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**Conditions
of
Minorities**

Zoltán Dövényi

Some regional aspects of the international migration in Hungary

1. Introduction

The socialist era was characterized by immobility across the borders; the socialist countries – Hungary among them – tried to avoid allowing great numbers of foreigners on their territory. At the end of the 1980s the changes of regimes brought important changes in this respect too, and the fall of the iron curtain did away with the social migration policy.

Permeable borders helped Hungary to join the stream of international mobility with all its advantages and disadvantages. The increasing number of foreigners coming to Hungary in the wake of developments raised the interest of scholars and now there is already a long list of references to the matter. Results cannot be denied, but the research is uneven, some aspects have been satisfactorily researched others left unnoticed.

Among the latter should be mentioned the analysis of the regional distribution of international migration. The present study is an attempt at this field. Due to restrictions of the length of the paper only some questions can be treated but with the help of maps and figures much can be enlightened.

2. The regional distribution of foreigners staying in Hungary

Since the number of foreigners increases year by year, surpassing the number of emigrants, it is calculated that there are more than 100,000 persons, though the exact figure is not known. In the 1990s the number of foreigners continuously grew and by the year 2000 it was over 153,000. The following year a new calculating system was introduced and the number was given as 110,000 in 2001.

Thus causes difficulties in handling the matter satisfactorily; since there is a break in the line of data the processes cannot be evaluated in progress because the changes do not relate to real life processes but are simply ones made in the statistical systems. Under such circumstances it

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is advisable to concentrate on the period after the year 2000 and make no references – or only with restriction – to earlier events and developments.

This is why the regional distribution of foreigners staying in Hungary will be analysed in a given time: the year 2002. The following important facts can be established:

- About the half of the foreign citizens was living in Budapest and County Pest, in the neighbourhood of the capital. Thus a large proportion of them are concentrated at a small region of Hungary.
- The other counties lag behind the Budapest region; it is only in the Counties Csongrád, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg where more than 5,000 persons lived. In the Counties Vas, Tolna, Nógrád and Heves the figure was less than 2000.
- Foreign citizens coming from different countries are concentrated in different regions of Hungary, thus several types of characteristics can be defined.
- In largest numbers Romanian citizens are represented who form considerable groups in most of the counties, they do not form the largest groups only in the Counties Csongrád and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg. Their preferred area is Budapest and its neighbourhood and they rarely choose the eastern parts of the country bordering Romania.
- The Ukrainian, Slovakian and Yugoslav citizens prefer the counties neighbouring their original country i.e. the Counties Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Győr-Moson-Sopron and Csongrád.
- The Chinese citizens show the densest settling pattern, 4/5 of them live in the Capital.
- In the case of the citizens coming from EU countries there is a pronounced West - East dichotomy; they mostly settled down in the western part of the Hungary (the capital and its neighbourhood included); they have chosen the eastern part frequently.
- According to their habitat the foreign citizens are mostly urban living in larger towns and cities, only 1/5 of them in villages. This is a much lower figure than the one of the Hungarian population. (*Fig. 1.*)

The positioning of the foreigners in Hungary is not only regionally different but also according to the recipient settlements. It is important that the settlements preferred by foreign citizens only partially correspond to the hierarchy of the settlement network. The situation of Budapest is unam-

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biguous because the capital of the country is at the same time the biggest recipient. The importance of the capital's commuter belt is indicated by the fact that there are three towns where foreigners are conglomerated: Budaörs, Érd, Gödöllő neither of which belongs to the first line of Hungarian towns, either by the size of their population or by playing any kind of central role. A similar interest was focussed of Gyula, the former county town which shares the place with Békéscsaba, the present county town.

Asymmetry appears only in the case of the largest recipient settlements. The towns coming in line after Budapest are all on the Great Hungarian Plane near the border. Of them Szeged comes first with 6,000 registered foreign citizens. A considerable increase in immigration from Transcarpathia is indicated by the elevation of Nyíregyháza to a leading target town. (Fig. 2.)

For a long time there were no data about the mother tongue and nationality of foreign citizens. It was generally accepted that their majority was ethnic Hungarian or had Hungarian as their mother tongue but it was impossible to justify it numerically. The 2001 census brought important changes by inquiring about the mother tongue and ethnicity along with nationality. Since the data were published on county level at last there is an opportunity to analyse the question regionally.

The census registered the mother tongue of more than 87,000 foreign citizens, including those who did not give an answer or whose mother tongue was unknown. Double citizens were excluded from the count, this is why the figure is lower than the above-mentioned 110,000.

65% of the 87,000 foreigners declared to have Hungarian as their mother tongue and if those are also considered who did not give an answer to this question and those who were unknown, the number could be higher, 78.3%. The importance of those who has Hungarian as their mother tongue is implied by the fact that German citizens, who are present in the second largest numbers represent only 5.4%, Romanians 3.3%. The 2.6% share of the Chinese and the 2% of the Ukrainians is also noteworthy.

It is no surprise, therefore, that in every county as well as in Budapest the majority of foreigners had Hungarian, as their mother tongue, the regional distribution, however, is very different in the various regions. While they represent 50% in Budapest, in County Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg it is more than 82%. There is a kind of West–East dichotomy: on the Great Hungarian Plain the proportion of Hungarian speakers is higher than in Transdanubia. It is the opposite in the case of the Germans taking the second place: they are more represented in Transdanubia. This

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shows the differences in the migration routes. Migration routes explain that there are more Ukrainians in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Romanians in the southern part of the Great Plain, and Croatians in the southern part of Transdanubia.

Budapest is worth mentioning for the language point of view. The importance of the capital is expressed not only in the number of foreigners living there but also in the structure they occupy. The foreigners living in Budapest have a much more differentiated structure; there are several language groups which can be found only in Budapest (Africa, Arabian, Modern Hebrew, Armenian, etc.).

The social economic influence of the foreign citizens living in Hungary is defined by their age. It must not be forgotten that the Hungary's demographic resources have been exhausted, therefore people belonging to the younger age groups are necessary even if – due their small number - they cannot reverse the unfavourable demographic processes.

Analysing the age-structure of the foreigners in Hungary taken as a continuum, the increase of the proportion of the older generation is conspicuous. The age structure of the indigenous population and that of the foreigners are approaching to one another thus the demographic advantage is about to diminish.

As is usual in work-oriented communities, the proportion of children and young persons is low: 15% in contrast to the 23.3% of the indigenous population. The regional differences follow a similar pattern as in the case of the over-60 year old group: the proportion of the younger than 19 year old group is 10.5%, in County Veszprém, but 23.7% in County Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg. Along the Ukrainian and Romanian border the proportion of the young persons is higher than average and since in this area the share of the older age group is also higher than average, it means that the proportion of population of working age is relatively low. Budapest and its neighbourhood represents the opposite where the share of old and young age groups is equally lower than average, thus the work force potential is higher.

3. The regional distribution of Hungary's new citizens

One of the important outcomes of international migration is that over 100,000 persons were naturalized between 1990 and 2001, about 10,000 new citizens per year. Before the change of regime it was less than a tenth of this number.

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As the population of Hungary has been continuously decreasing since 1981 the new citizens improve the unfavourable population tendencies. The balance is also improved by the fact that there were only 13,000 persons who renounced their Hungarian citizenship. It is the more important because there were fears in the time of the change of regime that people would leave their citizenship in great numbers; fortunately this was not the case.

As to the original citizenship of the new Hungarian citizens, it is clear that only few persons are involved. Hungary is in the focus of interest mainly of persons from neighbouring countries where ethnic Hungarians are living in great numbers. Of the 76 500 persons who were naturalized between 1993 and 2001 about 50,000 (64.5%) were formerly citizens of Romania, more than 9,200 (12.%) of Yugoslavia, about 5,700 (7.5%) of Ukraina. Even several of the 3,786 (4.9%) former Russian citizens most probably had Hungarian as their mother tongue.

The above four states have provided the 90% of the naturalized persons, thus the rest of the world has been represented by the remaining 10%. There is a lack of interest in the EU-countries, shown by the 600 applicants for naturalization. The Chinese living in Hungary are rarely naturalized (between 1993 and 2001 there were only 29 persons) Vietnamese somewhat more frequently (162 persons).

The regional distribution of the persons naturalized between 1993 and 2001 is roughly the same as that of the foreigners permanently staying in Hungary. Their main habitat is Budapest and its commuting belt. In the period under scrutiny every fourth of them was living in Budapest, every sixth in County Pest – mainly in the commuting belt. It is noteworthy that the concentration lessened during the period: while in 1993–1994 45% of the newly naturalized lived in Central Hungary, by the end of the period it was less than 40%.

The other centre of gathering for the new citizens is the southern part of the Great Hungarian Plain where they live especially in County Csongrád (1993–2001: almost 6,000 persons). In contrast to Budapest the share of this region is increasing: in 1993–1994 it was 13–14%, at the end of the period 20%.

Compared to the national average the number of new citizens is high in the Counties Hajdú-Bihar and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, along the Romanian border (about 4,000 persons each), in other part of the country it is much lower, sometimes negligible (e.g. in County Nógrád). It is valid even in the case of such counties where the economic situation would make possible the settling down of larger groups (e.g. in County Vas).

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The level of urbanisation of the new citizens is also notable: while two thirds of the indigenous population lives in towns it is three quarters in the case of the new citizens. It is though understandable since the new comers have better chances in towns to settle down than in villages. The county towns Debrecen and Szeged are the habitat of many of them. (Fig. 3.)

Since there are more women than men (about 55–45%), it increases the generally higher proportion of women; otherwise, the new citizens improve the age-structure even though on a small scale because they belong to a younger generation than the indigenous population. Though they show ageing tendencies: 1993: 30.2 years, 2000: 35.3 years in average, and if this tendency continues the minimal influence on age-improving will diappear.

4. Hungary and the migratory process from East to West

In her 1,000-year history Hungary frequently served as the 'highway of people', i.e. frequently was the scene of the so-called international migration. There were always economic, social or political causes in the background triggering these movements. There is also the geographical situation as a general feature which is a general aspect playing a role in all the times. A glance at the map explains that most of the movements of people were unavoidable.

The first of the reasons is that the routes connecting various parts of Europe cut through the Carpathian Basin and thus through Hungary. Since these routes are used legally as well as for illegal purposes, the activities concentrate in the region, this means that all types of international migration can be observed in Hungary.

In addition to immigration and emigration there is the frequently referred to function of a 'ferry country', i.e. that of providing contact between East and West. If we accept that Europe is basically divided into two parts, then the majority of the immigrants come from east heading west. Transmigration and refugee routes show a similar pattern. The transit function of Hungary appears most clearly in the fact that migrants who come from distant parts of the Asia and Africa (most frequently illegally) try to reach their destination in Western Europe via Hungary. (Fig. 4.)

It is not unimportant for the future if this trend will be permanent or will change considerably. There are several signs indicating the former. This is supported by the population forecasts of the world till the year 2050: the

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
increase of the population is expected to dramatically increase in those areas from where considerable masses of people have already moved across Hungary. While in the meantime Europe's share of the world's population has been halved the intensity of transmigration has to be expected.

This in-between situation can bring advantages as well as disadvantages for Hungary. If the country could pick the suitable groups from the 'population bonus' in order to improve the unfavourable demographic situation the geographical situation could work out profitably; if the main aim will be to try to fend off illegal immigration, a fairly hopeless battle as it is, than Hungary will loose the struggle by passing over the possibility to win. Whatever the outcome, it will depend on the future Hungarian migration policy.

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Fig. 1.


FOREIGN CITIZENS LIVING IN HUNGARY REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION
(2001)



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Fig 2.

FOREIGN CITIZENS LIVING IN HUNGARY DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO SETTLEMENTS (2003)



Design: Zoltán Dövényi
Map: Mária Máté-Káler

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Fig. 3

NUMBER OF NATURALISED PERSONS ACCORDING TO COUNTIES (2001)





Fig. 4.

HUNGARY ON THE ROUTE OF EAST-WEST
MIGRATION



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*Éva Gárdos–Annamária Sárosi***The demographic characteristics of foreigners coming to Hungary compared to the Hungarian population 1991–2000****Introduction**

The objective of the study is to analyse what kind of parameters motivate foreigners coming to Hungary in their choice of habitat and how much they differ in their gender, age, occupation from their surroundings. Motivation varies depending on nationality, occupation, and whether the person is young or old. As a first step distributions and cross references are analysed than by the help of multinomial regression it will be established how the chosen habitat corresponds to age, gender, occupation and nationality. The same methods will be used to find out whether the height of the economic level influences the choice of a village or a town near Budapest.

Trends of migration

From the beginning of the 1990s Hungary was reached by the waves of international migration. The political changes in Eastern Europe caused a change in the magnitude and nature of international mobility. Hungary became a transit as well as a target country. Most of the immigrants came to Hungary between 1988 and 1990; afterwards their number continuously decreased, than became stable, while since 1997 there is an increase. Between 1990 and 2000 201,000 foreign citizens were given long-term residence or immigration permit in Hungary. Part of the immigrants, left the country after a short while, they moved on or returned to their original country. The wave of immigration was accompanied by emigration; the number of registered emigrants was about 41,000 persons in the period in question. Some groups of immigrants arrived with the aim to settle down and get naturalized. About 20% of them actually became Hungarian citizens and thus were removed from the immigration registers. The immigration wave increased the number of the Hungarian population, in 1992 with 22,000 persons, later the number lessened and the yearly quota does not exceed the 50% of the figure for 1992.

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Results

Who came to Hungary in the 1990s? The majority of immigrants have been Europeans with a considerable number from Asia while very few came from elsewhere (Africa, America). In 1990, at the beginning of the change of regime, more than 90% of the immigrants came from Europe, a high proportion of them from Romania. Two third of the immigrants came from three countries: Romania, the successor states of Yugoslavia, the successor states of the Soviet Union, especially from Ukraine, and from China. The most important group of immigrants are the ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries. The percentage is above 80% of the immigrants coming from Romania; 50-60% of those coming from the former Soviet Union, especially from Ukraine (showing a tendency of increasing); 70-80% of those coming from the former Yugoslavia (showing a tendency of decreasing).¹

The rate of immigration was not even; more than 40% of those living permanently in Hungary arrived mainly from Romania before 1992, since than the flow of arrivals is continuous. Romanian citizens – mainly ethnic Hungarians – keep forming the largest group of immigrants. At the beginning of the 1990s, in 1993-1994, the number of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia leapt up above 25% as a consequence of the Yugoslav wars, than it went back to the earlier 7%. Coming from the former Soviet Union – later mostly from Ukraine – the number of immigrants increased from 10% to 18% by the end of the 1990s. The percentage of those coming from EU countries stabilized at 9-10%, the number of Chinese citizens was growing till 1997 it reached 9%, in some years, it was about 6% in 2000.

According to the gender of the immigrants, the ratio of men was 54% then it grew to 56%, by 2000 the proportion of men and women was about equal: 51%-49%; the ratio of men and women from the neighbouring countries is also about fifty-fifty; from the EU countries the ratio of men is 60% and from far away places more men come than women.


According to age: young adults are predominant; the proportion of the age group between 20 and 39 years was 50-60% in the period in question, at the end of the 1990s it was 53%. There is an equal share of the 0-19 age group and that of working over 40 of working age (21-22%). The average age of the immigrants was 28 years, in 1994 33 years and so it

¹ OECD Sopemi Trends in International Migration, OECD Paris, 2002.

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remained. According to gender no difference could be observed. All over Hungary the age distribution of foreign citizens is about the same.

Fig 1.



Source: KSH, Demográfiai évkönyv (Central Statistical Office, Demographical yearbook)

* BM-BÁH Állampolgársági Főosztály (Internal Ministry, Department of Citizenship)

Table 1

**Immigrants according to nationality 1990–2000
(%)**

| Nationality | 1990 | 1995 | 1998 | 2000 | 1990–2000 Average |
|---|------|------|------|------|----------------------|
| Europe | 92.1 | 78.2 | 76.9 | 85.5 | 83.2 |
| Of these: | | | | | |
| Citizens of EU-states | 3.6 | 10.1 | 10.2 | 9.1 | 8.1 |
| Romanian citizens | 79.5 | 36.4 | 34.3 | 44.1 | 46.0 |
| Citizens of successor states of former Yugoslavia* | 1.1 | 10.9 | 9.3 | 9.6 | 12.6 |
| Citizens of successor states of former Soviet Union** | – | 13.2 | 12.9 | 13.6 | 9.0 |

Source: KSH, Demográfiai évkönyv 2001. (Central Statistical Office, Demographical yearbook)

* Croatian and Yugoslav citizens

** Russian and Ukrainian citizens

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| Nationality | 1990 | 1995 | 1998 | 2000 | 1990-2000 Average |
|------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------------------|
| Asia | 4.5 | 15.7 | 18.3 | 11.0 | 12.3 |
| Of these: | | | | | |
| Chinese citizens | 1.8 | 8.6 | 8.0 | 5.3 | 6.1 |
| America | 1.7 | 4.2 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 3.0 |
| Africa | 1.4 | 1.5 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 1.2 |
| Unknown | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table 2

Number and distribution of foreign immigrants according to age and gender 1900-2000

| Age | Man (%) | Women (%) | Total |
|--------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| 0-19 | 23.2% | 25.5% | 4,863 |
| 20-39 | 54.3% | 53.0% | 105,908 |
| 40-64 | 19.9% | 17.5% | 37,011 |
| 65-x | 2.6% | 4.0% | 6,406 |
| Total | 107,829 | 94,056 | 201,885 |

Source: KSH Demográfiai évkönyv 2001 (Central Statistical Office, Demographical yearbook)

Table 3

The proportion of immigrant foreigners compared to the Hungarian population according to age and residence (1. January 2001, in percentages)

| | 0-14 | 15-19 | 20-24 | 25-29 | 30-39 | 40-49 | 50-59 | 60- | Total |
|-------------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|-------|
| Budapest | 1.3 | 1.7 | 2.9 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 2.4 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 2.2 |
| Other towns | 0.5 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 1.0 |
| Villages | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.7 |

Source: KSH Demográfiai évkönyv 2001. Népszámlálás 2001. (Central Statistical Office, Demographical yearbook, Census 2001)

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Among the foreigners coming to Hungary the proportion of the group 20–39 years of age is almost the double of the census ratio. The ratio of the group of younger persons is the same as that of the locals, while the older groups are underrepresented: 40–64 years of age 40%, over that age 80%. According to nationality the proportion of the age group 20–39 is 1.5–2.4 times as many as the similar group of the Hungarian population (28%). With the exception of Romania, among the citizens of the neighbouring countries the ratio of the group 0–19 years exceeds the census percentage (23%), and it especially high among the Slovakian citizens, 1.7 times more than the previous figure. The group of 40 years or older is underrepresented among the foreign citizens with the exception of the Germans where the ratio of the group 40–64 is the same as the census figures; all the same there are proportionately more Germans over 65 years of age, and next to the Chinese the least persons under 20 years of age, less than half of the census figures.

Regionally the distribution is not even among the counties, the immigrants rarely choose the western and northern counties for their residence. Their proportion grew fastest in Budapest in the period under investigation while the eastern counties, along the state border can be observed a proportionate decrease, though otherwise there is where a considerable contingent of immigrants is living. This indicates that the migrations flows toward Budapest and concentrates there. Almost 40% of the immigrants settled down in the capital where the share of the young active group (20–39 years) is 61%. In the westernmost counties and in County Pest, in the commuting belt of Budapest, the proportion of immigrants exceeds 50%. In eastern Hungary the percentage of the group of less than 15 years is remarkable while in southern and western Hungary the share of the older group is greater (6%). The over representation of the working age group in Budapest indicates that here the job seeking factor dominates and is stronger than elsewhere in the country. In the eastern counties along the state borders of the high percentage of the under-age group is the proof that the migrants arrived as families.

According to occupation² the majority of the immigrants were university, college or other type of students. Their composite percentage was between 28% (in 1990) and 20% (in 2000). The proportion of unemployed, house maker and old age pensioner taken separately did not

² The data refer to the occupation at arrival.

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reach 10% each, together it was 20% in 1995 and 28% in 1998. Though their proportion has decreased still 23% of the immigrants belonged to this group, which means that half of the immigrants was inactive or unemployed.

On the labour market the immigrants appeared in the industrial and building sector representing 24% of all immigrants in 1990 and 10% in 1998. There were years at the beginning of the change of regime when one third of the immigrant men sought work in the industry or building. The percentage of persons with higher qualifications was also high, in the first half of the decade in question it was 14%, since 1997 it is less than 9%. If all the categories of the higher qualified groups are lumped together, they reach their share is the same as that of the industrial – builder group.

Regarding occupation there is a considerable difference in the category of gender of the various nationalities. Among the Germans the students' share is the highest (32%). The positions requiring higher education are most frequently filled by Chinese (49%), USA (46%) and Vietnamese (43%) citizens. Only 6% of the Chinese immigrants come to Hungary to study; more than 25% of them work in the service industry. 25% of those coming from Romania are industrial or building workers. Comparing the data to the census results, the men migrating to Hungary are employed in the service industry to a higher proportion, which is especially high in the case of the Chinese, 60% more than the census figure but even among the Yugoslavs it is the double. There are many managers and white-collar workers among the Chinese, the double of the local count. The percentage is even higher among those coming from the USA, Vietnam and Russia. The successor states of the former Yugoslavia supplies the most agricultural workers, 50% more than the census proportion. Industrial and building workers mostly come from Romania, their share is 1.5 times higher than that of the local population. Other intermediate white-collar workers coming from Slovakia exceed the census data by 30%.

Women in work-situations show a different pattern. Compared to the census data they are employed more frequently in the industry and building (2.4 times) and less frequently in the service industry (60%). None of the nationalities reaches the proportion of the Hungarian population as workers in the service industry; with the exception of the Slovakian and Russian women they are over represented in the case of those coming from the USA (2,6 times), Chinese, Vietnamese and Russian citizens (2.6

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times). The proportion of intellectuals is three times higher among the Slovakian women than the census population. The industrial and building workers are 2.8–3.2 times over represented among the Romanian, Ukrainian and other citizens.

Immigrants live in 2,600 settlements of Hungary, which is 82% of all the settlements. This means that every type of economic-social area can be interesting for the immigrants. In the south-eastern and southern parts of Hungary 90% of the settlements were chosen by immigrants, in the western part 85%, while in the southern most county only two third of the settlements.

Comparing the distribution of foreign citizens according to the size and status of the place of their habitat it can be established with the help of the data of the 2001 census that the farther away country the immigrants come from, the greater the possibility that they chose Budapest for their habitat. Vietnamese and Chinese live proportionately five times as many in Budapest as the census population and three times as many those who came from the USA, Russia and 'other' countries. Slovaks and Yugoslavs are twice over-represented in county towns. Analysing the proportion of the immigrants and the census population according to the population size of the settlements it is evident that the bigger a settlement the more immigrants choose it as their residence: number of the foreigners who settled down in Budapest in 11 years equals 4.5% of the census population. The proportion is 3% in towns with more than 100 000 inhabitants, in the ones between 10,000–99,000 is about 1.5%, and in the smaller settlements about 1%. There is a difference between the preference of foreigners and Hungarian inland migrants. From the point of view of the legal situation it seems that foreigners prefer greater, more urbanised settlements while members of the Hungarian population like to choose smaller one when changing their residence.

In the multinomial regressive analysis the township is the reference category for the factors influencing preference. Men have chosen towns as their habitat in Hungary in a significantly higher proportion. Members of the group over 65 years old seldom settle down in Budapest; they prefer either villages or towns near the capital. The probable reason is that they want to live stress free but with the necessary infrastructure (shopping facilities, medical care, etc.) within reach. The year group 20–39 prefer the capital and – next to the oldest age group – the county towns. The analysis reveals that why it is so: it is not only the availability of work or study places but also that they want the livelier city life. Understandably

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no occupation group is so much oriented towards the capital and county towns as that of the students, even at elementary or secondary level. As expected, the people working in agriculture are living in less urbanised settlements; those with higher education and those working in industry and building prefer smaller towns. Nationality means the greatest difference in distribution. Chinese citizens choose the capital 7.2 times more frequently, 2.5 times frequently the county towns than those summed up as 'others'. In the case of the Vietnamese the preference for Budapest is 5.3 times greater. On the other hand people coming from the neighbouring countries rarely choose Budapest. Thus the choice is not only regulated by the age and occupation of the migrant but also by preconceptions; choice sometimes is due to lack of information.

Settlements, which are less developed, are less frequently the target place of international migrants than the inland ones (6% versus 16.7%). As has already been explained above foreigners prefer larger settlements, better infrastructure, which is understandably since they come first of all to study and to work or accompany their working or studying family. Those who live outside Budapest have rarely chosen areas where the economic indices are low and unemployment high, i.e. which are economically underdeveloped. The under-representation of foreigners in such areas is noticeable where there are industrial and educational centres.

The result of the logistic regression indicates that among those having settled down outside Budapest, the group of over 60 years and older insists on higher economic development, which can also mean that those of the younger groups are not necessarily living where they are working or spend their free time but are commuting. Examining the preference of settlements, Chinese, USA and Yugoslav citizens are the ones who do not care about under developed areas. This confirms the statement that the capital and county towns are mostly preferred. Considering occupation, not even students, let alone highly qualified persons and managers would choose such an area for their habitat. The results reinforce the fact that Chinese, Vietnamese and USA citizens insist on living in settlements with high infrastructure; such places where the local population shows a tendency of moving out the chances to receive immigrant settlers stand about 30% in comparison to more developed or attractive areas.

As a conclusion it can be stated that foreigners coming from far away countries are more likely to insist on living in highly developed, urbanized settlements, preferably the capital. People coming from the neighbouring

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countries seem to be less demanding; it may mean that their way of life is more mobile, they go back to their original dwelling more frequently, they can more easily find contact, information about what would be more advantageous for them ; thus they can change their habitat more easily; moreover, many of them are Hungarian speakers and their family is closer at hand than in the case of those who had to cross several borders to get to Hungary.

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Zoltán Ilyés

Identity as resource in a small region: the example of Gyimes

Introduction

Gyimes got into the focus of Hungarian and Romanian interest after the changes in Romania in 1989. Administratively it belongs to the Counties Harghita (Gyimesfelsőlök – Lunca de Sus, Gyimesközéplök – Lunca de Jos) and Bacau (Ghimes – Faget); it is an ethnographical region of special settlement structure and landscape. The uppermost part of the valley of the River Tatros was historically the part of County Csík, but due to its situation near the border, it was greatly influenced by Moldavian-Romanian culture. It was its historical-cultural characteristics, which ranged it into the small-region of Pogány Alps where, beside the settlements of Gyimes, several villages of the Szépvíz district of County Csík also belong. The settlement area of the Gyimes Csángós is a special chapter of the reception of Transylvania which developed into an 'ethnic landscape' organically connected to Székelyland but in many respect separated from it.

Settlement area, regional identity, administrative arrangements

Balázs Orbán was the first to describe Gyimes and the Gyimes Csángós¹ (earlier József Teleki, László Kővéry and Károly Benkő mentioned them in their writings). He explained how, due to overpopulation in County Csík, poor inhabitants settled down in the cleared woodland and founded settlements in the Transylvanian Alps. There was timbering on a big scale in the Transylvanian Alps in the 19th c. The pastures thus created drew the Csángós there whose livelihood was animal farming. First they rented land, later bought it, building first temporary living quarters, later permanently inhabited settlements. The reason for the 'swarming' of the Csángós in the 20th c. was reinforced by the relative overpopulation, the

¹ Orbán, Balázs: A Székelyföld leírása történeti, régészeti, természetrajzi s népismei szempontból. II. 1969. pp 77–78. (The description of Székelyland from the point of view of history, archaeology, natural sciences and folklore).

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closing down of the big lumbering factories due to the great depression, the high rent of pastures and meadows.²

A characteristic example how Csángó settlements came about is Háromkút east of the Hagymás Range where the land cleared by the Unio Timbering Company was bought by forty Csángó families. First they used the area as summer quarters during the time of hay making, later they built houses, stables, barns and settled down permanently; many of them even sold their village houses in Gyimesbükk or Középlök.³ The original patterns of clearance husbandry and typical great-family settlement forms have been preserved in Lesőd near Kászón where the family Fodor are living who moved from Gyimesfelsőlök in 1905.⁴ Similar inland colonisation created Csobányos, Gyürke, Aklos, Csinód, Egerszék, the Csángó settlements of the Úz Valley on the Csíkszentgyörgy and Csíkszentmárton properties as well as Gyertyános in county Háromszék, Brájtes (Barátos) and Terkuca near the border, Farkaspalló along the stream Domuk, Várpatak, Kovács Péter Sóvető, Visszafolyó near Gyergyószentmiklós, and Csiba-rét near Csíksomlyó.⁵ The inhabitants of Csobányos, Aklos, Csinód, Egerszék, Úz Valley were employed in saw-mills till the end of the 1940s.

Kostelek, Gyepece, Csügés (Hárompatak), Bükklok, Rakottyás and Lóvész in the Csík-Basin developed out of Romanian shepherd colonies at the end of the 18th and in early 19th c. Through exogamous marriages many inhabitants of Gyimes villages went to live in Kostelek, this influenced the ethno-cultural development of the villages too. Between and 1930 there were 73 exogamous marriages (out of a total of 182) of which in 29 (40%) one of the spouses was from the valley of River Tatros.⁶

² Antal, Imre: Gyimesi krónika. Európa Könyvkiadó – Kriterion Könyvkiadó, 1992. pp. 43–49, 86–90 [The Chronicle of Gyimes]

³ Vámszer, Géza: Életforma és anyagi műveltség. Kriterion Könyvkiadó, Bukarest, 1977. p. 197. [Way of life and material culture]

⁴ Kós, Károly: Népi építkezés Kászónban. In: Kós, Károly. Erdély népi építészete Kelenföld Kiadó, 1989. pp. 186–227. [Folk architecture of Transylvania]

⁵ Vámszer op.cit. pp. 197–198; Antal, Imre op.cit. pp. 44–46. Tarisznyás, Márton: Gyergyó történeti néprajza. Kriterion Könyvkiadó, Bukarest 1982. pp. 58–59. [Historical folklore of Gyergyó], Pozsony, Ferenc: Gyertyános. Művelődés XL. 1991; Barth, János: úz-völgyi magyarok. Település-néprajzi és népesedéstörténeti tanulmány. Barta Társadalomtudományi Bt. Kecskemét, 2004. [Hungarians in the Úz Valley. A study in settlement-folklore and population-history]

⁶ Ilyés, Zoltán: Az exogámia hatása három román eredetű csík-megyei havasi telep anyanyelvű állapotára és etnikus identitására (1841–1930). Demográfia XLI. 1998/2–3: 285–299. [The influence of exogamy on the status of mother tongue and ethnic identity].

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From the 1960s many of the Csángó settlements lost their population. From some villages the inhabitants moved to neighbouring villages (e.g. from Gyertyános to Kurtapatak, Esztelnek), others settled down in towns (e.g. from Aklos to Arad). Úzvölgy, Csobányos depopulated since the closing down the sawmills. In some villages, e.g. in Gyúrke there are no more permanent residents left. On the other hand the population of Egerszék and Csinód (and Lesőd) has been growing since the 1930s, according to the 1992 census there lived 320 people in the two settlements. The number of residents is stable in Háromkút and Csiba-rét; The people from Farkaspalló, Brájtes (Barátos), Terkuca moved back to Gyimes, using the settlements as sommer quarters or they are bought by Romanians from Domuk-Hosszúréz and Tarkő-Barátos (Tarcau-Brates). Among the settlements in Hárompatak Gyepece has suffered considerable population loss.

The administrative location of the settlement area of the Gyimes Csángós was constant till the middle of the 20th c: it belonged to the Szépvíz district with its historically changing dimensions. Between 1950 and 1952 the area of Csík and Kászon – thus Gyimesfelsőlok and Gyimesközéplok – became part of Stalin-territory, which had Brassó as its centre. From 1952 to 1968 Gyergyóbékás, Gyimesbükk, Rakottyás, Magyarcsügés, Gyepece és Kosteiek belonged to County Bacau. The other parts of former County Csík was part of the Hungarian Autonomous Province (1952–1960) later Maros-Hungarian Autonomous Province (1960–1968), divided between the regions of Maroshévíz, Gyergyószentmiklós and Csíkszereda.⁷

Since 1968 Gyimesbükk and its area is part of County Bacau, Gyergyóbékás and Háromkút where Csángós live, belong to County Neamt.⁸ With the ordering of Gyimesbükk and the alpine settlements of Hárompatak to an administrative unit with Bacau as its centre, the Romanian ethno-policy intended to place the village, which forms a contact area between Romanians and Szekelys, under Romanian dominance, however, it has not succeeded because of the Hungarian language of the orthodox (earlier Greek Catholic) congregation and the pastoration in Hungarian language of the Roman Catholic church.⁹

⁷ Vofkori, László: Erdély közigazgatási és etnikai földrajza. Balaton Akadémia, Vörösbereány, 1996. pp. 52, 56. [The administrative and ethnic geography of Transylvania].

⁸ Vofkori, László op.cit. pp. 64–65.

⁹ Ilyés, Zoltán: A csík-megyei görög katolikusok identitásváltozásai (1850–1944). Székelyföld, 2001/7: 88–105 [Changes of identity of the Greek Catholic congregation in County Csík].

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The small region of Pogányhavas was founded – on the pattern of the district of Szépvíz – from Csíksomlyó, Csíkpálfalva, Csíkszépvíz in 1999.¹⁰ The new small region association stops the administrative partition of Gyimes on the one hand connecting Gyimesbükkös to its associate villages. On the other hand it ranks the Gyimes-villages, which have a different economy- and mental-history, into a planning and identity-organizing region among the villages County Csík with a greatly different background. The range of the eponymous Pogányhavas – Széphavas is a geographical-hydrographical as well as ethnic limit between the symbolically still divided Csángós of Gyimes and the Székelys of County Csík.

Gyimes as a historical region of identity – differences and similarities

The settlers of Gyimes (the area of the so called Hárompatak: Kostelek, Gyepece, Csügé included)¹¹ arrived here from the villages of County Csík¹², from the dioceses¹³, from the alps of Negyedfélmegye¹⁴ and the so-called revindicated alps (territory taken back from Moldavia)¹⁵ since the beginning of the 18th c. They were all poor Székely and Romanian coters, who paid tax to the landowners of County Csík and did not own any land themselves till the middle of the 19th c. According to the *Erdélyország-*

¹⁰ Sarány, István: Pogányhavas kistérségi társulás. Hargita népe. 16. December 1999. In: [The small region association in Pogányhavas]. Koszta Csaba János: Kistérségi szerveződési folyamat Hargita megyében (1998–2002). In Bodó Julianna szerk.: *Székelyföldi mozaik. Térségi szociológiai tanulmányok*, Pro-Print Könyvkiadó, Csíkszereda, 2004. 229–263. p. 237. [Small region self-organization in County Hargita].

¹¹ Ilyés, Zoltán: Hárompatak település- népesség- és akkulturációltörténete. In: Tomisa, Ilona ed.: Hárompatak. Egy ismeretlen néprajzi kislaj Erdély és Moldva határsán. MTA Néprajzi Kutatóintézet. Budapest, 2004. pp. 7–53. [The settlement, population and cultural history of Hárompatak. In: Hárompatak. An unknown small region on the border of Transylvania and Moldavia].

¹² Basically from Csíkszépvíz, Csíkszentmiklós, Csíkország and Csíkszentmihály common lands.

¹³ E.g. Bálványos Alps at Gyimesbükk, which belonged to the St Peter diocese (including Várdótfalva, Csobótfalva, Csomortán, Csíktapolca). Antal, Imre op.cit. p. 61.

¹⁴ U. Kerégyártó, Adrienne: a csíkiak Negyedfélmegye havasáról. Néprajzi értesítő LXXIV. 1992. pp. 5–47. [The people of Csík from the alps of Negyedfélmegye].

¹⁵ Endes, Miklós: Csík-, Gyergyó-, Kászon-székek (Csík megye) földjének és népének története 1918-ig. Budapest 1938, pp. 226–228. [The history of the land and people of the regions Csík, Gyergyó and Kászon of County Csík].

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gi népszámlálás [Transylvanian census] of 1871¹⁶ there were no landowners in the three Gyimes villages, everyone was registered as cotter. The situation was modified somewhat by the law of adjustment in 1871, but even then many of them remained small holders, tenants who worked in the sawmills of the entrepreneurs who amassed huge wooded properties by taking advantage of the law of adjustment keeping the Csángós in proletarian circumstances¹⁷.

In the 18th and 19th cc. the Csángós complained about their exposed state in their letters addressed to the Transylvanian Gubernium and the County administration.¹⁸ Following the law of adjustment many of the Csángós could buy the meadows and pastures previously rented from the Székelys and this enabled them to better themselves materially that was not welcomed by the landowners of County Csík.¹⁹ The letter rented some of their alpine areas to Romanian shepherds coming from Háromszék and Barcaság. In 1883 the Roman Catholic diocese of Csíkszentmiklós rented the Gerendus Alps to a Romanian shepherd who arrived with 1700 sheep to the location. The area was in lease to people of Gyimesbükk who had already built on the land and intended to buy it. They did not let the shepherd to the area. 120 Székely from Szépvíz, Borzsova and Szentmiklós went against them accompanied by 12 gendarms shooting and fighting.²⁰ This is just one example of the century old feud between the Csángós and the Székelys caused by conflicts over ownership.

The rift caused by conflicting economic interests was reinforced by the mixed ethnic background of the Gyimes Csángós, their Romanian style clothing, their dialect, vocabulary, their shepherding way of life. The low urbanisation of the Csángós and the dominantly animal breeding occupation increased the rejection felt by the people of Csík. There was a saying according to which 'beer is not a drink, a girl is not a woman, a Csángó is not a man'. In 1897 the newspaper Csíki Lapok made fun of the thrifty Csángós who went by train to Madéfalva thirty kilometres away but went back on foot. The patronizing attitude was accompanied by authoritative way of speaking often with critical, instructive undertones. At the end of the 19th c. teachers at county-meetings frequently criticized

¹⁶ The Figures of the Transylvanian census of 1871. MS In German. Ctral Statistical Office.

¹⁷ Antal, Imre op.cit. p. 83

¹⁸ Antal, Imre op.cit. pp. 63–68

¹⁹ cf. Balás, Lajos: örökös emlékirat. Hatva, 1935 [Unending Memoirs]

²⁰ Balás, Lajos op.cit.

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the childrearing methods of the Csángó parents and often found the school attendance of the children insufficient.

That the problem was primarily economic is proved by the recollections of those Csángós who moved from Gyimesfelsőlök to Csinód near the River Úz where they lived on the common property in Csík; they called the representatives of the landowners 'bad men'.²¹ At the same time in the Úz-valley alps, which administratively belongs to Csíkszentgyörgy and Csíkszentmárton, the inhabitants claimed to be more 'civilized' than those who remained in Gyimes, disregarding the fact that the infrastructure was very backward in the remote alpine settlements: e.g. electricity was installed only by the end of the millennium. The closer contact with the Székelys, the adoption of the patterns of Csík raised an internal mythological frontier emphasizing the differences.

The railway built between Madéfalva and Gyimes in 1897 created hardly any change in occupational mobility or in changing domicile. The reasons lay in the local industry offering work places and the fact that Csík was insufficiently industrialized in general. At the end of the 1920s the great depression reached the area and the sawmills were closed down, the work force was drastically reduced and the people started to leave Gyimes.

In the second half of the 20th c. by the occupational mobility of the Csángós and their taking up domicile in Csík, made it easier for them to meet other people which resulted in more and more 'mixed' marriages. Traditional stereotypes were played down though they are still alive, indicating the awareness of the differences created by the differences in ownership, culture, way of life etc. all through the centuries. Even the members of the younger generation keep referring to the people of Csík as *The Hungarians*; there are conflicts at the work places, and the people of Csík jealously observe the growing interest in Gyimes coming from Hungary.²²

The intellectuals try to reinterpret the old existing division and separation as a Székely-Csángó common history and stress the unity of interests. The idea is exemplified in the new church built in Gyimesbükk in 1974–76 where

²¹ Ilyés, Zoltán: Szimbolikus határok és határjelek. A turisták és a helyiek határtermelő és -olvasó aktivitása Gyimesben. In: Biczó, Gábor: [vagabundus] Gulyás Gyula tiszteletére. Kulturális és Vizuális Antropológiai Tanszék, Miskolc (A Kulturális és Vizuális Antropológiai Tanszék könyvei 5). 2004. 189–212. p. 193. [Symbolic borders and border markers. Border creating and decoding activities of tourists and locals in Gyimes. In: In honour of Gyula Gulyás].

²² Ilyés Zoltán: Szempontok a gyimesi csángók etnikus identitásának értelmezéséhez. In: Keményfi Róbert – Szabó László szerk.: *Varia. Ethnographica et Folcloristica. Ujváry Zoltán 65. születésnapjára*. KLTE Néprajzi Tanszék, Debrecen. 1997. 72–80. p. 75. [Considerations concerning the interpretation of the ethnic identity of the Csángós of Gyimes].

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not only the religious beliefs of the community are represented but its canonised political-national consciousness as well. A new image of the Csángós of Gyimes has been created, who courageously stand their ground in remote places, building a church in spite of prohibitions and obstacles in order to blot out the earlier archetypically negative image the Székelys had of the Csángós. The frescoes in the church try to reflect the identical past, common fate in religion and minority life by depicting figures wearing Csángó and Székely costumes in the scenes of baptism and offering.²³ The church represents a strong identity-marker towards the Romanians of orthodox faith on the one hand but is also the means of demolition of mental division lines between Csángós and Székelys on the other.²⁴

The discovery of traditions and the invention of Gyimes

There was a three act folk play 'The wild flower of Gyimes' published by István Géczy in 1897, that first drew attention to the Csángós of Gyimes. The play became a favourite with amateur drama groups all over the country. The topic became even more popular after the film version of 'The wild flower of Gyimes' was released with popular Hungarian actors in 1938. The film does not even touch the limit of ethnic authenticity; the posters depicted the stereotypical scenery of Székelyland.²⁵ In the second half of the 20th c. , thanks to the growing interest and research in folklore Gyimes became the 'folklore museum' of Székelyland.²⁶ Especially through the collecting of songs and dances,²⁷ of myths and archaic prayers²⁸ dedicated the area to a preferred Transylvanian micro-region.²⁹

²³ Székely, László: Csíki áhítal Acsíki székelyek vallási néprajza. Szent István Társulat, Budapest, n.d. pp. 247, 503., [Devotion in Csík. The religious folklore of the Székelys in Csík.]: Váradi, Péter Pál-Lőwey, Lilla: Erdély-Székelyföld. Gyimesek vidéke. PéterPál Kiadó, Veszprém, 2001. p.120 [Transylvania-Székelyland. The Gyimes regions].

²⁴ Ilyés, Zoltán op.cit. p.204.

²⁵ <http://www.ernstgaleria.hu/plak/122.html>

²⁶ Kósa, László: A gyimesi csángók hagyományos élete. In: Kallós, Zoltán-Martin, György: Tegnap a Gyimesben jártam... Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1989. p. 15 [The traditional life of the Csángós of Gyimes. In: Yesterday I was in Gyimes].

²⁷ Kallós – Martin op.cit.

²⁸ Salamon, Anikó: Gyimesi csángó mondák, ráolvasások, imák. Helikon Kiadó, Budapest 1987 [Tales, charms, prayers of the Csángós of Gyimes].

²⁹ Cf. Karátson, Gábor és az elmaradtmleonardói fordulat. Utószó Lao-Céhoz. In: Lao-ce: Tao te King . Cserépfalvi n.p. 1999. p.vii. [Huang Kung-Wang and the turn of Leonardo which never happened. Epilogue to the translation of Huang Kung-Wang by Karátson, Gábor].

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The cultural features, ethnic and micro-regional characteristics – which earlier were meant to be the manifestation of distance and backwardness vehemently criticized by the elite of Csík – represent the models of 'real Hungarian' tradition for the ethnographers from Hungary. The TV channel Duna went so far as to changing the order of the stations at the feast of Csíksomlyó to be able to focus on the group of Gyimes pilgrims wearing their costumes. Thus the age old symbolic and sacred ordering of space was sacrificed for the sake of 'authenticity'. Because of the great masses arriving to the feast the traditional choreography had already changed by necessity since 1990.³⁰ In this context the Csángós of Gyimes, who stand out by their attire which is more in Romanian than Székely style, are held to be an ethnic group with its adherence to its culture, clothing and being Hungarian more exclusive and archaic than the Székelys.³¹

It is not surprising that Gyimes recently became a touristical target among the destinations in Transylvania; it became an almost compulsory stop in the journeys across Transylvania organized by travel agencies or planned individually. The house of pilgrims and school named after St. Elizabeth of the Árpáds in Gyimesfelsőlök, the skanzen in Gyimesbükk, the churches of the main valley are the most important attraction as well as the ancient "thousand year old frontier". The nearby opened Agrotouristic Hotel offers Csángó banquets. The buildings of the hotel cannot be called authentic compared to the traditional Gyimes architecture – which by now has completely disappeared – but being built of natural materials and of modest size they fit into their surroundings. The tourists are offered dishes of the local cuisine, they ca familiarize with the costumes, music and dances. The ancient frontier is the backdrop. The landlord, a descendant of an old Gyimes landowner family tells the story of the community and his own minority experiences, this way the tourists from Hungary can feel the atmosphere of the borderland and learn about the challenges of survival. A similar tourist project has been planned in Gyimesközéplek where the old houses collected in Gyimes and Csík are going to be reconstructed with care of the old architectural details but supplemented with modern comfort to offer appropriate accommodation.

³⁰ Cf. Mohay, Tamás: Tervezés és Csíksomlyó: a Csíksomlyói pünkösdi búcsún. Néprajzi értesítő LXXVIII. 1996: 29–58. [Space-order at the feast of Csíksomlyó].

³¹ On the esthetics of regions cf. Maase, Kaspar: Eine Republik von Provinzlern? Ästhetisierte Region und nationale Identifikation im vereinigten Deutschland [Kulturation 1/2003] In: www.kulturation.de

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The dance camps in Gyimesközéplek that were organized from the beginning of the 1990s till 2004 became one of the most important place of heritage-management and tradition-creation drawing vast numbers of tourists every summer.³² Its forerunner was the quiz and folklore festival entitled 'At the spring of River Tatros' organised in the Ceausescu era what wanted to commemorate the Gyimes peasant rising in 1934 and the brotherhood of Hungarian and Romanian peasants.³³ The internationalistic ideology faded away but the festival itself has survived the change of regime.

The invention of tradition of the Gyimes folklore, the landscape and the 'thousand year old frontier' its touristic canonisation and marketing has been going on since the beginning of the 1990s; it managed to free itself from the restrictions of the ethnocentric Romanian nation-state but sometimes is loaded with forms of the Hungarian minority's hegemonous consciousness of the area, interpretation of the past and invention of tradition.

The Rákóczi castle near the border is about to develop into a Hungarian place of pilgrimage, raising national sentiments, mobilizing historical knowledge and awakening the consciousness of communal fate in the visitors.³⁴ The locals do not offer more food for thought, they do not care to reveal deeper, ambiguous, enigmatic layers. Thus the ancient border has become an understandable item of folklore-tourism. The visitors on their turn also shape the image of the locals about themselves and through the stereotypes unwittingly decide what should be included into the stock of heritage, what is interesting for strangers.

This way the visitors are not induced to try to understand.³⁵ If we accept Gábor Biczó's definition of the 'deep tourist' cited from Simmel and József Böröcz, according to which the tourist is prompted to understand and

³² Invention of tradition is a legitimate theory in European ethnology and historiography. cf. Briesen, Detlef – Gans, Rüdiger: Regionale Identifikation als 'Invention of Tradition'. Wer hat und warum wurde eigentlich im 19. Jahrhundert das Siegerland erfunden. *Berichte zur deutschen Landeskunde* 1992. 66: 61–73

³³ Atal, Imre op.cit. p. 128.

³⁴ Ilyés, Zoltán: A gyimesi 'ezeréves' határ olvasatai. In: Feischmidt Margit ed. Erdély (de)konstrukciók. Néprajzi Múzeum – PTE Kommunikáció- és Médiatudományi Tanszék, Budapest–Pécs, 2005. pp.35–49 [Reading the 'thousand' year border. In: Transylvania (de)constructions].

³⁵ On the ethnicity of regions cf. Kenényfi, Róbert: Az etnikai táj kultúrnemzeti mítosza. *Regio* 2002:93–108. [The national-cultural myth of the ethnic landscape].

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make himself understood, abolish distance and strangeness,³⁶ the average tourist visiting Gyimes falls rather short of these requirements.

The present attitude toward Gyimes neglects the multicultural nature of the region, the covert as well as overt manifestations of Romanian influence, the ethnic and religious rivalries, the Gyimes people's grievances they suffered for their Greek Catholic faith and the deeply seated and ever repeated patterns of the controversies between the Székelys and the Csángós.³⁷

Summary

The visitor to Gyimes finds a special area dominated by the local religious and secular intelligentsia. It is defined by attempts at monopolizing the memories. In turn all these are taken over by the tourist narratives, into publications about the region, and appears in scholarly publications as well. The reception of the frontier and heritage is selective and arbitrary: apart from the local intelligentsia it is formed by travel agencies, guides and Transylvania-fans. The picture depicts the Csángós of Gyimes as a group of cultural relics standing sentry on the borders. This image overlooks the multi-ethnic character of the region and stresses Hungarian identity, requires steadfastness where it is not necessary and thus cannot ever be completely fulfilled.

In everyday life there is no isolating cultural-ethnic dividing line between Székelys/Csángós and Romanians but a wide zone of interference.³⁸ The border in this interpretation is a sensitive membrane, an intermediate zone letting through common memories and feelings of identity.³⁹ In this zone of the Csángós of Gyimes there is a sensitivity for double identity, compatibility with both cultures that the local and national elite have tried to homogenize and simplify.⁴⁰

³⁶ Biczó, Gábor. A határ metafora mint a turizmus antropológiai vizsgálatának paradigmatis példája: Gyimes esete. In: Fejős, Zoltán—Sziárdó Zsolt eds: *Helye(in)k, tárgya(in)k, Képe(in)k. A turizmus társadalomtudományi magyarázata. Néprajzi Múzeum, Budapest 2003. 40–50. p.42. [The metaphore of the border as the example of anthropological analysis of tourism.].*

³⁷ Ilyés, Zoltán op.cit. pp 72–81.

³⁸ Ilyés, Zoltán: *Nyelvhatár/kontaktzóna értelmezés a Székelyföld keleti peremvidékén.* In: Kozam, István—Papp, Richárd eds.: *ikái kölcsönhatások és konfliktusok a Kárpát-medencében. Gondolat-MTA Etnikai-nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intéze, Budapest 2003. pp.77–88. [The interpretation of language border/contact zone in the eastern borderland of Székelyland].*

³⁹ Frida, Balázs: *A másik felé. SA közeledés és az elkülönbözés szimbolikus stratégiái a gyimesi interetnikus zónában.* In: Kozma—Papp op.cit. p28.

⁴⁰ Ilyés, Zoltán op.cit. p. 83.



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*Péter Pál Tóth***CREATIVITY
AND STRESS AMONG HUNGARINAS LIVING
AS NATIONAL MINORITIES**

According to János Selye's widely-known definition, stress is "the unity of obsolescence processes concomitant with life" which is not necessarily a pathological change since the human body is always exposed to wear and tear even under normal conditions, and in certain respect "stress might have even a curing effect" (1). In Selye's opinion, while one group of changes brought about by stress is unambiguously harmful, the other helps the human organism to resist stress itself. These two major groups, or even the whole of the stress-generated changes, are termed by him as a general adaptation syndrome which develops in stages: from (1) alarm reaction, through (2) resistance, and up to (3) the state of exhaustion. To counterbalance stress, various systems seek to keep the human organism sound and functioning in a healthy way. Selye calls this state homeostasis.

At this point, we pose the question of whether Selye's stress theory, which was originally related to the physiological processes of the individual, can be applied to the fields of societal life.

In our opinion – without identifying society with the living organism and without relating societal functioning and "phenomena of life" to processes going on in the living organism – stress, i.e., a wide range of heavily burdening effects, both physical and psychical, may influence and determine human life in micro- and macro-communities just as well as in the cases of cells, organisms or individuals. Analogically, then, stress theory may be adopted to understanding social processes as well as the activities Hungarians living as national minorities

The following part of this paper aims to examine the question of whether a community of individuals, males and females of various ages and educational levels living in national minority status, such as Hungarian minorities who have been living for over seventy years in countries of a different historical, past and present, may be relieved from the effect of stress. To answer this question is the more difficult since in those countries where Hungarians form a major national minority group, the majority nation or rather the official policy which represents that majority is not

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interested in revealing the actual situation; thus, conducting a comparative empirical investigation is not possible. Moreover, the officially published data on national minorities are inaccurate and not easy of access.

The situation is made even more difficult by the fact that the relationship between creativity and stress among national minorities, including Hungarians, has not yet been scrutinized. Thus, with only the available data and a secondary analysis of data published so far, the best we can produce for now is an attempt to formulate a working hypothesis which might be applied to Hungarians living as national minorities in the neighbouring countries. Before treating this question, however, the process of becoming a national minority should be dealt with briefly.

Of the highly ramified and complex problems involved in this process, only those connected with the actual formation or genesis of national minorities will be examined here. I wish to make it clear from the beginning that however natural the existence of a national minority may seem, no form of that life may be regarded as natural or normal since the minority is always under shadow of the threat, open or latent, that is inherent in the minority life. It is an inevitable consequence that both the majority and the minority strive to ease or eliminate this unnatural state. There are several ways to put an end to this conflict, and these can be reduced to two basic forms. In the majority's view, assimilating a national minority is, theoretically, the best possible solution, while the minority, quite naturally, looks upon their own independence as the only answer. The particular types of transition which may be possible in regard to these two strategies, as well as methods by which or the extent to which such transitional strategies can be realized effectively, all depend on the intricate system of external and internal power relations.

The character of national minority life is determined essentially by the process through which it became a national minority. Three basic types of this process may be identified: national minorities generated by (1) organic development, (") inorganic development, and (+) the diaspora. Within each type, of course, several sub-types may be found but these will not be dealt with here.

The first or organic type of becoming a national minority is connected with the historical process of the formation of national states such as, for example, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands. In these countries, the organic type of development occurred among their Basque, Briton, Catalanian, Flemish, Friulian, Frisian, Gallegian, Sorbian, etc., ethnic groups. And naturally, prior to 1918, the same process



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was taking place in the case of national minorities who had been living in the territory of the one-time (or "historical") Hungary. In the case of the inorganic type of development, a certain nation or part of it become a national minority as a consequence of a political decision or annexation of that minority's native country or part thereof by another nation. The result of such an aggression may possibly be legitimized by power-policy decisions (pacts, peace, forced unification, and the like).

Unfortunately, history has produced a number of examples of the inorganic development of a national minority; here two sub-types may be clearly distinguished. The first sub-type includes peoples who were reduced to minority status by annexation, and who were granted a kind of independence in the new state formations. The situation of Tibetans in China is a case in point and the same applies to Letts, Lithuanians and Estonians in the former Soviet Union. In the second sub-type of inorganic development, only part of the given population is forced to become citizens of another state formation. There are many examples of this sub-type too. It will suffice to refer only to Hungarians living as national minorities in the neighbouring countries, and to Germans in Southern Tyrol.

The organic and inorganic processes of becoming a national minority are basically different. While the former follows naturally from social development, the latter results from the forcible subjection of the given ethnic group. This implies that development of the organic type, in connection with the formation of national states, takes a long time, while development of the inorganic type is violent and brief. The fact of violence is certainly not modified by the fact that the victorious powers consider the occupation or annexation of the given territory along with its inhabitants to be justified and legitimate nor by the fact that annexation may have been carried out by treaty. The time that actually elapses between the conquest or annexation of a given territory and the reduction of the related population to minority status is of secondary importance. This time lag is not really a decisive factor in the entire process because, in minority – majority and majority – minority relations, it is the particular genesis of becoming a minority that counts and will be borne in mind regardless of how long it took to subjugate the population. The essence of all this can be grasped only in conqueror – subject relations.

The organic and inorganic processes have one common feature: in both cases the given population becomes a national minority in its own native land. Furthermore, it is worthy of note that in the case of inorganic development the ethnic group reduced to minority status always has a

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parent nation (except in the situation where one country annexes another country as a whole), while in the organic case it is not possible, nor is it necessary, that the given national minority have a parent nation.

Among national minorities origination or living in the diaspora, the basic motives, or more precisely, the main determinants, of the external migration may be well observed. Relying on such observations, further subtypes can be identified.

In the context of the present study, in minority – majority and majority – minority relations, *stress is regarded as being the unity of assimilation processes which accompany the minority life. The reaction of minorities to this stress may generate certain faculties which enable the minority peoples to adjust themselves continuously to the actual situation and to resist both natural trends and forced political assimilation efforts in their struggle for survival and for the recognition of their ethnic characteristics and their dignity as national minorities.* (It is also implied here that, – in addition to stress –, anomia and other deviant phenomena concomitant with the functioning of society are also regarded as belonging to the normal state of society.)

Creativity is understood here as the minority's ability to preserve, develop and improve its particular ethnic, historical, cultural, linguistic, communal and other similar traits and traditions. Otherwise, the afore-mentioned conceptual approach only formally corresponds to János Selye's definition, however, in connection with the minority status, the concepts of stress and creativity should be used along with the concepts of adaptation or acculturation used so far. The actual situation of a national minority is determined by several circumstances; in addition to legal, political, cultural and economic conditions, factors pertaining to certain fields of psychology and social psychology are also important, and against this broader conceptual background, we may have a deeper insight into the actual situation of a national minority and in its real position and role in the given society.

Stress as the unity of assimilation processes, then, accompanies and coexists with the minority life and cannot be separated from it. In contrast to all this, various analyses, above all papers welcoming the "results" of the individual official policies towards national minorities as well as report veiling the real political practice of certain countries, try to prove the acceptance of the foreign patterns, i.e., those of the conquerors, and the reception and acquiring of the majority nation's language, script, culture, customs, and so forth, to put it briefly: the complete subjugation and des-

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olation of national minorities are represented in those writings as an unambiguously “positive” and “desirable” process in the minority life. In reality, however, since assimilation, for the minority, is ultimately tantamount to giving up both its own values and its unlikeness to the majority, on the one hand, and to receiving the particular values of another, majority, nation, on the other, neither the organic nor the inorganic (i.e., forced political) type of assimilation can be accepted by national minorities as a normal process. Undoubtedly, assimilation may really offer a richer and more perfect life to national minorities, provided they have the opportunity to preserve, even develop and fulfill, their identity so that coexistence will not cause injuries and will not cause or strengthen negative processes. (The enrichment and fullness of the minority life is still an idyllic image of a desired and much hoped-for future rather than the reality of our days.)

It also follows from what has been stated above that in the case of Hungarians living a national minorities in Austria, in the Slovak Republic, in the Ukraine and in Romania and Yugoslavia, creativity and stress with all their implications are essentially determined by the manner in which the Hungarians originally became national minorities and were forced to remain in that status after World War II (2). After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918, the emerging new states – with the aid of the Entente Powers – annexed territories inhabited not only by peoples belonging to their own respective ethnic units but also by Hungarians, who accounted for a considerable if not higher percentage of the populations (3). The occupying powers considered such annexations to be justified by the peace treaties with which the great powers concluded World War I – and which were contrary to the declared principles of those powers – and thus these regions along with their populations have remained in the possession of the occupying countries (4). In consequence of the will of the victorious powers of World War I and World War II, which powers ignored their own interests in the long run, and due to the greed of Hungary's neighbours, Hungarians in large numbers were reduced to minority status practically in an instant. According to what has been said above, this is a typically inorganic form of becoming a national minority. the results of these decisions, which are clearly connected with the formation of the so-called successor states and with the related interests of the Entente Powers, are clearly shown in the table below:

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Changes in Hungary's area and population resulting
from the Trianon Peace Treaty (1920)

| Country (to which territories were attached) | Area of attached territory (sq.km) | Number of total population | Of which: Hungarians |
|--|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Czechoslovakia | 63.004 | 3,567 575 | 1.072 000 |
| Romania | 102.181 | 5,236.305 | 1,664 000 |
| Serbo-Croatian-Slo- venian Kingdom | 21.031 | 1,519.013 | 459.000 |
| Austria | 4.026 | 292.588 | 26,000 |
| Total | 190.242 | 10,615.481 | 3,221.000 |

Hungarians living as national minorities became citizens and at the same time "minorities" of another, newly created state formation as a result of power-policy decisions rather than of the organic development of a former situation. Accordingly, the concept of *Hungarians living as national minorities* does not express either the process of how they became a national minority or their then existing and present status; therefore, they should rather be described as *part of the Hungarian nation that became citizens of foreign states*. This definition seems to be more adequate even if certain countries, referring to, e.g., historical, ethnic rights or the interest of achieving economic and strategic goals, will not accept it (5).

The process of becoming a national minority, in the Hungarian case as well as in others, has up to now determined the relation of the majority people to Hungarians, and conversely, that of Hungarians to the majorities. However, the content of this relationship is determined not so much by a policy towards nationalities, which pays due attention to the dignity of national traits and through this to the mutual enrichment of values, as by a struggle for creating a homogeneous national state. Subject to this objective, the official policies of the discussed countries, expressing the majority interests and often even falsifying historical facts, have continuously restricted and are still restricting the opportunities of the Hungarian populations annexed to their respective countries and impede the cultivation of the Hungarian culture, traditions, consciousness, vernacular, and so forth (6).

In their attempts to assimilate national minorities, the majority nations tend to regard Hungarians, who are numerically very significant even now, as a major obstacle in the way of achieving this end. This inevitably

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gave rise to the adverse policies towards national minorities that the neighbouring countries have conducted over the past seven decades. On this account, Hungary's neighbours, whatever their socio-political system, have sought to change the ethnic composition of territories annexed to them and to assimilate Hungarians forcibly. This attempt at assimilation resulted in a stress situation exceeding the normal for minority Hungarians. Consequently, in the Hungarian case, as well as with other national minorities, a one-side or deformed assimilation processes may be found. Under the circumstances, then, national minorities struggle, above all, to survive and to prevent the most determined, politically oriented attempts to forcibly assimilate them with the majority.

Owing to the fact that the particular local effects of socialism as it existed in Hungary's individual neighbour countries were different, the practice of assimilation, one-sided or asymmetric, and other factors have varied markedly from one country to another up to now; within this, there have also been certain distinct periods in each country. Hence it follows that in the case of Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries (as well as with other national minorities), a deformed assimilation process can be found. Such cases are called "A"-type stress since they involve not only a stress interpreted as the unity of assimilation processes accompanying the minority life but also its variants; namely, the creativity of a minority, which serves to counterbalance stress, i.e., to preserve ethnic traits, encounters serious difficulties. Consequently, "A"-type stress is regarded as being the unit of assimilation processes going on among national minorities that originated from the inorganic development, including a faculty which enables the minority peoples to preserve their own ethnicity and to resist forced assimilation efforts by the majorities. This also includes their ability to adjust themselves continuously and necessarily to natural trends and to the adverse policies towards national minorities which ignore the dignity of ethnic traits.

Over the past seven and half decades, historical events in the discussed countries have shown that the political regimes, which succeeded and often conflicted with one another, have not exercised any self-constraint in using every applicable means to eliminate the Hungarian minorities. In this regard, one needs only to remember such facts as the citizenship-less state of Hungarians in Yugoslavia after 1918, subsequent massacres (in Romania, in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia), the lack of citizenship of Hungarian in Czechoslovakia between 1944 and 1947, detention camps for Hungarians (in Romania, the Soviet Union

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and Yugoslavia), the forcible resettlement of Hungarians in other countries or the expulsion of Hungarians from their native land to Hungary, not to mention many other restrictions and curtailments, all considered as "legal" (7).

The situation of Hungarians living in Austria, the Slovak Republic, the Ukraine, Romania and Yugoslavia has been particularly influenced by the fact that they have had to adjust themselves continuously not only to a foreign power structure but also to the widely different language, culture, customs, traditions, etc. of the majority nation. In addition, they have always had to face those prejudices which the former minority peoples, with or without foundation, have invariably held against them.

An important landmark in the life of Hungarians living as national minorities was the period 1944–1945 when Soviet-type Bolshevik take-overs occurred in all the above countries except Austria. In their formative periods, these Bolshevik-type state powers, while coining slogans about the elimination of class oppression and social defenselessness, also promised to put an end to the subjugation and ruination of the national minorities. They made these peoples believe that the proletarian dictatorship along with Marxist ideology and political practice based thereon would deny and reject any kind of discrimination against national minorities (and they firmly maintained these pretensions until the regimes themselves collapsed). They also put forth that their minority policies would guarantee not only the mere survival of national minorities but also the manifold development and unfolding of the minority values. In this context, according to the official wording, it was only natural that national minorities would have full rights in every aspect of life. However, the bald fact is that these countries, in contrast to declared principles, took advantage of an unprecedented opportunity to eliminate the national minorities.

It can also be pointed out that when the political interest so desired, processes contrary to the official political objectives also took place; these were temporary, however, and could be termed as the method of "letting off steam". Beyond doubt, there were periods when national minorities, Hungarians and others, had a "breathing space". This was not to mean that legal measures afflicting the national minorities had been abrogated or that a former, more favorable situation had been restored. Namely, when the main motives for this kind of relaxation ceased, the adverse policy towards nationalities would be resumed along with further curtailments.

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Adding to all this were, among others, the following factors:

- 1) Despite experience gained in the interwar periods, the Great Powers that emerged victorious from World War II *relegated the cause of national minorities to the jurisdiction of the individual countries*. With this they put an end to even the minimum level of legal protection of national minorities which formerly had been provided for in one form or another within the framework of the League of Nations.
- 2) Squaring its practice with Bolshevik principles, a state power is intolerant of any unlikeness; this follows precisely from the homogenizing ideology which determines the state's policy; thus, countries under the state socialist social system were opposed to national minorities from the outset. The nationalization of land, commerce and industry deprived the national minorities, along with the majorities, of their material independence, while the struggle against clericalism reduced the believers, Catholic or Calvinist Hungarians, to the state of "enemies of the people's democracy". Urban development and the location of industry were used to change the ethnic composition of Hungarian-inhabited regions. It can be observed that the totalitarian state power, ignoring human rights, was taking advantage, to the fullest possible extent, of the defenseless situation of national minorities who had been deprived of their autonomy as well as of their various associations, institutions and minor communities (8).
- 3) In countries living under the state socialist social system, the central political power possessed all the means to put its Party-determined policy into practice and to implement it in minority relations.
- 4) A Bolshevik-type state power was developed in Hungary too. As a result, the state not only failed for a long time to support Hungarians living in the neighboring countries but even contributed to worsening the situation of Hungarians living as national minorities since the state, either consciously or unconsciously, in conformity with the true nature of the ruling socio-political system and ideology, tended to abandon the Hungarian minorities and even to prohibit any concern about them (9). After 1956, the scope of free action of the Hungarian political leadership was narrowed down by the fact that on November 4, 1956, the Yugoslavian leaders had "invited" Imre Nagy and his staff to the Yugoslavian Embassy in Budapest, and subsequently the Romanian leaders rendered similar "friendly" services to János Kádár's government.

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- 5) In interpreting the official political attitude, whether Hungarian, Czechoslovakian or Romanian, to be taken into account is the direct or indirect effect which was to be produced by these countries to comply with the Soviet expectations; namely, furthering the uniformity of the Soviet Bloc.

As it appears from the afore-mentioned five points, *political practice related to national minorities, which endangers the very existence of Hungarian minorities, can be identified in practically all – legal, political, religious, economic, cultural, scientific and other – spheres of the minority life.* This can be seen in such acts as falsifying history, preventing the cultivation of national consciousness, curtailing the minorities' economic activities, stepping down university education, limiting the use of the mother tongue and the free exercise of religion, closing down or curtailing institutions, restricting relations with the parent country, and so forth.

The situation of Hungarian minorities, as different from that of the majorities, is determined essentially by the genesis of their becoming a minority, and their assimilation is characterized by what has been defined above as "A"-type stress. In pursuance of the nature of the "A"-type stress, it should be said that the majority tends to regard the Hungarian minority (along with other national minorities) not simply as a minority but as a foreign body which endangers the essence and territorial integrity of the given country. Therefore, to the majority mind, their minority-related tasks included not only social, legal, educational, cultural, political and similar issues but also had internal security implications, and were dealt with accordingly. All this is related to the reducing or closing down of the institutions of national minorities, to hindering their self-organization, as well as to policies affecting every field of the minority life.

Although these facts are all widely known, national minorities are nonetheless prevented by well-founded and constant fears and by the conditioning of the majority practice from revealing and making known their *actual* situation. (However, to tell the truth, it should be added that they have not had any opportunity to speak out until recently, and the objective description of their plight even now encounters insurmountable difficulties.) This situation permits the disclosure of a "short-reality" only, and all that is truly important about the aspects of "landscape and soul", or, otherwise worded, about the aspect of Hungarian minorities, has remained hidden behind the utterable and namable things (10).

To sum up, it may be established that the deformed assimilation process which corresponds to the "A"-type stress among Hungarian minorities has

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advanced to a considerable extent. To wit, the majority people expect the Hungarian minority to break off its relations with and ties to the parent nation; in other words, they wish and demand the denial of all that is connected with the preservation of the Hungarian identity. To describe what all this has called forth among Hungarians living as national minorities in the Serbian Republic of Yugoslavia, a few key-words from Sándor Hódi's above-cited study will suffice: rootlessness, weakening instinct for life, desolation, assuming false identity, continuous threat, imitation of existence, idle expectation, lack of defence, subjection, impoverishment, deprivation, fright, disintegration of community cohesion, identity crisis, lack of sound intellectual and mental bearing (*Haltung*), anxiety, homelessness, escape, uncertainty, lack of ethnic consciousness, remorse, infantilization, dropping out, dispersion, suspicion, hopelessness, indifference, lack of perspective, self-abasement, hypocrisy (11).

What this "A"-typical stress means in practice and how well these concepts describe the situation of Hungarian national minorities can be characterized by some demographic data related to the Hungarian minority living in the Serbian Republic of Yugoslavia. Namely, in the Voivodship where the overwhelming majority of Hungarians living in the Serbian Republic can be found, the number of Hungarian births was 9,500 in 1950; this number had dropped to 7,091 in 1960, to 4,915 in 1970, and to 3,815 in 1989. While the birthrate has steadily decreased, mortality has increased: the number of deaths was 4,897 in 1960, 5,509 in 1970, 6,225 in 1980, and 6,193 in 1988. Various process, which intensify one another, brought about the following changes in the number of population. According to statistical figures for 1948, the number of Hungarian inhabitants in the Voivodship was 428,750; this number had fallen to 423,866 by 1971 and to 385,356 by 1981. Presently, this number is estimated at about 350,000. Thus, over the past forty years, the number of Hungarians living in the Serbian Republic has decreased by almost 80,000 persons (12).

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- (3) See: *Magyarország története* (The History of Hungary) vol. 8. Budapest, 1976. pp. 349–387.

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- (5) Czechoslovakia is an exception in this respect since in 1990, President Havel, followed by others, spoke of Hungarians now living in Czechoslovakia as part of the Hungarian nation annexed to Czechoslovakia
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Dóra Fodor

**Language attitude, language choice
and language substitution in a bilingual family
in Aranyosgyéres**

1. Bilingual families – a theoretical approach

Susan Gal has pointed out in her study on language substitution that '[it] is a world phenomenon: every continent and every period of history can provide examples of a people or a group of people who leave their language and choose another one. In this process bilingualism is a transitory phase, though it can remain a permanently stable state. The more general situation is that the state-language supersedes the minority language when the speakers of the two languages are living in the same economic and political system' (Gal 1992:47).

Language substitution usually is observed on the level of the community, from the point of view of an ethnic group. It is, however, worthwhile to examine how this phenomenon operates within the family, what kind of processes, factors define the way of the language substitution in a family. Such a research would reveal too, which are the external and internal factors supporting the stabilisation of bilingualism in a family.

When language substitution starts in a family, the situation is similar to the one in a mixed-language family. In the family under observation the man and wife - during the progress of the language substitution – took on roles usual in the case of couples with different languages: one of them preferred the state-language (Romanian) the other the mother tongue (Hungarian). The role model influences the language use of the family. External factors also played roles (political and economic situation, domicile, work place, schools), as well as internal ones (mentality, attitudes toward languages, the prestige of languages) (Gal 1992: 48).

The social changes characteristic of the 20th c., industrialisation, urbanisation, the development of mass communication drew nearer the minorities to the establishment requiring the dominant language: to schools, work places, offices, etc. (Gal 1992:48). It seemed necessary to examine how these external factors effect the scale of values of the couple and their attitude to the languages in question; after all, the internal factors are

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the ones which will determine their choice of language and what is more important, the choice of language and ethnic affiliation of their children, the next generation. László Vetési (1980) draws attention to the point made by Ganckaja and Tyerentyeva that in ethnically mixed families language and ethnic consciousness are the decisive factors in the process: 'Of these two factors the influence of the former starts operating in the moment the ethnically mixed family is formed, the latter starts being effective in the next generation of the family when the family members decide upon the ethnicity they wish to belong to.' (Ganckaja and Tyerentyeva 1971:260, cited by Vetési 1980:55).

In a family moving toward language substitution the linguistic factors start working when the above mentioned roles become decisive after the external factors had already influenced the mentality of the members: one of the spouses prefers the language of the majority, the other adheres to the use of the mother tongue. The question of ethnic consciousness will appear only in the case of the next generation since the choice if the one or the other language defines ethnic affiliation.

2. Introducing the family under investigation

The family are living in Aranyosgyéres. It is a settlement in Transylvania with sporadic Hungarian inhabitants. According to the data of the 1990 census, 9,6% of the population is Hungarian. Industrialisation, urbanisation have changed this settlement too, a big housing estate has been built. At the beginning of the 1970s the grown up children (the generation of 40-50 years of age) of parents who moved here from a village, could settle down mainly in flats in housing estates. This eminently was a Romanian speaking surrounding. Kindergarten and school with Hungarian as their language of instruction were only in the centre of the town.

F.I. and F.I., a Hungarian speaking young couple moved into a flat of the housing estate of Aranyosgyéres at the end of the 1970s. Language substitution started as a result in the family.

3. Work methods

The family was interviewed in the last days of 1998. It will be examined which phase of language substitution the family have reached in the past 25 years. There are four members; the new generation is represented by a girl (21, from now on L), and a boy (19, from now on F). Only three

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members of the family were interviewed: The mother (A1) and the young ones. The father (A2) refused to participate. However, my own observations and information culled from the answers of the other informants offered enough information about A2 to be included in the study. I tried to repeat the same questions in each of the 20 minutes interviews in order to be able to compare details. During the interviews I used both Hungarian and Romanian languages agreeing with the request and language ability of the informants: A1 spoke only Hungarian, L both Hungarian and Romanian, F only Romanian.

During the interviews there were direct questions about language attitudes and language use (Borbély 1995:287). There were questions about the mother tongue and national affiliation too, as it was also an aim to learn how language attitude and use are forming language and national affinity auto identification.

4. Aims and hypotheses

The aim was to examine how the prestige of languages, the attitude toward languages influences the use of language and identity patterns (mother tongue, nationality) of the family. The role of religion in language substitution was also of interest; and also whether the external and internal factors can contribute to the rehabilitation of the mother tongue, to the reversal of processes.

According to the results of sociolinguistic research (Schlieben-Lange 1997, Gal 1979, Brunder 1972, Eckert 1983, Paulston 1994: 13) language substitution is usually started by women. This can manifest itself in the choice of spouse, of language and also which language they use when speaking to their children (the mother tongue or the state-language). The general explanation is that women do not stand at as high a social position as men. The choice of the state-language, the language of power expresses a striving for social acknowledgment.

In the family in question and in the traditional communities of the Carpathian-basin the role of women is the opposite: they are the ones to preserve the mother tongue, their work and occupation does not take them close to the language of the dominant stratum. Their social standing allows more opportunity to keep family ties, which supposes the use of the mother tongue (i.e. a more intensive relationship to parents, older relations, etc.).

Minority Culture**5. The language attitude and language use of the mother**

A1 declares to have Hungarian as her mother tongue. Of the external factors, her work place and domicile were responsible for her bilingualism and language loss. In 1998 she was still working in a bakery in Aranyosgyéres. Both at her work place and dwelling place she has been surrounded by Romanian speakers.

The schooling of the children played a more important role in language preservation or language substitution; indeed it was what accelerated the process. There was no Hungarian instruction in the local kindergarten. Lack of time and the requirements of the work place motivated the parents to choose the Romanian kindergarten nearby. 'We went to work and there was no one to take the children to the kindergarten.' The language used in the kindergarten influenced the language use at home; the mother tongue was neglected. Beside the external factors (lack of time, work place, bigger distance to the Hungarian kindergarten) another factor played an important factor, that of prompting to follow a mutual pattern. 'There were two Hungarian families in the block of flats, all of them sent their children to the Romanian kindergarten.' The children's language use and knowledge was so much influenced by the kindergarten that it became natural to send them to Romanian schools. The children's use of language defines the use of language of the whole family. They speak less and less Hungarian. Talking about school, the language of learning is Romanian; Hungarian starts to lose its importance even in family situations.

Considering language attitude, in the case of A1 the symbolic value of the mother tongue is very high. Her answering to the question: 'Which language do you prefer? Which is nicer?' is: 'I prefer Hungarian, its nicer than Romanian because it is my mother tongue.' In spite of the driving forces, the high symbolic value of the mother tongue has been preserved. It is because Hungarian is the language of familiarity, it contributes to the feeling of 'belonging', enhances the feeling of security.

The mother tongue less frequently spoken feels more difficult than the more frequently use of Romanian: 'I feel Hungarian to be a more difficult language, more difficult than Romanian. May be because we speak it more often during work and with the neighbours. We feel Romanian is easier; as it is, we are surrounded by more Romanians.'

Within the family she speaks Hungarian only with her parents and relatives, with her husband Hungarian and Romanian, tries to speak in Hungarian with L who rejects it and with F she speaks only in Romanian.

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She does not know the Romanian language sufficiently, she makes lots of mistakes, is frequently corrected. She admits to know Hungarian better than Romanian: 'I am sooner recognised as a Hungarian than A2 or the children.' She explains her better Hungarian by: 'I spoke Hungarian at school too... the children went to Romanian schools, but I finished eight grades in a Hungarian school and also in kindergarten.'

In the case of A1 we can talk about subtractive bilingualism where the mother tongue has preserved dominance from the point of view of competence: her mother tongue (L1) can function independently from L2 (Veress 1996:55), but L2 is eroding L1, linguistic interference occurs frequently and there is a feeling of linguistic lack.

6. The linguistic attitudes of the father as reflected in the opinion of the other members of the family

A2 refused to participate; from the answers of the other members of the family it can be deduced what role had the father in the process of the family's language substitution. His nationality and mother tongue has been preserved as Hungarian; his Hungarian identity consciousness has not been lost (according to A1). In his language loss his work place and occupation played the decisive role. A2 is a coach in the sports club of Aranyosgyéres. Sports proved to be a field where he was drawn nearer to the state-language. It also influenced the communication and language use of the family too; on external influence, he brings home the language of his social contacts and his work place; this hastens the process of language substitution of the family toward L2 monolingualism.

7. The development of the younger generation's identity in the mirror of their language use.

The linguistic attitude of the younger generation is influenced not only by work place and the circle of friends but by the attitude of A2 too. Thanks to her closer contact to A1, L has not reached language loss yet. F on the other hand has been monopolised by A2, his occupation being similar to that of his father (The 19 year old F is the member of the same sport club), their similar interests (sport being work and leisure time activity in one) helped to complete the process. In the case of F the language substitution has been completed and has resulted in a new identity-consciousness? F declares to ha Romanian as his mother tongue and to be of Romanian nationality.

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
When plotting the internal communication system of the family it is clear that the Hungarian language has been relegated to the background.

L (girl, 21) after finishing her general schooling graduated from a three-year vocational school. She had several work places, mostly worked as a shop assistant. It is more problematic to define her mother tongue and nationality. She is at the stage of bilingualism that induces mixed identity patterns: there is an inner identity for herself but there is an outer identity for her environment. This dual identity serves as a defence-mechanism to cover up her insecure, ambiguous situation: she carries a Hungarian name but cannot satisfactorily in Hungarian. The psychological background of this dual identity, or rather 'half-identity' causes her shame and embarrassment. For the Hungarian acquaintances she explains her Hungarian name and scanty knowledge of the Hungarian language by a half-and-half (half Hungarian – half Romanian) identity. When talking to Romanians she uses the same explanation explaining her Hungarian name. If asked which language does she consider to be her mother tongue, she gives the answer: *"Păi ... mie îmi pare rău acuma că nu știu bine să vorbesc ... că mi-ar place mult ca să pot, dar e greu pentru mine ca să învăț de la început ... păi ... limba maghiară"* [Well, I am sorry that I cannot speak well – I would like to know, but it is difficult to start from the beginning well – the Hungarian language]. Do you declare to be Hungarian? – Yes; among Romanians, however, her behaviour changes: 'If I am among Romanians- it's half and half and if somebody asks I say, because I cannot speak well, rather do not speak in Hungarian, because I see they are looking at me strangely when I say I am Hungarian.' It seems that it is not only among Romanians she needs this half-and-half identity, as the Hungarian speakers cannot accept her scanty knowledge of Hungarian. The denial of her Hungarian identity became 'necessary' to avoid embarrassing explanation.

It is difficult to decide how much the admitting of the inner identity (Hungarian mother tongue, Hungarian nationality) depends on the need to comply to the demands psychically. In her answers there appears frequently the adjustment to the behaviour she believed me to represent. She has stressed several times how much she would like to improve her knowledge of Hungarian and would like speak Hungarian more frequently: *"Ha tudtam ... dacă aș știu să vorbesc perfect ungurește mi-ar place să vorbesc numai așa. Dar acum mi-e greu, deci mai bine pot vorbi pe*

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românește, mai bine vorbesc pe românește ... și nici nu prea am cu cine să vorbesc, deci numai acasă, dar prietenii mei toți sunt români" (If I could speak Hungarian well I would speak it all the time, but now it is difficult because I speak Romanian better, I prefer to speak Romanian, there is no one to speak to, only at home, all my friends are Romanian.) A1 draws attention to L's ambiguous attitude (I do speak to her in Hungarian but she is angry because she cannot and said she rather in Romanian). L does not speak Hungarian even when she has the opportunity to do so.



According to Susan Gal 'The strength of a minority language grows if it connects the speakers symbolically or practically with an economically or politically more developed world (Gal 1992:58). The mother country and economic connections strongly influence language attitudes. This what influences L when she declares her mother tongue. She explains choice: "*Cum am fost plecată am văzut ce diferență mare e între viața de aici și viața de acolo*" [As I was abroad I saw the great difference between the life here and there]. The remark refers to her two-month stay in Hungary in 1998; she worked there, that is how she collected her experience. The better conditions, the more developed economic situation enhances the prestige of the Hungarian language for her so much that it proves to decisive in identifying her mother tongue. Her relationship to the Hungarian language was formed in a positive way. L would like to go back to work in Hungary but better knowledge of the language would be necessary: 'I want to go back to Hungary, if I could speak better, and read and write.. then there would have been no problems.'

L always speaks with A2 and F always in Romanian, with A1 sometimes in Romanian, sometimes in Hungarian, however, more frequently

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in Romanian (A1's remark). The grandmother on the mother's side (only one grandparent is still living) does not want to speak in Romanian with her grandchildren. The language attitude of the grandparent, however, does not influence the younger generation in preserving their language. The reason is that the grandmother was not a dominant person in the family, neither was there a close contact between her and the grandchildren because of the distance (she lived in an other town). L speaks in Hungarian with the relatives but in her case the connection is not as strong as in the case of A1.

L characterised her command of languages that her knowledge of Romanian is much better than that of Hungarian. When speaking in Romanian her pronunciation shows Hungarian interference.

In contrast to A1, L is an example of subtractive bilingual where her L1 (Hungarian) depends on her L2 (Romanian) without which she cannot exist.

F (boy, 19 years of age) is the employee of the Aranyosgyéres sports club (football player). The close connection between A2 and F has been mentioned above. The Romanian language was decisive for F from his childhood through the common interest and in communication with his father it became more and more dominant and finally it completely replaced the Hungarian language. The language use of the father and the son defines the pattern of language use at home.

F does not make any effort to find any justification for his Hungarian name and lack of knowledge of the language. He declares that his nationality is Romanian, and his mother tongue Romanian. (*"Normal sunt maghiar dar la prieteni sau la alții le zic că sunt român ... oricum nu mă cred, că după nume sunt maghiar"* [I am actually Hungarian but I tell friends and everybody that I am Romanian though they do not believe it because by my name I am Hungarian]). He takes the situation easier than his sister because there are no sentiments attached to his being Hungarian. The exclusive use of the Romanian language means language assimilation naturally leads to the acceptance of the new nationality. Language serves as an absolute identity marker for him. He justifies his claim to be a Romanian national with his language use: (*"Mă cred român pentru că vorbesc românește toată ziua"* [I claim to be Romanian because I speak in Romanian the whole day]).

The possibility of forming contact with the mother country could enhance the prestige of the Hungarian language in the case of F too (a football club was interested in taking him over). Hungary lives in his mind

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as a country of success with possible contact to the west *"Îmi pare rău ... că acum poate trebuie să mă duc în Ungaria la o echipă de fotbal și nu știu nici să citesc, nici să vorbesc corect, numai de înțeles ... mi-ar fi folosit foarte mult, chiar dacă nu mergeam în Ungaria, dar mi-ar fi folosit..."* [I am sorry, may be I have to go to a Hungarian football team and I can neither read nor speak properly, I understand only the language... it would have been useful even if I would not go to Hungary, I could have used it]. There are no negative associations in his thinking about his Hungarian mother tongue.

He speaks in Romanian with everybody in the family, even with his maternal grandmother or does not communicate with her at all because he is not willing to use Hungarian. During the interview he frequently mentions that he has no opportunity to speak in Hungarian, this is why he does not use it (Romanian acquaintances, Romanian friends). The insufficient knowledge influences his choice of language because he refuses to speak in Hungarian even if he had the opportunity, similar to L.

He believes his command of the Romanian language perfect *"Vorbesc perfect româna"*. If he does not say his name no one would believe him to be Hungarian. He cannot read or write in Hungarian but admits to understand it and could also speak it but does not know the more difficult words: *"De înțeles înțeleg foarte bine ... înțeleg orice ... dar nu ... Știu și să vorbesc, dar nu știu cuvintele mai grele"* [I can understand it well, I can understand everything, but cannot speak, do not know the more difficult words].

In the case of F, though in his mind the prestige of Hungarian is still intact, we cannot speak about bilingualism. Considering own statement (cf. the quotation above), he can be suggested to be in the early stage of 'new monolingualism', which – under optimal circumstances – could still be reversible.

8. The role of the religious affiliation in the language substitution of the young generation

In the Carpathian –basin the reformed church is strongly connected to the Hungarians historically and ethnically and had an important role in the development, maintaining and preserving the Hungarian culture. In the 20th c. is changed. In Slovakia followed in the wake of Slovakisation by giving up its ethnic attachments and thus has hastened the process of the loss of Hungarian culture and language (Barna 1996). In the case of

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the Hungarian Calvinist minority in Romania there also is a kind of attitude, which helps assimilation and which may be ascribed to the 'more open' system of the Reformed church. The use of the Romanian language in religious instructions encourages linguistic assimilation and helps the appearance of new identity. Though in Aranyosgyéres this was not the practice, it was not at the assistance of the subjects of the present research in their language preservation either.

In my analysis I have described what kind of a role the religious affinity could have played in helping language preservation. Religious instructions could have improved L's knowledge of her mother tongue; however, for the reformed church was satisfied with the ritualistic repetition of the text without requiring understanding of it. Thus it could not even serve as a lesson in the mother tongue. Since only memorised texts were expected of her, the instruction did not play any positive role for L in preserving her mother tongue. There was no attempt at increasing her language competence, at strengthening the prestige of the mother tongue (e.g. by courses helping to improve her knowledge, etc.)

Her brother could not meet even the basic requirements. F was not confirmed because at 14 years of age his knowledge was so scarce that he was unable to recite the memorized text and he was not allowed to be confirmed in Romanian.

Comparing the situation of the two informants it becomes evident that language substitution can be facilitated not only by the constant use of the Romanian language but also by the lack of courses to maintain the mother tongue. In the case of L and F their religious affiliation did not play any positive role in ensuring the preservation of their mother tongue.

9. The relationship of language attitude and identity patterns of the informants

The next figure represents how important it is which generation a member of the family belongs to. The youngest member abandoned not only his mother tongue but his nationality as well.

Of the questions about language attitudes the first one was directed toward sentiments about the mother tongue, the symbolic value of languages. There is a correlation between the answers to the first question and the identity markers (mother tongue, nationality). A1 ascribed a greater symbolic value to the Hungarian language and it defines her identity consciousness. L prefers Romanian. The acceptance of Hungarian

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and the 'half' preserved Hungarian identity is due to the closer mother-daughter relationship and to her visit to Hungary. These factors are slowing down her change of identity. In the case of F, who is indifferent towards Hungarian identity, and who is closer to A2, his attraction to the Romanian language helped him develop his Romanian identity consciousness.

| | A1 | L | F |
|---|-------------|----------------------------------|---------------|
| Nationality | Hungarian | Hungarian (I) 'half-half' (O) | Romanian |
| Mother tongue | Hungarian | Hungarian | Romanian |
| 1. Do you prefer the Hungarian or the Romanian language? | Hungarian | Romanian | Romanian |
| 2. Which seems more difficult: Hungarian or Romanian? | Hungarian | Hungarian | Cannot decide |
| 3. Do you prefer to speak in Hungarian or in Romanian? | In Romanian | In Romanian | In Romanian |

I = "inner identity"
O = "outer identity"

Analysing the language attitude of the Romanians of Kétegyháza, Anna Borbély pointed out that the preference of languages (Question 3) and the answers about their difficulty (Question 2) are in correlation with the language choice (Borbély 1995:298). We could observe the connection in the case of our three informants, since all three prefer to use the Romanian language. The answers are not always in positive relationship with the identity-pattern. A1 finds Hungarian more difficult (Question 2) and prefers to speak in Romanian (Question 3), however, she has a strong identity consciousness. This is in agreement with the high symbolic value of her mother tongue (Question 1). F's answer referring to the difficulty of languages (Question Question 2) shows that he has already completed language substitution because in his mind the Hungarian language has already been repressed and he is unable to decide which language is more difficult. For him only the Romanian language exists.

10. The language situation of the informants and the development of their identity in the past five years

The bilingual situation discussed above was researched in 1998. After five years, in 2003, I went back to find my informants. The period

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between the meetings did not bring them closer to the Hungarian language and identity, on the opposite; they belong to the losses registered in the 2002 census. Their lives prove that they departed from everything connecting them to Hungarians.

Both young persons have chosen Romanian spouses, the Romanian language dominates their family communication. In the new family of the girl Spanish came into the picture as, similarly to other young Romanians, she and her husband believed emigration to Spain to be only acceptable solution. The mother, who seemed to be most committed to the Hungarian language, has also chosen Spain after retirement. She takes care of her grandchildren; her use of language is dominated by Romanian and Spanish and speaks in Hungarian only when going home to visit relatives, which is getting rare.

The young man is still a football player, now belonging to a club in Torda. His Romanian contacts at the work place and family communication have completely distanced him from the Hungarian language. Of his Hungarian relatives he has contact only to his father and they speak only in Romanian with one another.

Examining the language use of the two young persons it is obvious that not only the state-language but also living under the influence of a world language can also wear away the mother tongue, which was pushed into the background from the beginning.

Conclusions

1. At the onset of the process of language substitution in the family under observation two different role models developed: one of the spouses (A") being indifferent to the Hungarian identity, enforced the use of the second language (L2); the other (A1) adhered to their mother tongue (L1). Their surrounding (Romanian friends and neighbours), the dominant position of the husband, the weakening of the Hungarian identity consciousness of the younger generation, all contributed if not to the complete abandonment of their national affiliation but at least to the loss of importance of the use of the Hungarian language.
2. The external factors (Romanian setting at the work place, Romanian neighbours and friends, the isolation of the housing estate, lack of kindergarten and school with instruction in the Hungarian language near the home, the occupation (sport) encouraging language super

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substitution played an important role in breaking up the process of language preservation. To this were added the internal factors which also influenced the process.

The research disagrees with the earlier findings of sociolinguistic research (Paulston 1994:13). In this case it was not the woman, the mother who preferred the state-language and thus helped the language substitution; on the contrary through her closer contact to her Hungarian-speaking relatives she is the one who preserves the mother tongue. In addition she had her positive attitude toward Hungarian that manifests itself in her high symbolic valuation of the mother tongue. The husband had less time to maintain family relationships because of his occupation (he spends more time away from home). This is accompanied by his indifference towards Hungarian identity and consciousness; he is speaking less in Hungarian, which leads to language loss. If the change is not still clear in the father's identity pattern, the son already has a new identity consciousness: he declares to have Romanian as his mother tongue and to be a Romanian national.

3. From all this it follows that the road leading to the language substitution of a family is greatly influenced by parents' pattern and the inner psychic bondage characteristic of the family. For the new generation not only the language but also the national consciousness is an important factor. The members of the new generation choose their identity after the parent they identify closer. While F was closer to A2, L was to A1, thus she could form a closer contact to the Hungarian-speaking relatives. This is why in spite of her speaking in Romanian most of the time and her scanty knowledge of Hungarian she has preserved in her identity pattern Hungarian as her mother tongue and her so called 'inner' Hungarian identity consciousness.
4. The answers given to the questions of the interviews revealed the external and internal factors, which facilitated language substitution and also those, which could reverse or as in the case of the present study could have reversed the process. For the parents' generation the symbolic value of the mother tongue is enhanced by the need of 'belonging', of the closer contact to the Hungarian-speaking relatives. The language attitude of the younger ones depends more on political-economic situations. The prestige of the mother tongue grows if their minority language connects them to a mother country, which counts as economically more advanced in their view. Apart from these exter-

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- nal factors there are internal ones for the young persons too which can check linguistic assimilation (e.g. the closer contact between A1 and L).
5. Religion could have a positive role in preserving the language. Since the reformed church did not feel important to maintain the Hungarian language of the scattered Hungarian population, its dedication towards the Hungarian language weakened (cf. their allowing to use the Romanian language during instructions, or the lack of language programmes to check language loss). From the point of view of the preservation of the mother tongue it was – if not a negative force – but in the case of our informants an indifferent factor.
 6. After five years the economic instability, the rootlessness, the lure of western countries, emigration which is not directed any more toward the mother country, the new country with its higher prestige leads to the choice and exclusive use of a new world language and the complete abandonment of the minority mother tongue. For those members of the family who remained behind the separation from the family and the community exerting preserving force resulted in the total dominance of the state-language, i.e. that of the Romanian language.

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Minority Culture*Erika Rácz***The development
of church matters in the settlements
along River Mura till 1945**

A group of Croats are living in County Zala along the River Mura in Hungary. There are only seven villages left: Fityeház, Molnári, Murakeresztúr (earlier Keresztúr and Kollátszeg), Petrivente, Semjénháza, Tótszentmárton, Tótszerdahely; some of the Croatian speakers live in Nagykanizsa and Letenye, altogether about 8,000 persons speaking the so-called kaj-Croatian dialect.

The Croats along the River Mura have preserved their mother tongue but assimilation – the common fate of minorities reached them too.

There are two important factors hastening or slowing down assimilation: the church and schools – these play a role separately or together in the preservation or giving up the mother tongue; in most of the villages of the region there were Roman Catholic elementary schools; the local parish priest was responsible for the overseeing the instruction as well as the management of the schools.

Almost 100% of the population of these villages follow the Roman Catholic faith. Till the end of the 18th c. the region belonged to the Zagreb diocese. The bishops of Zagreb regarded it their important duty to send priests with Croatian mother tongue to the area; thus there usually were Croatian priests who had studied in Zagreb. It was only Tótszentmárton which had a church; Molnári, Tótszerdahely, Petrivente and Semjénháza were the filials of Tótszentmárton; Fityeház that of Szepetnek (at the time its population overwhelmingly Croatian); Kollátszeg and Keresztúr belonged to Légrád across the River Mura.

In 1777 the Szombathely diocese was founded. This became a turning point in the assimilation of the Croats living along the River Mura. The villages of the region were allotted to Hungarian dioceses; to make things worse it meant this divided the Croats in two groups. The subversion of the Croatian language in church services also began. The attempts at Magyarizing were carried out by different methods. In 1883 the bishop of Veszprém wrote a letter to the parish priest of Keresztúr in which he reproached him for the neglect of education in the village, "because the

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pupils are not Magyarized, they do not know anything of any subject.'¹ Three letters of the bishop of Szombathely, dated at different times dealt with the use of the Croatian language. All three were addressed to the parish priest of Tótszentmárton. The first, dated in 1909: 'Regarding that the congregation of Tótszentmárton asked for a chaplain speaking Hungarian in the case they are unable to employ an assistant minister speaking Croatian because the majority of the congregation speaks and understands Hungarian, the language of preaching and service is going to be Hungarian.'² The second letter was written in 1932: 'My son in Christ, I have learned that that the schoolmaster of Tótszentmárton has translated the Croatian church songs into Hungarian and this is the way he has them sung in church. If this is true, I disagree with it; it would cause untoward excitement among the people. Church singing is the last where any changes can be made. If they want to sing in Hungarian it can be introduced at the mass for young people and then only step by step...'³ The third letter was written on the same topic also in 1939: 'I appeal to your human wisdom as pastor in finding the best solution for the use of language during services. There are two lines: not hurting their feelings about their language and not letting obstruct Magyarization.'⁴

The use of the Croatian language was gradually ousted from church services and other church functions. How did this happen at the various parishes?

In 1830, in the protocol of the Canonica Visitation of Tótszentmárton contains a list of books where one was entitled 'Capucini Croatici'⁵. The original protocol written in Latin was translated into Hungarian in *Historia Domus*. In the translation the book was referred to as 'István Capucinus: Croatian homilies'. In 1866 and 1867 there was a gospel in Croatian⁶ in the inventory of the Keresztúr 'Mother church and Abbey' (the church in the village was built around 1810), in 1893 the book was not any more in the inventory; there were only Latin, German and Hungarian books in the possession of the parish. The 29th August 1896 meeting of the Tótszentmárton school board dealt with the advertisement for the position of the

¹ Murakerestúr, Archive of the Parish office

² Tótszentmárton, Archive of the Parish office 2955/1909.

³ Tótszentmárton, Archive of the Parish office, letter No. 2119/1932

⁴ Tótszentmárton, Archive of the Parish office, letter No. 2150/1932

⁵ Tótszentmárton, Archive of the Parish office

⁶ Murakerestúr, Archive of the Parish office

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schoolmaster: 'a competition should be advertised for the position in Tótszentmárton ... the tasks of the cantor are to be carried out in Croatian.'⁷ Béla Terbók schoolmaster won it; in the agreement about his fees it was noted that the knowledge of the Croatian language was necessary in his work as a cantor.⁸ On the 12th November 1899 the duties of the bell-ringer was described in the kaj-Croatian dialect.⁹ It was extended in 1904 with the Croatian description left unchanged.¹⁰

Between 1906 and 1941 the church authorities asked the local parish priests to fill in questionnaires about the situation in the Catholic parishes. Some of the questions were about the nationality language:

- what language was used for the sermons?
- in what language was the congregation singing?
- what language was used in other church functions?

The 1908 questionnaire filled in at Murakeresztúr stated that 'The language of the sermon is Hungarian, only the gospel is read in the local dialect on Sundays and holydays. During the service the congregation sings in Hungarian. Other church functions are in Hungarian'.¹¹ According to the data for 1917 only Hungarian was used.¹² In Tótszentmárton 'the sermon is in Croatian, the congregation sings in Croatian during the service, during other church functions the use of the Croatian language is general' between 1906 and 1913.¹³ This was still the situation in 1917 and 1932 too.¹⁴ In 1940 the language of the sermon was Hungarian, the singing both in Hungarian and Croatian, during other church functions, e.g. funerals both Hungarian and Croatian was in use.¹⁵ At Tótszerdahely the sermon was in Hungarian, the congregation sang in Hungarian and Croatian in 1941.¹⁶ In 1943 the bishop of the Szombathely diocese pro-

⁷ Tótszentmárton, Archive of the Parish office

⁸ Tótszentmárton, Archive of the Parish office

⁹ Tótszentmárton, Archive of the Parish office

¹⁰ Tótszentmárton, Archive of the Parish office

¹¹ Murakeresztúr, Archive of the Parish office, Questionnaire for the Catholic priests for the year 1908.

¹² Murakeresztúr, Archive of the Parish office, Questionnaire for the Catholic priests for the year 1917.

¹³ Tótszentmárton, Archive of the Parish office, Questionnaire for the Catholic priests

¹⁴ Tótszentmárton, Archive of the Parish office, Questionnaire for the Catholic priests for the year 1917.

¹⁵ Tótszentmárton, Archive of the Parish office

¹⁶ Tótszerdahely, Archive of the Parish office 6/1942.

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vided data for the Minister of Religion and Education in aid of the 'elaboration of the ethnic past' based on the reports of the parish priests of the region. According to the data from Tótszentmárton, Tótszerdahely and Szepetnek (Bajcsa – still a settlement with Croatian majority, belonged to Szepetnek) in 1943: In Tótszentmárton the singing was Croatian during low mass and in Hungarian during high mass, the priest preached in Hungarian. In the village 'there is no nationality problem at present, the local population speaks both Hungarian and Croatian.' Tótszerdahely had its parish since 1930. According to the report the language of the services was Hungarian at the time of the inquiry, before the curacy it was sometimes Hungarian, sometimes Croatian. In 1943 Magyarization became characteristic of the village. In Szepetnek the language of the service was Croatian till the 1880s (earlier the inhabitants of the village were Croat speakers). The inhabitants of Bajcsa, belonging to the parish can speak Hungarian well. 'The older people speak Croatian at home but the younger generation knows Hungarian better than Croatian and speaks almost exclusively Hungarian. The quick Magyarization is due to the work of the school with Hungarian as its language of instruction.'¹⁷

The language of religious instruction was Hungarian in every village. May be it was Croatian in Tótszentmárton and Tótszerdahely for a while because a report about the school year of 1862/63 states that the language of teaching in the schools of the two villages was Hungarian as well Croatian.¹⁸ Since 1908 the language of religious instruction was Hungarian in both places.¹⁹ In 1935 the parish priest of Tótszerdahely asked the bishop of Szombathely to allow Mária Bondor teacher to instruct first graders in religion 'because their not knowing Hungarian religion cannot be explained to them, only memorization can be expected.'²⁰ The bishop assigned the task to Mária Bondor and warned the priest that 'religious instruction means the explanation of the material and not making the children memorize it. Explanation should be in the mother tongue of the children.'²¹ The county meeting of Zala planned the building of a church in Tótszerdahely in 1938. The meeting addressed a decision for approval to the Minister of Interior. In it they explained the request 'Tót-

¹⁷ Szombathely, Archive of the bishopric, Acta Cancellariae 1000/43.

¹⁸ Archives of County Zala, school inspector reports 1863.

¹⁹ Tótszentmárton, Archive of the Parish office, statistical report of schools

²⁰ Tótszerdahely, Archive of the Parish office 7/1935

²¹ Tótszerdahely, Archive of the Parish office 1266/1935.

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szerdahely lies directly by the border drawn by the treaty of Trianon, thus it is about the benefit of the Croatians on their way to Magyarization, the church will not only help them but also it is in the interest of the Church and the nation. The Croatian speaking congregation can see how the Yugoslavs are building over the border and they themselves have not even their church.²² In 1938 the deputy parish priest of Tótszentmárton wrote a letter to the presidency of religious funds of the Ministry of Religion and Education asking for help for building a chapel in Semjénháza. He was of the opinion that the inhabitants of Semjénháza deserved assistance because 'though most of them have Croatian as their mother tongue they decided that in their school the instruction should be completely in Hungarian.'²³ In 1939 the deputy parish priest of Tótszentmárton turned to the management of the publishing house Szent István Társaság for a donation of religious books in Hungarian for the local Roman Catholic elementary school, explaining that 'though all the members of the congregation have Croatian as their mother tongue, following their own request, the school instructions are completely in Hungarian thus they deserve the help from the Szt. István Társulat.'²⁴

The church has a decisive role in the use of the minority language as is reflected by the statistics:

| Date | Settlement | Number of Inhabitants | Declared to be Croatian speaker (%) |
|------|---------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1881 | Bajcsa | 405 | 72.0 |
| | Murakeresztúr | 1,230 | 81.0 |
| 1941 | Bajcsa | 550 | 4.5 |
| | Murakeresztúr | 2,235 | 17.0 ²⁵ |

The village of Bajcsa was the filia of the Hungarian parish . In Murakeresztúr Géza Csóthy (earlier Kaufmann) was abbot for 42 years, he was

²² Tótszerdahely, Archive of the Parish office 23082/1938

²³ Tótszentmárton, Archive of the Parish office, 1938

²⁴ Tótszentmárton, Archive of the Parish office


²⁵ Sources: A magyar korona országában az 1881. év elején végrehajtott népszámlálás főbb eredményei megyék és községek szerint részletezve. II. köt. Budapest, 1882; Az 1941. évi népszámlálás. Demografiai adatok községek szerint. Budapest, 1947. [Census in Hungary in 1881, results by counties and villages]

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'the uncompromised fighter for the common good and the Church.'²⁶ It must be added that the church was only one of the factors of assimilation.

Religious affinity played an important role in the preservation of national identity in spite of the gradual withdrawal of the mother tongue. The sermon in the mother tongue, the communal singing in church was the only mental nutriment of the people. The prayer books published in Zagreb bought individually or the ones copied by hand were used to pray from at home and were cherished for generations.

²⁶ Pfeiffer János: *A veszprémi egyházmegye történeti névtára (1630–1950)*. München: Grösses Gesellschaft, 1987 (= *Dissertationes Hungaricae ex historia Ecclesiae*, 8). 353. [The historical register of the diocese of Veszprém 1630-1950].



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*Györgyi Bindorffer***Assimilation processes in Csolnok****1. Introduction**

Csolnok lies in County Komárom- Esztergom in the coal-basin of Dorog; it is 5 km away from the town of Dorog, 13 km from Esztergom, in the valley of the stream Janza, surrounded by hills.¹ Built on the hillsides its system of streets developed accordingly. It is characteristic of a village built in a valley: the streets are running along the boat-shaped valley after branching off at a y-form, they run parallel to the main street and the stream of Janza cutting along the valley. Owing to its geological situation it has been suitable for wine growing, but lacking in flat areas agriculture could offer livelihood only to a few. Livelihood meant working in the mines from the beginning of the 19th c. till 1979. The shafts, however, were inundated by karstwater and had to be closed in the early 1970s. There are still coal reserves left unexploited. Tunnels of the former mines connect Csolnok and Dorog. Since transport over ground was difficult, during the working period of the mines coal was transported underground to the train-station in Dorog and frequently the inhabitants also used these means to get to the town. Since there are hardly any work places in the village nowadays most of the people commute to the towns nearby.

Csolnok is a German village, or Swabian as the inhabitants prefer to be called; as there were no deportations in the area the saying has it: 'who is from Csolnok is a Swabian.'² The census data of the last 20 years confirm the statement only partially.²

| | P | N | M | MH | C |
|------|-------|--------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| 1980 | 3.668 | 14 0.4% | 396 11% | | |
| 1990 | 3.350 | 605 18% | 794 14% | | |
| 2001 | 3,406 | 1,041 31% | 671 20% | 858 25% | 1290 38% |

¹ Getehegy, Magoshegy (Hochberg), Kálváriahegy (Kalvarienberg), Leégett hegy (Abgebrannter Berg), Kecshegy (Kasperk).

² P = Population; N = Nationality; M = Mother tongue; MH =uses mother tongue among friends, relatives; C = adherence to national culture.

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The population of Csolnok decreased since 1980, but considerably increased the number of those who declared their mother tongue and origins. Notwithstanding Csolnok being a German settlement, the number of declarations is few in comparison to the total of the inhabitants. According to Hoóz³ and colleagues 52% of the inhabitants were German. The research of the Minorities Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2002 revealed that the claims and the actual situation did not tally.⁴ 70% of the inhabitants of Csolnok are still German in spite of all forces driving towards assimilation not even mixed marriages influence it; it is an exceptionally high proportion.

What do the data tell? Do they reflect the compulsion of taking Hungarian family names in the 1930? The memories of the 1941 census? What do they tell about the times of socialist oppression of identity when they carrying 'dangerous' sounding names meant to confess being different? In 2001 when the declaration was anonymous only 31% of the inhabitants declared to be German. Is Csolnok a German settlement? If we open the telephone directory, there are more Hungarian than German names. Did the number of Germans decrease so much? Is assimilation that forceful? What does Swabian identity mean? How far have the Swabian inhabitants of the village preserved their identity? What does it mean to be Swabian? What has the mine signified? The present paper tries to find the answer to these questions.

2. Historical overview

Csolnok was first mentioned in documents from 1232 as Vathacholnuka belonging to the Csolt family; then it appears as Kolnuk between 1263-1531 as the property of the convent on the Isle of the Rabbits (today Margaret Island in Budapest).⁵ During its history it changed hands several times, it belonged to the pasha of Buda, then to Esztergom, then again to the nuns of the Margaret Island; sometimes it was completely depopulated, than again resettled.

³ Hoóz, I.–Kepecs, J.–Klinger, A 1985 *A Baranya megyében élő nemzetiségek demográfiai helyzete 1980-ban*. Pécs: MTA Regionális Kutatások Központja.

⁴ Ethnic affiliation was verified by local indigenous Germans, the members of the local minority governments and as control by one Hungarian person who assessed families. No other data were recorded and they were anonymous.

⁵ Cf. Fekete, Tibor 1977 *Den Janzaback entlang*. Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó.

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In 1685 the Treasury commissioner reported that they found hardly any persons in County Esztergom. The area was totally destroyed and only after the recapturing of Buda did life restart. First Hungarians arrived from Upper Northern Hungary, who followed the Reformed faith. According to some sources it was Graf Antal Grassalkovich who invited in the German settlers in 1714, others claim (Fekete 1977) that they already had been arrived to Csolnok at the end of the 17th c. 8 families out of 34 were described as Germans in 1715. According to their social status 13 heads of families were serfs, 21 smallholders. Among the typically agrarian population there was one blacksmith, one tailor, one boot maker and one shoemaker.

The German settlers were Roman Catholic by faith. The Roman Catholic parish was founded with the help of Graf Antal Grassalkovich.⁶ The church dedicated to St. John of Nepomuk was also built by Graf Antal Grassalkovich in 1767–75, from the stones of an earlier late 17th c. church. The altarpiece depicts the patron saint St. John of Nepomuk. The other Roman Catholic church dedicated to the patron saint of miners, St. Barbara, was built in the miners' colony in 1932.

Grassalkovich settled down 400 persons coming from Alsace to Csolnok and neighbouring villages: to Kesztlőc, Csév, Dág, and Slovaks to Sárísáp. Though these families have preserved their Slav names: Szkle-nár, Klimó, Micsán, Janosek, Sztoján, Janositz, Dlabik, they became Germanized within a generation. Their names still indicate their origins, in spite of their Slav names the persons declare to be Swabians and their mother tongue as Swabian. The third wave of settlers arrived in 1785–86.

The origin of the inhabitant of Csolnok is not clear. The groups arriving in different times from various regions, speaking different dialects were integrated in Csolnok; they became Swabians of Csolnok, speaking one dialect. This unity can be explained as the result of an acculturation process during which the participants had adjusted to one another, borrowed each other's customs, married each other. The share Roman Catholic faith probably made this process smoother, resulting in a community with homogeneous culture, of strong Swabian identity speaking the same dialect.

⁶ Till then the registers were at Dorog. During World War II some of the registers were destroyed, thus about forty years are missing from the history of Csolnok.

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3. The intra-ethnic relationships of miners and peasants

In Csolnok the coal found under the village supported several generations of miners. The occupation was handed down from father to son. 'There was no family with at least one miner in it.' The mine was the source of livelihood, offering work place locally; it saved the village men from conscription, it was a safe hiding place during the war, it was the reason that the Germans of Csolnok were not deported after the war. On the parallel of 'mother earth' one could say, it could be called 'mother mine' for the people of Csolnok. The miners' life and the mine is preserved in memories, songs, poems. Here the first word mentioned is not deportation but mine. Though it had been closed 20 years ago, it is still alive especially in the life of those men who spent all their lives there.

The traditional peasant life changed in Csolnok at the beginning of the 19th c. The Rükschuss brothers from Germany were carrying out geological explorations and found brown coal in the Anna-valley near Sárísáp in 1781. Mining started in Csolnok around 1810.⁷ It was discovered that the whole village is sitting above coalfields. The people of Csolnok first participated in transporting coal and other above ground works, later they accompanied the miners coming from abroad or other nearer settlements and started working under the ground too.

Of the shafts belonging to the mining company those under Csolnok were the most profitable. There were 12 shafts within the village directly leading underground. 'There is coal under the whole village, if it were not there, open mining would be possible. It happened that the walls of the church cracked from the detonation; it had to be reinforced. In the houses you could hear the hammering.' – people remembered.

Except of some bigger farmers, practically the whole village lived off the mine. There was not enough land to be owned; for the newly weds the opening of the mine meant their livelihood had been secured. From peasants they turned into miners; most of the Csolnok peasants became cutters; but since other craftsmen were also needed, they were employed

⁷ According to Miksa Haníken, who was the first director of the Hungarian Royal Geographical Society founded in 1869, that every cadastral yoke of land contains 40 thousand tons of coal. Economically mining was not lucrative at first because the coal was embedded in dolomite and limestone, mining rights were unsettled, there were no roads and railways and there was the constant danger of rising karstwater, making necessary the filling of the disused shafts with sand.

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as carpenters, locksmiths, blacksmith and electricians by the mines. But there were also master miners, charge-hands and other specialists among the men of Csolnok.

The mine needed work force; the population grew considerably during the development of coal mining. When news about the opening of the mine went around Hungarians, Slovaks, Germans, Krajnians⁸ arrived to the village. In 1905 Augusta-pit was opened, in 1910 Teresia-pit, then Reiman-pit; in 1918 the tunnel was finished to Dorog and the underground small-gauge train *Népe* started running, which transported not only coal but passengers as well.

Apart from mining the people of Csolnok continued wine growing and have making their own wine each year. 'Daytime in the vineyard – night time in the mine' has the saying. The greater part of the agricultural work was done by the miners' wives: they cultivated the garden crops, the vineyards, half acre potato or maize fields – as they did not own more, they worked on leased land. They also worked as day labourers on the land of rich peasants. There were many women who worked along the men by the coal tubs. The sons went to the shaft with their fathers.

Memory has it there was trade union in the mine; they also organised strikes because after 12 hour shifts they had to work on Sundays too. The social democrats campaigned and once the gendarmes surprised the meeting and beat up the participants; but no one remembers serious actions of the labour movement. Many of the inhabitants took out the newspaper in German language published by the Berg Verein, but the Swabians of Csolnok were not interested in the movement. Though they voted Peyer for Member of Parliament in 1922 and 1926, instead of politics they were interested in their everyday livelihood. The well-known rate of work and industry of the Swabians did not lose in intensity in the mine either. The Independent Small-holders' Party kept trying in vain, they could convince only one middle peasant.

After the great flooding in 1927, Reiman-pit was closed. After the great depression, in the 1930s the miners left to find work in French, German and Belgian mines. From the 1930s the owner of the mine⁹ required of the people to change their German names to Hungarian ones. 'This is Great-Hungary – they said – where only Hungarians are living.' The Germans

⁸ They were referred to as *oberkrénitzers*.

⁹ The Salgótarján Coal-mining Company of shareholders took over the mine after the fall of the Republic of Councils in 1919.

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were threatened to lose their jobs, thus they did change their names. The members of the first and second generation still around think back with anger to the Magyarization of names. The peasants kept their names; they did not depend on anyone. This is how the pseudo-Hungarian names as Parti, Tarkövi, Marosvári, Sajtos, Honosi, Húsvéti, Hercegfalvi, Havasi, Halas, Kalocsai, Selmec, Bérces, Kerti, Mezősi, Mártai, Mécsei, Mosolygó, Vájó, Barlangi; this is why there are so many Hungarian names in the telephone directory.¹⁰

Csolnok was a homogeneous village concerning religion. Ethnically there were Germans, Slovaks and Hungarians. 'There was just one Jew in the village, the baker but he married into a Swabian family.' The mine attracted many people; notwithstanding how many of them arrived and wherever they came from the majority of the population remained Swabian. As a local inhabitant put it: 'They assimilated to us.' At the beginning of the 20th c. not only miners but farmers, farm hands also came to Csolnok, as well as trades people: butcher, barber, shoemaker, boot-maker, shopkeeper, joiner, tailor, merchant, brick-layer, road-labourer, watch-maker, etc.¹¹ Most of the new comers were single German and Slovak men who got married, settled down and became people of Csolnok.

The richest peasant families had 30–50 cadastral yochs of land, the middle peasants 15–25. The average was 12 cadastral yochs; with two cows, 3 pigs, vineyard and press shed it was already something. If there were several sons, one had to become a miner. Many of the miners hoed in the peasants' fields on a third part basis. The girls went into service when they were 12–14 years of age to Rákospalota near Budapest.

One third of the population was peasant, 2 thirds miners or tradesmen working for the mines. Among the tradesmen there were local artisans. The three strata were divided not only by their occupation but also by their domicile, clothing and pastime. The fourth stratum was the intelligentsia of the village: the leading members of the village, the priest, teachers, the doctor, the postmaster, mining-engineers. The members of this group came from outside the village and could be Hungarian or German.

¹⁰ The first instance for Magyarization of a name occurs in the register for birth in 1898: a person from Csolnok changed his name Binder to Bati. Up to the time of the forced Magyarization there were one or two changes per year.

¹¹ They came from the nearby settlements: Dorog, Dág, Tarján, Bata, Epöl, Zsámbék, Nyerges, Zsámbék, Esztergom, Üröm, Piliscsaba, Sárissáp, Perbál, Leányvár, Pilisborosjenő.

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The peasants lived in the present Petőfi Street, formerly Bauergasse; this is the longest street in Csolnok. In the József and Rákóczi colonies only miners were living. There was constantly strife between peasants and miners. The miners kept goats that were nicknamed 'miners' cow' by the peasants. Older men can remember more serious quarrels in the taverns. Before the war a peasant girl was not allowed to marry a miner. A woman from a mining family told: 'A young peasant man wanted to court me. His mother let me know if I would inherit a 'langer acker' her son would have been allowed to marry me.' In spite of their disagreements, they depended on each other. When the miners were given coal as their due, the peasants carted it home for them. The fare than was paid in work because the miners had no cash. The peasants leased land to the miners who again paid by work.

The village and the miners' colonies were separated from one another. The colony originally consisted of two parts, Augusztá-colony was built between 1907 and 1912, Reiman-colony in 1922–23. The buildings housed four or eight apartments consisting of one room, kitchen and pantry, no comfort. There was a small garden belonging to each of the flats. The inhabitants of the colony were not only Hungarians; Swabians also went to live there because the rent was cheap. The Hungarians of the colony married Swabian girls; this was the other way how Swabians got to the colony; marriage between those from the colony and the village was unavoidable, however great the opposition was to it. The Swabians in the village looked down at the Swabians living in the colony.

There were men who served in the Hungarian army, in the Wehrmacht as well as in the SS, but because of the mine they were mostly exempt from service. 'We did not want to go but were conscripted. I would have liked to go to the Hunyadi panzer division. Maybe because we are not that kind of Germans. We are Hungarian Germans; or Germans feeling Hungarian?' But nobody asked where did you want to go. When I came back after the war, I was told if I went down the mine to push trolleys I would avoid trouble. As if I had wanted to become a soldier of the Wehrmacht.' There were about 12–20 persons who joined the SS voluntarily. The Volkbund had a lot of members but it was popular mainly among the peasants, as memory has it.

Concerning the period under discussion we did not find assimilation tendencies. The community of the village was unified in spite of the inner controversies. The children attended school for six years; they were not educated any further because their work was needed in the farms, or fol-

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lowed their fathers to the mine. It was not to make further education easier for them why they Magyarized their names, they did it for stronger reasons, for fear of losing their work. The Hungarians the people of Csolnok met did not offer them any patterns of behaviour or way of life they would have wished to follow and assimilate.

One means of assimilation was the compulsory drills of the paramilitary youth organisation 'Ievente', introduced by two teachers at the end of the 1920s. The boys were instructed in Hungarian. Maybe this is why they preferred to join the Hungarian army to the German.

We cannot talk about linguistic assimilation. Hungarian was exclusively used at school, they did not speak it either at home or in the village. In the 1960s if the old people could speak in Hungarian at all, their pronunciation was not correct and could not write it at all. 'My father always asked me how to write his name. He had a Magyarized one and he could not even pronounce it.'

4. After the war till the change of regime

The front reached Csolnok by December 1944 and remained stationary for three months; sometimes the Germans occupied it, sometimes the Russians. The inhabitants hid in the cellars, or in the mine. After the war the village was destroyed and robbed of everything. Deportation was prepared in Csolnok too; the German population packed their belongings and waited for the orders; it did not come; someone had remembered if the Germans are deported there would be no one to work in the mine. Thus only seven Hungarian families were settled over from Szimő in Slovakia.

'Before the war the peasants cared only for their land, but after the war more and more members of the peasant families went to the mine. They were declared kulaks, and their property confiscated. When the agricultural cooperatives were formed and the remaining land would have been taken away, they became miners to avoid joining the co-op.'

As the peasants worked in the mine too, the strong controversy between the two groups lessened. 'Our family was rich before the war, rich enough for my parents to stop me marrying my husband who was a locksmith in the mine and had only some land. There were several such cases then.' The marriages between Swabians belonging to different groups of occupation earlier became more and more frequent, however ethnically mixed marriages became more frequent only from the 1970s.

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Though there were no deportations from Csolnok, the inhabitants were considered guilty. New leadership was appointed, none of them were from Csolnok. Chairman of the council, president of the executive committee, party secretary, personnel man came from Esztergom, Dág, Sárísáp. The new management, the 'communists', were intimidating the inhabitants by their mere presence. 'In 1950

no one dared declare to be Swabian, though everybody was. They did not know Hungarian, they could not properly pronounce it but everybody said they were 'matyar', so great was the pressure.'

The mine was reopened, and attracted even more work force to the neighbourhood and the village. In its golden days the mine had 14 thousand workers. It was closed down in 1979 after continuous reductions of the work force. Mining became unprofitable because of the constant flooding.

The agricultural cooperative and its subsidiary lines gave work to many. The centre of the coop was not in Csolnok and less man were members than worked earlier in the mine; it were mostly the women who worked in the coop.

The image of the village started changing in the 1960s. The one-window houses got another window, bathrooms were attached to them, and open corridors were also glazed in. Around 1963 there were changes in clothing as well when the women started going to Dorog, Esztergom and Budapest. The children who were born after the war were not dressed in traditional costumes any more.

Mixed marriages started in the 1960s; for 125 homogeneous marriages there were 98 mixed ones; and there were 59 homogeneous marriages between Hungarians. Between 1970 and 1981 the number of mixed marriages increased while that of the homogeneous German ones stagnated. There were 125 homogeneous Swabian marriages, 115 mixed ones and 68 homogeneous Hungarian marriages. Between 1982 and 1990 the trend changes and there were 43 homogeneous Swabian marriages, 82 mixed marriages and 47 homogeneous Hungarian marriages. The data indicate that the total of the marriages decreased. Between 1990 and 200 there were 25 homogeneous Swabian, 45 mixed and 28 homogeneous Hungarian marriages. This is the year when there were marriages where both of the spouses were born in mixed ones.

The people of Csolnok count the children in mixed marriages as Swabians; statistic may register decrease in proportion but the group consciousness overrides it. '80% of the children are Swabian' says a man

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belonging to the first generation. Those born in mixed families declare to be Swabian. Linguistic assimilation started late in Csolnok but then grew rapidly. Members of the first two generations were still competent in their mother tongue. The third generation, however, shows a sudden change. They claim Hungarian to be their mother tongue and their competence in speaking German is not as good as their parents'. The language used upwards is Swabian but downward Hungarian is the language of communication. According to scholarly literature the mother tongue withdraws first from public domain and remains within the family. In Csolnok it has happened the other way round it withdrew earlier from the family than from the public domain where Swabian is still spoken.

Assimilation was slowed down by other factors as well; the present generation is the first one with learning. There were persons who participated in higher education earlier too, but it was in the 1970a when they were on the increase.

5. National revival after the change of regime

The local government of the village has declared to be a minority government for the last two cycles. The affiliation to nationality is not expressed only in change in the local government. There is special care taken of the teaching of the language and maintaining identity consciousness. 'There is excellent language teaching for our children starting in the kindergarten and this is the root of our cultural life' explains the mayor. 'There are dedicated teachers at all levels, from the kindergarten, in the primary school and the music school; German ethnic traditions and the German language receive special stress.' The director of the primary school, teaching the pupils in eight grades is József Taffner. He was the first to found a German ethnic music school in Hungary. The school has 90 pupils who learn to play the clarinet, brass instruments, piano, flute, accordion, percussions, and also has jazz ballet and folk dance sections.

There are two kindergartens in Csolnok. Most of the children have been born in mixed families, they did not learn the language at home, nor ethnic culture, it became the task of the schools. There are two primary schools too, one in the village, the other in Rákóczi colony. In the school six teachers of German teach the children five hour per week. The pupils can practice the language in the drama group. There are special interest groups for those who aspire to further education. The pupils can enter the German grammar school of Vörösvár and Csepel, or go to school to Esztergom and

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Dorog. 'The school used to have two languages of instruction. When the decree appeared that only subject teachers are allowed to teach we had to give it up because we could not find teachers to teach geography, mathematics, biology in German.' While in the socialist times only the language was taught, now handing over traditions and maintaining identity is very important. 'Elderly persons come to tell the children about the past. It is a pity it has to be in Hungarian. For lent we bake doughnuts. Auntie Halas came in traditional costume, taught the children how to put it on, how to handle them, they learnt how to put up their hair in the old way.'

According to the statistical data adherence to the ethnic culture represents a higher value than the proportion of people admitting it and the value appearing for the self image of the group. It means that cultural traditions have strong appeal and people cannot and will not pull themselves out of the emotional influence. The returns of the census of 2001 prove that adherence to the cultural traditions and the appeal of the Swabian culture can be a stronger force than origins and mother tongue.

The director of the Lajos Kossuth Community Centre is responsible for the organisation of the cultural life. Beside the religious holidays and church festivals (18–19th May), there are dances on the village day when the various cultural groups also perform. Following traditions, there is a Maypole erected in May; there is street dancing on the 19th August; the miners' feasts are also celebrated and there are commemorations of the victims of the labour camps of the 1950s. There are vintage processions, the Elizabeth and Catherine-day balls, Christmas concerts and inviting in together the New Year. On 4th December, St. Barbara's day, wreaths are laid at commemorative tablets. The Pensioners' Club organises exhibitions to show the traditional costumes. There are choir and folk dance performances together with visitors coming from other villages.

The community centre houses the groups of the German Ethnic Cultural Association: the brass band, choir and folk dance group. The jazz ballet group of the music school has its rehearsals in the building just as the pensioners' club, the club of diabetics and club of Mums and Babies have their meetings.

Tradition has it that the Miners' Brass Band of Csolnok of national fame was founded in 1860. Under János Fódi who has been directing the band since 1961, they had much success. Beside the young people of Csolnok there are musicians coming from other nearby settlements. They play popular Swabian songs as well rock music, 'this is what the audience wants,' they say.

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The German Ethnic Choir was formed in 1951. They did not sing constantly, the choir fell apart several times; it was formed again in 1986. Primarily they sing German folksongs collected in the area. It is a pity that the majority of the members is over 60 years old and they keep leaving the choir one after the other because of ill health. New blood is difficult to find. Though there is a school choir, the children who have not learnt the language at home pronounce the German words with heavy Hungarian accent. In the choir the youngest is of 58 years of age. 'Everything goes if we go' they say.

There is a church choir as well and the so-called Wagenhoffer choir. At school the children have a concert in German at Christmas. There are Nativity plays in the church and the Wagenhoffer choir sings German songs before the midnight mass.

The German Ethnic Youth Dance group was formed in 1990 on the initiative of some enthusiastic young persons. Their aim was to resuscitate the tradition broken in 1951. Their repertoire consists of folk dances of the region and also dances with special choreography. They have received a bronze medal at the national festival German ethnic groups. In the dance group there are young people from Szár, Sárísáp, Vörösvár, Leányvár, Esztergomi, even from Budapest. As I have learned, there are 'echte Hungarians' among them.

There are two dance groups for children. New performers are needed as the fluctuation is great in the big group. 'We are getting older, get married, have children and do not have any more time for the rehearsals.'

Everybody calls József Klinger the 'Mundartautor'. He writes sketches that are performed by the members of the pensioners' club. At the yearly needlework exhibition the dolls dressed in traditional costumes have the greatest acclaim.

There is the Miners' Club in the Miners' Community Centre in the colony and the Miners' Museum. At the beginning of September there is a festive meeting organised by the Miners' Union and the Pensioners' Association of Csolnok.

'Lots of things have got lost. There is no more greeting in the New Year, no initiation ceremony for the young men. Hardly any pig killings. We still have the procession on Corpus Christi day, but only around the church; we still go to the pilgrimage; we travel by bus organised by the pensioners' club. The church festival is still held and occasionally the vintage procession. The decline of our culture started when television came in. We have forgotten a lot and now try to revive some.'

Minority Politics and Minorities Rights**6. Origins, group membership and language use – a summary**

The Germans of Csolnok who arrived from diverse areas at various dates cannot be certain where their ancestors had come from. The 'somewhere' from Alsace, Bavaria, Frankland, the Rhine region does not offer any definite starting points. If we add to the new comers through marriages, the migrants attracted by the mine, the settlers from Slovakia, the miners coming from Austria, Germany in the 19th c., the present German speaking population has indeed a colourful mixture of people as their ancestry.

The inhabitants of the village spoke Hungarian and German and for a while also Slovakian. The unifying factor was the shared Roman Catholic faith. The church preserved the settlers language since the chaplain was required to be able to speak German in addition to Hungarian.

According to Károly Manherz the *Mundart* of Csolnok developed out of the language of the first and second wave of settlers' Rhine-Frankish and the third wave of settlers' Bavarian dialect.¹² Linguists observed Alsatian features brought along by the second wave in the vocabulary of the Csolnok *Mundart*. Though it is difficult to prove the Alsatian origin, the only indicator remaining is the family name Quintz, the locals insist on it, maybe because it is a smaller, more easily definable area; as well known, the place of origin, the starting point is very important in the forming of the identity.

Certain customs, e.g. the rattling at Easter, the shape of the rattle, the way it is made points toward Bavarian origins. The existing place-names do not help as they were alternatively used with the Hungarian equivalents or the Hungarian names were pronounced conforming to the *Mundart*.¹³

The people of Csolnok are proud of their mother tongue. Fekete (1988:26) writes that the people of Csolnok never felt that their language differed considerably from the written language. They prided in that they

¹² Károly Manherz calls the dialect a *Sprachinsel*. The dialect is at the edge of the German dialects, which had been levelled regionally (cf 1983. *Die Ungarndeutschen und ihre Wissenschaft*. Budapest: TIT. p. 9.) He includes the varieties exclusively spoken in Zebegény, Dunabogdány, Kismaros, Nagymaros and Csolnok; these are dialects which were levelled locally out of a mixture of Rhine-Frankish and Danube-Bavarian dialects having lexical characteristics and certain features of pronunciation, e.g. of the initial clusters.

¹³ Cf. Fekete 1977:29.

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could understand each other in writing. Some of the grown ups told, when they were in Germany speaking in their mother tongue, the Germans there could not believe they came from Hungary. 'It happened in Cottbus. In a shop we were asked where we came from, From Hungary. How come we speak German so well? Because we are Ungardeutsch. Ungardeutsch? The man came out to look at our licence plate. Ungardeutsch, Germans living in Hungary. Because of the licence plate we were Hungarians for him and he could not understand it. They never heard about us, did not know we exist.'

'In my generation everybody started speaking in German. Those who went to kindergarten learnt Hungarian there but at home we spoke Swabian with our grandparents even with our parents.' – told one of the informants. Before the grandchildren were born, we spoke only swabian at home. But the children are not interested any more. We hardly noticed and were talking in Hungarian. The young people cannot understand the dialect properly; those who learn the language are learning German not the dialect. In the street, when I meet friends I talk in the dialect; I could not use any other language than that of my youth.'- explained a woman of the first generation. 'Our parents could not speak Hungarian nor German only the dialect of Csolnok. After the war life and school taught us Hungarian.' 'The 18 years olds do not want to know the dialect. My grandchild tells me to speak 'properly' 'Our 20 year olds understand the dialect but do not want to speak it. What for? It is unnecessary – they say.' Notwithstanding, they declare to be Swabians, they are self-conscious, but their mother tongue is Hungarian. 'We brought up our children to be Swabians. We sang and danced at home. They still feel strongly about it that but the grandchildren are not keen any more.'

The ambiguity of the place of origin does not cause any problems of identity in Csolnok. Wherever the ancestors came from they were united in this settlement, became Swabians sharing one mother tongue; the group-membership, the loyalty to the group is a strong bond for all three generations analysed. The late linguistic assimilation has strengthened it. The members of the first and second generation are still speaking the dialect in the streets and at home every day, this is what they consider their mother tongue. If we presume that the 31%, which declared to be Swabian, also contains the 25% who uses the mother tongue regularly when talking to family and friends, we can say that 83% of the population who declared to be Swabian actually adheres to their mother tongue. The third generation considers Hungarian to be their mother tongue but it

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does not mean the exclusion of the use of the dialect. 'We are linguistically assimilated we speak the dialect only with our grandparents but we are strongly attached to the folk culture, music, dances of the village.' 'I can hardly wait for Friday to come home and go to the dance rehearsal.'

Home is Csolnok and the home country is Hungary. The members of the choir sing Hungarian songs too, not only on stage but also for themselves while drinking wine. The concept of the native land connects them to Hungary in spite of the fact that they would never claim to be Hungarians. 'In Germany I am a stranger, here I am at home.' 'Our culture is German, our origins too, but this is our native country, this is where we should prosper. This is the only place I feel well.' 'Csolnok is my home, I would not go away from here. Since Csolnok is in Hungary, we belong to this country, to this nation. I like Hungarian jokes. My uncle who went away because he wanted to be German, suffers from homesickness so much he almost became seriously ill.' 'I am proud of the many Hungarian persons who became famous worldwide. I believe what is Hungarian belongs to us too.'

The people of Csolnok cannot avoid the pressure of assimilation. It appears mostly in the changes of the language use, mixed marriages and structural assimilation. Swabians are proud of their origins, their culture and whoever can, tries to keep the dialect. They maintain their culture and try to hand it over to their descendants. It is to the future to show with what success.

Minority Politics and Minorities Rights*Béla Pomogáts***Transylvanian collaboration – on the margin
of a news item**

In the 23rd September issue of the weekly *Erdélyi Riport* I have read that Sabin Gherman, the young Romanian politician, not unknown in Hungary, turned to Béla Markó, the president of the Hungarian Democratic Association in Romania, with the idea of a joint Hungarian-Romanian political action in Transylvania. Gherman became known as the leader of the former Transylvania-Banat Ligue, at present the president of the Christian Democratic Party as well as the author of the pamphlet *I am fed up with Romania*. The pamphlet was directed against the Great-Romanian nationalism, which ruling high above the nations of Transylvania has constantly prevented the conciliation between Romanians and Hungarians for 80 years. I met the young Romanian politician of Kolozsvár (Cluj-Napoca) in Budapest at the end of the 1990s and reacted to his plans and reasoning with interest, though without feeling hopeful.

Sabin German now suggests the Hungarian Democratic Association in Romania to open up for the Romanian and German supporters of the Transylvanian regionalisation and form a loose political association under the name Hungarian Democratic Association in Romania – Transylvanian-Block Regional Association. This forum could then represent all the inhabitants and ethnics and fight for the reshaping of the Romanian state on the basis of a kind of autonomy for the historically developed regions in opposition to the traditionally centralising and homogenizing policy of the government in Bucharest. In aid of the work of the association, as the paper informs, there would be a so-called 'Transylvanian assembly' as a consulting body, consisting of one third each of Romanian, Hungarian and German advisors. This group would support the parliamentary work of of the Association by bills, provisions of law and its expertise. Gherman's suggestions do not aim at destroying the unity of the Romanian state and they are not about changing the legal status of Transylvania within the state either; what it suggests is, in accordance with the European principle and the practice of the European Union, that the Romanian state should conform to the wish for extensive construction of regional autonomies and through these to fulfil the demand for the Romanian – Hungarian reconciliation in Transylvania so frequently declared (and unfortunately always let fail).

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I must confess, I was excited about the news of Sabin Gherman's endeavours; partly because there is a tradition in the Transylvanian political culture of the collaboration of the Transylvanian nations and cultures and assertion of interests mutually agreed upon, partly because the political strategy of regionalisation aims at the territorial, administrative and cultural arrangements which in the 21st c. Europe have already proved successful in the western regions of the continent. In Central Europe it could serve the redressing of the ethnic conflicts amassed and having caused so much common pain in the 20th c.

Let us analyse the first consideration. The old historical Transylvania has many traditions, which could serve as the forerunner of the social arrangements, nowadays called 'multicultural'. Multiculturalism allows the various ethnic groups, religions and cultures to develop fairly freely (more freely than the legal system and political practice of Europe of the times). The development formed a certain system of ecclesiastical and cultural autonomies. Indisputably, Transylvania had an enormous role in the improvement of Hungarian culture or even in the foundation and maintaining of Romanian national culture. Transylvania protected a European heritage, which later blossomed through European liberalism.

The tradition of Transylvanian liberalism was acknowledged and held up as a model to be followed by Hungarian politicians and Transylvanian authors like Zsigmond Kemény, who described the preservation of European liberal and 'leftish' traditions as the major force of Transylvanian politics, as he explained in his treaty *Erdély közéleté* [Public life in Transylvania]. He wrote: 'Concerning new ideas, Transylvania occupied the far left among the European blocks of states. What had been introduced here was the radicalism of the times which started to break away from the traditions of the past... Its constitution – as we regard the *Approbata* and *Compilata* – was more democratic-aristocratic than monarchic.'

During the time between the two world wars, the multicultural and liberal traditions of Transylvania revived mainly in the Transylvanist ideology, which was represented by the literary, and partially by the political life of Transylvania and in the 1920s (and up to the time of Hitler's seizing the power and the 'Great German' ideology reaching Transylvania) the Transylvanian Saxon intellectuals and more sporadically the Romanian intellectuals also joined forces. The repeatedly surfacing thought of the Transylvanian regionalism could not, however, take root in the public life and administration; Transylvanianism as a form of consciousness, an identity-forming factor came through among Hungarians and especially in litera-

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ture, among writers who gathered around *Erdélyi Helikon* [Transylvanian Helicon] and *Erdélyi Szépmíves Céh* [Transylvanian Guild of Arts].

During the period between the two wars the founders of the Transylvanian Thought developed a kind of strategy for multiculturalism; thus Károly Kós with the greatest publicistic effect and artistic force in his *Erdély – Kultúrtörténeti vázlat* [Transylvania – an outline of its cultural history], published in Kolozsvár in 1929. Kós depicts Transylvania as a special geographical, historical and cultural unit, whose peoples: Hungarians, Romanians, Germans do not only maintain close relationship with their mother countries but through the traditions of several hundred years of coexistence, developed lively cultural contacts among each other too. The relative balance of the three peoples of Transylvania made possible their autonomous cultural development.

The three Transylvanian cultures constantly influenced each other, as Kós remarked: 'the outstandingly different cultures of different origin, belonging to peoples with different minds were branded by the marks of the constant coexistence, contact, common joy and grief, which already in the times of the princes, the time of the democratic widening and public intensification of the intellectual life became noticeable.' The author followed up the process, the interaction of Hungarian, Romanian, Saxon cultures; by introducing the three Transylvanian peoples and their three cultures in their autonomous but at the same time reciprocal development, Károly Kós defined and laid down the principles of the historical attitude of the Transylvanians.

The Transylvanian multicultural model was delineated by other authors too, e.g. by Aladár Kuncz, Jenő Szentimrei, Lajos Áprily, Jenő Dsida, who always represented the idea of the Transylvanian culture: the joining forces and cooperation of Hungarians, Romanians and Saxons. Their periodical, *Erdélyi Helikon* regularly published the works of Romanian and Saxon authors in Hungarian translation; the literary approach was the aim of the publishing house *Erdélyi Szépmíves Céh* directed by Károly Kós, which published a selection of Romanian folk ballads entitled *A havas balladáí* [The ballads of the alps], translated by Imre Kádár in 1932. In 1934 five Romanian plays by Caragiale, Goga, Eftimiu, Minulescu and Sadoveanu were translated by Imre Kádár with the preface by Miklós Bánffy.

Similar initiatives aimed at the Hungarian -- Saxon cooperation, the works of the eminent Transylvanian German authors, e.g. Meschendörfer, Zillich, Folberth and others were regularly published in Hungarian

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periodicals. In 1933, one of the classics of Transylvanian German literature: Meschendörfer's *Corona (Die Stadt im Osten)*, about the history of Brassó was published in the translation of Károly Kós.

The Transylvanianist idea of cooperation of the nations of Transylvania was not foreign for the representatives of the Romanian and German literary life at least in the 1920s. Several authors could be mentioned who were agreeable to the 'Transylvanian thought' which propagated cooperation and regionalisation. Thus the Romanian Emil Isac, Corneliu Codarcea, Avram P Todor, Ion Chinezu who wrote about Hungarian literature; the German Adolf Meschendörfer, Ernst Wittstock, Otto Folbert, whose *Die drei Durchbrücke – Eine Vision der siebenbürgischen Landschaft* is an essay on the importance and possibility of the cooperation of Transylvanian peoples and cultures. There were several Hungarian, Romanian, German periodicals which were ready to maintain the cultural relations, like the Hungarian *Erdélyi Helikon*, the Romanian *Idea* and the German *Klingsor* The *Aurora* published in Nagyvárad in Hungarian and Romanian in 1922-23, the *Cultura* in four languages (Hungarian, Romanian, German and French) in Kolozsvár since 1924, already proclaimed and served the idea of Transylvanian multiculturalism and the cultural approaching of the peoples of Transylvania.

Indeed the idea of the regional cooperation of the nations of Transylvania and a kind of Transylvanian autonomy was not alien to the Transylvanian Romanian and Saxon intellectuals. It was first of all attractive to the Saxons who had an old tradition of autonomy going back to the Middle Ages; they were able to preserve their cultural independence and national organisations in Hungary following the compromise with Austria of 1867. The 'enlarged association committee of the Saxon folk association accepted the union with Romania at Meggyes on the 8th of January 1919, the general assembly of the Swabians of Banat joined the resolution. The German minority of Transylvania, however, wanted to preserve their political, social and cultural institutions, and referring to the Resolution of Gyulafehérvár (Alba Julia) as well as the minority contract of Paris, strove for real autonomy.

The meeting of the Germans of Romania held at Temesvár on the 6th September 1919, which agreed upon a mutual political party and a uniform electoral program, delineated the main aims of the German minority: 'a constitution has to be drawn up that would ensure the Germans of Romania forever to organise themselves politically as a uniform nation; it would enable them to reach their national, cultural and economic aims.'

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The same resolution insisted upon the introduction of regional administrative autonomy, wide ranging school system and the right for the minorities to elect their own office-holders. The Saxons, and the Germans of Romania in general did not aim at the autonomy of all the peoples of Transylvania only for the German minorities: Transylvania Saxons, Banat Swabians and scattered groups in Bukovina and Regat.

On the other hand there were some inclination for supporting the idea of Transylvanian autonomy among the Romanian intelligentsia and especially among the office-holders of the National Party founded still in earlier, minority circumstances. Some leading personalities of the party, especially the representatives of the north-Transylvanian Romanians following the Greek Catholic faith, had been suspicious of the policy of Bucharest and especially of the corrupted government of the liberal followers of Bratianu; *Patria*, the official organ of the party frequently called attention to the conflict between the politics of Transylvania and Regat. Alexandru Vaida-Voevod pointed out several times that he and his comrades were against the strong centralisation introduced by the Bucharest government after the union, and they were of the opinion that the government should better recognise the special political traditions and interests of Transylvania. His aim was: 'national unity on the basis of decentralisation, i.e. regionalism instead of despotic, forced centralisation.'

The striving for decentralisation of the politicians of the national party did not go as far as to consider seriously the realisation of the Transylvanian autonomy, even less the autonomy of the minorities, though it was Vaida-Voevod who signed the minority treaty of Paris in the name of the Romanian government. The proclamation of the Transylvanian autonomy served only as a political weapon in the battle against the liberals and when they were to form the government after the elections in 1928, they continued the policy of centralisation started by Brateanu. The leaders of the democratic movements of the Hungarian minority, however, trusted the party with Transylvanian background more than the liberals representing the interests of Regat.

The idea of Transylvanian regionalisation based on the cooperation of the three nations could not become a real political strategy. The Transylvanian Saxons, who were on friendly terms with the Hungarians in the 1920s, in the 1930s and especially after Hitler's Nazi party seized the power in Germany, committed themselves to the idea of Great Germany and gave up the idea of the Transylvanian solidarity. It was sealing the fate of the Transylvanian Germans: in 1944–1945 the great majority of

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German men were deported to Soviet labour-camps, very few of them returned. The Transylvanian Saxons and the Banat Swabians could never again represent their national interests in organised form. Their associations were absorbed by the dictatorial system; in the 1970s there started the exodus to the GDR and by now the earlier German towns and villages are either completely empty or changed.

The Romanian political elite also gave up the idea of the Transylvanian solidarity and regionalism since the political life was greatly influenced by the idea of keeping the territories gained (conquered) after WWI by all means, partly as an answer to the Hungarian aspirations toward revision in the 1930s. The policy was to abolish all the historical, cultural as well as identity characteristics, which developed within the Romanian nation. The 'national homogenisation' later, in the Ceausescu-era became the single leading strategy and every other considerations were subordinated to it. The traditions of the Transylvanian 'multiculturalism', the possibilities of the Transylvanian regionalism and the solidarity of the Transylvanian peoples based on Transylvanian patriotism was destroyed in the historical sense, it became the victim of Great Romanian nationalism. Sabin Gherman's present propositions may prepare the 'revitalisation' of these traditions and strategies left forgotten for so long.

Let's see now the second consideration. This is just as important and promising as the first one discussed above. As I have pointed out earlier, the young Romanian political thinker's suggestions about the Transylvanian regionalism correspond in general lines to the strategical concepts accepted and realised in the European Union. These propagate the revitalisation of the historical regions, which were formed in their time by various economic and cultural factors and shape Europe's structure in the future through the free development of these regions. Naturally we have to consider the legacy of the 20th c. not altering the existing structures of states but re-establishing the natural and traditional organisations and identities.

I am fully aware of the fact that the governing policy of Bucharest, which always wanted to homogenise the country (and the dictatorship, overthrown in 1989, used aggressive methods in order to realise it), is traditionally rejecting the idea of internal regionalisation. The European integration can and will demand the revitalisation of the traditions in the historical regions in Romania; it also may fill the special Transylvanian traditions with new content. European integration has already gone hand in hand with the revitalisation of cultural regions and I hope this process would not leave out

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Romania. In this respect Sabin Gherman's appealing suggestions do not seem to belong to romantic visions with little chance of coming true. The events at the end of the 20th c. have revealed that the Central European states constructed after WWI. Were not as stable as was expected by the treaty-makers of St. Germain and Trianon. The 'quasi-integrational' systems and reasons of states, which were mainly artificially constructed, have disintegrated, e.g. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia. Both state-ideology and state-construction were artificial result of outside decisions. Neither Czechoslovakia nor Yugoslavia were held together by historical traditions and real national interests though both claimed to have been 'nation-states' when entering European politics, in the case of the first it were the Czechs in the latter the Serbs whose national supremacy stood out.

In reality the states created to replace the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were multinational (with the exception of Hungary defined by the treaty of Trianon and Austria by that of St. Germain); the only difference was that in contrast to the Monarchy which was on its way toward federation, the new one strove with every possible means to become nation-states. This is also true of the system of the Romanian kingdom and later the People's democratic republic. The two Slav countries formed after WWI. Were always insecure by inner tensions and the moment they lost the guarantee of outside supportive powers, became instable, rifted in two or blew to pieces; thus they proved the inner insecurity and fragility of the European order set down after WWI. And reinforced after WWII.

Today the only remaining successor-state integrated according to the treaty of Trianon is Romania. The Romanian state is not lacking inner tensions. Great-Romania created in 1918-1919 consists of three territories: Moldavia (and Bessarabia) with eastern Slav (Russian and Ukrainian) historical traditions and political culture; Wallachia representing the southeastern traditions, the mentality and political culture of the Balkans; and Transylvania with its European patterns culturally belonging to the west. Even the Romanian civil and cultural and religious life (because of the Greek Catholic church which adhered to Rome) in Transylvania differs greatly from the political culture and religious traditions of Regat. Romanian is at the point of impact of three regions of European civilisation and history. And this should have directed the development of the state created after 1918 and reinforce in 1945 toward democratic federal arrangements. Only dictatorships (ultra-right or ultra-left) have been able to guarantee the stability of the system and an eventual democratic development must reveal the inner 'fault lines' of the state-system.

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The Hungarian territories annexed to Romania after WWI. (in addition to Transylvania, part of Banat, the region of the River Körös and Máramaros) did not belong

To the eastern, southeastern region either historically or from the point of view of its cultural and mental history, to the region which was the place of origin of Romanian culture and mentality. Transylvania had its own independent political profile, culture and identity, which under more fortunate circumstances could have been the starting point of a development similar to the one in Switzerland. Unfortunately these traits have faded away and changed considerably by the Romanian imperialism, by the loss of the Jewish and German population, by the radical change in the proportion and political power of the Hungarians and through the great number of Romanian settlers coming from Regat. These changes mutilated and pushed into the background the western type (mostly Latinate) mentality of the Transylvanian Romanian intelligentsia. On the altar of unification of nation and state the values of western type of political culture have been sacrificed.

In spite of 80 years of aggressive and cunning manipulation of the Bucharest politics. Romania has not become a homogeneous nation-state and it will be even less likely to be one if the union planned with Bessarabia (Moldavian Republic) will eventually happen. There are great rifts behind the facade of the Great-Romanian state, which tries to present itself to be a whole and homogeneous national unity; the causes are not only the presence of the minorities, not even the millions of Gypsies, but because of those differences which appear among the Romanian inhabitants of the various regions developed and developing in different ways.

The Oltyans, Moldavians, Transylvanians differ in many ways; the Romanian Greek Catholics want to their being different from the Orthodoxes who have received state assistance and are in favourable position; and those living in the northern and western regions (in Transylvania and Banat) have (and will have) different interests than the inhabitants of eastern and southern areas. The former most probably would approach Central Europe economically, what comes from their geographical situation in relation to the European Union; the latter would approach the Balkans as is indicated by their traditions and long standing interests. The Romanian society is on the threshold of changes, the monolithic state that was the creation of the Ceausescu-dictatorship has to be given up; the still existing communist nomenclature and Securitate-groups,

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though having lost of their power, still adhere to the preservation of the monolithic construction, probably they would retreat by themselves under the pressure of economically motivated changes.

The politics of the Bucharest government and Great-Romanian powers are still being directed by the vision and myth of the nation-state. The Romanian nation has not yet acquired the experience necessary to become a nation-state that could creditably be based on the inner solidarity and unity of mentality in a community of several 10 millions of people. Sabin Gherman's critical remarks refer to this problem; he questions the political rhetoric about 'national unity'. The constant reference to 'national unity' has only tactical and propaganda aims and there is no real strategic strength in it. The Bucharest government and the ultra-right – ultra-left (they are about the same in Romania) want to strengthen nationalism through it that is necessary and useful to them in maintaining their power; on the other hand they want to find arguments in favour of the Romanisation of the ethnic minorities.

The inner democratic development of Romania and its trying to find its place in Europe is rendered more difficult by the fact that the nationalist idea of creating a nation-state permeates the majority of the Romanian society and political life; even those political forces cannot free themselves from it that otherwise are susceptible to the requirements of a democratic society; who are democratic and broadminded and try to approach the European political culture. The Romanian democrats are forced to adapt themselves to the nationalistic ideology that have predominated Romanian history for 100-150 years; that were intensified to paranoia by the dictatorship fallen 15 years ago and that were cynically maintained and applied by the post-communist system in order to preserve its power. This is the tragedy of every democratic and liberal policy: the politician who is not satisfied by Great-Romanian nationalism and wants to direct Bucharest politics towards more democratic forms, either is compelled to join the nationalistic public opinion (and give up the important aims of democratisation) or becomes isolated from the majority of the public.

Hungarian intelligentsia and politics have to try to find their way to reach these different strata: the diverse regions, the Transylvanian Romanians, the democrats, the liberals (who are not always the same as the Bucharest liberals), all the 'Sabin Ghermans' so to speak who are interested in the westward orientation and closing up, want the economic and political integration of the Central European region. It is evident the

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regional concept and policy must appear within the Romanian state sooner or later, since the idea will play an ever growing role on the continent and especially in Central Europe – and not in individual states but in traditional, historically developed economic and cultural regions. One of the prerequisites of the closing down of the post-Trianon era is the regional development and consciousness. The ideology of the nation-state will hopefully be abandoned in Romania too, the Romanians have to do away with the harsh and aggressive results its ideology, the same way as communism has been failed. This is in the interest of the Hungarians, of Central Europe and the Romanians too.

The nation-state structures of Europe that played such an important role earlier – they were responsible for two world wars caused by their imperial competitiveness – since the turn of the century, the millennium are proceeding towards loosening up. It is the result of the development of the institution- system of the European Union and the stabilisation of its inner cohesion on the one hand, and the revival of the regional traditions and identities on the other. Both processes go hand in hand with certain manifestations, e.g. the nation-state can assign some aspects of sovereignty to the organisations of the Union or that of the regions. There are regional institutions that are the creations of these welcome processes that serve as intermediate governing structures between counties and the central government – as the so-called Euroregions which play a role in the interregional relationships of economy and culture (e.g. between Alsace in France and Baden Württemberg in Germany).

In the Central European area the regional organisations and regions reaching over state borders can gain importance in the future. There already exist such 'Euroregions' e.g. in the area of Miskolc–Kassa–Ungvár–Szatmárnémeti, or Szeged–Arad–Temesvár–Szabadka, or Szombathely–Zalaegerszeg–Lendva–Maribor–Graz. These regional integrations, however, are not yet comparable to the western patterns in their functioning. They are confined to limited economic cooperation and to the efforts of well-intentioned intellectuals; the regional meetings and consultations indicate the usefulness of real regional cooperation, how it could release the national conflicts inherited from our past.

Without doubt, democratisation in the region has shown results since the developments in Central Europe at the end of the 1980s; these are indicated by the various changes in governments and power groups. The regional comparisons, the recognition of mutual interests, however, are still to come. First of all because it seemed impossible to get rid of the

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myth of the nation-state, the ruling systems which hindered political integration and caused national-ethnic conflicts in the region. 'Intermediate Europe' could not shake off the forms still stamped by the eastern-type political culture. The mutual requirement of the European integration could open roads toward reconciliation and cooperation as has successfully been accomplished in the western part of Europe. The regional organisations would promote cooperation within the area and further Central European and through it European integration.



**Minorities
history**

Minorities History*Emil Niederhauser***The 1905 Russian Revolution
and Ethnicity**

First of all it should be explained that Soviet historiography forbade the use of the term Eastern Europe; since other synonyms were also banned, Eastern Europe simply did not exist, as can be confirmed by those who are still around to remember.

Having got rid of the restrictions imposed on by the party state, we can now freely talk about Eastern Europe of which Russia itself comprises one third, the Balkans another third, and to the remaining third belonging to those western type countries at the western edge of the region, which, geographical terminology permitting, could be referred to as west Eastern Europe.

Since the whole region of Eastern Europe is underdeveloped, there were numerous inside weaknesses, social problems, not to mention ethnic diversity; the latter was usually left out of consideration at the beginning of the 20th c. as only social antagonisms were accepted as legitimate, ethnic differences were regarded as deplorable sidetracking. If a revolution was actually expected in the region, according to the concept of the times it had to be a social one and never one on nationalistic basis, the latter would have been regarded improper.

The staunchest reactionaries would have been satisfied even with a national revolution; however, these kinds of differences were neither overt nor unambiguous for a long time. If there was anyone reckoning with a revolution – any kind of it – they were not numerous. After all everything was under control in the region, everybody knew his task from the emperor down to the beggar: what for then a revolution?

All the same, it broke out, and especially where it was least expected because of the greatest order (i.e. the greatest oppression), in Russia. Later generations, not without Soviet prompting, regarded it as an epic event; others took hardly any notice of it. If anyone wanted to consider the reasons, they were numerous inside and outside alike, the poverty of the masses, the enormous abyss between the upper and lower classes. Others saw the hot-headed revolutionaries as the key figures. What indeed happened was the fall of the last absolute state and changed over to modern bourgeois democracy, which was a satisfactory result and the problem seemed to have been solved.

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Only few had recognized the major controversy of the region, since this problem was not in the foreground anymore. It was considered evident that in a poor backward country only social antagonisms could be the trigger of revolution; therefore it had to be a social revolution. Especially those who devoted their lives to the cause accepted that it was socialist as well. In Russia there were many conceptions as varied and different as were the thinkers.

All things considered it was a social revolution, and it did was not regarded as a scare elsewhere in Europe, not anymore, and the revolutionaries themselves did not believe that it would happen either. The social situation was similar all over the region, however, in other aspects there were considerable differences. Though bourgeois development had started in Russia there were still many obstacles to be cleared away. Since the bourgeois transformation had started earlier in various countries, it seemed foreseeable what turns it was going to take. The bourgeois system worked well in neighbourhood under Franz Joseph (at least the majority were satisfied with it), why should it not work under Nicholas II., who came out better in comparison to the very old Austrian monarch.

In reality the underdevelopment in Russia was more serious than it was estimated. Every-day life was very much the same in Russia as in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or in the small Balkan states, which being national states, prided themselves in being most up to date. However, in this 2/3 part of the region many problems had already been solved what still were present in Russia. During the party-state era it was not allowed to admit that those countries were more forward in many respects, especially in their social and political systems. Even twenty years ago it was still believed that, allowing some advanced development in some aspects in those countries, the Russian Empire was the most developed in general, especially because it was an empire; moreover it was more homogeneous than the greatly varied Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It was the great number of Russian inhabitants (about the half of the population) that gave a uniform Russian colouring to the whole empire which could not be regarded as anything else than Russian.

The inside political system of states could be very varied in these times; not two countries resembled exactly to one another; the main difference lay in the characteristics of their political systems. In Russia for example the absolute state had still its formal presence and it counted as an anachronism in Europe at the turn of the 19th-20th cc.; the paternalism in

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Russia was so much familiar even abroad that it was not recognised as a backward aspect.

Outside Russia it was acceptable to state that the great developments of the 20th c. had already appeared in other parts of the region, in Russia, however, were still to come. There was again the objection: how could a great political power be less developed than small countries? An empire cannot lag behind a small state. This great-power approach would be familiar to those who still remember the party state. In other words, the Russian revolution, which started in January 1905, must be a model to Eastern Europe, which shares similar features.

According to the theory Russia was a great power, the 1/6 of the world (a slogan already fondly used by Nicholas II.) thus the rest of Eastern Europe had to follow the path laid out by the Russian Revolution as closely as possible. In reality no such thing happened, there was no revolutionary outbreak in the other 2/3 part of Eastern Europe; Russia's insistence was not heeded.

In what way could they have followed suit? The establishment of the bourgeois system, which was introduced, at long last in Russia, was carried out after around 1848 or somewhat later; still it was an event of the 19th c. This meant a change in the political system; called for a constitutional system, for parliamentarism, contest among parties (even if they fought over simplistic problems). On the other hand there was hardly any difference in the everyday of the economy; the standard of living was of course different in each country, but so was elsewhere too in Europe. Eastern Europe was always the rearguards in material matters; the fact was not only recognized but also openly declared. In the Balkans there were no great power aspirations yet. Even the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy did not consider themselves to especially progressive just for being a part of a great power; their great thinkers had already realized that the great-power status of the Monarchy has little importance in the national developments of their own countries. Since there were no immediate changes in Russia, the role model of the Russian revolution was not taken too seriously.

There was one momentum of interest, however, for contemporary Europe: that the revolution had weakened Russia as a great power, thus its influence over Europe could have been diminished. The faltering of the great Russian power was certainly agreeable for the leaders of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but was also welcome to the small Balkan states, they had been accustomed to the situation where the Russian

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power devoured small states. The great powers on the other hand did not let it alter their dealings among each other.

The European public opinion took interest in this question, since changes in the power role of Russia and its influence could not be indifferent for any European statesman belonging whichever side of the political spectrum, whether progressive or conservative, or even modern revolutionary. Some were even inclined to believe that the weakening of Russia could strengthen the progressive side.

Still the question is the significance of Russia for Europe, and not only for Eastern Europe. However, this was not the sole problem. There was the question how to follow suit with national changes and modifications as set by the Russian revolution. Without doubt, party-state historiography appointed special importance to the Russian factor; but what about following suit? It was an issue insisted upon by the party-state after all WWII. Russia's European arbiter role became dogmatized and thus it had to be treated as a focal aspect and could not be left out of consideration. And following the Russian example was part of these considerations. How and in what sense should the Russian have been followed? In the actual historical research this question did not play any important role, it was quite enough to stress the fact of following and was not necessary to directly explain it.

What about possibility of imitating bourgeois transformation, i.e. adopting the political system of Russia? Both the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the new Balkan states had already finished their actual bourgeois transformation in realizing a kind of European system. It was another question whether this transformation had indeed created a civil society or borrowed merely overt features. A parliamentary system had developed all over the continent, only the Osmanly Empire was the exception, but by 1905 this also changed. A civil society in a strictly western sense was not achieved even by the system of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (neither in some European countries as Germany). There were no considerable changes in the every-day realization of the development in Russia either what could have been imitated.

If regarded from the Russian 'national' point of view, Eastern Europe failed to follow the Russian model because it had already surpassed it. It was a fact that could not have been denied even by party-state historiographers but it was felt necessary to stress how consciously and carefully planned the Russian changes were carried out. Thus at least one level was found where Eastern Europe could be compared to Russia and the

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Russian great power ambitions could be satisfied at a later date. This way it was possible to lump Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Balkan states together; Russia came out this way as no way less developed than the rest of Eastern Europe and the problem was quite satisfactorily solved.

This is one aspect of the question, how the differences between Russia and the other Eastern European states could be, and must be treated from a party-stated point of view. Now the really important question was whether they could or should have to follow the Russian example. They had to, there was no question about it, only the methods could be argued about. It became evident that the only acceptable solution would be the repetition of the Russian revolutionary experience in some form. If historians did not want to depart from historical facts entirely, they could operate with the time factor. This proved to be a real help since Eastern Europe did follow the Russian example at some later time; there were revolutions at a later date, which were appropriate to be called socialist and which, in this respect, were indeed repetitions of the Russian events, even though started at a lower level. During WWII and especially afterwards the Eastern European countries had to go all the way Russia went following her own inner motivations; in this sense the Eastern European countries indeed followed suit.

This, however, was not quite what the party-state(s) expected around 1905. By historical standards Eastern Europe did follow the Russian model; the obfuscation is evident, the countries went their way under outside (Soviet) power pressure, no inner motivation could be established (but that was unimportant anyway).

This is the sense it can be claimed that the countries of Eastern Europe followed the Russian model of 1905. Of course, the suggested modification in the dating of the process went against the expectations in Eastern Europe around 1955. If we want to play upon words (and that was the most that could be done at the time) it can be ascertained that Eastern Europe had indeed followed the Russian model – and than no date was mentioned; or that it did not follow because by around 1905 (in reality around 1955) it did not seem quite so important. In the latter case the time is clearly established and the form of disobey defined.

Looking back, the imitation of the Russian (Soviet) model seemed to be greatly important and it was imperative to document the relationship in satisfactory forms. If we want to interpret the situation free of former or present emotions we cannot state that on the short term, i.e. between

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1905 and 1907 the Eastern European countries, or even the whole of Eastern Europe lined up to follow Russia on the revolutionary path. It would be more than difficult to establish such a quick and straightforward reaction, however important it was deemed to be. Historically speaking it is evident that there were similar processes in the development of Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Balkan states which made easy to compare these features and helped equating them; this is something quite independent of the party-state attitudes; other European countries had also developed similar relationships on various levels, parallel or similar developments resulting from the contact of many centuries, e.g. between Britain and France, without any need to suspect authoritarian regulations. Unfortunately Hungarian society took the party-state regulations for granted and cannot, would not get rid of them. It is well known that interference from the higher spheres were common practice but it does not automatically deny the reality of parallel or similar developments among the Eastern European countries; the various states of Latin America come to mind as a parallel, where the similarities of the inner social and political structures are the result of their historical developments and not illicit meddling in their historiography.

So far reaching conclusions can be drawn when the process and influence of the 1905 Russian revolution are analysed. Though the party-state authorities frequently drew artificial parallels to justify political theories or measures, it would be a mistake to ignore or misrepresent such facts.

Gizella Föglein

Problems of minorities demography in Hungary (1945–1980)

When establishing or estimating the number of national minorities a subjective and an objective factor have to be reckoned with i.e. the question of national identity and that of mother tongue. The choice of national affiliation should be a primary right of every person chosen by conscience - free of external pressure or influence and no kind of advantage or disadvantage must follow whichever nationality the individual decides upon. It is a fact, however, that "history" has provided several examples where this human right has been restricted or even denied. The question of the mother tongue is easier to settle since it is a question of facts. This why the statistical surveys approached the question from this angle following World War II.

It is the census returns which give some information about the tendencies of the numerical and ethnic distribution of national minorities after WWII. Without serious suspicion of fraud there is no reason to question the data of a national census. 'Naked' facts or surprisin indeces do not represent the absolute situation, they are only informative and thus the results of a census are a kind of reflection of given historical-political circumstances.

1941–1949

The data of the 1941 census of Hungary, its borders delineated in the Trianon Treaty, can serve as starting point for post war times too, taking in account the human losses caused by war as well as other changes in population and ethnic situation In 1941 Hungary had 9,319.992 inhabitants. Of these were 8,657.172 (92.8%) Hungarian, 662,820 (7.2%) non/Hungarian speakers (German 477,057 = 5%; Slovak 75,920 = 0.8%; Romanian 14,161 = 0.2%; Southern Slav 49,019 = 0.7%, of which Serb 5,444 = 0.1%; Croate 22,269 = 0.3%; Bunyevac and Sokac 16,491 = 0.2%; Wendish and Slovene 4,816 = 0.1%) Concerning national affinity – this was the first census to inquire about this aspect as well - 8,921.457 (95.8%) declared to be of Hungarian, 398,535 (4.2%) as non Hungarian nationality [German 303,419 = 3.3%; Slovak 16,689 = 0.2%; Romanian

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7,565 = 0.1%; Serb 3,633 = 0.04%; Croate 2,708 = 0.03%; Bunyevac and Sokac 1,511 = 0.01%; Wendish and Slovene 2,058 = 0.2%.¹

The military operations in Hungary, the pushing forward of the Soviet army, the withdrawal of Hitlerite and Hungarian nazi forces and their ditroyal resulted in the collapse of the earlier administration. This went hand in hand with the fleeing of German and Hungarian Nazi representatives and also members of the misled civil population. The Hungarian nazi power intended a 'total depopulation' of the country and evacuation was planned along these lines. By the end of November 1944 the wish to leave the country became less fervent and the people concentrated in masses in the Transdanubian area did not follow evacuation orders. A statistical survey of the situation of 30th June 1945 estimated 1,033,491 as the number of those who fled to the west; of these 641,506 had returned by the date of the survey.² It is possible there were more to return back in the following month. According to some estimates 10–15% of the German minority of Hungary fled from the country from the approach of the Red Army.³ Of the German speaking minorities 20,000 persons fled or were evacuated to the Western Zone of Germany, 4,000 to the Soviet Zone, 15,000 to Austria.

There are no 'up-to-date' data about the military, civilian and prisoner-of-war losses caused by WWII in Hungary; when Hungary became the actual field of military operation the publication of lists ceased, documents got lost or were destroyed.⁴ Therefore the magnitude of various losses can only be calculated and estimated on diverse bases with any accuracy.

There are contradicting accounts about the human losses of WWII in Hungary published by various authors.⁵ According to some it is about

¹ Balogh Sándor (ed.) Magyarország a XX. században Kossuth Könyvkiadó. Budapest, 1985. p. 500. (Hungary in the 20th c.)

² Somlyai, Magda: Történelemformálókörnapok. 1944 ősze – 1945 tavasza. Gondolat Kiadó. Budapest. 1985. p. 19. (History-forming weekdays). Reference: Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkönyv. Budapest. 1946 p. 204 (Manual of Statistics for Hungary).

³ Dokumentum der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa. Band II. Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Ungarn. Bundesministerium der Vertriebenen, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsschädigte. Düsseldorf. 1956. 40 E. p. 40.

⁴ Stark, Tamás: Változások a magyarországi népesség számában 1938–1949. (A katonai, polgári és hadifogolyvesztés, valamint a szomszédos országokból Magyarországra menekültek száma). MS. 1988. ELTE Történelmi Könyvtár. P.6. (Changes in the number of the Hungarian population 1938–1949. Military, civilian and POW losses as well as evacuees from neighbouring countries into Hungary).

⁵ Stark, Tamás ibid. p.14

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700,000–750,000 persons, of these about 500,000 is the share of the present area of Hungary.⁶ Human losses mean partly the soldiers died in action or in POW lagers and partly the civilian victims of bomb raids and the victims of the Hungarian Holocaust.⁷ From the area of present-day Hungary there were about 850,000–900,000 persons taken prisoners of these 550,000–570,000 in the Soviet Union, the others to the west. Between 1945–1946 about 290,000 returned from the west and about 300,000 from the Soviet Union. In 1947 practically every POW returned from the west; by the end of 1947 further 128,000, by the end of 1948 another 170,000, in 1949 and in the following years some more thousands of POW returned from the SU.⁸ The number of those who did not return or died as POW was estimated between 50,000 and 150,000.⁹

The establishment of the military and civilian losses of the ethnic minorities is even more difficult if not downright impossible. With the exception of German speaking inhabitants, there are not even estimates. Earlier West German statistics reckon with about 60,000 persons as POW and in forced labour service; of these 30,000 – 35,000 civilians and about 30,000 POW were ethnic Germans.¹⁰ According to other estimates the was losses of Hungarian German minority was about 11,000.¹¹

The size and distribution of the ethnic minorities in Hungary were defined by migration: the deportation of ethnic Germans and the Czecho-slovakian–Hungarian population exchange.

After the formation of the Temporary National Assembly in Debrecen 1944, but before the signing of the armistice treaty, Soviet authorities

⁶ Balogh, Sándor ed. Magyarország a XX Században (Hungary in the 20th c.) p. 262; Für, Lajos: Magyarország háborús embervesztesége. In: Glatz, Ferenc ed.: Az 1944. év története. História Évkönyv. Budapest. 1984. pp 80-80. (Human losses of Hungary. In: The history of the year 1944); Korom, Mihály: A magyar fegyverszünet. Kossuth Könyvkiadó. Budapest. 1987. p 174. (The Hungarian cease fire).

⁷ According to the estimates of Tamás Stark, the military losses were 1200,000 – 160,000 persons, the number of civilian victims about 80,000 – 100,000. Stark, Tamás: Változások a magyarországi népesség számában... pp- 30-38.

⁸ Pető, Iván – Szakács, Sándor: A hazai gazdaság négy évtizedének története. 1945 – 1985. Vol. I. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. Budapest. 1985. p. 18. (The history of forty years of Hungarian economy).

⁹ Mihály Korom's estimate was 50,000–70,000 persons. Korom, Mihály: A népi demokrácia első éve. Valóság 1984. 3. pp. 3–4. (The first years of popular democracy). According to Tamás Stark there were about 150,000 persons who did not return. Stark: Változások... p. 76.

¹⁰ Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen. 44E, p.44.

¹¹ Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen. 72E. p.72.

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deported men and women of German ethnicity – or carrying German names – of working age from the eastern part of Hungary, irrespective of their individual political responsibility or participation in war crimes. In 1944 and 1945 there were more than 60,000 persons deported for communal work to the Soviet union.¹² There are no data how many of them survived and returned back to Hungary later. West German sources estimated about 20% to have lost their lives.¹³

On the 29th December 1945 the decree on the evacuation of ethnic Germans from Hungary to Germany was announced and enacted on the insistence of the Allied Powers.¹⁴ The Népápolgondozó Hivatal (Folk Settlement Bureau) registered 135 655 ethnic Germans who were relocated to the American Zone of Germany between January and December 1946, and 50,000 to the Soviet Zone from spring 1947.¹⁵ Contemporary German statistics published higher numbers because they included those too who fled or were evacuated at the end of the war. The number of German nationals who remained in Hungary or returned back at some later date can only be estimated or reckoned with the help of various statistics.

The Czechoslovakian – Hungarian treaty concerning the exchange of population signed on the 27th February 1946, was not reciprocal.¹⁶ There were 73 273 persons in Hungary who declared to be Slovaks and resettled voluntarily by April 1948.¹⁷ 31% of them were casual labourers, 19% poor peasants; in Hungary they left behind about 24,000 cadastral yoke

¹² Korom, Mihály: Az Atlanti Chartától a potsdami kollektív büntetésig. In: Zielbauer, György ed.: A magyarországi németek hozzájárulása a közös haza építéséhez. Tudományos Tanácskozás az elűzés 50. évfordulóján.. Országos Német Önkormányzat, Budapest, 1996. 202. o. (From Atlantic Charta to collective punishment. In: The contribution of ethnic Germans of Hungary to the building of a common country. A scientific conference on the 50th anniversary of their expulsion.).

¹³ Zielbauer, György: Magyar polgári lakosok deportálása és hadifogsága (1945–1948). Történeli Szemle. 1989. 3–4. sz. (The deportation and captivity of Hungarian civilians. 1945–1948).

¹⁴ A nemzeti kormány 12 330/1945. ME sz. rendelete a magyarországi német lakosság-
nak Németországba való áttelepítéséről. Magyar Közlöny, 1945. december 29., 211.sz.

¹⁵ Balogh, Sándor: Magyarország külpolitikája 1945–1950. Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest. 1988. pp.101, 102.(Hungarian foreign policy 1945–1950).

¹⁶ 1946.XV. Törvénycikk a Magyarország és Csehszlovákia között lakosságcsere tárgyában Budapesten 1946 február hó 27. napján kelt magyar-csehszlovák egyezménybecikkelyezéséről. Magyar Törvénytár. Budapest, 1946. pp. 64–71. (Act of the population exchange between Hungary and Czechoslovakia).

¹⁷ Balogh, Sándor: Magyarország külpolitikája 1945–1950. 1988.

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land. There were about 80,000 Hungarians resettled or evacuated from Slovakia who left behind about 137,000 cadastral yoke land in Slovakia.¹⁸

Census*1949*

Information about the number and ethnic composition of minorities in Hungary is provided by the census of 1949 and those of the following years. In 1949 Hungary's 9,204,799 inhabitants claimed to be Hungarians: 9,076,041 persons (98.6%) and only 128,758 persons (1.4%) to be non-Hungarian speakers. Of the latter: German 22,455 (0.2%); Slovak 25,988 (0.3%); Romanian 14,713 (0.2%); Serb 5,158 (0.1%); Croatian 9,946 (0.1%); others 50,498 (0.5%) (these are Wendish, Slovene, Bunyevac and Sokac, etc.).¹⁹ Between the minority indices of the census of 1941 and 1949 there is a difference of about 530,000 persons. The Germans who fled or were expelled from Hungary and the Slovaks who settled over to Slovakia together made out together about 328,000 persons, there were thus 200,000 non-Hungarian speakers unaccounted for. The indices indicating nationality are even more puzzling. In 1949, 9,104,640 (98.91%) inhabitants declared to be Hungarians and 100,159 to be non-Hungarians [Romanian 8,500 (0.09%); Slovak 7,808 (0.08%); Croatian 4,108 (0.04%); German 2,617 (0.03%); Slovene, Wendish 666 (0.01%)].²⁰

1960

The census of 1960 shows the highest indices concerning the number of the members of national minorities in Hungary, counted together or considered independently – with the exception of Serbs.²¹ All the ethnic minorities increased in number compared to the data of 1949, though later there were no more migrations. That Hungary's population was

¹⁸ There were about 105,000 Slovaks in Hungary in 1930 and about 634,000 Hungarians in Slovakia in 1937.

¹⁹ Balogh, Sándor: Magyarország a XX. Században... p. 501.

²⁰ 1990. évi népszámlálás. Anyanyelv, nemzetiség, településenként 1980, 1990. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Census of 1990. Mother tongue, nationality according to settlements 1980, 1990).

²¹ The lowest index for the national/ethnic minorities was shown by the census of 1949 due to post-war migrations.

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9,961,044 persons, of which there were 9,786,038 (98.24%) Hungarians. The number of non-Hungarian speakers was 175,006 (1.76%), 46,248 more than in 1949. Of these: German 50,765 (0.51%, +28,310 persons); Slovak 30,690 (0.31%, +4,702); Romanian 15,787 (0.16%, +1,074); Croatian 33,014 (0.33%, +15,316); Serb 4,583 (0.05%, -575 persons); Gipsy (Roma) 25,633 (0.25%); and others (Bunyevac, Sokac, Wendish, Slovene and unknown mother tongues) 14,534 (0.15%, -2,479 persons).²²

Considering their claims to national affinity, there were 9,837,275 (98.76%) persons of Hungarian nationality, 123,869 (1.24%) non-Hungarian nationals; of the latter Croatian 14,710 (0.15%); Romanian 12,326 (0.12%); German 8,640 (0.09%); Serb 3,888 (0.04%); Gipsy (Roma) 56,121 (0.56%); others (Bunyevac, Sokac, Wendish, Slovene and unknown) 13,744 (0.14%).²³

The 1960 census shows a kind of 'magnanimity' in the case of the Southern Slav speakers: the minority indices refer only to Serbs and Croats; Slovenes, Wendish, Sokac and Bunyevac ethnics are lumped together with other ethnic groups under 'Others'.²⁴ The 'peak' results of the 1960 census is in connection to the beginning of the 'melting' in international politics and that the restoration and consolidation of the Kádár-regime was in progress.²⁵ While the measures of retaliation to the revolution still went on., the government made efforts to gain followers by popular provisions, e.g. by raising the salaries, by subsidies, that confidential files were discontinued, etc. It was to win over peasantry that through a law decree, already introduced by the government of Imre Nagy, came into effect which abolished the system of compulsory delivery of agricultural produce. Resignation from the agricultural co-operatives became simpler, and later the system itself ceased to exist. Another popular provision was the abolition of the tax for being childless; by appointing Easter Monday and Christmas (25th and 26th December) as holidays; and somewhat later the introduction of old age pension for co-op members. During

²² 1991. évi népszámlálás.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Gipsies (Romans) were always grouped as individual both ethnically and nationally in every census.

²⁵ The first government of János Kádár 4th November 1956; government of Ferenc Münnich 28th January 1958-13th September 1961; second government of János Kádár 13th September 1961-30th June 1965.

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the Second Three Year Plan (1958–1960) and the Second Five Year Plan (1961–1965) the improvement of the living standard and living conditions of the population appeared as real targets. One of the proofs for these developments was the budget accepted by the new parliament assembled on the 26th November 1958, which true to the promises financed the above improvements and the sums for social, cultural and educational purposes were increased by 31%. János Kádár pointed out in his 9th December 1960 speech in the parliament that the forming of agricultural co-operatives was successful beyond hopes, nobody believed – as he put it – the development to be so vigorous.²⁶ The regime got first reinforced by the harsh and traumatizing terror than was consolidated by the amnesty. The second Kádár-government and the ones following it could make the people accept – ethnic minorities included – and not without reason that it serves their best interests in a country surrounded by an aggressive empire.²⁷ The growing numbers representing ethnic minorities in the census returns, however, were not the reflection of their actual size, merely a slight approach toward reality. The causes lie deeper. The German nationals who underwent much suffering might not yet have put off their fears and still harboured uncertainties and even suspicions. Besides, in their case as well as in the case of other ethnic minority communities, there was a strong spontaneous process towards assimilation, well expressed by the results of the 1970 census.

1970

Similarly to all the census before 1941, the one in 1970 inquired only after the mother tongue and excluded the question about nationality. In 1970 Hungary had 10,322,099 inhabitants, of these 155,862 (1.5%) were non-Hungarians, 19,144 less than in 1960. Of these Germans: 35,594 (0.3%); Slovaks 21,176 (0.2%); Romanians 12,624 (0.1%); Croatians 21,855 (0.2%); Serbs 7,989 (0.08%); Slovene, Wendish 4,205 (0.04%).²⁸ The

²⁶ Tisztelt Ház! A magyar országgyűlés története 1848–1998. Eds. Stemler, Gyula – Tombor, László. Puskás Tivadar Távközlési Technikum. Budapest, 1998. p. 178. (Honoured House! The history of the Hungarian parliament 1848 – 1998).

²⁷ Magyarország miniszterelnökei 1848 – 1990. Ed. Dús, Ágnes. Cégér Kiadó Kft. Budapest. 1993. pp. 206, 210, 212.

²⁸ 1990. évi népszámlálás. Anyanyelv, nemzetiség településenként 1980, 1990. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. Budapestm1993. p. 8 (The census of 1990. Mother tongue, nationality according to settlements 1980, 1990. Central Statistical Office).

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sudden increase in the number of Serbs is the result of an incorrect wording in the instructions;²⁹ the speakers of southern Slav languages were lumped together, according to the detailed instructions Serbs and Slovenes were to be entered into the rubrik as 'Serbs', Rác and Wendish under 'others', whereas Slovenes and Wendish, sharing the same religion belong together and Serb and Rác are two names of the same people.³⁰

1980

In 1980 Hungary had 31,231 (0.29%) German speaking inhabitants. The number is 8,776 more compared to 1949, but 19,534 less than in 1960. Slovak speakers were 16,054 persons (0.15%) 9,934 less than in 1949 and 14,636 less than in 1960. Of the Slovaks living in Hungary the 1980 return had the lowest number after WWII. and it is similar in the case of Romanians, Serbs Slovenes and Wendish. In 1980 there were 10,141 (0.09%) inhabitants who claimed to be Romanian speakers, this is 1,732 less than in 1949 and 5,646 less than in 1960; Serb speakers were 3,426 (0.03%) in 1980, 1,732 less than in 1949 and 1,157 less than in 1960; the number of Croatian speakers was 20,484 (0.19%) in 1980, this is 61 more than in 1949 but 12,500 less than in 1960; people with Slovene and Wendish as their mother tongue were 3,142 (0.03%) in 1980, 1,047 less than in 1949, There is no data about them for 1960 in the statistical manual.³¹

The data of the 1980 census represented the 'peak' concerning the number of German, Slovene and Wendish speaking minorities. The data

²⁹ Inhabitans with Serbian mother tongue were 5158 (1949), 4583 (1960), 7989 (1970) according to the census returns.

³⁰ Dávid, Zoltán: A magyar nemzetiségi statisztika múltja és jelene. Valóság, 1980. 8. p.101. (The past and present of national minorities statistics in Hungary). 'The realization of the number, position and local distribution of the national minorities is impossible since the last census ceased to give a report on each of the settlements individually. The data given for the county do not provide exact information, the global numbers do not allow to discover which villages have inhabitants belonging to national minorities and thus prevent the follow up of the processes and the comparison of time segments. This is the major cause of the disorder disturbing the discussions on minority problems. Everything is mixed up, those who kept their mother tongue and nationality with those who have long given up their original ancestry and those who have claimed to be Hungarians for several decades. This is how unfounded estimates are created about the number of national minorities.' Ibid. p.8.

³¹ 1990. évi népszámlálás. P. 8.

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referring to the German speakers gave 11,310 (0.11%) persons, 8,693 more than in 1949 and 2,670 more than in 1960; Slovene, Wendish: 1,731 persons, 8,693 more than in 1949, no data were given for 1960. (In 1970 there was no question about the nationality of the minorities). The number of Slovak speakers was 9,101 (0.08%) which is a kind of transition between 1949 and 1960: 1,293 more than in 1949 and 5,239 less than in 1960. A similar process is reflected by the data for Romanians and Croatians: the former with 8,874 persons (0.08%) is 374 more than in 1949 and 3,452 less than in 1960. The number of Croatian speakers was 13,895 (0.13%), 9,735 more than in 1949 but 815 less than in 1960. The number given for Serb speakers was the lowest in 1980: 2,805 (0.03%), which is 1,385 less than in 1949 and 1,083 less than in 1960.³²

* * *

The census data can only partially indicate the number of the members of national minorities in Hungary; rather than giving the size it seems to be a reflection of their political and legal situation, which mirrored the historical-political situation of the times. Expressed in numbers, the internal and international politics came to the surface which directly or indirectly influenced the lives of the national minorities.

Various demographic surveys

In addition to the census indices there are other – mainly estimated – data about the number and ethnic composition of the national minorities in Hungary.³³

Surveys

The Ministry of Cultural Education prepared a proposition for the Party Committee of MDP on the situation of national minority education in Hungary.³⁴ The document drew attention to the difficulties which obstructed

³² 1990. évi népszámlálás. P.8.

³³ e.g. from the state-party, various ministries, minority associations, Central Statistical Office, documents, publications, press material.

³⁴ A magyarországi nemzetiségek adatai. (data concerning the national minorities of Hungary) MOL 276.1./1954/91. cs. 83. ö.e.

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the minorities cultural work of the previous ten years caused 'by the inaccuracy in counting the number of minorities population of our country.'³⁵ It claimed that the data of the 1949 census did not represent real numbers, i.e. they were not reliable. In order to get rid of ambiguities, the Central Statistical Office (CSO) and other national organs were asked to provide data and further estimates were made with the collaboration of the county councils. These investigations yielded the following counts: Germans 250,000–300,000; Slovaks 120,000–150,000; southern Slavs 80,000–100,000; Romanians 25,000–30,000; total 470,000–580,000 persons.³⁶ The above estimates are the result of the counts carried out in the villages, and reflect the proportion of the inhabitants using their mother tongue in everyday situations. In addition to these estimated data the CSO also supplied data which gave the number of Germans as 3,437, Slovaks 22,359, southern Slavs 24,702, Romanians 10,000, total: 60,498 persons.³⁷

The Ministry of Cultural Education attached a preparatory resolution to the above proposition in which the CSO was requested to 'revise the data concerning the number of the ethnic minorities and provide the Ministries of Education and Cultural Education with more reliable figures.'³⁸ It also suggested the CSO to take samples in at least some of the minority communities to be able to publish verisimilar data.

The CSO prepared a report and published it for inner use on 1. January 1955. The number of ethnic minorities were deduced from the results of the census of 1930 and 1941 as well as the data collected about the post-war migrations. This document gave the number of Germans as 220,000, Slovaks 60,000, southern Slavs 45,000, Romanians 15,000, total 340,000 persons belonging to ethnic minorities in Hungary.³⁹ In later publications these figures cropped up over and over again frequently without reference to the sources or the archive material.

³⁵ MOL 276.f./1954/91. cs. 83. ö.e

³⁶ MOL 276.f./1954/91. cs. 83. ö.e

³⁷ MOL 276.f./1954/91. cs. 83. ö.e

³⁸ MOL 276.f./1954/91. cs. 83. ö.e

³⁹ MOL 276.f./1954/91. cs. 83. ö.e

Sándor Horváth

Examples of the Assimilation of the Gradistye Croats from the 16th to the 20th century

1. Introduction

There are living a considerable number of Croatian inhabitants in the villages of County Vas: in Felsőcsatár, Horvátlovő, Horvátzsidány, Narda, Ólmód, Peresznye and Szentpéterfa. Felsőberkifalu, Bozsok, Harasztifalu, Horvát nádalja and Tömörd can be claimed to have reached the last stage of Magyarization. The process can be observed in the language the speakers use in various situations.

The language corruption of Croatian speakers was already noted by 18th c. sources. SOSTERICH wrote in his prayer book published in 1781: "...many will say: this is not the real Croatian tongue ... since our language is very corrupted in the Hungarian Kingdom, so mixed that they speak it in a different way in every village, as we ourselves can testify – here it is mixed with German, there with Hungarian, elsewhere with Slovak, or some other language. the language is in decay and decline. The same happens in the written form too...in writing and printing everybody writes the Croat words differently."¹ Indeed, it would have been possible for all the villages to Magyarize during the following 200 years; but it has not happened. One village is Magyarized the other is not. Why? What was there to favour Magyarization in the one case? What was different or missing in the other? The present research has not confined itself to the usual stereotypes like: the more conservative a village community, the better the ethnic characteristics are preserved; the change in work conditions hastens assimilation; mixed marriages accelerate the loss of the (minority) mother tongue, etc. Accepting there is truth in the stereotypes,

¹ Sosterich, Jeremias: *Marianszko czeveche (...)* Soprun, 1781. Published by László Hadrovics: *Schriftum und Sprache der burgenlaendischen Kroaten im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert. (Writing and speech of the Croats of Burgenland in the 18th.–19th. cc.)* Budapest, 1974 pp. 523–524. – the corrupted speech of the Croats was also described as a macaronic language.

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the task is to find out what are the factors encouraging preservation, loss or change of minority identity and how do these operate.

2. Ethnically mixed marriages and assimilation.

To some extent Magyarization can be explained by mixed marriages. WWII and the introduction of the collective farm system have usually been named as turning points, when members of the older generation remember how it was against custom to marry from outside of the village. This can be regarded as the ideal of a community sharing a traditional culture, however, reality is modified by necessity. The community adheres to the ideals in mind, keeps referring to it, while reality of everyday life does not necessarily follows it. Some earlier times people mentioned that every young person in Narda wanted to marry from the village only, it was declared if someone married from or into an other village that there was no one who had wanted that person in Narda. The "Research Of The Micro Regions of Transdanubia" inquired about where the spouses came from. There were hardly any villages where the informants would state that only endogamous, i.e. in-village marriage was customary, and it was only in Horvátlövő, Harasztifalu and Horvátnádalja where the informants stressed the requirement of in-village marriages.

The people in Harasztifalu claimed that they preferred to marry locally, it was rare to take a spouse from other places; in Horvátnádalja 'local' included the neighbouring settlements. In Horvátnádalja the population was more conservative, kept a closer order so much so, that the house of the girl who turned down her suitor was 'chaffed', i.e. marked with chaff strewn about it. A girl was expected to accept her in-village suitor or the whole family had to suffer of the shame. In all the villages only ethnic Croatian speaking settlements were mentioned as possible places to marry from. In Horvátzsidány it was stressed that up to 1945 they only married Croats and Catholics. It was important to marry from the neighbourhood, was explained in Narda: 'Even the book advised: choose your spouse from the neighbourhood, the godparents from as far as possible.'² The following non-Croatian villages were mentioned: in Bozsok they were Perenye, Velem, Kőszegszerdahely; in Narda they were Vaskeresz-

² In Croatian: *Zeni se iz cin blizega a kumi se iz cin daljega. Sad je pont fordítva.* (Sic! The last two words are in Hungarian).

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tes, Ólmod. Kiszsidány; in Szentpéterfa they were Kertes and Ják. The ideal must be contrasted with reality, by checking the data of the parish registers. The matriculae of the examined villages – with the exception of Horvátnádajla – were inspected for the purpose.

The results were drawn from the diagram representing the proportion of exogamy. Szentpéterfa is the odd one out where the proportion of local exogamy was about 20–25% between 1831 and 1895 while in the other villages about 50%. After 1950 there was an increase in outside marriages in Nagykölked and Ólmod, to a lesser degree in Harasztifalu and Horvátszidány. (The diagram representing the situation in the first half of the century is not yet ready for all the villages); concerning the 18th c., Julianna Örsi's remarks seem to have been justified: 'as to the main tendency, we can state that in Hungary the settlements were more open in their marriage relationships in the 18th c. Endogamy proves to be strongest in the second half of the 19th c. Nowadays there is a return to exogamy.'³

Some facts should be considered before arriving at any hasty conclusions about the relative openness of the settlements under discussion (with the exception of Szentpéterfa). The diagrams testify that there is not only regional-local exogamy but ethnic exogamy as well.⁴ According to the figures in Szentpéterfa the outside marriages were only 1–2% between ethnic Croats thus local exogamy was ethnic exogamy at the same time. Harasztifalu shows a similar proportion of ethnic exogamy; but in Narda, Ólmod and Horvátszidány it is much lower (the tokens for Narda were so few they could not be plotted on the graph.) It is characteristic of Harasztifalu that though the average is low, the swing is big: from zero to 40%. The graph for Ólmod can be explained by the fact that it is a very small village with few marriages thus the percentages are more extreme. This way the 14%, i.e. the smallest proportion of ethnic exogamy means 13 couples between 1870 and 1880; at the same time 23%, the highest rate of Ólmod means just two couples between 1800

³ Örsi, Julianna: Exogámia és endogámia Magyarországon a XVIII-XIX. században. (Exogamy and endogamy in Hungary in the 18th-19th cc.) In: Novák, László – Ujváry, Zoltán. Lakodalom (Folklor és etnográfia 9.) Debrecen 1983. 36.

⁴ Lacking more exact definitions, for the 19th c. marriages between inhabitants of Croatian villages were treated as endogamy. On the correlation between family name and ethnicity cf. Horváth, Sándor: Házassági kapcsolatok a horvátok lakta Nardán (Marriage relationships in Croats inhabited Narda). Vasi Szemle 1989. 192.

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and 1820. This is the danger of numeric analysis where several aspects have to be taken into account at the interpretation.

There is a third factor of modification, which can distort the diagram. In the matriculae of the Catholic Church only those marriages are registered which happened in the settlements belonging to the various mother-churches. If a man or woman was married in a church belonging to another parish, they are lost from sight. However, this is exogamy too; it is to be considered though, whether living away from their birthplace did they play any role in the life of their birthplace. Emigrants and those who joined the church – e.g. nuns – had special influence upon their birthplace (Szentpéterfa offers good examples, as shown below).

While the above-mentioned villages are examples for ethnic endogamy, in Tömörd, Nagykölked and Horvátlovó the mother tongue was greatly mixed within the families. In Tömörd ethnic exogamy does not mean couples with mixed tongues, but men and women from Hungarian villages. The shaded parts of the diagram show the proportion of marriages where neither the groom nor the bride were Croats; they were employees of the local Guary and Chernel estates. This is confirmed in the register: 'servants, serve at Tömörd, day labourer, farm hand'. According to the testimony of the graph, the number of Tömörd's inhabitants almost doubled when the number of exogamous marriages increased, and with the sudden increase of doubly exogamous marriages the number of the population stagnates, the proportion of the 'indigenous' population decreased. This leads back to the analysis of the project.

Analysing above the marriage relationships at Narda it was analysed what were the influencing factors, which played a role in the area choice - what kinds of exogamy were possible if the terminology set down by Julianna Örsi was consistently adopted.⁵ The same points will be considered in the case of the other villages under investigation.

When marrying religion is the first and foremost consideration. Nemescsó and Meszlen by Tömörd as well as Kőszegdoroszló, Cák, Lukácsháza by Bozsok were strongly populated by Lutherans, while Calvinists live at Nagykölked, Kiskölked by Harasztifalu and the villages called Rádóc. In the 17th c. there were attempts at reforming the Catholic Croats but without success. Understandably religion meant a strong divi-

⁵ Cf. Örsi, Julianna 1983 and Horváth, Sándor 1989. p. 89.

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sion line in the social relationships of the Croats. Even if they were ready to marry from neighbouring Hungarian villages it was extremely rare if they accepted Lutherans or Calvinists. In answer to the questionnaires the inhabitants of Bozsok named Hungarian villages as Perenye, Velem and Kőszegszerdahely, but excluded Kőszegdoroszló, Cák and Lukácsháza. The eminent importance of the same religion was also stressed in Tömörd. In Bozsok, which is exceptionally open to exogamy, the southern neighbour Bucsú was not mentioned; it belongs to another mother-church.

The district of Tömörd parish did not exceed the village limits thus it is frequent that exogamous marriages with Horvátzsidány, Peresznye and Harasztifalu are ethnically endogamous. Tömörd was forced to open up since it was not only surrounded by villages with Hungarian speakers but they also were Lutherans and Calvinists. At the other limit of Tömörd was the county border: Bük, Csepreg, as well as Horvátzsidány and Peresznye belonged to County Sopron. Ethnic endogamy became more important than county limits and distance (Harasztifalu is about 40 km away). The major reason in the Magyarization of Tömörd lies in the frequency of exogamous – especially of doubly exogamous – marriages. In the case of Felsőberkifalu and Horvát nádálja the church played a decisive role. These villages were attached to the parish of Körmen where there was no Croatian priest, whereas in 1646 the inhabitants of Horvátalja, Felsőberkifalu, Harasztifalu and Nagykölked employed a Croatian priest who became the parish priest in Nagykölked.⁶

In the 16th–18th cc., even in the 19th it was not infrequent for priests and schoolmasters born or educated in Croatia to come to work in the settlements of Gradistye. Grgur Mekinich-Pythiraeus whose name has been preserved as the first publisher of a book written in Croatian (his protestant prayer book was first published in 1609) probably came from the area over River Mura; before him 'Juraj Zywanich', the Glagolyte priest of Kelénpatak also is believed to have come from Croatia to the Croats of Gradistye in 1561. From Croatia came the schoolmaster of Tömörd: Thomas Frantic mentioned in 1647; the parish priest of Nagynarda: Georg Pribanics (1755–1790), Michael Zadravec (1830–1863, who was also parish priest in Rohonc) and György Frideczky. It was during his being a parish priest in Nagynarda when Frideczky published his prayer-

⁶ Völgyes, Ferenc. Harasztifalu története. Az iskola története. 1987. MS. SNAA-1633. Szombathely Archives of the Folklore Department of Savaria Museum. p. 4.

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book *Angjel cuvar* (Guardian Angel) in 1869, a remarkable event for the folklore history of Gradistye as this is the first book to use the diacritical Croatian letters (with 'hacek') introduced during Croatian language reforms.⁷ Forced Magyarization should be assumed in the villages near Körmend and in Bozsok from the beginning of the 18th c. 'The manorial court in Körmend ruled that the three Croatian villages belonging to the estate could go for confessions and baptisms only to the priest of Körmend.'⁸ Fran KURELAC warns us in his book published in 1871 that the directories were misleading about the mother tongue of the people at the settlements. The Croatian patriot collected information in the years of 1846 and 1848. As he wrote 'no one can rely on the Hungarian directories because they write 'Lingua Croatica' only if the preaching is in Croatian; but there are villages with pure Croatian speakers without a Croatian priest and preaching. Such places are Bozsok, Nádálja, etc.'⁹ Kurelac's references are obscure but most probably he referred to Horvátnádálja when he wrote that the people had complained at the church festival in Szentkút that they themselves financed a young local man in his studies to have someone to preach them in their own language but this man was forbidden to preach in Croatian.¹⁰ Something similar happened at Bozsok where there was no Croatian-speaking priest; their schoolmaster was not allowed to accompany them to the Croatian church festival in Incéd (Dürnbach) only to a German village, which usually was frequented by Hungarians.¹¹ Kurelac also told the story when he was on his way to Rohonc, he met a woman who talked to his little son in Croatian and a town employee scorned the woman for talking in that 'dog's language'.¹²

The data of the daughter-churches of the parish of Szentpéterfa explain why it is that apart from the strong tendency for local endogamy

⁷ Bencsics, Nikolaus: Einige Bemerkungen zu älteren Beziehungen der burgenländischen Kroaten zur alten Heimat. In: *Burgenland und seiner pannonischen Umwelt* Festgabe für August Ernst. /Burgenländische Forschungen. Sor dərband VII/ Eisenstadt, 1984. pp. 14–18.

⁸ Kállay, István: *Úriszéki bíraskodás a XVIII–XIX. Században*. Budapest 1985. p. 97 (Legal processes before manorial courts in the 18th–19th cc.)

⁹ Kurelac, Fran: *Jacke ili narodne pjesme prostoga i neprostoga puka hrvatskoga po zupan Soprunskoj, Mosonskoj i Zeleznoj na Ugrih*. Zagreb 1871. xiv. and ff.

¹⁰ Kurelac 1871 xxx.

¹¹ Kurelac 1871 xxix.

¹² Kurelac 1871 xxx.

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the few instances for exogamy represent ethnic exogamy at the same time. Monyorókerék, Kolom, and Tótfalu appear frequently in the cases of exogamous marriages. These settlements belong to the Szenpéterfa parish. When discussing exogamy in Narda it was pointed out that beside ethnic endogamy administrative regions also define the area for exogamy. According to the *matriculae* Felsőcsatár, Alsócsatár, Kiszarda, Csém and Incéd belonged to the marriage region of Nagynarda, but Horvátlövő did not, because Narda and Horvátlövő belonged to different administrative regions at the beginning of the 20th c.: Narda to the notary-district of Felsőcsatár; Horvátlövő to that of Németlövő. Moreover, Horvátlövő belonged to the Erdődy estate, while Narda – together with Incéd and Csém among others – to the Batthyány estate.¹³ The area of the notary-district with Kőszegszerdahely as its centre, was the same as that of the parish, thus Magyarization was easier as was also in the case of the Croatian villages belonging to Kőszeg.

In Horvátlövő there is no such overlapping of marriage area and parish boundaries, neither that of marriage and administrative district limits. During the 16th c. it was infrequent for Croats to settle in ethnically closed, all Croatian settlements. According to what we now know about the villages under investigation, it was only Tömörd, which was completely settled by Croats: all the names registered in 1569 were Croatian.¹⁴

There was a considerable population of Germans in Horvátlövő from earliest on. This is why the people from Horvátlövő married more frequently from Németlövő, as well as Magyarkeresztes, Németkeresztes, Pornó.

The choice of a spouse was also determined by the social, economic status as well as the financial situation. This can be best observed in the case of the special trades (cf. the marriages of the servants in Tömörd). Material considerations strengthened endogamy in the second half of the 19th c., as cited from J. Őrsi. In the analysis of the situation in Narda it has been indirectly connected to the emancipation of the serfs, directly to the intention to prevent the decreasing, dividing, selling of the landed property.¹⁵

However high were the graphs for exogamy, they invariably decline by the end of the 19th c. 19th c. registers testify that it was Felsőcsatár, Szenpéterfa, Harasztifalu, and Horvátnádálja where numerically the more cot-

¹³ Horváth, Sándor 1989. pp. 200–201.

¹⁴ Hajszan, Robert: *Die Herrschaft Güns im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert*. Güttenbach/Pinkovac, 1993. p. 138.

¹⁵ Horváth, Sándor 1989. p.195.

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ters, farm hands and servants lived belonging to the poorest strata. It means that material situation did not play a decisive role whether a community lost its ethnic identity or not.

3. Work and assimilation

Work usually is claimed to be the second decisive factor next to ethnic exogamy: in situations where people work away from home or when at home, they work together with people coming from elsewhere. In our villages only the big estates received work force from other regions as, was reported in the questionnaires for Bozsok, Horvátzsidány, Nagykölked, Tömörd and Narda. Big farms too, like the families Mazalin and Károlyi, employed sharecroppers. The informants from Bozsok, Harasztifalu and Tömörd denied to have taken up work away from their village. May be it is not a controversy in the case of Tömörd, since they denied to have worked in the farmsteads, though informants in Meszlen and Kőszegdorozsló claimed to have worked there together with people from Tömörd.

The inhabitants of the other Croatian villages went to work not only to the neighbouring farmsteads, but also to Steiermark and to Vienna. Though there is not enough evidence¹⁶, it seems that commuting, guest working is much older than has been believed, being fairly common at the beginning of the 19th c.¹⁷ Dániel BERZSENYI remarked: 'the best areas of the counties of Vas and Sopron are the most densely populated but the Hungarians even there cannot manage to work their land, Henczes and Croats are harvesting there too, and I have seen Bohemian scythe-men near Kőszeg.'¹⁸ Elek Fényes described the Croats as good servants and famous carters.¹⁹ Recent research has given detailed infor-

¹⁶ Horváth, Sándor 1989. p.195

¹⁷ Horváth, Sándor: Kölcsönhatások a nyugat-magyarországi horvátok népi kultúrájában. II. In: Eperjessy, Ernő – Krupa, András eds. A III. békéscsabai Nemzetközi Néprajzi Nemzetiségkutató Konferencia előadásai. Budapest-Békéscsaba 1986. p 744. (Reciprocal influences in the cultural life of the Croats of Western Transdanubia. Proceedings of the III. International Conference on Folklore Minorities research).

¹⁸ Berzsenyi, Dániel: A magyarországi mezei szorgalom némely akadályairól. 1833. p. 209. In: Berzsenyi Dániel összes művei. Published by Döbrentei, Gábor. 3. Edition Buda, 1842 (On the obstacles in the way of Hungarian agricultural business. In: The collected works of B.D.).

¹⁹ Fényes, Elek: Vas vármegye. Mostani állapotja statisztikai és geographial tekintetben. 1836. Vas megyei levéltári füzetek4. Szombathely. 1991. p. 14. (County Vas. Its present situation from statistical and geographical points of view.)

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mation about Croatian carters who went as far as Varasd (Varasdin), Zagreb, Fiume (Rijeka) and in the other direction, through County Vas to the shores of Lake Balaton. People going to markets were also exposed to town influence. Coloman CHERNEL wrote about the clothes worn in and around Kőszeg in the 17th c.: 'women's wear is very simple without any special characteristics; they do not care for luxury, though the women coming from the neighbouring Hungarian and Croatian villages, who favour rich colourful clothing, show enough tempting example.'²⁰ The women of those Hungarian and Croatian villages probably frequented markets and if their 'rich colourful' costumes did not influence town's wear, that of the towns most probably influenced theirs.

In the 20th c. it must have been a great experience for the girls to go into service to Budapest. There were hardly any women among the oldest generation who would not have taken up service from autumn to the 29th of June. Nuns originating from Szentpéterfa found work place for them.²¹ However, no direct connection can be detected between Magyarization and any type of work away from home. It is noteworthy that Károly GAÁL in Pásztorháza, a Gradistye Croatian settlement in Burgenland, observed something similar: 'Unmarried women went regularly to serve into Hungary or out to Austria. While the men spoke three languages, most of the women spoke only the Croatian of their own village; they had forgotten the language learnt during their work'.²²

4. Analphabetism and the role of schools in Magyarization

It is usual to believe that analphabetism is a preserving factor in traditional culture while learning, or at least literacy hastens assimilation. During the reform period of the 19th c. teaching the Hungarian language in schools in minority regions was regarded as an important task; there were laws to encourage Magyarization. György TILCSIK explains that these laws and the accompanying efforts, movements 'served the Magyariza-

²⁰ Chernel, Kálmán: Kőszeg sz. kir. Város jelene és múltja. I. Szombathely, 1877. p.16. (The present and past of County Vas).

²¹ Personal information from Kurz, Ferencné Harangozó Mária 1912 and Geosits Károlyné Rumpell Julianna 1912. Fieldwork: 11. 06. 1992.

²² Gaál, Károly: Megjegyzések a stinátzi (Burgenland) hírmestojás kialakulásához. In: Dunamenti népek hagyományos műveltsége. Budapest, 1991 p. 44. (Remarks to the development of painted eggs in Stinatz, Burgenland. IN: traditional folklore of the people along the River Danube.)

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tion of public life, appealing to the intelligentsia speaking other languages, in short to achieve their assimilation.' Later he adds: that 'in the 19th c. it was the first time that on the 24th April 1820, that the general assembly of County Vas dealt with the language of education...and decided to employ only such schoolmasters who speak Hungarian.'²³ At the time the argument was that there were schoolmasters in Hungarian settlements who did not speak Hungarian. A couple of years later the endeavour was directed toward the Magyarization of the ethnic groups, the Croats among others. It is no coincidence that the county opened kindergartens first of all in minority settlements at the second half of the 19th c. Especially in the 1920s were many instances of irredentist Magyarization. The case of Szentpéterfa comes to mind. The village with an almost all-Croatian population was split into a pro-Hungarian and a pro-Austrian part. The leader of the Hungarian 'party' was a Croatian schoolmaster from a neighbouring village. Szentpéterfa was annexed to Hungary and earned the title of 'the most loyal village'.

The role of the trio of teachers – priests – notary could have great influence upon the process of Magyarization. Horvátnádálja near Nagykölked, a village completely Magyarized by now, provides an example. At the consecration of its new school in 1894, Vasvármegye, the daily newspaper of County Vas reported: 'The original mother tongue of the inhabitants of the village was Croatian, even now they speak Croatian at home. When children start school they only know Croatian, but both at school and in church Hungarian is the language, now they are on their best way to complete Magyarization; in this grand national mission the church dignitaries and teachers have a credit who were employed in this village and who are working here... what a great national service is that of a teacher who educates the children of 900 people to be Hungarian in language and sentiment and increases the prestige of the Hungarian state as well.²⁴ Franko Zenko DONADINI was in Körmend as a soldier during WWI. He published a pamphlet in 1916 with the title 'Croats in the neighbourhood of Körmend (Hungary)' in which he wrote: 'In Horvátnádálja there live four Hungarian immigrant families: that of the teacher, the notary, the inn-

²³ Tilcsik, György: A magyar nyelv iskolai oktatása Vas megye nemzetiségi vidékein a reformkorban. In: Előadások Vas megye történetéből. Szombathely, 1990. pp. 232–233. (The teaching the Hungarian language in the schools in the minorities regions of County Vas. In: Lectures on the history of County Vas).

²⁴ Iskola-szentelés. Vasvármegye. 5. December 1894. (School consecration).

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keeper and the proprietor.²⁵ The above four persons, or the already mentioned trio of teacher – priest – notary – played, however, an important role in the preservation of the national identity of the Gradistye Croats. If we examine the manifestations of language and ethnicity or their disappearance, schools are the most important factors either in teaching Croatian or in Magyarization.

The Hungarian language foundation promoted the successful teaching of Hungarian language in schools. In special regions teachers successful in Magyarization was awarded special premiums. Alajos Tárnok, the retired steward of the Zichy-estate started a foundation to forward the teaching of Hungarian in the Némétújvár district.²⁶ All the Croatian speaking pupils of the Catholic School of Inczéd were presented with textbooks in Hungarian because the priest of the above village aimed at the Magyarization of the young generation.²⁷ 'Since the Bach-era more than seven Croatian and Wendish villages had been Germanised and topographically the process is in progress what is against the interests of the Hungarian state; this is why it would desirable – and it is justified by the patriotic feelings of the inhabitants of county Vas – that no teacher ignorant of the Hungarian language should obtain employment in any elementary school in this county, - neither anywhere in Hungary; and the situation observed in the district of Szt. Gothard should be given an avoidable example, where 18 of the 28 teachers of the district are unfamiliar with the Hungarian language.²⁸ As stated in the report, there were 30 Hungarian, 150 German, 14 Wendish, 16 Croatian, 1 Hungarian-German, 4 German-Hungarian, 17 Hungarian-Wendish, 4 Croatian-Hungarian and 1 Wendish-German public elementary schools in County Vas.

When in the school year 1874/75 the schools were examined, the major interest of the evaluation of the Croatian teachers was their command of the Hungarian language and whether they were prepared to teach Hungarian. The school in Horvátnádálja was found 'Excellent in

²⁵ Krpan, Stjepan: Franko Zenko Donadini – malo poznati pohoditelj zapadnougarskin Hrvata. Migracijske teme. Casopis za istrazivanje migracije i narodnosti. Zagreb. 199. p. 359.

²⁶ VaML IV. 401/b. 339. 1887/123.

²⁷ VaML VI. 502/b. 364. Doboz. Évi jelentés a vas megyei tankerület népoktatásának állapotáról 1874/75 tanévben. Előadva az isk. tan. 1876. március 30-ai gyűlésén. 5. (Annual report on the situation of public education in the school district at the meeting on 30th March 2876).

²⁸ Ibid.

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teaching Hungarian'; the one in Felsőberki: 'Well organized school, teaching results especially good in Hungarian'; the teacher in Csatár: 'Young and eager Croatian teacher, however not enough trained. Prepared to teach Hungarian'. There are other illuminating remarks, as in the report on Pószaszentkatalin: 'The parents would be willing to have their children taught Hungarian but the teacher cannot do it. The people cannot understand Croatian neither the Croatian spoken in Hungary' (remark crossed out). Remark about Nagykölked and Nádálja: 'This village is being Magyarized by the school.'²⁹ After 1850 schools in Croatian villages of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy should have used textbooks from Croatia, however, the Croats of Gradistye preferred books written in their own local dialect. The Austrian historian, Johann Seedoch regards it as the beginning of the ethnic consciousness of the Gradistye Croats.³⁰ The ministry asked for the approval of the bishops to introduce the textbooks from Croatia; the bishop of Győr, following the advice of the Croatian priests disagreed, the bishop of Szombathely did not answer at all. It was in the reply from the diocese of Győr where the demand for the use of the local language was expressed. In the diocese of Szombathely the textbooks from Croatia were officially introduced in 1853, however, there are no indications whether they were indeed used.³¹ The following quotation is taken from the minutes of the meeting of Croatian teachers published in the correspondence column of contemporary newspapers: 'finally, wishing that the ideal to Magyarize our Croats and elevate our schools to up-to-date standards must not falter on the parsimony and withdrawal of some. The people would be glad if their children would learn Hungarian alongside their mother tongue especially as we do not have adequate textbooks in Croatian and the common public, instead of sitting at home reading, spends the Sunday afternoons in taverns carrying on not exactly edifying palavers; this great shortcoming could be mended by learning the Hungarian language (...)'³² It is still not known what language was used in Szombathely between the Croatian teachers and their pupils, probably they spoke Latin even out of the classroom. 'It

²⁹ VaML VI. 502/b Cs. Vasm. Tanfelügy. (School-inspector of County Vas).

³⁰ Seedoch, Johann: Razdoblje Franje Josipa. In: Povijest i kultura Gradiscanskih Hrvata. Zagreb, 1995. p.146.

³¹ Tobler, Felix – Seedoch, Johann: Skolstvo od 16. stoljeca do 1921. godine. In: povijest kultura Gradiscanskih Hrvata. Zagreb, 1995. p. 242.

³² *ibid.*

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is noteworthy that in the 16–17th cc. the schoolmasters of Szombathely were mainly Croatian speakers, even born in Croatia' – remarks Tibor Antal HORVÁTH. 'Kitonich János' of Kosztajnica exemplifies the case, who was the first secular head of the grammar school in Szombathely – in the summer of 1591 he was mentioned as director for several years past. Croatian teachers are reported to be active in Szombathely from 1570 onward.³³ At the time this did not lead to national dissension or to linguistic overpowering. It also means that Croats in the villages were not lacking in teachers and most probably literacy was far greater in the 17th c. than presumed, as is confirmed by visitation reports.

Returning back to the initial statement that 'in contrast to analphabetism, education furthers assimilation', the correct answer is that sometimes it is true, sometimes it is not. The counterexample is Kópháza near Sopron. There was vivid local literacy early on but this was not the reason why the Croats there became Magyarized.

5. The role of the Church in Magyarization

Ethnic identity – in a national sense- is especially strengthened by religion, language and politics. This is why three chapters carry these ideas in the titles of the volume, Ethnicity, nation, identity. Croatia and Europe published in Croatia which analyses the ethnic processes of recent years, mainly from the social point of view.³⁴ Another volume about ethnicity published in Oxford contains similar sections.³⁵ It is therefore worth considering these points when analysing the assimilation of the Gradistye Croats.

If a Hungarian-speaking priest was appointed to a parish, who did not speak any Croatian, the possibility of Magyarization became stronger. This is what happened in Bozsok. Already in 1846–48, when Fran Kurelac was collecting folksongs among the Croats of western Hungary, there were complaints that even the gravest sins could be confessed to their priest and they would be absolved without any remonstrance and appropriate penance because the priest did not understand any Croatian.³⁶

³³ Horváth, Tibor Antal 1993. p. 330.

³⁴ *Etnicnost, nacija, identite.* (Hrvatska i Europa). Priredili: Cicak-Chand, Ruzica – Kumpes, Josip. Zagreb, 1998.

³⁵ *Ethnicity.* Eds Hutchinson, John – Smith, Anthony D. Oxford – New York. 1996 (Oxford Readers).

³⁶ Kurelac, Fran: *Jacke ili narodne pesme prostoga in neprostoga puka hrvatskoga po zupah Soprunskoj, Mosonskoj i Zeleznoj na Ugrih.* 1870. xxix.

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József Góczán from Káld could take up his position only after a delay on the 22. November 1852, because as he wrote in the parish chronicle: 'the congregation was agitated by my Croatian -speaking rivals to apply for a Croatian-speaking priest, which they had done'.³⁷ Afterwards Bozsok ceased to be a local parish and became the out parish of Szombathely.

'The priest assaulted for his patriotism' was the title of the report of the daily of County Vas in March 1895: 'Ferenc Szamálovics, the eager young parish priest of Tömörd had the children to sing and say their prayers in Hungarian. Recently the judge of Tömörd and a certain Vlasics kicked up a row during mass and reprimanded the priest and when the latter left the church, they led a mob against him, grabbed him by the arm and shoved him about. The judge and Vlasics threatened the priest with throwing him out of the church if he dared have the children to pray in Hungarian again, not caring if they were sentenced to 10 years for their deed. The parish priest, Szamálovics reported the incident to the right honourable Bishop who gave his sympathy to the young priest telling him "don't mind my son if like St. Sebastian you are stoned for your country and being Hungarian!". We note the beautiful and memorable words of the bishop gladly and enthusiastically.'

József Schápy, the parish priest of Narda had trouble with his congregation in Nagynarda over the issue of Magyarization. 'The war in Narda' was the title of the leading article of the daily Vasvármegye on the 12. January 1902. 'There are phenomena among the Croats on their way towards Magyarization which give reason for concern. In Nagynarda, where József Schápy, the parish priest, who in spite of being of Wendish descent, has always been a dedicated propagator of the Hungarian language and culture; at the beginning of the Millennium year introduced singing in Hungarian in the churches of Nagynarda and Felsőcsatár.³⁸ But what did actually happen? Introducing the Hungarian language in church, during the vespers on the 29th December 1901 'the congregation of Narda interrupted the Hungarian singing, it was repeated the 31 December when priest Schápy appealed to their patriotic feelings and asked them to allow the Hungarian language in church as before. ... at present, waiting for higher disposition, there is no singing in Narda either in Hungarian or in Croatian. ...It is not permissible that the church of the Hungarians which

³⁷ Kuntár, Lajos: Bozsok. Szombathely. N.d. p.58.

³⁸ A nardai háború.

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was built with so much work and cost should be destroyed by some unruly persons wishing to fish in troubled waters.³⁹ The county's daily supported the priest of Narda in spite of the fact that he had been their worst enemy as an adherent of the people's party. The paper declared that 'Considerations of Hungarians are the most important idea for us this is why we support the populist priest in this question and protect his truth because he is right when he wants the hymns to be sung in Hungarian in our churches.' The article ends with the declaration: 'It must not be and we would not allow to happen that the priest, though our sworn opponent, should fail in the cause of the nation and that of the national language. This is how we judge the war in Narda, which must end in honours for its standard bearer.'⁴⁰ A paragraph in the January 8. issue of the paper *Vasvármegye* seems to try to divide opinions about the war in Narda: 'The seed sown found fertile soil especially in the souls of the congregation in Felsőcsatár who are soberly thinking citizens adhering to the Hungarian race and cultivating Hungarian ideas and as such should be regarded as examples for the other non-Hungarian speaking villages. They condemn the disorder in Narda and distancing themselves from similar acts are eager in propagating the Hungarian language; therefore they deserve the warmest and undivided praise.'⁴¹

6. The role of the press in Magyarization

The strong nationalistic feelings of some members of the press have already been seen from the quotations, e.g. the way they defended the priests in their efforts to Magyarization. In the second half of the 19th c. the press took an active part in moulding national-ethnic opinions. In 1867 the county organ propagated the exchange visits of children which in their opinion would help Magyarization: '... there will not be any Wendish, German, Croatian person who would not be able to speak Hungarian in addition to his mother tongue and would not claim the one learnt to be his own.' – are the closing sentences of the article 'Let's Magyarize!⁴² There are further examples in the 1884 issues of *Vasmegeyi Lapok* in favour of Magyarization: 'At the end of the previous month

³⁹ A nardai békellenkedők. *Vasvármegye*. 1902. Január 8. 3 (The malcontented of Narda).

⁴⁰ A nardai háború. *Vasvármegye*. 1902. Január 12. 1. (The war in Narda).

⁴¹ *Vasvármegye* 1902. Jan. 8.

⁴² *Vasmegeyi Lapok* 1884. Május 22. 2.

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was the closing examination in the school of Német-Gyirót; it was a pleasant surprise for the audience to listen to the children's pure Hungarian speech, and when they sang "God bless the Hungarians" there were tears of joy in the eyes. Keep at it!"⁴³

7. The stratum orientation of Magyarization and its relationship to mobility

Pilgrimages and local church festivals have further demolished the myth of closed societies existing before 1945. There were participants at the St. Jacob festival in Ják from Horvát nádajla in 1751, as recorded in the proceedings of a witchcraft trial.⁴⁴ The women of Szentpéterfa told how they went to the St. Anna festival to Kertes on a carriage in great secrecy; they stayed for one dance and then returned back home. They were afraid their parents would have learnt about it. "We did not go anywhere; we were not allowed. 'Why? Was it forbidden?' – 'We could not do it. What our parents said was sacred.' This is still the model of the old traditional society, the generations were subordinated and superordinated, the norms being set by the elders. There are more than one factors, which describe Szentpéterfa as a conservative society. The constantly high proportion of endogamy can be one of the reasons that have encouraged the preservation of traditions in a conservative village community. However, this was also the place where many enterprising persons were born who emigrated to America especially at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th cc.

The emancipation of the serfs with its bipolar aspects resulted in the mobility of a great portion of society. This did not only facilitate ethnic mixing but incited it as well. Such processes were not in the accord with the idea of nation-state. Communities are preserved by group-consciousness. The 'we' frequently means contempt against 'them'.

In the case of the Gradistye Croats Magyarization became an issue in those communities where Hungarian was not spoken at all or only to a small extent. The area was a fairly stationary conservative peasant society. Other groups could become mobile more easily because in addition to their Croatian mother tongue they could speak Hungarian and/or Ger-

⁴³ Vasmegeyi Lapok 1884. Május 22.2.

⁴⁴ Schramm, Ferenc: Magyarországi boszorkányperek 2. Budapest, 1983. p.731. (Witchcraft trials in Hungary)

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man as well. They became carters and merchants. Pásztorháza or Stinác (Stinatz, Austria) became the carting centre.

Traditional belief has it that it was an 18th c hermit who launched vegetable gardening in Hidegség and Homok; according to others it was István Csetkovics, parish priest of Hidegség in the middle of the 19th c.⁴⁵ The hermit might have been the instigator but the villages became full blown vegetable gardeners only at the second half of the 19th c.; there is no mention of growing vegetables in these villages in the mid 19th c. description of the county, whereas all special activities were duly listed.⁴⁶ Selling their vegetables meant greater mobility, which in turn helped Magyarization. Péter HANÁK's observation has been justified who points out the close relationship between production for market and urbanization as well as urbanization and Magyarization. However, in his opinion industrialization is more important than agriculture, but the example of Homok proves that non-traditional agricultural production is closely connected to commerce and thus increasing mobility.

Tourism in the neighbourhood of Homok started first in the first half of the 19th c. when István Széchenyi had opened his spa for the public in Fertőboz on Lake Fertő.⁴⁷ There are no direct proofs of its influence in the Magyarization of the area. At the end of the 20th c. the increase of tourism in the neighbourhood of Lake Fertő may help Magyarization because a new tourist village has been built next to the old one; it seems, however, that tourism encourages the community to enhance their Croatian background; especially folklore is an inviting feature offering novel experience to the visitors. There is a new folklore museum where local crafts programmes tempt even those who otherwise would not visit the museum.

⁴⁵ Kelemen, István: Fertőhomok 1274 – 2001. p. 151.

⁴⁶ Horváth, Zoltán 1976

⁴⁷ Tilkovszky, Lóránt: Széchenyi István fertőbozi fürdője. Soproni Szemle 1960/2. pp. 181–185. (The spa of István Széchenyi at Fertőboz).

