.[3] The acronym for the camp system set up in late September was UPVI (Upravlenie

[1] T 034143 grant from the Hungarian National Fund for Scholarly Research (OTKA), and the Bolyai János Research Fund of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences contributed to the research on the forced labour of Hungarians in Soviet custody.

[2] Stalin's statement is cited by Andreas Hilger. Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der Sowjetunion, 1941–1956, Klartext, Essen, 2000. p. 173.

[3] On the organization of "archipelago GUPVI" see: Stefan Karner, Im Archipel GUPVI. Kriegsgefangenschaft und Internierung in der Sowjetunion 1941–1956. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Wien–München, 1995, p. 55.; Stefan Karner, The GUPVI. In: Bulletin du Comité international d'histoire de la Deuxiéme Guerre mondiale. Montreal, 1995, pp. 177–189.

po delam Voennoplennych i Internirovannych – Administration for Affairs relating to Prisoners of War and Internees).

UPVI was established besides Gulag and the two camp systems cooperated closely. The chiefs at UPVI mostly came from the Gulag's administration. On the part of NKVD (Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs), General Vasili Tsernishov, former commander of Gulag, supervised the camp system. In the summer of 1941, General Serov, another former commander of Gulag, became the head of the UPVI camp system. In February 1945, the camp system was expanded and reorganised and it became GUPVI, that is, it was turned into Central Administration for Affairs relating to Prisoners of War and Internees. At that time it included over 350 camps and 4,000 auxiliary camps. Besides these, there existed special work brigades, hospital camps, detached work brigades, corrective work camps, political detachment camps and prisons. According to Soviet figures, these held a total of over 4 million foreign prisoners during their overall operation.[4]

The establishment archipelago UPVI–GUPVI during the first days of the war indicates that the Soviet leadership considered the war a suitable occasion to fill up its industrial and agricultural sectors with foreign manpower. The early setting up of GUPVI proves that they did not distinguish civilians and soldiers and that war, beyond the expansion of the Communist system, also served to secure the Soviet Union's manpower supply.

The events in Hungary in the last months of World War II and subsequently were not unique phenomena: these formed an integral part of Soviet policy conducted in the occupied territories. The conclusion of collective responsibility, ethnic cleansing, and the using of masses for forced labour were all essential parts of the Soviet system.

Soviet policy applied in Hungarian territory fits into a series of collective retorsions and ethnic and political cleansing carried out inside and outside the Soviet Union.

Deportation

Civilian population was deported from Hungary in two waves. The first wave of mass arrests happened immediately after the military operations. Two or three days after the occupation of some greater village or town, the Soviets generally collected and took away the people using the removal of ruins as an excuse. There are only scattered data available on the number of the deported. After the occupation of Kolozsvár (Cluj Napoca), the Soviet armed forces carried off some 5,000 civilians. They took 300 civilians from Hajdúböszörmény on 28 October 1944. Some 2,000 men and women were driven to prisoner camps from Nyíregyháza on 2 November and 300 civilians ended up in Soviet captivity from Hajdúnánás.[5]

[4] Ibid.

[5] Magyar Országos Levéltár *(Hungarian National Archives)* KÜM Szu tük XIX-J-1-j IV–48229. Box 25044/45.

The deportations of greatest extent took place in Budapest. Marshal Malinovski, fearing reprisal, explained the protracted occupation of the capital with the great number of German-Hungarian troops. He indicated the presence of a 180–200,000-strong force in his earlier reports, while the surrounded German-Hungarian units only numbered about 80,000 men. Since the marshal had to hand over the promised number of prisoners to GUPVI, he had to make up the difference between the fictitious and the actual number from civilians. Following the occupation of Budapest, Marshal Malinovski reported 138,000 prisoners of war. Since the number of real POWs, including the German troops, could not be more than 40,000, he gathered some 100,000 civilians from Budapest and its surroundings to secure the promised number of prisoners.[6]

The second wave of deportations followed the first by 1-2 months. It was much a more organised, and carefully planned and prepared operation which, however, did not cover the whole territory of the country.

The deportations in the present-day territory of Hungary were carried out in accordance with the decree of the Soviet Union's Committee for State Security (KGB) issued on 16 December 1944. The decree ordered the "mobilisation" of ethnic German women and men of working age in Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia and their deportation to Soviet camps.[7]

The deportation of ethnic Germans from Hungary was subsequently "legitimised" by the decree of Ferenc Erdei, minister of the interior of the provisional government, on *"the registration of persons of German origin in the territory of Hungary for the purpose of their employment in the forced-labour service"*.

Mobilization, in principle, only affected ethnic Germans. Yet, the majority of the deportees were Hungarians. The second wave of deportation in the post-war, present-day territory of Hungary, following the advance of the front, started in the area east of the Tisza River and Northeastern Hungary, continued in Budapest and in the region between the Danube and Tisza Rivers, and ended in the Southeastern Transdanubia. It seems, from the way the selection of population took place, that the Soviet internal affairs detachments had a prisoner quota for the various areas. If this quota could not be filled up with ethnic Germans, then came the Hungarians with German, and then those of Hungarian name. However, if they could meet the quota, they even left the local Germans behind despite the order above.

Soviet troops and Hungarian "polic" escorted the prisoners to the receiving camps at 25–30 kilometres from the front, of which about 80 operated in Hungary. The collecting camps operated beyond these. In the territory of the country there

[6] Zalán Bognár, Egy csata utóélete *[The consequence of a battle]*. In: Studia Caroliensia, 2000/1 pp. 78–81.

[7] György Dupka–Alexei Korsun, A "Malenykij Robot" a dokumentumokban *[Documents on the Deportations of Hungarians from Carpatho-Ruthenia]*. pp. 33–34 ; Stefan Karner, Im Archipel GUPVI. Kriegsgefangenschaft und Internierung in der Sowjetunion 1941–1956. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Wien–München, 1995. p. 25.

were ten camps (Baja, Debrecen, Gödöllő, Jászberény, Székesfehérvár, Vác, Kecskemét, Cegléd, Szeged, Gyula) that held more than 20,000 prisoners.[8] These camps were guarded exclusively by Soviet troops. The inhabitants of the area could not even go near to the camps usually set up in military barracks. Occasionally, however, it was possible to bribe the guards with gold and alcohol, and the most tenacious could receive news about their relatives or, sometimes, obtain their release. The prisoner already "bought" was safe, but the guards remedied the "deficiency" from among the locals. There were camps where one could send in food and there were some camp commanders who even received relatives, calmed them, and promised that the captives would be released soon.

The real prisoners of war, the Hungarian soldiers who switched sides in the hope of freedom, and the civilians spent 1 to 2 months locked up together in the collecting camps. They were then loaded onto wagons and told that the place of their work would be "somewhere else".

There is only approximate data available on the number of the Hungarians who fell into captivity and were deported.

The Central Statistical Office (KSH), considering the possible number of Hungarian soldiers captured in Soviet territory, in the fighting in Hungary, and during the withdrawal of March–April 1945, estimated that altogether 600,000 Hungarians fell into Soviet captivity.[9] Since the 1946 KSH report makes mention neither of ethnic Germans carried off from Hungary nor of the Hungarians deported from Carpatho-Ruthenia or Transylvania, the total number of Hungarians and ethnic Germans in Hungary captured and deported by the Soviets can exceed the KSH data by as much as 50–100,000 people. The order of magnitude of these estimates is reinforced by Soviet data that emerged after 1989. According to the figures of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, there were 526,000 prisoners in the Soviet Union on 31 October 1945.[10] However, this number includes only those who were registered in the autumn of 1945. This number could not cover those who were captured earlier and died before October 1945. The Soviet data did not include those who died in the transit camps and during transportation. Yet, the death rate was much higher during transportation than in the camps in the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the data on the 526,000 persons registered in the autumn of 1945 actually stands for more – even by as many as 100,000 more – prisoners.

[8] Hadtörténelmi Levéltár *(Archives of Military History)*, Budapest, Békeelőkészítő anyag *[Peace Preparation material]* A/l. 94/4766.

[9] Hadtörténelmi Levéltár *(Archives of Military History)*. Budapest, Békeelőkészítő anyag *[Peace preparation material]* A/l. 94/4766.

[10] Gosudarstvennaia archivnaia sluzba Rossiiskoi Federacii, Centr hranenia, istorikodokumentalnih kollekcii *(State Archives of the Russian Federation, Center for preservation of historical collection)*, Moscow, MVD, fond. 1/n opis: 01e delo: 81. See also: V. P. Galicki, Vengerskie voennoplennie v SSSR *[Hungarian POW's in the Soviet Union]*. Voenno Istoriceskii Jurnal *(Review of Military History)*, 1991/10, p. 45.; Voennoplennije v SSSR, Dokumenti i Maleriali *[Prisoners of war in the Soviet Union, Documents and Materials]*. Ed. M.M. Zagorulko, Logos, Moscow, 2000, p. 332.

The number of civilians cannot be accurately established. The POW department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to compile a list of deported civilians based on the declaration of the relatives during 1945. The lists available contain the names of 75,811 people from the countryside.[11] However, this does not include in full the number of German deportees, and the number of Hungarians registered subsequently is not complete either. Considering the deportations in Budapest and surroundings that affected some 100,000 civilians, and those in Carpatho-Ruthenia or Transylvania, the number of civilians can exceed 200,000.[12] This is approximately one third of the total number of prisoners.

Transport

The prisoners were transported from the collecting camps in Hungary to transit camps in Romania. Often Hungarian police forces also participated in the loading. Similar to the Russian guards, they too hit the prisoners with their guns and forced them on board. Usually 60 people were squeezed into one wagon. 30-30 people had to settle at the two or more storey bunks in the left and the right. There was a stove in between but captives received fuel only sporadically. There was a small hole bored in the bottom of the wagon, which served as the toilet. The openings on the sides were covered with barbed wire and the doors were locked before departure. There was a brake booth with guards at the end of the train. On the way the trains occasionally stopped to get water and that was the last chance for escape. However, the guards opened fired as soon as somebody tried to flee. Evidently, they were responsible for showing up with a certain number of prisoners, so they had to find new prisoners to make up the losses.

The prisoners reached one of the transit camps after days spent travelling. The two largest camps of this kind were in Foksáni (Foksani) and Máramarossziget (Sighetu Marmatiei). Infamous transit camps operated near Brassó (Brasov), in Temesváron (Timisoara), Jasi and Ramnicul Sarat. Besides Romania, many Hun-

[11] József Domokos devoted years for studying petitions of the relatives of deportees, and the lists of deported persons compiled for the Allied Control Commission. On the basis of these sources stored in the Military Archives in Budapest, he identified 75,811 deportees from the countryside. The results of Domokos' research were published in: Magyarország a második világháborúban, Lexikon A–Zs, *[Hungary in World War II. An Encyclopedia]* ed. Péter Sipos–István Ravasz, Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság, Petit Real Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1996, p. 498.

[12] On the deportations of Hungarians from Transylvania see: Fehérkönyv az 1944. Őszi magyarellenes atrocitásokról *[White Book about the atrocities committed against Hungarians in the Fall of 1944]*. Edition of Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, Cluj-Napoca, 1998 pp. 27–30; Transilvansky Vopros, Vengero-Rumunsky Territorialnuy Spor i SSSR 1940–1946, Dokumenty *[The Transylvanian Question, Hungarian–Romanian Rivalry for Transylvania and the Soviet Union, 1940–1946]* Rosspen, Moscow 2000, pp. 288–289.; On the deportations from Carpatho-Ruthenia see: György Dupka–Alexei Korsun, A "Malenykij Robot" a dokumentumokban *[Documents on the Deportations of Hungarians from Carpatho-Ruthenia]*. Intermix Publishers, Ungvár–Budapest, 1997. p. 15.

garians were transported to the camp near Szambor in Western Ukraine, which was another important transit post.

The death rate was monstrous in these camps. No reliable data are available but the recollections of the survivors can provide an authentic picture of the circumstances in these transit camps. Dysentery epidemic decimated the prisoners in Temesvár in the summer of 1945, with some 30,000 German, Hungarian, Romanian and prisoners of other nationality dying there. The survivors taken to the camp in Foksáni also talk about epidemics and dying masses.

The recollections reveal that the prisoners received food only once a day during the weeks of transportation, and it was usually dry bread and some hot liquid dubbed as soup. In the case of winter transports, there was often no fuel, so the stoves in the wagons could not be heated up enough. These circumstances caused about 10–20 per cent of the prisoners to die. The dead were left by the tracks and nobody registered the casualties.

After the transit camps and weeks spent in wagons, the prisoners arrived in one of the infernal "circles" of the Soviet archipelago.

The Soviet archipelago

The Hungarians were scattered between some 2000 camps. According to information received from returned survivors, several camps were successfully identified by the Ministry of Defence, then under a minister of the Smallholders Party. There were Hungarians in 44 camps in Azerbaijan, in 158 in the Baltic States, in 131 in Belarus, in 119 in Northern Russia, in 53 in the surroundings of Leningrad, in 627 in Central Russia, in 276 in the Ural Mountains, and in 64 in Siberia.

The prisoners decimated and psychologically and physically broken during the long train journey could only leave the wagons with difficulty, leaning upon each other. They experienced Soviet reality at the very moment they got off. Many described in their recollections that the locals rushed to the just emptied wagons in search of the remnants of some edible food. Those who were transported from Romania on board of ships experienced the same in the Black Sea ports. Miserable and starving locals waited for them in the port of Sevastopol begging for clothes, shoes, and food. The prisoners arrived in a world where they could bring something even after weeks of hardship. It happened often that the guards plundered the shipment they had been escorting when they left the wagons or the ships. The captives had to line up, they were counted, and then they had to put their remaining personal belongings on the ground or in baskets. The confiscated objects usually ended up at the guards but it also happened that they were distributed among the locals who surrounded the new arrivals. The guards, to whom the survivors often referred as the "Tatar boys", were cruel. They shot or beat to death with the butt all those who stopped while they were supposed to be marching. The inhabitants of the villages and towns passed by the procession surrounded the transports with fierce hatred and occasionally only the guards could save

the prisoners from the wrath of the locals. On other occasions it was the guards to beat up the people they were escorting. The marching prisoners, as they were dragging themselves along, had to put up with a shower of stones, threats, and spits. At that point they could not yet understand what the people were shouting at them, they only understood the term "fascist". However, hostility was not based on hatred deriving from nationalist or racist prejudice. Russians were told that the "prisoners of war" all committed war crimes, they were mass murderers and, basically, they were responsible for the misery of the country. Yet, the anger of the locals was primarily fuelled not by their thirst for revenge but their bitterness and hopelessness. They were shouting that the prisoners should go home, since they themselves had hardly anything to eat and the newcomers would take away even that from them. Sometimes, the local population was furious with the Hungarians for strange and unexpected reasons. According to a recollection, *"truly dull people live [in Krasnojarsk]. They said to us, 'So, you are Hungarians? Well, it's your problem! You were surely Communists, so you deserve your fate! ... Yes, you should be tied up with Béla Kun, he had been a Communist too and then died here in Krasnojarsk. But see for yourself what happens here!'."*[13]

The buildings were huge grey sheds. The prisoners were lousy and dirty after the long journey but the inhabitants of the camp were in no better condition either. Defencelessness and hopelessness worked the prisoners collected from different countries into a single grey mass. They were all wearing rags and the new arrivals could hardly distinguish the men from the women, and the people of different nationalities.

Life in the camps can be described authentically but never accurately. Hundreds of recollections reveal that the life, the working conditions, and the relationship with the guards and the locals changed from camp to camp. In some the guards killed for fun, in others the guards pillaged the nearby apple orchards together with the prisoners. In certain camps the captives regularly received permission to leave to the neighbouring villages, while, at places, the guards fired at anybody who went near the fence. In some people had work 14 hours, in others 12 or 8 hours. In some cases they received token payment, in others they did not. There were camps where almost every prisoner died, while in some the losses "only" amounted to 10 per cent. In some cases one was killed for running away, in others only received punishment. The circumstances of life and work depended on the commanders, the guards, the relationship with the locals, and the still unknown "orders from above". Furthermore, the social and geographical environment, the climate and the date and period of captivity also influenced camp life. In 1945, there were numerous camps where prisoners had American tinned food to feed on, while starving became general by 1946. Despite considerable differences, camp life universally meant distress, defencelessness, and despair.

[13] Zsoll Csalogh, M. Lajos, 42 éves *[Lajos M., Aged 42]*. Maecénás Budapest, 1989. p. 67.

Prisoners were forced to build their own camps. The most rudimentary ones were huge, 2-3 metres deep basins dug in the ground, with several thousands of people held under the open sky. The system of camps that were able to hold prisoners and make them work for longer periods was developed during the war and the post-war years. In general 4 rows of wires surrounded the camp. Two high ones stood 3-4 metres apart and, at 4-5 metres from each, a one-metre high defensive wall ran parallel in the inside and another in the outside. The internal defensive wall was the limit of how far the prisoners could go. The guards moved between the two higher fences and towers stood in the corners of the camp. There were camps with two rows and others with three rows of fences that could not be approached to less than 2 metres.

The major part of the sheds used as permanent quarters were shelters dug in the ground that held some 300 people. The buildings that accommodated more, about 1,000–1,500 prisoners, were built of bricks.

In these, the rooms opened from corridors. In the lower rooms there was a one-story, in the higher ones two- or three-storey rows of boards. The beds were made of these boards of various size laid down crosswise. The prisoners did not receive covers, mattresses or straw. At the same time, the sheds were crowded: So many were lying next to each other that a whole row had to move when one wanted to turn to the other side. Usually there was no window-glass in the windows and there were no stoves. The prisoners prepared their own stoves from bricks and iron plates, on which they could also boil water when they managed to get some fuel.

The men and the women were in different barracks and the guards generally stayed in a separate building. Prisoners were accommodated not only in camps built for that purpose. Factories, storehouses, barns, and plundered monasteries and churches were also turned into camps.

The day of the prisoners started with breakfast and then they had to line up. Several survivors recalled that the commander gave a brief speech to them, in which he summarised the reason of their deportation. According to a very simple explanation, they were fascists and had been deported in order to make good all the wrongs they had done to the Soviet Union.

Following their arrival into the camp, if there was a suitable facility, the prisoners were disinfected and their hair was removed. Then came a medical check up, which was only a pinch in the bottom of the prisoners, as the doctors inferred their general state of health from the flexibility of their skin. There were four categories established: the prisoners in group one and two were required to do every kind of job. Those in group three did not have to work in the mines. The severely feeble, dystrophic people were usually made to work within the camp.

The civilians and POWs, who usually arrived in good clothes and boots, were given camp clothes. The garments of greater value were taken away and the prisoners were given dirty rags pulled off from dead Soviet or German soldiers. They wore canvas shoes with wooden soles. The prisoners themselves also prepared footwear from waste rubber and canvas. The free Russian workers wore same

kind of footwear. Only the officers had real shoes, American boots or Russian boots with linen insert. Occasionally several prisoners had to share a pair of footwear, so the person whose shift was over had pass it on to the next. They had no underwear. In the winter they usually received padded trousers, quilted jacket and Halia boots – if not, they had to go on wearing their usual clog. The ones working in the mines received sackcloth trousers that, in lack of a belt, were fastened with strings or wires, a shirt that could be fastened at the neck, a quilted jacket and, for footwear, gum or wooden shoes.

Registration took place several times during the first month. However, the Hungarian soldiers captured at the Don River in early 1943 were for example only registered in the spring of 1943 for the first time. By that time nearly half of the prisoners had died. The prisoners had to appear in front of a board made up of officials and doctors, and a four-page data sheet including 52 questions was filled out about everybody. The questions concerned every little detail of their life at home. The interrogators inquired about social (class) background, qualifications, language knowledge, and political views. If the person was a soldier, he had to render detailed account of the time he spent at the theatre of war. A postcard-size personal card with the most important data was also prepared of everybody. The prisoners than took this card and the four-page questionnaire with them from camp to camp. The Russians tried to verify the authenticity of the answers by holding several interrogations during one's stay in the camps. Those whose answers changed between two sessions were considered suspects. The prisoners who could not speak Russian were at the mercy of their questioners. Several recollections indicated that the interpreter translated arbitrarily or, obviously at prior orders, described the civilians as members of a fighting unit. Many prisoners only discovered the "mistake" months or years later. However, if they protested, they only became suspicious without their record being corrected.

An informant system was organised within the camps for the uncovering of the past of the prisoners, their observation, and the gathering of damning proofs. The informants were selected by the political officer. He ordered the chosen prisoner into his office and told him about his task. The squealers had to gather information on the pre-war activities of the prisoners and their family members. They also wanted to know what was on the mind of the prisoners and especially the officers, what they were talking about, what were their plans. Upon reporting, the squealers received extra ration of soup from the political officer. When they were unveiled, they were quickly removed to another camp to escape the revenge of their fellow prisoners. However, the people who were forced and intimidated to become squealers usually gave themselves up to their companions. They told the others what they had to report about and they agreed on the details of his report. This was not only a moral but also a rational decision on their part. The squealers were also people struggling to survive who, at the same time, had to be loyal primarily to their fellow citizens – if only for fear of their eventual revenge should they be unveiled.

The captives usually worked 10–14 hours a day. In theory they did not have to work on Sundays, but the command of the camp found things to do then as well. In certain cases the prisoners received token payment, in others they did not. Those had better chances for survival who were employed in some factory or in agriculture as skilled workers. However, most of them worked in mines, at clearings or built roads or railways. The conditions were worst at Gulag camps that held the convicts. The three most infamous camp districts – Vorkuta, Norilsk, and Kolyma – were north of the Arctic Circle. According to recollections, time and again the temperature dropped to close to 60 degrees below zero, but the severe, constant wind, called the purga, was even worse. The regulations required the prisoners to work outdoors until 36 degrees below zero and they could be made to work in a closed space between 36 and 42 degrees below zero. With this cold many froze to death during the several kilometres they had to walk to get to their workplace. The prisoners worked inside the camps when it was colder than 42 degrees below zero.

According to the regulations, the daily ration of the prisoners was as follows: 600–700 grams of bread or biscuit, 90 grams of barley or husked wheat mush, 600 grams of potatoes and vegetables, 40 grams of meat, 120 grams of fish, and 20 grams of sugar. The German Red Cross reconstructed the actual ration of the prisoners on the basis of the survivors' recollections. This revealed that they only received the daily potato/vegetable ration as specified. They usually received cabbage or turnip as vegetables. The actual ration they received from the flour-paste-like bread was 400–600 grams and some Hungarian prisoners remember considerably smaller, 200-300-gram rations. They almost never received meat and the randomly distributed salted fish rations were also far from the specified quantities. On the other hand, the prisoners often received barley or nettle soup. The starving prisoners complemented their daily diet with whatever they could find. Those who worked near some water with fish and scallops, while in other camps the people hunted for susliks and crows. In the late 1940s their circumstances improved somewhat in the camps where they received some payment for their work. They could buy potatoes and salted fish in the canteen after the deduction of the "costs" of "room and board" and protection.

The general state of health of the prisoners quickly deteriorated due to the minimum and unvaried diet, the harsh circumstances, and the overwork. They received practically no medical attendance. Although there existed a "consulting room", the doctors, prisoners themselves, had neither equipment nor drugs. The prisoners ate charcoal against diarrhoea and chalk dust against stomach ache. For other infections they normally used diluted potassium permanganate. However, there were "special" treatments as well. In camp No. 6 of the Siberian Berkul, the people ate raw rat liver against night-blindness. In one of the camps of the Donletz Basin, typhoid fever was "cured" with tea made of burned bread. Still here, scabs were "treated" with grease mixed with sulphur. In many other places the prisoners prepared tea from pine needles for vitamins.

Only the sick with a fever had a chance to get to a hospital. Given that those had no equipment either, they could not be cured but they were at least left in peace for some time. Infections caused the death of large number of people. The ill lost weight quickly and emaciated until they died. Frequent diseases included malaria, typhoid fever, and scurvy which caused the teeth to loosen and fall out.

Many died in "accidents" at work (crumbling mines, explosions) or froze to death. The high death rate turned the people apathetic. The deaths were reported with delay so that the companions could collect the rations of the dead and they were not always registered. Registration usually was suspended in the times of epidemics. Upon a person's death normally not the actual reason of death was recorded in the minutes. Before the burial the head of the dead was smashed because many tried to escape by feigning death. The stripped bodies were buried in mass graves. In the winter, when it was impossible to dig graves in the frozen ground, the remains of the dead were covered with snow. Officially nobody notified the family of the deceased, if they were informed, it was by a survivor.

Commanders and guards held the fate of the prisoners in their hands. They decided on what counted as a crime and they determined the punishment. The range of crimes and punishments was wide. For escape and attempted escape death was the usual sentence but the commander was occasionally satisfied with public beating. There were guards who did not do anything if an exhausted prisoner sat for a while, while others tortured those who "rested without permission" to death. "Jail" was the most general punishment. It was a pit dug into the ground with no place to sit, so the jailed person had to stand day and night on bricks. The guards made this even more unbearable by stripping the miserable and pouring water under them so that they could not sit down at all. Prisoners were also tortured with heat: they were closed into heated cloth-disinfecting rooms for ours.

The locals and the free or convicted Russian workers greeted the Hungarians with hostility at first. Several survivors said that upon their arrival, as they marched toward the camp and passed the villages, stones were showered at them, the locals spit at them, threatened them, and shouted to them to go home. At work the Russians did not talk to the prisoners. The shovel lifted up threateningly was the main teaching tool in the mines and factories. The locals feared that the prisoners will take away the little food and opportunity that was left.

The relations normally changed when the Hungarians learned to speak Russian and, on occasions, received permission to visit the village near the camp. The local people understood that the prisoners were innocent and that they were just as miserable as themselves. Often proper exchange of goods evolved between the locals and the captives. Skilful Hungarians prepared simple utensils from waste materials and exchanged them for food. The Russians' demand was especially high for small crosses that could be worn on a necklace: they even gave money and bread in exchange of those. The Russians and Ukrainians usually did not have much more foodstuffs than the prisoners but the local population did not fall victim to the regular epidemics occurring in the camps. The basic difference

between the lives of the prisoners and the average Russians was that the people outside the camps were free, though even their freedom was very much curtailed. The Russian workers could not change their workplace, could not leave their home, and could not travel. They were constrained to stay at one spot, much as the prisoners. However, the "free" at least had their family and did not meditate on the past and did not long for freedom, since, in one way or other, they have always lived under inferior circumstances.

The survivors paint a tragic picture of the general situation of post-war Soviet Union.

At the same time, the prisoners could see that not only war but also the confusion characteristic of Soviet management and the wasting due to negligence contributed to the misery. Many forced labourers saw freight trains stranded on tail tracks with completely corroded machinery brought from Germany. It also occurred to them that, in the midst of the terrible shortage of foodstuffs, hills of harvested wheat rotted in lack of organised transport, storage, and distribution. Soviet corruption, inseparable from the Soviet lifestyle, and the unlawful appropriation of goods developed amongst these circumstances. According to the recollections of the survivors, Soviet society was based on stealing. Everybody stole from everybody else. Not commerce but stealing ensured the exchange and circulation of objects and valuables. This was even more so in the camp archipelago. The guard was steeling from the prisoner and vice versa, the prisoners were stealing from each other and everybody was stealing from the factory. However, factories also thieved the people when they did not pay them or did not distribute jackets to them. The prisoners, whenever they could, stole fuel for their stoves but the guards often took that away from them. The chief and his subordinate were also stealing. People cheated, they were constrained to cheat at rationing and the registration of finished work. Stealing was an integral part of life in the camps and it became the only means of survival. A Hungarian priest was asked by fellow prisoners whether the Ten Commandments still counted and stealing was still a sin. The priest reflected briefly and then answered that thieving from each other was still a sin but stealing from the guards or from work was not.

Survivors transported back home

The provisional government and then, following the first free elections, the government of Ferenc Nagy, considering their limited possibilities, did a lot for the liberation and returning of POWs and interned civilians. Béla Miklós, head of the provisional government, complained at the occupation authorities because of the deportation of civilians on 26 December 1944 and then again on 7 January 1945.[14]

[14] László Szűcs (ed.) Dálnoki Miklós kormányának minisztertanácsi jegyzőkönyvei, 1944. december 23.–1945 november 15. *[Minutes of the Council of Ministers of the Miklós Dálnoki Government, December 23, 1944-November 15, 1945].* vol. A , p. 149. note 22.

Ferenc Nagy, at his negotiations in Moscow in April 1946 raised the issue of returning the POWs to Hungary. Although the Soviet government announced the release of prisoners in August 1945, their organised transportation only started in June 1946.

However, the trains arrived regularly to the receiving camp in Debrecen only until November. After a long interval, Stalin continued the release of prisoners in May 1947 in order to improve the election chances of the Communist Party that proclaimed itself the "liberator of POWs".

The registration of the prisoners returning from the Soviet Union started reliably after June 1946. Most of the sources estimate the number of those who arrived before that to be between 100,000 and 150,000. Between June 1946 and December 1948, the POW Receiving Authority in Debrecen registered 202,000 returned prisoners.[15] Between 1949 and 1951 another 20–25,000 arrived home but no accurate data is available on those who returned after 1951. Some 3,000 prisoners were transported back between 1953 and 1955. Based on Hungarian sources, altogether some 330–380,000 people arrived back home.

Considering that neither the people were registered in the transit camps nor the deaths along the way, the more than 200,000-strong gap between the number of the deportees and the returned can indeed reflect the number of Hungarians who died in the Soviet archipelago and during the outbound journey. However, the survivors were also victims. The majority of the prisoners arrived home sick and many became disabled for the rest of their life. Their captivity is a troubling memory even from a distance of decades.

[15] Hadtörténelmi Levéltár *(Archives of Military History)*, 1948. eln III. Tájékoztató.